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Introduction
Representations are notorious troublemakers. Nevertheless, they and their close kin –
information,  function  and semantic  content  –  are  prominently invoked in psychology,  the
neurosciences  and  the  cognitive  sciences  in  general.  Representational  states  include  our
beliefs about the content of our fridges, our intentions about going to the movies, and our
neural structures aimed at the recognition of faces. It is impossible to conceive of either of
said  fields  as  explaining  what  they  do  without  invoking  intentional  terms:  terms  which
involve  being  aimed  at something  or  being  about something.  Uncovering  the  nature  of
intentionality and revealing its connection to research in cognitive neuroscience is what this
book is about.
There is virtually no one in cognitive science today who would seriously contest that it
is the brain in virtue of which we have mental states. Thus, descriptions of how the brain
works play a crucial role in explaining intentional psychological properties. At its most basic,
such descriptions are provided by neurobiology: by describing physicochemical properties of
nervous  systems.  Yet,  representational  notions  are  not  a  proper  part  of  the  conceptual
inventory of physics or any closely related science. Especially in virtue of their being tied to
normativity and rationality, they go beyond what is describable physically or naturalistically.
Consequently,  it  can  seem  puzzling  how  physical  objects  or  structures  come  to  be
representational in the first place. This long-enduring puzzle has frequently been taken as an
invitation to attempt to explain away representation as pertaining only to bogus properties
(and  the  sciences  which  rely  on  them  as  pseudoscience),  to  attempt  to  naturalise
representations (with mixed and far from uncontroversial results), or to mystify physics by
endorsing panpsychism: by holding that mental properties are a basic feature of our physical
universe.  This  book,  however,  endorses  the  view that  the  notion  of  representation  yields
significant  explanatory  value  and  should  therefore  be  taken  seriously,  and  that  such  an
intentional realism ultimately needs to be reconcilable with a sober form of physicalism.
The most common way of characterising representations is by their role in symbolic
systems.  A symbol  is  composed of  a  material  part  (the “signifier”)  and its  meaning (the
“semantic  content”).  For example,  some ink blots qualify as instantiating a specific  word
which in turn represents the word’s meaning.  This  notion of representation  is  used as an
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explanatory concept in intentional psychology. Intentional psychology uses attitudes (such as
believing or desiring) toward semantic content in order to causally explain behaviour. For
example, someone’s desiring a beverage can cause their pouring a drink. Applications also
extend into the animal realm, whenever we have reasons for believing animals to be capable
of having certain mental states which can fulfill similar causally explanatory roles, or even
into the realm of robotics  or  household  applications  (when we say that  a  robot  goes left
because it sees an obstacle on the right, or that a thermostat heats up the room because it
believes it to be too cold).
While having such an intentional  attitude need not itself  involve using symbols  or
performing a symbolic  action,  I  will  argue that matters  of symbolic  ascription are in fact
constitutive of content-ascriptions in intentional  psychology.  When psychological  attitudes
are ascribed to agents who are oblivious to symbolic ascriptive practice, I will call these states
“sparse”,  but  whenever  they  presume  an  agent’s  responsiveness  to  matters  of  rationality
underlying such practice I will call them “rich”. This distinction is meant to highlight that
agents can act for reasons which they themselves are systematically oblivious to, and if this is
so, then norms of rationality have no direct bearing on them. For example, if a thermostat
does not act on the fact that the room is too cold, merely providing it with good reasons to
heat it up will not sway it. In this case and many others, the ascribed form of content is sparse.
However,  when  an  agent’s  behaviour  is  shaped  by  these  very  norms,  the  corresponding
content  is  richer,  since  it  presupposes  a  different  form of  cognitive  responsiveness.  This
distinction between rich and sparse content is integral to matters of ascribing content across
different kinds of agents, and while intentional states can in an attenuated way be ascribed to
thermostats, it is especially the rich kind of content-ascription which intentional psychology
exploits.
I am also going to argue that the notion of an intentional mental state can only be
understood against the backdrop of a psychological theory: mental representations are objects
invoked to explain human behaviour, and so their meaning is determined by how any of them
systematically explains it. Explanations in intentional psychology are causal and lawlike. So,
understanding what an intentional mental state is rests on understanding what kind of lawlike
inferences are supported by the ascription of such a mental state. Since parts of this argument
require  bolstering  which  may  go  beyond  deeply  rooted  intuitions,  I  will  also  investigate
alternative approaches – chiefly those holding that having or ascribing a mental state can be a
kind of  pretheoretical  brute  fact  which we have immediate  access  to,  such as  by way of
introspection – and go into their shortcomings.
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The  view  that  matters  of  meaning  are  interlocked  with  matters  of  intentional
psychology in an intimate way has been popularly argued for in recent analytic philosophy.
Advocates of this view developed arguments establishing a necessary connection between the
abilities  to  have  and  ascribe  intentional  states,  the  knowledge  of  laws  of  intentional
psychology  and  the  mastery  of  matters  of  symbolic  and  mental  meaning.  To  understand
meaning it has been thought to be necessary to be able to ascribe mental states, and in order to
ascribe mental states to others it should be necessary to know how to ascribe these states to
oneself. Some of these interconnections immediately present themselves when considering
examples: for anyone would obviously lack the competence to ascribe the belief that, say,
grapes are sweet if they did not even know what kind of behaviour is typically explained by
someone’s having this belief in conjunction with a desire for eating sweet food. While an
implication  along  these  lines  –  that  theoretical  knowledge  about  the  laws  of  intentional
psychology is necessary in order to ascribe such psychological states – is relatively easy to
swallow,  it  has  also  been  argued  that  mental  states  cannot  even  be  had  without  such
competence.  To  make  this  point  clear,  I  will  partially  rely  on  an  argumentative  strategy
employed by the late Donald Davidson. The way he tied meaning itself to the ascription of
intentional psychological states forms the bedrock for my claim that matters of meaning and
matters of mental states are inseparable.
Analysing  this  intimate  relationship  between  (both  mental  and  non-mental)
representation and intentional psychology is the subject of my first chapter. This relationship
is not to be understood as just any kind of relationship which intentional psychology happens
to maintain  to other  matters,  but as essentially  characterising  the field.  So,  analysing  this
relationship is my method of choice for reconstructing what intentional psychology itself is.
The  chapter  is  structured  thematically,  as  a  logical  introduction  to  the  characteristics  of
intentional psychology,  rather than by giving a one-by-one overview of important theories
about the field. Nevertheless, this reconstruction will draw on many such theories from the
contemporary and recent literature in order to clearly bring out its central issues.
In the cognitive sciences in general, representational concepts are used more loosely
than in intentional psychology. On the one hand, intentional explanation informs all kinds of
psychological theories: common categories of beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on, figure as
singling out explananda in academic psychology. Yet, academic psychology is broader than
intentional  psychology,  since  its  resulting  explanations  of  such intentional  phenomena go
beyond  the  conceptual  inventory  of  intentional  psychology.  That  is,  explanations  of
intentional states need not themselves invoke intentional states. For example, sitting at a dirty
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desk has been found to influence moral judgments (Schnall et al. 2008a & 2008b), finding
coins in a phone booth has been found to influence helping behaviour (Isen & Levin 1972),
and the amount of meal breaks a judge has had before sentencing has been found to influence
its severity (Danziger et al. 2011). Also common are explanations using so-called black-box
models,  schemas picking out causal factors of cognitive processes and characterising their
interaction.  For example,  several types of marketing and environmental  stimuli  as well  as
buyer characteristics interact in models aiming to predict consumer behaviour. And when it
comes to investigating processes of information transfer either in artificial systems or in actual
neural networks, and to modelling how a specific output is or can be derived from a specific
input, determining computational processes plays a central role. All of these approaches fall
squarely  into  the  methodology  of  the  cognitive  sciences,  and  all  can  be  called
“representational”,  while  not  necessarily  invoking  the  notion  of  semantic  content  which
intentional psychology invokes.
Since the cognitive sciences encompass both psychology and the neurosciences and
are centrally taken to investigate matters of cognitive representation, one could expect that
these  differently  employed  forms  of  representation  turn out  to  be  offshoots  of  one  basic
notion of  cognitive representation,  and that the notions used in  psychology and cognitive
neuroscience are best understood in how they relate and contribute to such a basic notion.
Regrettably this is not the case, since the claim that the cognitive sciences investigate forms of
“cognitive representation” is not backed up by a basic definition of what is  cognitive – a
glaring omission Jesse Prinz calls “scandalous” (Prinz 2004: 41). So, what unites the various
fields  in  the  cognitive  sciences  is  not  that  they  all  point  toward  a  common  notion  of
representation, but rather that they can all be (more or less loosely) treated as describing and
explaining forms of processing of different kinds of mental representations. Some explain this
processing in mathematical, some in logical, some in conceptual, and some in causal terms.
That all of these forms of processing converge on their objects is, at least implicitly, due to the
allusion to a common investigation of the mind. Again, there is no common definition of what
the mind is, but the question “does this field of inquiry investigate the mind?” seems to yield a
clearer  answer  than  the  question  “does  it  investigate  cognitive  representation?”  – if  only
because there is no intuitive notion of the latter, but a whole bunch of intuitive notions about
the former. And the connections between all of these intuitive notions are made by the very
sciences which are lumped together in virtue of these connections: Mental state descriptions
explain behaviour, behaviour is a causal consequence of neuronal activity, this activity can be
modelled in terms of computational processes, these computational processes pick out causal
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factors of cognition, the models can be tested by behavioural psychology, and so on. So, while
we can find these connections which illuminate the notion of cognition, we should not expect
to find a shared notion of representation.
In  the  neurosciences,  where  information  processing  is  conceived  of  in  terms  of
electrical  signals  transduced  in  cellular  networks,  semantic  content  also  has  no  direct
explanatory role that could be considered as being akin to its role in intentional psychology.
Yet,  we can still  find the term “representation”  being used abundantly:  Some neurons or
neuronal networks are said to represent somatic states, others emotions, sights, sounds, smells,
spatial locations, and so on. These differences in usage and explanatory role show that the
term “representation” is far from being used uniformly across the diverse disciplines making
up the cognitive sciences, and therefore, we shouldn’t expect problems posed by adopting one
notion to necessarily also be posed by adopting another. So, while neuroscience can explain
phenomena of intentional psychology, it does not inherit the latter’s form of representation as
an explanatory concept.
Yet, despite some substantial differences we can find a common structure underlying
the forms of representation in intentional psychology and those in cognitive and neuroscience
which  I  am going to  delineate.  Crucially,  all  forms  of  representation  require  teleological
principles which connect descriptions of intrinsic or organismic states in a functional way
with their  environment.  In  the second chapter  I  will  investigate  and characterise  the role
representations play in cognitive neuroscience and the different principles underlying them.
Here  we  will  also  find  out  how the  neuroscientific  research  of  intentional  states  can  be
reconciled with the form of non-intentional explanation which neurobiology offers, and that
this reconciliation suggests the possibility of localised translations between mental and neural
descriptions.  These translations  are  localised  insofar  as  some of  them may only apply to
individual agents over a certain amount of time.
The notions  of representation  invoked by the two fields  chiefly considered  in this
book, namely intentional psychology on the one hand and neuroscience on the other, form
two extremes, insofar as one is used in semantic explanation, whereas the other is invoked for
physical explanation. Investigating these should turn out to be instructive for other kinds of
cognitive representations as well, since many of these can be placed into the same spectrum
opened up by the two extremes. At the end of the first chapter I will briefly consider some of
the psychological and cognitive states which are not the main focus of this book, but which
can be related to and at least partially investigated and understood in terms of intentional
states.
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Overall, my aim is to give a comprehensive account of issues connected to the notion
of representation and intentionality in cognitive science rather than attempting to solve any
highly specialised problem. This approach is justified by the fact that intentionality, together
with  free  will  and  consciousness,  arguably  poses  one  of  the  three  biggest  philosophical
problems to current cognitive and neuroscience. And while matters of both consciousness and
free will are generally seen as subjects which neuroscience might shed new light on but which
aren’t integral to the application of neuroscientific methods, matters of intentionality are in
fact integral to the enterprise of cognitive neuroscience itself: cognitive research in general
depends on the notion of representation. So, my broad approach reflects my express desire to
reach beyond matters indigenous to philosophy. In writing this book I tried not to presume
any specialised  philosophical  background knowledge on the part  of  the  reader.  However,
since intentionality has been under extensive scrutiny for quite a while now, important issues
revolving around it run the danger of seeming idiosyncratic and only explainable by appeal to
philosophical tradition. Some of the topics treated in chapter I may suffer from this apparent
idiosyncracy. However, I hope that each of its subsections will eventually make clear how
each topic contributes  to understanding intentionality.  To facilitate  selective reading, I am
providing individual summaries at the end of each chapter. These densely retrace the points
made  in  the  individual  subsections  and  are  primarily  meant  to  increase  the  book’s
accessibility  by  clearly  marking  where  to  find  which  argument  or  topic.  A  less  dense
recapitulation of the entire line of reasoning can be found in the conclusion.
As  for  the  current  state  of  the  philosophical  research  of  intentionality,  much
illuminating work has been done in 20th century analytic philosophy of mind, and this work
informs many of the theoretical concepts invoked in the cognitive sciences today. However,
the analytic philosophy of mental representation may be facing its twilight years. This is owed
to the fact that many believe that all that can be said about this topic has already been said and
consequently that much of what is currently said is a rehash: “Every conceivable position
seems to  have  been occupied,  along with  some whose  conceivability  it  is  permissible  to
doubt. And every view that anyone has mooted, someone else has undertaken to refute. (…)
But the chaotic appearances are actually misleading. A rather surprising amount of agreement
has emerged, if not about who’s winning, at least  about how the game has to be played”
(Fodor 1985: 76). So, while I won’t attempt to reinvent the wheel in these pages, I do propose
building a new chassis on top of a set of them. Or, to put it more bluntly: In light of a new
quality  of  interaction  between  philosophers  and  empirical  scientists,  we  can  provide  an
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updated (while not radically revised) foundation for the notion of representation in cognitive
science.
Before concluding this introduction, I wish to add a few words about the philosophical
method and its integration into cognitive science. Joshua Knobe (2015) recently published
some quantitative  data  on  “what  philosophers  of  mind  actually  do”  (in  fact,  he  not  only
considered  work  done  in  philosophy  of  mind,  but  also  in  epistemology,  ethics  and  the
philosophy of action). He diagnosed a shift from a less empirically informed philosophy to
experimental philosophy and philosophy relying on empirical results. In comparing a sample
of highly cited papers from 1960 to 1999 with a recent sample from 2009 to 2013, ratios
change substantially (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Distribution of philosophical methods in the late 20 th and the early 21st century (after Knobe
2015).
One central tenet in recent neurophilosophy has been that (at least some) philosophical
problems can be solved empirically. However, the basic idea underlying my investigation in
this book is rather that empirical science always comes with a host of philosophical problems.
So, while the methods of empirical scientists and the methods of philosophers differ, there is
no question that their work can directly connect: It connects in working on common problems,
and it connects insofar as much of the conceptual work done by philosophers is informed by
the current state of science and vice versa. As Sellars has stated succinctly,  “there has arisen
the temptation (…) to confuse the sound idea that philosophy is not science with the mistaken
idea that philosophy is independent of science” (Sellars 1997: 80, §39). But “what we call the
scientific enterprise is the flowering of a dimension of discourse which already exists in what
historicians call the “prescientific stage”, and that failure to understand this type of discourse
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“writ large” – in science – may lead, indeed, has often led to a failure to appreciate its role in
“ordinary usage”, and, as a result, to a failure to understand the full logic of even the most
fundamental, the “simplest” empirical terms” (ibid.: 81, § 40).
So, we should neither indulge the view that our mental categories are insulated from
the discoveries of cognitive science, nor jump to the conclusion that cognitive science pursues
the  goal  of  doing  away  with  common  mental  categories.  Being  sympathetic  to  both  a
pragmatic  scientific  realism  (i.e.  that  what  is  considered  real  depends  on  our  scientific
theories) as well as to intentional realism (i.e. the view that intentional mental states have
genuine explanatory value), I advocate a moderate view regarding the relation of mental and
neural  categories:  Namely  that  if  we  retain  the  teleological  principles  governing
representational  explanations,  mental  state  descriptions  could  (empirically)  turn  out  to  be
translatable to neural state descriptions and vice versa. As I’m going to show at the end of the
second chapter,  such a  translation  is  feasible  even if  mental  theories  are  not  reducible  to
neural theories. Matters related to reductionism will pop up here and there, but generally, this
book has been written with the hope that separating the question what role intentionality plays
in  cognitive  and neuroscience  from the  question  whether  mental  states  can  or  should  be
reduced makes for a valuable perspective. While scientific insights might change our picture
of the mind radically at some point in the future, we still need to work with what we have, and
not with what we are promised.
I. Intentional Psychology
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I.1. A Basic Characterisation
Intentional psychology is the practice of explaining phenomena by invoking mental
states  which  have  semantic  content.  It  is  the  basis  of  our  social  interactions,  colours  the
perception  of  our  lives,  lends  purpose  to  our  daily  affairs,  enables  communication  and
kinship. We value friendly dispositions, expect sadness to be a consequence of a dear friend’s
passing,  understand how someone in a desperate pinch can be moved to commit  criminal
deeds, and much more. All of this is because we can, and usually do, know what connections
exist  between objective  events  (such as  someone’s  passing)  and intentional  mental  states
(such as their peer’s sadness), and we know of the relation between such mental states and
their potential effect or expression (such as subdued behaviour), which supplies observable
evidence for the former’s ascription. Indubitably, much of this knowledge is engrained deeply
within ourselves and an essential part of what we think of as the human condition: we can
hardly imagine human interaction without these familiar psychological laws, and are easily
prompted to see them at work in our surroundings. 
Consequently, we also trace many of these into the animal kingdom: We think dogs
sad  when  their  master  neglects  them,  and  we  think  monkeys  angry  when  they  receive
cucumbers instead of the grapes they expected (Brosnan & DeWaal 2003) – and we deem
their behaviour well justified in cases such as these. Conversely, we would find it bewildering
if any sentient being wasn’t bothered by being treated badly, or if anyone wouldn’t respond
with joy to being reunited with a loved one. There are exceptions, of course, but none that
would  disastrously  undermine  said  relations’  explanatory  power  in  regard  to  rational
behaviour.  It  is  the  theoretical  integration  of  these  and similar  cognitive  and behavioural
states, events, processes and the systematic relations between them which I subsume under the
monicker “intentional psychology”.
With some exceptions which I will explore shortly, intentional psychology is usually
taken to explain a wide variety of complex human behaviour in terms of the interaction of
“propositional  attitudes”,  i.e.  attitudes  such  as  beliefs,  desires  or  intentions  toward
propositions. A proposition is what is expressed by a that-clause. For example, I may have
any given attitude toward the proposition that it rains – I may believe, desire or, if I also
believe myself to be a rainmaker, even intend it. If I do have one such attitude, such as the
belief that it rains, then it does not make a difference to the truth of the mental state ascription
that  I  believe  that  it  rains whether  it  is  ascribed  in  English  or  in  French:  thus,  the
propositional attitude is not simply to be identified with a linguistic entity, such as a sentence,
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but  with  its  meaning.  This  terminology  and  form  of  analysis  harkens  back  to  Bertrand
Russell’s writings: “What sort of name shall we give to verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘wish’ and so
forth? I should be inclined to call them ‘propositional verbs’. This is merely a suggested name
for  convenience,  because  they  are  verbs  which  have  the  form of  relating  an  object  to  a
proposition” (Russell 1918: 227). “[P]ropositional attitudes like belief, desire, intention; being
pleased, astonished, afraid, or proud that something is the case; or knowing, remembering,
noticing, or perceiving that something is the case” (Davidson 2001b: 3) have been a mainstay
of 20th century analytic philosophy, and they continue to be a central object of analysis.1
 As Robert Cummins concisely states, explanations of behaviour in terms of beliefs,
desires and intentions (“BDI” for short) are 
“by far the most familiar explanatory model [in contemporary psychology]. It is the model of
common sense psychological explanation, as well as Freudian psychodynamics, and a great
deal of current developmental, social and cognitive psychology. It is what Dennett praises as
explanation from the intentional stance, and what Churchland deplores as folk-psychology.
(Dennett, 1987; Churchland, 1981.) Underlying BDI is a set of defining assumptions about
how beliefs,  desires  and  intentions  interact.  These  assumptions  are  seldom if  ever  made
explicit, just as one does not make explicit the mechanical assumptions about springs, levers
and gears that ground structural explanations of a mechanical machine. Everyone knows that
beliefs are available as premises in inference, that desires specify goals, and that intentions are
adopted  plans  for  achieving  goals,  so  it  doesn’t  have  to  [be]  said  explicitly  (except  by
philosophers)” (Cummins 2000: 127).
In what follows, I will  treat  propositional  attitudes,  the central  terms or objects  of
intentional  psychology  (or  of  what  Cummins  calls  BDI-explanations),  as  a  subset  of
intentional mental states. It is plausible to assume that not all mental states are intentional, and
that not all intentional states are propositional attitudes. The former is owed to a descriptive
inventory of the mental states we’re capable of having: For example,  Searle lists “a  pain,
ache, tickle, or itch” (Searle 1979: 74) as non-intentional mental states, and it seems prudent
to say that these states are mental as well as non-intentional, insofar as they are “not ‘about’
anything,  in the way that our beliefs,  fears, etc.  must  in some sense be about something”
(ibid.). The latter, however, is at least partly owed to a theoretical or terminological decision.
Mental states which are said to be intentional but non-propositional are usually those whose
expression cannot be related to the mental mode or attitude by way of a that-clause. Examples
1 See e.g. Quine 1980: ch. 1, 1956, 1960: 200 ff., Sosa 1970, Kripke 1979 & 1980, Lewis 1981, Davidson 2001a:
ch. 2 & 7, Fodor 1989: ch. 1, Fridland 2015.
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are  liking,  seeing,  loving,  hating,  smelling,  and  so  on:  emotions  and  experiential  states.
“Perhaps we should explain what it is to have such an experience in terms of a propositional-
attitude representation; but it’s not obvious why we should” (Crane 2013: 104). So, we might,
perhaps  with  much  effort  and  in  a  rather  roundabout  way,  be  able  to  reconstruct  non-
propositional intentional states in propositional terms rather than allowing there to be genuine
non-propositional  intentional  states.  For  example,  smelling  ketchup  is  much  the  same  as
perceiving  that  there is a smell of ketchup. So, “[w]hat holds for the propositional attitudes
ought, it seems, to be relevant to sensations” (Davidson 2001b: 3) as well as to “knowledge,
memory, attention, and perception as directed to objects like people, streets, cities, comets,
and other non-propositional entities” (ibid.).
Rather  than  going into  reformulation  attempts,  what  matters  to  me  is  whether  the
intentional content of non-propositional states can be analysed in a similar way as that of
propositional  ones.  Propositional  attitudes  can be easier  to  analyse  than non-propositional
ones because we have an idea of how the symbols  expressing such propositions get their
meaning (see I.4 and I.7.4). The content of a propositional and that of a non-propositional
state are sometimes determined and/or acquired analogously, in which case I will treat them
as explanatorily  similar,  even without  conducting  any attempt  at  reformulation.  However,
they need not be analogous, such as in the case of the cognitive aspects of know-how or skills
(cf.  Fridland  2015).  Because  of  the  close  connection  between  intentionality  and  the
propositional form I will focus on a kind of analysis which works for propositional states in
general, and then see whether and how it can be applied to some non-propositional states. In
any case, I am not going to insist that there are only those intentional mental states which can
be analysed analogously to propositional attitudes. Rather, I believe that those that are in fact
analysed this way are interesting enough to warrant their own analysis, that they are widely
used  in  explaining  human  behaviour,  and  that  we  can  for  this  reason  treat  them  as  a
paradigmatic form of mental intentionality.
In this chapter I am going to develop a view of intentional psychology which is guided
by insights about the practical requirements of mental state ascriptions, about the form and
function  of  psychological  explanation,  and  about  semantic  facts  as  pertaining  to  mental
intentionality.  For  example,  the  fact  that  mental  state  ascriptions  have  an  intersubjective
function, namely the prediction, explanation and normative control of behaviour, implies that
its observable aspects play a central role in their characterisation. Case in point, my friends’
knowing my intention of meeting with them tomorrow at 8pm allows them to predict that I’ll
be there at 8, explain why I’ll be there at 8, and scold me if I’m not there at 8.
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I.2. Intentionality
The  first  question  to  ask  when  dealing  with  intentional  mental  states  is:  What  is
intentionality?  The  modern  version  of  this  originally  medieval  scholastic  concept  was
introduced into academic psychology by Franz Brentano in the late 19th century. Brentano was
key to turning psychology into an academic enterprise to begin with, and his students included
famous  psychologists  such  as  Sigmund  Freud2 just  as  well  as  famous  philosophers  like
Edmund Husserl. My own understanding of intentionality has its roots in Brentano’s concept,
but relies less on Brentano’s phenomenological  account than a semantic account which is
closer  to  research  in  recent  analytic  philosophy.3 For  this  reason,  I  will  barely  go  into
phenomenological  aspects,  but  rather  introduce  and  explore  intentionality’s  semantic
underpinnings.
However, before elaborating on what intentionality means, I should briefly mention
what  it  does  not mean:  in  psychology and action  theory,  the  term is  sometimes  used  in
connection with agency, or as a property of actions or agents, as if it were derived from the
word “intended” (as in “did he just push me intentionally?”). However, in the sense relevant
for  this  book,  intentionality  is  not  directly  related  to  the  concept  of  agency,  and  no
terminological relation obtains with the common usage of “intended”.4 Rather, 13th century
theologian  and  philosopher  Thomas  Aquinas  originally  derived  it  from  the  Latin  word
intentio,  with  its  corresponding  verb  being  intendere,  meaning  “to  aim at”  (see  Aquinas
1272/1952).5 Intentionality,  in this sense, is connected to the notion of reference, with the
referenced object being the “aim” of an intentional state. So we should clearly distinguish
between referring to something and intending something.
While there are plausible connections between intentionality and agency, this should
not obscure the distinct meanings of the terms. One such plausible connections is that actions
2 For Brentano’s impact on Freud see Smith 1999: 9-15. In his letter to Silberstein from March 5 th 1875, Freud
refers to Brentano as “a damned clever fellow, a genius in fact” (Boehlich 1988: 95).
3 For a critical history of intentionality since Brentano which considers both analytic and continental traditions
see MacDonald 2012.
4 The exception being that an intentional object of a mental state could be referred to as its “intended object”. It
should be understood that this use of “intended” can still be distinguished from its use in phrases such as “I did
not intend to spill your drink”. In the former sense, “intended” can be substituted by “referenced” or similar
semantic notions, whereas in the latter, it cannot. Curiously, the word “mean” can be used just as ambiguously as
“intended”: it can figure in pointing out semantic relationships (“La lune means the moon in French”) as well as
intended actions (“I did not mean to spill your drink” – although the semantic notion could be brought out more
clearly, e.g. by saying “I did not mean spilling your drink”, or using quotation marks: “I did not mean ‘to spill
your drink’”). If not explicitly mentioned otherwise, I am using the semantic understanding of intentionality, not
the one related to agency.
5 For contemporary interpretations of Aquinas’ view on intentionality see Kenny 1984 and Brower & Brower-
Toland 2008. For an examination of medieval views on the connections between intentionality, cognition and
mental representation as well as their legacy in modern thought see Klima 2014.
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require intentions to precede or cause them, and intentions are themselves intentional mental
states. Assuming a combination of theories of action and theories of mind which hold that any
action requires intentionality, and that having any intentional mental state requires being an
agent, instances of agency will always coincide with instances of intentionality. However, no
such specific theory or combination of theories is assumed or implied by my use of the term
“intentionality”, and neither is any direct relation between it and any concept of agency. As
Dennett points out:
“When  discussing  the  [ascription  of  intentional  states]  (...),  the  word  ‘intention’  means  
something broader than [introspectible mental events which precede actions] (…). It refers to 
states that have content. Beliefs, desires, and intentions are among the states that have content. 
To adopt the intentional stance towards a person - it’s usually a person, but it could be towards 
a cat, or even a computer, playing chess - is to adopt the perspective that you’re dealing with an
agent who has beliefs and desires, and decides what to do, and what intentions to form, on the 
basis of a rational assessment of those beliefs and desires. It’s the stance that dominates Game 
Theory. When, in the twentieth century, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern invented 
the theory of games,  they pointed out that game theory reflects something fundamental in  
strategy.  Robinson Crusoe on a desert island doesn’t need the intentional stance. If there’s  
something in the environment that’s like an agent – that you can treat as an agent – this changes
the game. You have to start worrying about feedback loops. If you plan activities, you have to 
think: ‘If I do this, this agent might think of doing that in response, and what would be my  
response to that?’ Robinson Crusoe doesn’t have to be sneaky and tiptoe around in his garden 
worrying about what the cabbages will do when they see him coming. But if you’ve got another
agent there, you do” (Daniel Dennett in Edmonds & Warburton 2015: 129).
Consequently, and following its etymological root, I will construe intentionality as the
property  of  referring  to  something.  Brentano held  that  mental  states  are  characterised  by
“aiming” at referenced objects and different modes of referring to these:
“Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages call
the  intentional  (or  mental)  inexistence6 of  an object,  and what  we might  call,  though not
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be
understood here as meaning a thing),  or  immanent  objectivity.  Every mental  phenomenon
includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In
6 Here, “inexistence” means “inclusion”.
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presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on” (Brentano 1973: 88). 
For our purposes, this is to say that the form of, say, ascribing a belief consists in specifying
that it  is  a  belief  and in specifying  what is  believed.  In “Marcia  believes  that  the sun is
shining”,  “believes” specifies the mode of the intentional state, while “the sun is shining”
specifies its content. This is exactly the form of what is traditionally called a “propositional
attitude”: what I just referred to as the intentional mode is the attitude taken toward what I just
called the content, which consists in a proposition.
Tracing  the  concept  of  intentionality  back  to  Brentano’s  writings,  we  find  him
insisting that this property is held exclusively by mental states. That is because in his work
intentionality is crucially invoked as a criterion to distinguish physical from mental states
(ibid.). Combined with the claim from Brentano’s quote above, this means that according to
his view, all mental states are intentional and only mental states are intentional. As mentioned,
I assume no such thing (although I do believe that there is a strong link between mental states
and intentionality). The central reason for abandoning this assumption is that non-intentional
states  have  been  playing  important  explanatory  roles  in  contemporary  psychology  (see
Bechtel  & Wright 2009). I  will  take a closer look at  some of these,  and their  relation to
intentional states, in section I.9.
I.3. Objects of Mental Reference
Since we have construed intentionality as the property of referring to something, a
consequent question is what this “something” consists in. Do mental states refer to external
objects or  internal cognitive states? For example, perhaps the content of my belief that the
next supermarket is around the corner is properly explained in terms of an internal map in my
brain – if so, my belief gains its content in virtue of persisting in an internal representation.
Even so, the content of said belief still seems to be an external state of affairs: namely, that
there  is  a  supermarket  around  the  corner.  To  make  the  distinction  between  internal  and
external objects, it might help to think of internal ones as objects constituted or characterised
by intrinsic properties of the intentional state’s subject, whereas external objects are rather
constituted or characterised by extrinsic properties, such as physical properties not belonging
to the physical basis (if there is one) of a subject’s mental state.  I will come back to this
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distinction and its relevance for matters of mental content in more detail  in section I.8. For
now, I hope the idea of a “physical basis” of a mental state is clear enough, even if you
happen not to share the assumption that there is one. (By the way, my talk about a physical
basis here would also allow for a necessary but not sufficient basis, i.e. the claim that some
physical basis is necessary for a mental state to exist, but that the mental state consists in more
than this physical basis, and that from the mere presence of the physical basis we cannot infer
the instantiation or nature of a mental state.)
One view which relates intentional states to external goings-on is one which identifies
social practices or conventions as a root of meaning, so let’s briefly consider the in this sense
externalist notion that the fact that a mental state refers to a specific object has to be traceable
back to certain social practices. How about the following example: my belief that a soccer
team is made up of eleven field players depends on a social convention, namely the rule that a
soccer team is made up of eleven field players. But this does not suffice for our purposes,
since even if there were no such rule, I could still believe that a soccer team is made up of
eleven  field  players  –  I  would  merely  be  wrong  about  it!  Still,  my  wrong  belief  would
nonetheless have meaning, namely the content of the proposition that a soccer team is made
up of eleven field players. What presently matters is that the content has meaning, and even if
this fact turns out to depend on a social convention, it cannot merely be a conventional soccer
rule. It has to be another kind of convention, namely the convention that the symbols used to
express said belief mean the associated content.
Thus, we need to be a bit more sublime in our choice of examples: let’s say that if I
believe that quarks can have several distinct spins, the fact that my belief refers to anything
depends on the establishment  of quantum physics.  The establishment  of quantum physics
entails that its terms have meaning (by way of definition, description, stipulation or what have
you), and conversely, without quantum physics, its terms would mean nothing. That is, you
could write down the word “quarks”, but even if you got lucky in catching some meaning by
it,  it  could  not  be the  meaning endowed by quantum physics.  Could a  Neanderthal  have
thought about quarks? What could possibly have qualified any thought of his to be a thought
about  quarks?  Obviously,  it  cannot  be the  Neanderthal’s  utterance  of  the word “quarks”,
since,  even if  he  had been able  to  produce  a  sound which  would have  sounded like  the
utterance of “quarks” to our ears, no convention would have been established to the effect that
any  such  utterance  means  anything.  Thus,  being  able  to  think  about  anything  plausibly
requires the establishment of some social conventions about symbolic expression.
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On  the  other  hand,  simply  performing  a  symbolic  action  which  conforms  with
conventional  standards isn’t  enough either.  If  I  happen to raise  my hand during a voting
process, but am actually unaware that a voting is taking place, then I am not actually voting
(perhaps I am voting in a legally binding sense, but I certainly do not mean to do so). And if I
mispronounce  “Porto”  as  “Bordeaux”,  then  I  am not  actually  referring  to  Bordeaux.  So,
meaning something depends on internal  and external matters: symbolic conventions and the
intention to exploit them in order to express something (see I.4.4).
But even if social conventions are necessary in order to be able to have intentional
states,  this  does  not  imply  that  social  conventions  are  somehow  themselves  part  of  an
intentional  state’s  referential  object.  Rather,  pointing  to  its  being  embedded  in  social
conventions would be part of a good explanation of an individual’s  intentional capacities.
Now, if there was a way of tying the explanatory power of psychological theories, which
builds on social conventions, to the object of reference, we might be getting somewhere. I will
come back to this question in sections I.6 and I.7; what should for now be clear is how basic
considerations of matters of intentionality lead to this question.
Historically, some of the issues related to the question whether intentional states refer
to mental or non-mental objects (or to representational or non-representational objects) were
initially  further  developed  by  Brentano’s  student  Twardowski  (cf.  his  1977).  (And
Twardowski’s work strongly influenced Meinong and Husserl, in whose work intentionality
played a central role.) In response to the work of Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl the issue
was also discussed by Brentano himself (Brentano 1973: 385). Its implications are connected
to matters of ontology as well as of theoretical parsimony. For example, if one adopts the
view that intentional mental states are directed toward external objects, what needs clearing
up is what mental states referring to fictitious or imaginary objects are then directed toward
(cf. Thomasson 1999).7 Clearly, one has a harder time locating unicorns in the external world
than in anyone’s mind. However, trying to circumvent such problems by allowing mental (i.e.
immanent or internal) objects into one’s ontology results in an inverse problem by duplicating
many already existing objects  – for any thought  about,  say,  Rome would not  be directed
toward the actual city of Rome, but toward a mental representation of Rome. Thus, for any
external  object  our  thoughts  and  psychological  attitudes  can  be  directed  toward,  one
additional internal object would have to be introduced, effectively doubling our ontological
7 Note that this question also points to the dichotomy between how objects actually are and how they are given to
us, and that it is related to the distinction between extensional contexts (i.e. contexts in which substitution of an
expression with any expression with the same extension preserves truth value) and intensional contexts (in which
said truth-value preservation is not the case) in philosophy of language (see Quine 1980: ch. 8). See also section
I.6.1.
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inventory. Today, we can trace this discussion to theories of embodied or enacted cognition or
the  extended,  embodied  or  embedded  mind,  which  holds  that  “perception  is  cheap,
representation expensive” (Haugeland 1995:  219),  intending to do away with a lot  of the
representational  objects  which  previous  theories  of  the  mind  have  allowed  into  their
ontology.8
Once intentional states are identified with propositional attitudes, the object of mental
directedness is tied to the content of the respective proposition. Focussing on propositional
content means straying from Brentano’s main objective, which consisted in taking stock of
mental objects by way of introspection. While introspection can yield evidence for ascribing
propositional attitudes, the nature of an attitude’s content is not directly or necessarily bound
to matters of introspection, and wanting to explicate mental content in terms of objects that
appear in introspection would be seriously misleading (see section I.7 for the details).  For
Brentano, however, the endeavor of categorising phenomenological, subjective objects which
appear in introspection was indeed the very pinnacle of empirical psychology (see Brentano
1995: 4) – a viewpoint which was most harshly criticised by behaviourists (see section I.7.3).
Today,  behaviourism itself  has itself  long come under  criticism,  but the current  cognitive
sciences can (and do) much more readily accommodate behaviourist notions than Brentano-
type  phenomenology:  “Although the  paradigms  of  classical  and operant  conditioning  and
associative  learning  theory  were  rejected  by  those  (...)  who  founded  modern  cognitive
science,  they  found  a  good  home  in  cognitive  neurobiology  where  versions  of  the  two
learning  paradigms  are  widely  used  to  this  day  in  conjunction  with  electrophysiology
experiments that are used to induce LTP [i.e. long-term potentiation]” (Sullivan 2014: 56 f.).
Ultimately,  it  is the view that the intentional properties of cognitive states are best
explicated as being based in their functionality and their intersubjective aspect which keeps
matters  of  consciousness  separated  from  our  present  matters  of  investigation:  “Perhaps
consciousness isn’t essential to mind in the way that cognition is. This does not make the
problem  of  consciousness  go  away,  but  it  does  make  it,  provisionally,  someone  else’s
problem” (Cummins 1991: 20).  This is not to say that matters of consciousness cannot be
subjects of scientific investigation or that there is no place for phenomenological research in
cognitive  science.  There  is  no  denying  that  our  mental  life  comes  with  characteristic
experiential  qualities,  that  current  approaches  to  investigating  them  are  promising  (cf.
Gallagher  2003  &  2012),  and  that  neural  structures  can  be  meaningfully  invoked  to
investigate questions of subjectivity (cf. Qin, Duncan & Northoff 2013) and consciousness
8 Beside Haugeland 1995,  see e.g.  Chalmers  & Clark 1998, Noë 2004: 75-122,  Clark 2008,  Menary 2010,
Shapiro 2010. Also compare section II.7.2.
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(Overgaard 2015). What should be denied is that free-floating subjective qualities could be all
there is to an intentional state, or that the phenomenological qualities of any such state could
by themselves ground its functionality: “[A]ny putative conscious experience should be the
experience of an agent. The thought here is that we cannot make sense of the image of free-
floating  experiences,  of  little  isolated  islets  of  experience  that  are  not  even  potentially
available  as  fodder  for  a  creature’s  rational  choices  and  considered  actions”  (Clark  &
Kiverstein in Block 2007: 502; also compare Evans 1982: 158). Plus, why should evolution
have equipped us with something that is so radically private as to be functionally inert? Any
remotely plausible answer to this question will have to mention that such phenomenological
qualities  do  indeed  have  a  value  that  goes  beyond  providing  subjects  with  subjective
experiences; some value that is likely describable in functional terms; and if that is the case,
then we are already set on the road toward the theory of the mind which I am going to argue
for in the following sections.
On top of all this, describing current phenomenological research as the realisation of
Brentano’s aim to base empirical psychology wholly on introspection would be a far stretch
indeed.9 In this sense, his general enterprise has no systematic bearing on what follows, and
even my use of intentionality owes little more than terminological and historic tribute to his
legacy. For him, intentionality really wasn’t about the “content of a proposition”, if the latter
means being identified by anything beyond introspective phenomenology.
I.4. Semantics
I.4.1. Basic Issues
The second question to ask when dealing with intentional mental states is: What is
semantic content? So, we need to get clear on semantics: the study of meaning. The term
“semantic”  is  used  interchangeably  with  “as  pertaining  to  meaning”,  such  as  “semantic
properties” being “properties pertaining to meaning”, a “semantic theory” being a “theory of
meaning”, and so on. Meaning, representation, denotation, information, aboutness, and so on,
are all semantic terms. The term “representation” commonly refers to entities that are used in
a  multitude  of  symbolic  practices,  especially  when  talking  about  representation  used  in
9 For a discussion of the relevance of private subjective states for psychological explanation and ascription see
sections I.7.2 and I.9.4.
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relation to propositional attitudes. There are forms of non-symbolic representation, and I will
investigate some of these (in section I.9 and chapter II), but for much the same reason as why
I am treating propositional attitudes  as a paradigmatic starting point of my analysis,  I am
treating symbolic representation as a starting point of analysing representation per se (see
I.4.4 for why mental meaning requires investigating symbolic meaning).
Apart from describing how representation works, and how methods of representation
achieve their  purpose,  a  central  task of semantics  lies  in clearing up what  meaning itself
actually is. There have been numerous attempts to explain the meaning of “meaning”. For
example, to roughly sketch some influential theories (pertaining to potentially different forms
of representation):
• Knowing the meaning of X means having a mental idea of X (Classic Internalism)
• The meaning of X is its use in a symbolic system (Wittgensteinian pragmatism, cf. his
1953: §43)
• The meaning of X are the conditions of its verification or the way X contributes to the
verification conditions of a statement it figures in (Verificationism)
• Knowing the meaning of X means having a truth theory of the language in which X is
an expression and knowing how X contributes to the truth of statements it figures in
(Davidsonianism, see II.8.4.2)
• and so on.
This cursory classification is merely supplied for illustrative purposes. Presently, we
neither need to subscribe to any of these views, nor distill one we can get behind. While the
following sections will partially rely on claims about the nature of meaning, I am not going to
make a dedicated effort to arrive at a unified account of what meaning is. What I am centrally
going to  argue  for  is  that  symbolic  meaning  requires  conventional  rules,  that  the  use  of
symbols  must  be practical  and fundamentally learnable,  and that meaning is distinct from
semblance and causation.
I.4.2. Semantic Mechanics
Symbolic  representations  are  characterised  by a  reference-relation  holding between
appropriate kinds of objects: on the one end of the relation stands a  signifier – the material
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part of a symbol – and on the other its meaning (or its “semantic content”)10 That is, a signifier
represents, is about, or refers to its meaning. For example, in case you happen to read this text
on paper,  then  your  understanding  of  what  I  am trying  to  tell  you  will  depend  on your
perceiving a significant contrast between the parts of the paper on which shapes have been
printed  which  are  interpretable  as  letters  (and  ultimately  words  and  sentences)  and  the
“empty”  non-letter  space  that  surrounds  them.  In  case  you  are  reading  it  digitally,  then
contrasts between groups of pixels will do this job. In either case, the relevant contrast has
been so designed as to fall under a certain representational scheme (i.e. letters, words and
sentences) which can be reliably interpreted. What you take these to be standing for could be
real objects, such as my writing the word “chair” could stand for any actual chair, or they
could stand for abstract contents, such as scientific theories, or your ideas about any of these
objects. In this sense, “meaning” can be ambiguous: it can stand for real objects or mental
ideas (as reflected in the distinction between “reference” and “sense”, cf. Frege 1892). 
A symbol is what unites a certain group of material objects (i.e. those that qualify as a
signifier) and specifies what the signifier refers to. So, both signifier and meaning are not
actually singular objects, but should rather be treated as the specification of criteria which
could be satisfied by an arbitrary amount of objects. For example, a certain structure of blots
of ink, which is defined by its spatial and visual qualities, qualifies as forming a specific word
which in turn represents this word’s meaning. So, an indefinite amount of blots of ink can
bear  the  characteristics  necessary for  being  signifiers,  and signifiers  can  in  turn  refer  to,
denote or represent any number of objects, just as a potentially infinite amount of instances of
“chair”-tokens can refer to a potentially infinite amount of chairs.
There are, of course, forms of symbolic representations beyond linguistic ones such as
letters,  words and sentences.  Some other common forms are sociopolitical  representations
(such as the way each US governor represents their state, or the way I could represent the
GSN-LMU at a conference; cf. Pitkin 1967) and pictorial representations (such as “the Mona
Lisa represents Lisa Gherardini”). In these cases, what makes a signifier a signifier may differ
dramatically (having a certain similarity, being elected, having a certain causal history), but in
general,  the  relational  structure  of  the  symbol  applies.  Characteristic  for  symbolic
representation is also a certain conventionality and a pragmatic dimension. That is,  which
signifier  represents  which  meaning  is  established  conventionally,  and  what  makes  a
representation  a  representation  is  it  is  used  as  such.  This  is  why  Charles  W.  Morris
characterised a symbol as having three types of  relations, namely  semantics (the relation to
10 Here I am adopting Ferdinand de Saussure’s terminology (Saussure 1983: 67).
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objects), pragmatics (the relations to people) and syntactics (the relation to other symbols; cf.
Morris  1938),  and  why Charles  Sanders  Peirce  defined  “a  sign  as  anything  which  is  so
determined by something else, called its object, and so determines an effect upon a person,
which  effect  I  call  its  interpretant,  that  the  latter  is  thereby mediately determined by the
former” (Peirce 1998: 478).
Pragmatics and conventionality are important in highlighting that anything can be used
as a representation for anything, and that commonality of properties (i.e. similarity) between
signifier and meaning is not sufficient for establishing a representation relation (cf. Goodman
1972:  437  –  446,  Crane  2001:  348).11 Of course,  properties  can be  shared:  Similarities
between a picture and what is depicted can be exploited in order to establish the relation
between the two. However, pictures can be completely dissimilar to what they depict (just as a
person  who  represents  Germany  needs  not  resemble  Germany,  and  nor  does  the  word
“Germany”).  Whether the signifier  is expected to share any property with the represented
object also depends on convention. Scott McCloud has created an illuminating schematic for
the kind of choices visual artists and designers face: Visual representations can be fashioned
so as to evoke a certain (pseudo-)realistic semblance of the depicted objects, but they can just
as well go for iconic abstraction, or for evoking properties of the artistic medium (see Figure
2). Crucially, similarity or a sharing of properties between two objects is not sufficient for one
to be a representation of another. Generally, symbolic representations are representations due
to their  being artefacts  fashioned and used for a representational  purpose – and there are
numerous methods for achieving this purpose.
No dichotomy or dualism is necessarily implied by a relational analysis of meaning
alone. (Even when setting aside self-reference, a relationship between two identical objects, or
instances in which symbols refer to other symbols.) In fact, when analysing meaning as an A
referring to a B, A and B can still be similar in terms of belonging to the same kind, type or
class  of  objects.  For  example,  proponents  of  physicalism  would  probably  want  to  have
meaning understood as something “material” also, so calling the signifier the “material part of
a symbol” would be misleading. And the option of incorporating meaning itself into a monist
worldview like physicalism is certainly an option that’s still on the table (depending on the
strength of the physicalism endorsed, it can be conceived as a basic criterion for accepting a
semantic theory). In any case, the mere difference between A and B implies nothing more
substantial about the nature of A and B than their not playing the same semantic role.
11 For problems surrounding notions of similarity regarding mental representation see Cummins 1991, ch. 3.
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For this illustration, please refer to the print version or Scott McCloud's website
(http://scottmccloud.com/4-inventions/triangle/index.html).
Figure 2: Scott McCloud’s “Big Triangle”.12
12 For more information see http://scottmccloud.com/4-inventions/triangle/index.html.
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As I’ve mentioned, in order for A to refer to B, A needs to fulfill specific criteria for
counting as a signifier, so it needs to be somehow suited to refer to B. But it should be noted
that the property of “being suited to refer to B” does not imply any inherent or immanent
property on behalf of the signifier itself. In most paradigmatic cases of reference relations,
signifiers signify merely by virtue of being used as signifiers, that is, by virtue of there being a
convention about A’s being used to refer to B – standard cases being words and images. No
immanent or inherent property of any ink blot determines its being used as a letter; rather,
once it is established that it can be used as a letter, then some of its intrinsic properties (such
as its shape) qualify it as being interpretable as a letter.
Going into linguistic examples, words can refer to real, imagined or fictitious objects,
to events or states-of-affairs, be they actual or counterfactual, and to many more things, while
being wholly dissimilar to all of these, in structure as well as in appearance. In fact, all it takes
for something to be referred to by a word is to establish the reference relation by way of
convention. One instance of establishing such a relation can be a definition, i.e. introducing a
word with the explicit purpose of referring to whatever one wants to have it refer to. Again,
definitions  are  but  one  way  of  establishing  such  a  relation;  explicit  definitions  are  not
necessary for words to refer, and in many cases in which we use words to refer to things, we
do so without ever having come across an explicit definition. We often learn to use words
implicitly,  by way of making guesses about how those around us use these words, and we
collect various cues in the environment to support these guesses. And even when explicitly
asking our peers about how they use their words, we should not expect their explanations to
always be akin to definitions. 
However,  establishing reference relations  is  not a magic trick one can perform by
merely conjoining word and object in the absence of any other conditions. Going back to our
example of definitions, they usually do the trick because they are made in the context of an
established convention,  namely the convention that defining a newly introduced term (the
definiendum) makes it refer to the content of the definition (the definiens), and they are made
against  the backdrop of a community whose common practice  provides the fulfillment  of
necessary contextual  conditions.  For instance,  if  I  were to define a  new term right  away,
anyone able to understand this text will likely be predisposed to understand my definition, at
least  in  principle.  They  may  criticise  my  definition  for  being  awkward,  unnecessary  or
unwieldy, but even so, they will understand that by the definiendum I mean to refer to the
definiens.
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The specific formal and practical requirements for the establishment and the use of
reference relations are embedded in our social practice of using symbols, and they have to be
principally relatable and learnable in order for us to rely on them; but apart from these sketchy
remarks, I will not pursue them any further here. What matters for now is that acknowleding
that many reference relations primarily depend on conventions does not make the conjoining
of  signifier  and  signified  a  random matter,  for  the  conventions  may  themselves  rely  on
complicated and, to those exploiting the reference relationships, often opaque matters.
Relating  reference  to  convention  sets  the  former  apart  from  relations  such  as
semblance or causation. While many images are similar to what they refer to, and while many
indicators are actually caused by what they indicate  (such as a functioning speedometer’s
current display), both relations are neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing a reference
relation. That is, we should not rule out that similarity and causality can play roles in picking
what refers to what, or that reference relationships will at times exploit either, but we would
be mistaken in expecting reference tout court to consist in nothing but similarity or causality:
“For  a  representation  is  a  representation  of  Pegasus  not  because  it  necessarily  looks like
Pegasus, nor because it is caused by Pegasus, but because it can be used to express thoughts
(intentional states or acts) about Pegasus” (Crane 2001: 348).
Consider the case of the speedometer: if functioning correctly, the speedometer works
because there is a causal link between display and speed. However, this is only because we
have fashioned the speedometer in this way – the causal connection is not arbitrary, but rather,
through technical ingenuity, the output of the speedometer is always interpretable as a symbol
indicating the current speed. Thus, it would not do justice to analyse the speedometer only in
descriptive terms of the speed causing a certain display.  Two further things are required,
namely that the speedometer has been fashioned to display speed (i.e. a norm) and that there
is a symbolic convention which makes the speedometer’s output interpretable as the display
of a specific speed. Without being justified in assuming that the two latter requirements are
met, we would have no reason to assume that the speedometer is displaying anything. If there
was no symbolic convention to make the output interpretable, then all the causal relations in
the world would not suffice. And if there was no norm for the speedometer to indicate the
current speed, it would cease to be a speedometer. This is why clouds resembling the face of
Zeus do not refer to Zeus, and why the patterns which male pufferfish create to attract females
are not art (see  section 2.4). They are not referential until they’re made part of a symbolic
practice which endows them with meaning (and sometimes, all it takes is someone saying:
“look, Zeus!”). But, crucially, if nothing else can be said about a phenomenon except that it
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instantiates a causal relation, or bears some semblance to an object, then we have no reason to
assume it is one of reference.
I.4.3. Semantic Externalism and Causality
In spite of what I’ve just said about causality, I need to add a complication here, which
touches  the  nature  of  how many symbols  achieve  their  meaningfulness.  For  one form of
semantic externalism consists in the claim that symbols refer to their meaning because the
former stand in a causal relationship to the latter. For example, according to this view, the
word “tiger” refers to tigers only because anyone’s use of this word stands in an (occasionally
long-winded) causal chain with someone’s direct experience with a tiger – an event which
caused that very animal to be named “tiger”, which then causes any of us to refer to tigers by
uttering the word “tiger” (the causal chain’s length being of no immediate import).13
Now, this notion of reference as depending on causality does not conflict in any way
with  that  of  its  depending  on  conventionality  and  the  idea  that  reference  is  not  readily
reducible to causality. For, firstly, it is the initial “baptism”  (cf. Kripke 1980: 96 ff.)  which
introduced  conventionality:  whoever  encountered  tigers  first  could  have  named  them
anything, and the community which adopted the use of the word could as well have rejected
it.14 And, secondly, even if causality plays a role in the way semantic externalism says it does,
anyone’s  use  of  the  word  “tiger”  does  not  indicate  tigers  the  same  way  a  speedometer
indicates speed. While speedometres are also subject to conventionality – their display could
take any readable shape or form –, their meaningfulness at any single point in time depends
on an active, working and direct causal link between display (signifier) and speed (meaning).
No such causal link is systematically assumed when talking about tigers. Of course, we could
imagine a direct causal link such as this, namely when we are talking about a specific tiger
which  is  currently  present  –  i.e.  indexing  it  THIS tiger  HERE and NOW –,  and we are
updating our assertions about THIS tiger directly. In such cases, the truth of our assertions
will depend on such an active and direct causal link. However, it is not reference itself which
depends on this causal link; and since most of us will never be in such a situation, or may
13 My points here are essentially an amalgamation of points made prominently in Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1981.
14 Here, I have made two simplifications: namely, that the “baptism” was close enough to what can be described
as a straightforward singular event, and that linguistic communities consequently adopt or reject the result of the
naming. In reality, things will of course not be that easy. Yet, this does not touch their being conventional.
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have never even been in the presence of a tiger beyond the confines of a zoo, neither does the
meaningfulness of our assertions about tigers.
Commonly, reference is an asymmetric relationship, as are causal relationships. The
word “tiger” refers to tigers, but usually, tigers don’t refer to words. (I say usually because,
since reference relationships can be introduced by way of convention, it might be possible to
introduce the convention that real tigers are used as symbols for words. Absurd as it sounds, it
is  possible.)  If  causality  plays  a  role  in  establishing  meaning,  then  causal  and referential
relations should point in opposite directions: The symbol refers to the object, whereas the
object causes the functionality of the symbol. Consider that in a Kripkean baptism, the tiger
(plus some contextual conditions) causes the symbol “tiger” to refer to tigers . Thus, “tiger”
refers  to  a  tiger,  whereas,  going  in  the  opposite  direction,  the  tiger  causes  the  semantic
functionality (the “meaningfulness”) of the symbol “tiger”. In this sense, the two asymmetries
are not exactly mirrored, since, if we take “A” to mean the symbol (the word “tiger”) and “B”
the referent (the actual tiger),  then A means B, but B did not simply cause A. Rather,  B
caused that A means B. However, the direction is still reversed, since it is less likely that the
symbol causes its referent. This much seems clear in the case of tigers and tiger-symbols,
since no tiger-symbol has ever literally caused a tiger. (What does it mean to “cause a tiger”?
Whatever it means, no symbol seems to have accomplished that.)
However, even in the example just invoked, we did not require that the tiger alone
cause  the  meaningfulness  of  the  word  “tiger”,  but  rather,  the  tiger  plus  some contextual
conditions. If we accept that, then we can accept that the symbol “tiger” could cause the tiger
plus some contextual conditions; for instance, the use of the symbol in a tourist’s exclamation
“let’s go look for a tiger!” can cause the tiger to be present in their vicinity (where the tiger’s
presence are the contextual conditions, much as they constitute the contextual conditions in a
“baptism”).  In fact,  we should suppose imperatives and exclamations to usually work this
way: If we use a specific symbol in either, we should expect to bring about the referent of this
very symbol (plus contextual conditions). If that wouldn’t work, we would not be motivated
to use imperatives at all. The exclamation “let’s cause a riot!” is supposed to bring about a
riot, after all.15 Crucially, though, the fact that imperatives using certain symbols bring about
their  referents does nothing for the reference relation itself,  since,  logically,  the reference
relation has to be presupposed for an imperative to bring about the used symbols’ referents. If
the symbol “riot” would not refer to riots, then shouting “let’s cause a riot” could not cause a
15 This may also work in other linguistic forms besides imperatives and exclamations. Imagine a culture in which
mentioning riots causes riots because of social conventions (perhaps mentioning riots is a taboo, and breaking
taboos causes riots). In this case, mere mention of a symbol causes its referent.
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riot (at least not in virtue of the exclamation’s semantic properties). Therefore, the shouting
causing the riot is not the basis of the reference relation, but vice versa. The fact that these
sorts of causes are, in this sense, semantically inert establishes the reversed asymmetry I was
aiming to get at: If causes play a role in semantics at all (at least in Putnam’s and Kripke’s
sense), then they should go in one direction, namely from the referent to the reference relation
(from the tiger to the symbol “tiger”), and not vice versa. Whereas the symbol refers to its
referent,  and not vice versa: Tigers do not refer to the word “tiger”,  but rather, the word
“tiger” refers to a tiger. (Self-reference constitutes an exception, since “A → A” also implies
“A ↔ A”.)
I.4.4. Mentalism
So far, in probing the phenomenon of reference, I have been talking about symbolic
reference only.  But what bearing does symbolic  reference have on intentionality,  or more
specifically,  on the mind? One reason is straightforward: If intentionality is a property of
certain mental states, and intentionality is properly analysed in terms of symbolic reference,
then shedding light on symbolic reference is a proper part of analysing the respective mental
states. However, I have not said enough about why intentionality should be properly analysed
in  terms  of  symbolic  reference.  Perhaps  mental  reference  is  completely  different  from
symbolic reference, and if that is the case, then we could just ignore the latter.
But before I go into that, I should also mention that a second thread can be construed
in the reverse direction: not from mental to symbolic reference, but from symbolic to mental
reference. If none of its inherent qualities suffice for qualifying a physical object to function
as a signifier, one question seems pressing: If we use them as such, how exactly do they get
imbued with meaning? How do regular objects get transformed into symbols? What turns ink
blots on paper or pixel arrays on screens into letters, what makes Picasso’s “Guernica” refer
to the horrors of war, what makes flags stand for countries, and what can turn a catastrophe’s
survivor into a symbol of hope? One answer to these questions is: The mind. And one way to
interpret this answer is to hold that symbolic meaning is derived from mental processes: that
they  only have meaning insofar as they are used by people capable of intentional thoughts,
and insofar as they are used in order to express and communicate these.16 This comparably
weak point is already implied by accepting the pragmatist view that there are no symbols
16 See Chisholm 1958, Haugeland 1981, Searle 1980, 1983, 1992, Fodor 1989, Cummins 1991: 21 ff.
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without their being used. For instance, this view implies that if there was no one to use words
as signifiers, then words could not mean anything (or rather, they would not exist as such). If
80 million years ago, winds had formed shapes that resembled the letters B-E-N-C-H out of
sand on a distant planet, they could not possibly have referred to any bench – in the absence
of someone to use them as a signifier, and in the absence of a symbolic system which enables
anyone to use them as such, they could not refer at all.
However, we can also opt for a considerably stronger view and not merely hold that
something’s being a symbol implies its being used in a symbolic practice by cognisers, but,
more crucially, that symbolic representation is derived from mental intentionality. According
to this view, mental intentionality is the primary form of intentionality,  whereas symbolic
intentionality is secondary.  John Searle takes one such route when distinguishing between
intrinsic  intentionality,  which  is  the  intentionality  exhibited  by  an  individual’s  mental
processes, and the intentionality exhibited by symbols, which is derived from these mental
processes. To illustrate this point, he says that the French statement “J’ai grand faim en ce
moment” is “derived from the intrinsic intentionality of French speakers. That very sentence
might have been used by the French to mean something else, or it might have meant nothing
at all, and in that sense its meaning is not intrinsic to the sentence but is derived from agents
who have intrinsic intentionality [i.e. French speakers who exhibit the intentional desire of
hunger]. All linguistic meaning is derived intentionality” (Searle 2000: 93). Similarly, Cussins
points out that
“[t]he theory of content – in terms of which we explain what content is – locates the notion 
with respect to our notions of experience, thought, and the world. But it is important to see that
this is consistent with the notion of content being applied (though not explained in terms of) 
states which are not states of an experiencing subject. There are derivative uses of the notion 
in application to the communicative products of cognition, such as speech, writing, and other 
sign-systems,  or  to  non-conscious  states  of  persons  such  as  subpersonal  information-
processing states, but these uses must  ultimately be explained in terms of a theory of the  
primary application of content in cognitive experience” (Cussins 2003: 133).
Thus,  the  two  opposing  views  we  can  take  at  this  intersection  coincide  with  the
difference  of  explanatory  direction:  Do  we  explain  symbolic  intentionality  by  mental
intentionality or vice versa? Searle, Cussins, Fodor and many others take the former route.
Their  theories,  which  take  the  foundation  of  meaning  to  be  found  in  the  mind,  are
consequently called mentalistic. One reason for adopting such a theory is holding the classic
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Gricean view that the use of symbols is essentially pragmatic and therefore dependent on
intentions. For example, by uttering “you’re obstructing the view” toward a person sitting in
front of me at a cinema, I do not mean to make a simple statement as evidenced by the literal
meaning of the uttered sentence; rather, the intended meaning is to get this person to clear the
view  (compare  Grice  1989:  86-116  &  213-223).  In  this  sense,  intentions  are  clearly
indispensable when it comes to properly understanding the meaning of utterances (and other
forms  of  symbolic  expression).  Thus,  on  this  view,  symbolic  meaning  is  explained  in
reference to mental states. Another reason is a view like Fodor’s: the view that the basis of
intentional  mental  states  are  quasi-linguistic  (i.e.  word- or  sentence-like)  structures  in  the
mind. This view has appropriately been dubbed the “Language of Thought” hypothesis (or
LOT for short; cf. Fodor 1975)17. If this claim is true, then it is plausible to believe that such
mental entities constitute the basis for non-mental sentences (like those in a book) as well.
Now, first off, I agree that pointing toward mental intentionality is necessary to get
clear on non-mental intentionality. This is because symbols do require cognitive operations in
order to mean something, operations whose investigation falls squarely into the psychological
domain. There certainly are other (sociological and linguistic) dimensions to the question how
symbols  are imbued with meaning,  but what psychology can contribute is to identify and
characterise the bases for our ability to interpret symbols in the form of cognitive processes or
mechanisms  (such  as  those  necessary  for  reading  etc.).  The  skills  employing  such
mechanisms are taught and honed intersubjectively, requiring established conventions, which
is why analyses of the social contexts, and the role they are playing, are needed, and why
individualistic  analyses  of  such  cognitive  competences  of  individual  interpreters  are
ultimately not sufficient for a full understanding of their nature (see also section I.8).
Although intentionality depends on such mental operations, these are themselves non-
intentional: being apt at reading, i.e. cognitively transforming blots or pixels into letters, is not
itself an intentional state. As Searle has pointed out, such skills belong to a background of
“nonrepresentational  mental  capacities  that  enable  all  representing  to  take  place”  (Searle
1983: 143):
“Think of what is necessary, what must be the case, in order that I can now form the intention 
to go to the refrigerator and get a bottle of cold beer to drink. The biological and cultural  
resources that I must bring to bear on this task, even to form the intention to perform the task, 
are (considered in a certain light) truly staggering. But without these resources I could not  
form the intention at all: standing, walking, opening and closing doors, manipulating bottles, 
17 Also see his 1970, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2008.
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glass, refrigerators, opening, pouring and drinking. The activation of these capacities would 
normally involve presentations and representations, e.g., I have to see the door in order to  
open the door, but the ability to recognise the door and the ability to open the door are not  
themselves further representations” (ibid.; also see Radman 2012).
When internalised, such abilities are skills of the same sort as those we employ when
using tools: Once we are apt at driving a car, we can do so without consciously thinking
about, say, how to change gears.18 Rather, apt drivers have internalised enough facts about
controlling their car in order to be able to just do it. In difficult and/or novel situations, which
require their conscious attention (and which afford them enough time), drivers will switch
from  merely  reacting  to  reflecting  (i.e.  to  conscious/deliberate/cognitive  control).
Analogously, whenever readers try to decipher a bad printout, they will switch from merely
recognising letters to actively trying to interpret them (by any number of strategies, many of
them requiring  conscious  reflection).  And  we  all  know what  trying  to  read  while  being
distracted or tired is like. Sometimes, we fail at yielding a semantic output, and we will just
have to read it again. So, while interpreting symbols requires cognitively outputting semantic
representations, these will still be based on automatic and unconscious non-intentional mental
skills.
These general remarks are, I believe, sufficient to establish a general agreement with
Searle; and in no way do I believe that Grice is wrong in stressing that literal meaning is
usually not sufficient to grasp intended meaning, and that thus, pragmatics are essential to
intentionality. However, agreeing with these points still doesn’t imply mental intentionality’s
primacy. Note that the mental states underlying non-mental intentionality in the two examples
invoked at the outset should properly be construed as intentions for A to mean B, where A is
an utterance (i.e. a non-mental symbol) and B its intended (mental) meaning. In Searle’s case,
A stands for “J’ai grand faim en ce moment”, whereas in the Gricean example, it stands for
“you’re obstructing the view”. At a first glance, it sounds as if what Searle had in mind was
claiming that the mental state of being hungry was meant to explain the utterance “J’ai grand
faim en ce moment”, and that what Grice points to is that the desire to get someone to get out
of the way explains the utterance “you’re obstructing the view”. But this is only part of the
story.  If  we were to  describe the  explanatory states  fully,  we would  need to  add further
intentions, namely “intending the sentence ‘J’ai grand faim en ce moment’ to imply being
18 For a more elaborate distinction about the form(s) of consciousness involved here, see Armstrong 1981 (in
particular his example of the long-distance truck driver). My notion of consciousness here does not encompass,
say, perceptual consciousness in Armstrong’s sense, but requires consciously entertaining intentions.
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very hungry at the moment” and “intending the utterance ‘you’re obstructing the view’ to
imply that the person obstructing the view should get out of the way”. Since these intentions
are directed towards non-mental symbols (namely the utterances), we can see that in both
cases the non-mental symbol is constitutive of having either mental intention. If there were no
symbolic representation, no one could have a mental intention that was about it (i.e. we could
not intend A to mean B if there were no As). Thus, there can be no understanding the mental
intention without understanding the nature of symbols; and thus, mental intention cannot in
any substantial way be primary to symbolic intentionality.
To be clear on this point: In Searle-like cases, the mental intention that was supposed
to be primary to the intentionality of the sentence “J’ai grand faim en ce moment” is “I am
very hungry right now” – a mental state that does not presuppose symbolic intentionality. The
problem is, the notion of mentalistic primacy was construed as explanatory primacy, and as
holding  that  the  mental  intentionality  explains  the  sentential  intentionality.  However,  the
mental state of being hungry does not by itself explain why “J’ai grand faim en ce moment”
refers to the speaker’s being very hungry (and that was what the deference to the intentional
mental state was supposed to achieve). In fact, it only does so if the speaker also intends to
use the sentence as meaning her current hungriness. Of course, the mental state of hunger
explains the utterance causally; that is, a Frenchman’s hunger causally explains his utterance
“J’ai grand faim en ce moment”. But this is just to say that expressing one’s hunger is, after
all, an action that is to be explained, other things being equal, by the mental state of being
hungry. However, this was not the point. The point was to explain how “J’ai grand faim en ce
moment” gets its meaning, not why it is sometimes uttered by Frenchmen. And as pointed
out, the full explanation would have to add that the Frenchman intended to express his hunger
with a symbolic act, namely uttering “J’ai grand faim en ce moment”. So, strictly speaking,
there’s  not  just  one  cognitive  state  explaining  the utterance,  namely  the  hunger,  but  also
another cognitive state: that of knowing that one can express being hungry symbolically by
uttering “J’ai grand faim en ce moment”. Without this knowledge, the mental state of hunger
alone could not explain the utterance.
Thus,  it  is  true  that  we  should  point  toward  cognition  when  seeking  to  explain
symbolic intentionality; but in cases as the ones just discussed, we also need to point toward
symbolic  intentionality  when explaining  cognition.  This  is  because being apt  at  symbolic
actions such as speaking a language, or, more generally, using signs to express one’s mental
state, requires cognitive skills to begin with. Learning a language, or learning to master any
symbolic  practice,  changes  our  cognitive  makeup.  The symbolic  system itself  becomes  a
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causal factor in explaining the mind. If we seek to explain the difference between an English-
speaker’s expressing their hunger by saying “I am famished” and a Frenchman’s expressing
the same mental state by saying “J’ai grand faim en ce moment”, we point toward their having
learned different languages. If we seek to explain the difference between a human being’s
expressing their hunger and a dog expressing its hunger, we point toward the human being’s
having learned  any language. And in many cases, we are dealing with mental states which
arise from partaking in symbolic practice, such as being afraid of a stock market crash – a
mental  state  that  dogs  cannot  share  (even  though  they  plausibly  can  have  some  mental
attitudes toward the consequences,  such as starving). Here, partaking in symbolic  practice
such as having learned a language becomes a causal factor in explaining the mind; and if, like
Searle and Grice, we invoke examples which require linguistic expression, then the mental
states we will end up pointing toward in explaining the intentionality of the symbols that are
used will necessarily have to include mental attitudes toward symbols in the first place. (Of
course, none of this is to exclude that there can be intentional mental states, such as desiring
food, which can precede the use of symbolic  systems.  However,  these can do nothing to
establish mental primacy in cases that do in fact deal with such use.)
While denying that these examples establish mental intentionality as primary, I do not
intend to pursue establishing the primacy of symbolic representation either. Rather, I think the
proper  view is,  at  least  when examples  such as  these apply,  to  see mental  and symbolic
intentionality as interlocked in the way just described: Symbolic intentionality depends on
cognisers,  and  what  cognisers  do  often  depends  on  there  being  symbolic  systems.  A
theoretical  upshot  of  the  two  forms  of  intentionality  being  interlocked  is  that  intended
meaning  and  the  form  of  intentional  mental  states  that  are  expressed  in  the  way  these
examples illustrate (namely linguistically) cannot be ascribed separately. (For, based on what
I have said so far, one might think that we could settle the question whether someone is a
competent practitioner of symbolic actions before tackling the task of ascribing mental states
to her.) I already pointed out that there are in fact two mental states underlying the utterance
“J’ai grand faim en ce moment”: namely the hunger, but also the intended meaning (“I mean
to  express  my  hunger  by  this  utterance”).  Yet,  these  two  separate  cognitive  states  are
expressed  in  but  one observable  action,  namely  the  utterance.  Borrowing  from  Donald
Davidson’s  terminology:  symbolic  and mental  intentionality  are  two aspects  forming  one
vector, and the two aspects are only ever observable indirectly by observing the vector. Thus,
“[i]t makes no sense to suppose we can first intuit all of a person’s intentions and beliefs and
then get at what he means by what he says. Rather we refine our theory of each in the light of
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the other” (Davidson 1980: 258).  What the assignment of meaning to symbolic actions and
what intentional psychology jointly attempt is to untangle such vectors using theories whose
operative structure consists in assigning intended meanings and intentional mental states. I
will elaborate on its methodology and theoretical foundation in greater detail in section I.7.4.
So far,  I  have  established  that  meaning  something  symbolically  means  having  an
intention to use a symbol in a certain way. I have also suggested that symbolic intentionality
is constitutive for some form of mental intentionality insofar as learning to refer to objects in
a certain way enables us to have attitudes about them in the first place (compare II.3). Yet,
these two points do not by themselves establish that mental intentionality is symbolic. The
latter view is introduced by Cummins as follows:
“Haugeland  (1985)  credits  Hobbes  with  being  the  first  to  have  an  inkling  that  mental  
representations might be language-like symbols. This is now the orthodox position, insofar as 
there is such a thing. (…) [I]f mental representations are symbols, then mental representation 
cannot be founded on similarity; symbols don’t resemble the things they represent. The great 
advantage  of  symbols  as  representations  is  that  they  can  be  the  inputs  and  outputs  of  
computations. Putting these two things together gives us a quick account of the possibility of 
thought about abstractions. When you calculate, you think about numbers by manipulating  
symbols.  The  symbols  don’t  resemble  the  numbers,  of  course  (what  would  resemble  a  
number?), but they are readily manipulated.
Connectionists also hold that mental representations are symbols, but they deny that these  
symbols are data structures (i.e., objects of computation). In orthodox computational theory 
the objects of computation are identical with the objects of semantic interpretation, but in  
connectionist models (at least in those using truly distributed representation) this is not the  
case. Connectionists also typically deny that mental symbols are language-like. This is not  
surprising; given that the symbols  are not  the objects of  computation,  there would be no  
obvious  way  to  exploit  a  language-like  syntactic  structure  in  the  symbols  anyway”  
(Cummins 1991: 6).
I  can  afford  to  be  silent  on  the  dispute  between  orthodox  computationalists  and
connectionists.  What  my  claims  require  is  to  hold  that  mental  states,  in  order  to  be
representational, need to satisfy conditions of symbolic ascribability. That is, they generally
need  to  be  states  which  process  inputs  and  produce  outputs  (i.e.  which  are  functionally
characterised,  cf.  Lewis 1972: 204, 207 f.)  in  a way that  warrants intentional  ascriptions.
Practically,  states fulfilling such requirements can have a widely varied nature and can be
implemented in an indefinite  amount  of ways.  Theoretically,  what is important  is that the
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states  have  symbolic  properties.  In  intentional  psychology,  mental  content  is  symbolic
because its ascription must obey such requirements; this is the line of reasoning I am going to
pursue  in  I.6  and  I.7.  In  other  cognitive  sciences,  representations  are  symbolic  due  to
considerations of their functionality (this is what I am going to explore in the second chapter).
While  my  ultimate  goal  is  to  establish  connections  between  intentional  psychology  and
neuroscience,  I  will  assume  no  substantial  connection  between  different  forms  of
representation or intentionality from the get-go, since, as Cummins also succinctly notes,
“to understand the notion of mental representation that grounds  some  particular  theoretical  
framework,  one  must  understand the  explanatory  role  that  framework  assigns  to  mental  
representation. It is precisely because mental representation has different explanatory roles in 
“folk psychology”,  orthodox computationalism, connectionism,  and neuroscience that it  is  
naive to suppose that each makes use of the same notion of mental representation” (Cummins 
1991: 12 f.).19
As far as Fodor’s LOT goes, I suggest we take it with a grain of salt: The mind is
indeed sometimes structured in a linguistic way, but this shouldn’t come as a huge surprise
given my suggestion that symbolic systems can be causes for our cognitive constitution. If we
are  apt  at  those  which  are  linguistic,  if  our  mind  has  learned  to  operate  in  and on their
structure, then it seems plausible to think that at least the part of the mind that operates this
way adopts a sentential structure. Yet, neither mental nor symbolical intentionality depends
on its being structured so. Compare Dennett:
“Of course sometimes there are sentences in our heads, which is hardly surprising, considering
that  we  are  language-using  creatures.  These  sentences,  though,  are  as  much  in  need  of  
interpretation via a determination of our beliefs and desires as are the public sentences we  
utter.  Suppose the words occur to me (just  “in my head”):  “Now is the time  for violent  
revolution!”—did I thereby think the thought with the content that now is the time for violent 
19 Cummins also urges us not to confuse mental representation with intentionality (ibid. 13-15). By that he means
to warn us that representation in different cognitive sciences need not work like representation in intentional
psychology or inherit the latter’s kind of representations or explanatory schemes. However, throughout this book
I  will  use  “intentionality”  to  simply  refer  to  all  kinds  of  representational  properties,  while  still  sharply
distinguishing between kinds in intentional psychology and representational entities in other sciences. That is,
unlike Cummins, I will not (terminologically) equate intentional states with propositional attitudes (ibid.: 14),
but I substantially agree with him in holding that the problem of representation in cognitive science isn’t merely
the problem of figuring out the nature of propositional attitudes: “anyone who assumes, for whatever reason, that
a theory of mental representation must give us intentional contents (e.g., objects of belief) is making a very large
assumption, an assumption that isn’t motivated by an examination of the role representation plays in any current
empirical theories. After all, it isn’t belief of any stripe that most theoretical appeals to mental representation are
designed to capture” (ibid.: 15).
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revolution? It all depends, doesn’t it? On what? On what I happened to believe and desire and 
intend when I internally uttered those words “to myself”” (Dennett 1987: 93).
Here,  Dennett  insinuates  two  important  things:  firstly,  the  real  cause  for  there
sometimes  being  sentences  in  our  head  is  that  we  are  language-users  (not  vice  versa).
Certainly, this leaves open the possibility of language being naturally suited to the expression
of our minds – i.e. that our minds have natural properties which lend themselves to verbal
expression better than to, say, pictorial expression (for one, sounds are usually easier for our
bodies to produce without additional tools than pictures). But we also know that our minds
can adapt to all sorts of different forms of symblic systems – pictorial, numerical, musical,
visual, and so on. So the primary explanatory cause for our sometimes having sentences in our
heads  such as  “Now is  the  time  for  violent  revolution!”  is  that  we commonly  traffic  in
languages  – an ability  for  which the natural  structures  underlying  our minds  can provide
necessary, but not sufficient conditions. The structure of our minds must enable us to learn
partaking in symbolic practice such as language, but the learning process itself very much
shapes the structure of our minds too. What happens when children learn languages? Their
minds are shaped from what we might idealisingly call a “natural” state toward a decisively
socially influenced state: the state of being apt at using language. It remains controversial to
what degree innate structures lead us toward language-use (for contemporary nativist views
see Carruthers, Laurence & Stitch 2008: esp. ch. 11 and 12), but what cannot be denied is that
learning  is  necessary  for  speaking  a  language.  And  even  beyond  childhood,  we are  still
constantly learning in some way or another. Many of the properties of symbolic systems are
young in evolutionary terms; so it would be absurd to hold that they could all be innate. So,
while it is plausible to assume that a general innate learning mechanism is usually part of our
minds, it probably isn’t a mechanism that specifically enables us to learn English, Quantum
Physics or C++.
While this line of thought captures a lot of what I think is true about “sentences in the
head”, it does not fully do justice to LOT. In fact, the part of LOT that has to do with mental
sentences is best  understood as concerning syntax,  while we are currently concerned with
semantics (and it is the semantic point which is reflected in Dennett’s quote). In brief, LOT is
true if the objects in our minds have a syntax akin to natural language, which, at its most
basic,  boils  down  to  compositionality,  or  the  claim  that  “the  semantic  value  of  thought
(/sentence)  is  inherited  from  the  semantic  values  of  its  constituents,  together  with  their
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arrangement”  (Fodor  2001:  6).20 For  example,  in  the  case  of  a  mental  state  that  can  be
expressed by the propositional attitude “believing that all bears in Bavaria have brown fur”,
LOT would roughly hold that the underlying cognitive state is a composition of the cognitive
entities corresponding to the concepts “bears”, “fur”, “brown” and “Bavaria” (plus relevant
quantifiers  and  connectives).21 The  reason  for  inferring  mental  compositionality  from
linguistic  compositionality  is,  briefly,  that  sentences  are  used  to  express  thoughts,  so  if
sentences are compositional, thoughts should be too (cf. Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988).
However,  there  are  several  forms  of  cognitive  encoding  which  would  preserve
compositionality of computed representations (and thereby the productivity and systematicity
of  language).  Smolensky,  Legendre  and  Miyata  (1992:  esp.  41-45)  have  shown  this  by
proving an equivalence between a parser written in TPPL, a LISP-like language that uses
classical representations and a connectionist network using fully distributed representations.
They conclude that “[s]ymbols and rules (…) play essential roles in (…) [explaining] crucial
properties  of  higher  cognition,  but  they  do not  play  a  role  in  algorithms  which  causally
generate this behavior” (ibid.: abstract). Given this result, we can see that it is not necessary
for there to be a one to one correspondence between constituents of thought and constituents
of language in order to  show how language can be used to express thoughts.  By turning
sentential cognitive structures into a possibility rather than a necessity, Fodor’s and Pylyshyns
claim  becomes  an  empirical  hypothesis.  That  our  means  of  expressing  our  thoughts  are
linguistic  cannot  by itself  settle  the question whether the structures underlying our higher
cognitive capacities are best described by sentential, connectionist or other means (for further
bridge-building between symbolicist and connectionist representations see McCulloch & Pitts
1943 and Leitgeb 2003). Rather, it seems much more plausible that our means of expressing
them is sentential because we have learned to use sentential symbolic structures, not because
they are primarily sentential “in the head” – and thus, we’re back at Dennett’s quote.
LOT should not be mistaken for an answer to the question where intentionality comes
from: “Those who defend the [LOT] hypothesis are at pains to make it clear that postulating
sentences in the head is one thing, and explaining how those sentences get their meaning –
giving a ‘semantics for the language of thought’ – is quite another” (Crane 2001: 346). But
20 Fodor also makes a stronger claim: “In fact, (and this is no small matter) the connection that compositionality
imposes on the relations between the possession conditions of concepts and the possession conditions of their
hosts  goes  in  both directions.  That  is,  compositionality requires  not  just  having the  constituent  concepts  is
sufficient for having the host concept, but also (and more obviously) that having the host concept is sufficient for
having its constituents” (ibid.: 9).
21 Personally, I find it easiest to make sense of this claim by replacing “cognitive” with “neural”, but since we
can find both the terms “mental” and “neural” to be in use when making this claim, I opted for the ambiguous
“cognitive” here to capture the ambiguity inherent in the claim itself.
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where,  then,  do  semantics  come  from?  One  answer  to  this  question,  which  is  regularly
combined with LOT, is that the mind is a syntactic engine driving a semantic engine; that is,
that  it  carries  out  syntactic  operations  on  structures  that  have  semantic  content  (such  as
sentences). As Ned Block puts it,
“the idea of the brain as a syntactic engine driving a semantic engine is (...) that we have
symbolic structures in our brains, and that nature (evolution and learning) has seen to it that
there are correlations between causal interactions among these structures and rational relations
among  the  meanings  of  the  symbolic  structures.  A  crude  example:  the  way  we  avoid
swimming  in  shark-infested  water  is  the  brain  symbol  structure  ‘shark’ causes  the  brain
symbol structure ‘danger’. (...)
[Its] processors “know” only the “syntactic” forms of the symbols they process  (e.g.,  what  
strings of zeroes and ones they see),  and not what the symbols mean.  Nonetheless, these  
meaning-blind  primitive  processors  control  processes  that  “make  sense”  –  processes  of  
decision, problem solving, and the like” (Block 1995b: 397 f.).
Since it is thusly assumed that “if you take care of the syntax, the semantics will take
care  of  itself”  (Haugeland  1981:  23),  all  the  brain  really  has  to  do  is  carry  out  these
computations  in  order to accomplish  all  the wondrous tasks we commonly associate  with
rational thought. This picture is exceedingly attractive, given the widespread and rather basic
assumption that our brain’s main contribution to cognition is its computational powers, and
that its computational properties can be described naturalistically (i.e. non-representationally,
see section II.2), thus effectively setting up a program to naturalise rational thought. However,
the only way for me to reconcile LOT with my own view that semantics is not derived from
internal  “mental  meanings”,  but  rather  crucially  depends  on  a  specific  connection  to  the
environment  (see  sections  I.8  and  II.6),  is  to  take  LOT  as  a  hypothesis  about  how  the
cognitive bases for intentional mental states are implemented (namely as a specific form of
syntactic operations). I do share its basic assumption that those parts of the brain relevant for
cognition are fruitfully conceived of as engines which operate on entities that have semantic
properties,  but I see no way to properly construe these neural operations as sufficient  for
construing meaning, much less point to them in order to clear up questions about symbolic
intentionality. Given this view, some of Fodor’s stronger theses, such as that the semantics of
English are properly researched in terms of the semantics of thought (cf. Fodor 2001), must
seem outlandish.
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The bottom line is that, while LOT amounts to a theory about how a physical system
such as the brain can deal with the productivity and systematicity of language on the one hand
and the semantic properties of symbolic systems on the other, this is far from establishing that
matters of the brain can be invoked to explain semantic properties. In fact, what lends the
“syntactic engine” view its explanatory force is that matters of semantics do not have to be
settled  by investigating  the  physical  bases  underlying  mental  processes  in  the first  place.
Rather,  it  establishes  that  a  physical  system’s  conforming  to  rational  demands  need only
presuppose its running syntactical operations. That the semantics “will take care of itself”, as
Haugeland stated, should not be taken to mean that semantics are already implied by certain
syntactic operations, but rather that if there are semantic relations, then there can be physical
systems  carrying  out  syntactical  operations  preserving  them.  As  Block  pointed  out,  the
processors carrying out the syntactic operations do not need to “know” what the symbols
mean.  But that  is  not to say that  semantic  properties  can be disregarded in favour  of,  or
reduced to, syntactic operations, but rather the opposite, namely that what the symbols mean
is  not  determined  by  the  syntactic  operations  alone,  but  rather  by  the  function  that  the
execution of these syntactic  operations implement.  Evolution and learning has caused our
brains to carry out specific operations (such as associating shark-representations with danger-
representations),  but  only  because  they  serve  specific  functions;  and  characterising  the
functions  at  least  partly  requires  characterising  what  goes  on  beyond  the  brain  (namely,
stating the context of evolution or learning). I will pursue this view further from sections II.6
onward.
Dennett  insinuates  secondly  that  if  there  are  sentential  entities  with  intentional
properties in our heads, then what they mean is subject to the same form of interpretation as in
the  case  of  non-mental  sentences.  While  this  is  consistent  with  Fodor’s  version  of  LOT,
highlighting the fact that “mental sentences” are slaves to the same dynamic of the underlying
ascription of psychological states as non-mental sentences serves to bring out the way our
ascribing psychological states and intended meanings to one another is interlocked. Crucially,
the Davidsonian view that meaning is the operative part of such psychological theories, which
I’m partial  to  (see  I.7.4),  does  not  imply  that  questions  of  psychology  are  explanatorily
primary to our use of symbols. It is fully consistent with my claim that the most plausible way
to connect symbolic intentionality and mental intentionality is to say that it takes cognitive
skills to use symbols, and that there are no symbols without cognisers (here, we can embed
Gricean  pragmatics).  Furthermore,  it  is  consistent  with  holding  that  at  least  some
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psychological  states  are  intentional  because  they  are  attitudes  taken  toward  things  that
inherently have symbolically referential properties (such as, but not limited to, propositions).
I.4.5. Rich Versus Sparse Representations
How should we deal with mental states which we want to call intentional, but which
do not plausibly require symbolic intentionality? There are two kinds of mental states to deal
with here: Mental states whose having relies on mastering concepts, and mental states which
don’t. For example,  could anyone believe that there’s a red flower on the meadow if this
person were to live in a world in which no symbols of any form existed? Having such a belief
requires  having  the  appropriate  concepts  (red,  flower,  meadow),  which  in  the  classic
philosophy of mind are often taken to require linguistic (or at least quasi-linguistic) skills (cf.
Davidson 2001b: 95-105). Accepting this view implies that without symbolic practice there
can be no concepts.
But concepts need not be linguistic, and if we do not want to concede that having
concepts requires having a language, maybe we could employ a definition of concepts which
is satisfied by multimodal/multisensory integration (cf. Holmes et al. 2009, Reig & Silberberg
2014, Deroy 2015): Perhaps the most important feature of concepts is that they can be applied
across different relevant instances – such as the concept “flower” applying to different flowers
– and so we should hold that our concept “flower” could also consist in a mental entity that
bundles all the different modalities needed to react consistently to flowers, including any such
bundling that  would be formed based on past interaction  with flowers (i.e.  knowledge or
memory of flowers). Such multimodal concepts go a long way to explaining our behaviour
toward flowers; perhaps we have learned from interaction, perception and/or imitation that
they’re good for picking.
But in this story, what role does intentionality play? It seems sufficient to tell it  in
terms of behaviour, of causes and interaction, as I have just done. Adding that someone who
has, in this sense, learned to properly interact with flowers has a mental state that is directed at
flowers  does  not  seem to  have  any  explanatory  surplus  compared  to  the  non-intentional
explanation. Sure, we might like to say that some of his mental states are directed to flowers.
Then again, we might mostly want to do so because it is natural for us to take the intentional
stance, i.e. for us to ascribe intentional attitudes in order to explain behaviour (cf. Dennett
1987);  and  our  taking  this  stance  does  not  require  that  the  cogniser  whose  state  we are
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describing intentionally is, in fact, an intentional agent – much like describing a thermostat as
believing that the room is too cold does not imply that the thermostat satisfies any substantial
criteria for being an intentional agent (see section I.7.5). In these cases, it is sufficient to use
only a sparse notion of “representation”, namely a purely causal one. We should distinguish it
from  a  richer  notion  which  implies  that  cognisers  are  generally  moved  by  the  laws  of
intentional psychology, or, in other words, minds whose features are causally explained by
intentional  features:  Features such as learning to partake in symbolic  practice,  learning to
read, learning to conform to social standards, learning to meet institutionalised expectations,
learning that giving a promise means intending to keep it, and so on.
“What’s  special  about  us is that  we don’t  just  do things for reasons. Trees do things for  
reasons. But we represent the reasons and we reflect on them, and the idea of reflecting on 
reasons and representing reasons and justifying our reasons to each other informs us and  
governs the intentional stance. We grow up learning to trade reasons with our friends and  
family. We’re then able to direct that perspective at evolutionary history, at artifacts, at trees. 
And  then  we  see  the  reasons  that  aren’t  represented,  but  are  active”  (Daniel  Dennett  in
Edmonds & Warburton 2015: 130).
Explaining behaviour related to said kinds of higher cognitive skills is what the true
explanatory value of intentional psychology consists in, and if explanations can do without it,
then there is no good reason to take the use of semantic terms such as “is about” or “refers to”
as  implying  that  we  are  dealing  with  the  explanation  of  a  genuinely  agential/intentional
phenomenon – even if we are still free to take the intentional stance toward it, as in the case of
the thermostat.
For example, if I buy a pack of mozzarella, and am motivated to put it into the fridge
in an upright position, then the cause (i.e. the proper referent of an explanation of what goes
on in my mind) are representational properties of the pack of mozzarella. The only way to
determine  whether  the pack stands upright  is  to  know the difference  between the typeset
“Mozzarella”  and  “Mozzarella”. Of  course  there  are  physical,  biological  and  anatomical
prerequisites  to  meet  in  order  for  me  to  acquire  this  knowledge:  I  have  to  be  a  kind  of
organism which can be conditioned to distinguish “Mozzarella” from “Mozzarella”, which
can generalise  over a potentially infinite  class of type  sets  in order to determine whether
they’re upright or upside down, and which can be motivated to act in accordance with this
knowledge. Still, there is nothing which all upright typesets have in common which could be
explained  in  purely  physical  terms  (compare  Fodor’s  pointing  out  that  “interesting
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generalisations (...) can often be made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing
in common” in his 1974: 103), or determining which could be traced back to biological and
anatomical configurations or disposition. Thus, in cases such as this, the explanatory cause
always and exclusively consists in a representational feature.
To  be  sure,  both  sparse  and  rich  notions  of  representation  can  be  described  as
phenomena  of  mental  directedness.  Appetite  for  chocolate,  fear  of  snakes,  fear  of  stock
market crashes, appreciation of mathematical proofs, and so on – all of these mental states
have intentional objects, even though the former pair can be sparse and the latter can only be
rich.  What  makes  the  difference  is  that  it  is  only  the  rich  notions  which  come with  the
notorious  problems  which  intentionality  poses  for  the  cognitive  sciences  (and  for
naturalistically  inclined  philosophers  of  mind),  namely  phenomena  of  normativity  and
rationality. Only in cases of rich intentionality are norms and matters of rationality necessary
parts  of  causal  explanations  of  mental  states.  Desiring  to  come  up  with  an  elegant
mathematical proof, composing classical orchestra pieces, seeking to be a virtuous person,
protesting  nuclear  power,  and  so  on  –  if  we  wish  to  explain  the  respective  underlying
cognitive states, standards of rationality which are external to the cognisers will have to be
evoked as causes of mental effects: Explaining why someone speaks English is not merely a
matter of explaining their internal cognitive state, but also of specifying English grammar as
an external cause of this cognitive state. In these cases, representations (such as a rulebook of
English grammar) are invoked as causal determinants of behaviour (compare  section II.3).
Typically, it is in the interaction between cognisers and representations where we can locate
matters of rationality and normativity: namely, by the cogniser’s adhering to what is specified
representationally, by adhering to logical, social, moral norms and rules. Clearly, such cases
differ  from  being  hungry  or  fearing  snakes,  which  we  can  explain  without  invoking
representations as causes.
To be sure, I do not wish to claim that rich or high-level cognition, such as skills
required  for  making  informed  political  election  choices,  are  typical  for  human  cognition
across the board (and we may even imagine being able to live out most of our days without
invoking them). But I do claim that it is characteristic for human cognition to  include such
high-level  cognitive  skills  and  that  those  who  cannot  have  them appear  stunted.  So,  an
account of the mind which disregards rich representation cannot amount to an account of the
human mind.
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  difference  between  sparse  and  rich  notions  of
representation does not coincide with the difference between being free of and being causally
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influenced by external restrictions. Rather, the sparse notions we have been discussing are
also governed by external restrictions, namely those of evolutionary adaptation: we would not
be  hungry and we would  not  fear  snakes  if  either  didn’t  serve  an  evolutionary  function.
Whereas rich notions are governed by aims such as being rational, being consistent, being
virtuous. Both notions are teleological in nature, that is, they are formulated in terms of aims
(from  the  Greek  word  “telos”,  τέλος).  In  sparse  notions,  we  usually  find  biological  or
organismic functions which we can describe as aims, whereas in rich notions, we will refer to
norms which are socially constituted and/or implemented (see II.7). The latter will  build on
mental capacities which are evolutionarily acquired – we can only ever build on what nature
has equipped us with –, but, unlike in the case of those connected to sparse notions, they will
not  be  evolutionarily  determined:  evolutionary  and  organismic  explanations  will  not  be
sufficient to have and explain them.
Essentially, intentional psychology as explored in this chapter is concerned with rich
notions of representations, whereas I will explore the role of sparse notions as invoked in
neurobiology  in  chapter  II.  This  difference  in  representational  notions  points  toward  a
dilemma that  the cognitive  neurosciences  face:  Among other  things,  they seek to  explain
intentional states. But it seems that either the notion of representation is too sparse to support
the notion of intentionality, whereby we would lose all of the explanatory power intentional
psychology has, or it is not sparse enough for being meaningfully tied to neurobiology (and
therefore, to potential descriptions of what fundamentally produces mental states). The most
fundamental  field in the neurosciences,  which cognitive neuroscience has to be integrated
with (which can be read strongly as “reduced to” or weakly as “communicating productively
with”), is neurobiology, and neurobiology decidedly rests on physicalism. Thus, as Dretske
poignantly put it, the challenge is to “bake a mental cake using only physical yeast and flour”
(Dretske 1981: xi). These are some of the challenges that will be addressed in chapter II. The
idea, very briefly, is that physical states which allow for cognitive processing are endowed
with  intentional  properties.  Namely,  since  we  are  cognitively  outfitted  to  consistently
associate  certain  environmental  cues  with  arbitrary  signifiers  and to  adapt  our  behaviour
accordingly,  we can use environmental  cues,  which are evidence for ascribing intentional
mental states, to explain and predict the kind of behaviour typically or normatively connected
to the mental states identified by the respective attitude and content.
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I.5. Mental Constructionism
In this chapter I am going to explore the ontological consequences of my conception
of mental states. Since I construe the reality of mental states as tied to their explanatory value,
treating them as kinds in psychological theories, I adopt a kind of pragmatic scientific realism,
which holds that what is real is determined (or at least strongly informed) by what kinds we
use in scientific theories. I am not going to argue that this is the only adequate explication of
what it is to be real, but that this is the conception relevant for mental states. This section will
then  lead  into  the  subsequent  sections  discussing  how mental  states  are  used  to  explain
phenomena.  In  this  sense,  this  is  a  “theoretical”  section  discussing  the  ontological
underpinnings of what is explored in the following “practical” section.
The view I am going to endorse in this book is a weaker form of what has been dubbed
“mental  constructionism”.  This  weaker  form sheds  some of  the  stronger  version’s  theses
about  representational  properties  being  married  to  linguistic  competence,  and  about  the
spuriousness of intentional laws – but more on this later on. Some of its (stronger) forms have
been attributed to Wilfrid Sellars and Donald Davidson, among others. Both of them make a
case for mental states being theoretical objects, and it is this notion of our constructing mental
objects  according  to  their  explanatory  value  and  theoretical  aesthetics  which  gives
constructionism its name. For example, Sellars argues that mental states such as thoughts and
perceptions should be understood as theoretical entities postulated to explain overt behaviour
(cf.  Sellars 1997: 90-117). Since they can only play this role if  they are intersubjectively
accessible,  he  points out that  “concepts  pertaining  to  such inner episodes as thoughts are
primarily and essentially  intersubjective, as intersubjective as the concept of a positron, and
(...) the reporting role of these concepts — the fact that each of us has a privileged access to
his thoughts — constitutes a dimension of the use of these concepts which is  built on and
presupposes this intersubjective status” (ibid.: 107, §59; see also his 1957). And Davidson
treats mental states as akin to abstract objects such as units of measurements: “Just as we
cannot  intelligibly  assign  a  length  to  any object  unless  a  comprehensive  theory  holds  of
objects  of this  sort,  we cannot  intelligibly attribute  any propositional  attitude  to  an agent
expect  within  the  framework  of  a  viable  theory  of  his  beliefs,  desires,  intentions,  and
decisions”  (Davidson  1980:  221,  also  see  Field  1975).  Such  comparisons  highlight  the
abstract, theory-dependent nature of mental states, as well as (in Davidson’s case) a holistic
view of the mind: the view that mental states pick out relative properties in an interdependent
web of such states, just as metres specify points on a relative scale of size or length. For
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example, for any belief to qualify as being about a tree, the belief’s bearer must have “many
general beliefs about trees: that they are growing things, that they have leaves or needles, that
they burn. There is no fixed list of things someone with the concept of a tree must believe, but
without many general beliefs, there would be no reason to identify a belief as a belief about a
tree, much less an oak tree” (Davidson 2001b: 98, also compare Searle 2000: 107).
As  previously noted,  these  relative properties  are  expressed  in  propositional  form,
assigning semantic content by means of a that-clause which is preceded by the specification
of what is called the intentional mode (see e.g. Searle 2000: 99  and I.1). For example, you
could justifiably assign to me the mental state that I believe that as I am writing this, it is way
past  my  bedtime.  In  this  case,  “believing”  is  the  intentional  mode  (others  are  doubting,
dreaming, desiring, and so forth), and “as I am writing this, it is way past my bedtime” is the
propositional content. This form of assigning mental states is not necessarily linguistic: For
example, Sellars required for a basic representational state “to have propositional form, (…)
[it] must represent an object and represent it as of a certain character” (Sellars 1981: 336) , a
requirement met by a range of non-linguistic forms of representations, such as maps.
Just like the notion of propositional attitudes, the roots of constructionist views can be
traced back to Bertrand Russell, who expressed its core back in 1928:
“modern science gives no indication whatever of the existence of the soul or mind as an entity;
indeed the reasons for disbelieving in it are very much of the same kind as the reasons for  
disbelieving in matter. Mind and matter were something like the lion and the unicorn fighting 
for the crown; the end of the battle is not the victory of one or the other, but the discovery that 
both are only heraldic inventions. The world consists of events, not of things that endure for a 
long time and have changing properties. Events can be collected into groups by their causal 
relations. If the causal relations are of one sort, the resulting group of events may be called a 
physical object, and if the causal relations are of another sort, the resulting group may be  
called a mind. Any event that occurs inside a man’s head will belong to groups of both kinds; 
considered as belonging to a group of one kind, it is a constituent of his brain, and considered 
as belonging to a group of the other kind, it is a constituent of his mind. Thus both mind and 
matter are merely convenient ways of organising events.” (Russell 1973[1935]: 142 f.)
Not minding the details of Russell’s view, what we should take away from this quote
is that the concept of “mind” is but one way to organise certain features of the world (in
Russell’s case, events characterised by (a) specific type(s) of causal relations). I take this view
to be a natural companion to the modern scientific worldview, namely the view that, roughly
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speaking, there are objective features of the world which we have more or less good access to
by  way  of  perception,  measurement  and  various  forms  of  interaction.  Consequently,  we
construct scientific theories in an attempt to systematically relate these features to one another
(such as by way of causal relations, identity relations, structural relations such as mereology
or the forming of certain spatial or temporal patterns, and so on) in order to explain them and
the phenomena by which they reveal themselves to us. In such theories, certain key concepts
will serve to give structure and support to the theories and the laws they entail. In the natural
sciences, natural kinds serve as such key concepts. Conceptually, they enable us to distinguish
between generalisable or universalisable relations and non-universalisable ones.22 Similarly to
what Russell insinuates, psychological explanation depends on taking causal relations to be of
a specific sort: psychological explanation is a specific form of causal explanation, one which
relies on psychological laws and psychological kinds. I will go into more detail regarding this
kind of explanation in section I.6.
The constructionist view as has just been laid out has been dubbed “antirealist” and
contrasted with a “realist” view of the mind, where mental states are taken to be as real as
“tables,  stones  and  electrons”  (Heil  2000:  131).  However,  the  mere  fact  that  intentional
psychological explanation traffics in abstract terms and depends on a theory is not to say that
it  assumes  an  antirealist  outlook.  On  the  contrary:  a  compelling  view  advocated  by
naturalistically inclined philosophers is that scientific theory itself is the measure of what is
real: “in the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all
things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not” (Sellars 1997: 83, §41; compare
also  Quine  1980:  ch.  1). So,  what  we  should  be  looking  for  to  judge  realness  is  not  a
pretheoretic notion of the concept “mental state”, but sound criteria for determining whether
these concepts capture real causal relations, and it is in virtue of capturing these that they
figure in psychological theories in the first place. (I will go on to argue in section I.6 that this
criterion is in fact met by intentional psychology.)
And following Dennett,  we should construe realism of  theoretical  objects  as their
being  good theoretical  objects.  For  instance,  rather  than  pursuing  a  purely  metaphysical
question about whether theoretical/abstract objects such as centers of gravity are real,  “we
should be (…) more interested in the scientific path to realism: centers of gravity are real
because  they  are  (somehow)  good abstract  objects.  They  deserve  to  be  taken  seriously,
22 I  say “conceptually”  because it  is not all that  clear whether  there can be a purely empirical  or epistemic
criterion for distinguishing between laws and non-lawlike regularities, and many believe that the notions of laws,
natural kinds, induction etc. are essentially circular (see e.g. Davidson 1980: 217 f., Fodor 1974: 102) – even if
they may form a virtuous rather than a vicious circle. See also section I.6.2.
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learned about, used. If we go so far as to distinguish them as real (contrasting them, perhaps,
with  those  abstract  objects  which  are  bogus),  that  is  because  we  think  they  serve  in
perspicuous representations of real forces, “natural” properties, and the like” (Dennett 1991b:
28 f.). Or, as Richard Healey worded Dennett’s “deep pragmatist point – it is more important
to  appreciate  the  purposes  for  which  we agents  created  concepts  of  these  things  than  to
undertake the quixotic and ultimately unrevealing task of relating them in an orderly way to
some allegedly fundamental ontology” (Healey 2013). 
Sticking with Heil’s paradigmatic instantiations of “realness” such as tables, stones or
electrons, we should hold that mental properties are perhaps closest to electrons, insofar as
these are construed as theoretical  entities  as well;  that is,  they play a central  role for the
explanatory  value  of  these  theories.  Whereas  tables  and  stones  can  be  defined  quite
independently of being kinds  in  a  theory,  insofar  as  tables  can be (at  least  tentatively or
heuristically) defined by their function, and stones can be defined by being made of a certain
material. Ultimately, tables and stones will stand in some relation to theories (tables more to
social  and  cultural  theories,  and  stones  more  to  physical,  geographical  or  architectural
theories), but their everyday use diverges from their being used as kinds in theories. That is,
even  if  “being  made  of  stone”  works  as  a  kind  in  architectural  theories,  there  is  no
requirement for any of us non-architects  to (even implicitly)  refer to architectural theories
when talking about stones. Whereas it seems quite impossible to talk about electrons without
presupposing that they play a major role in the explanatory value of physical theories, just as
it seems impossible to talk about semantic and mental properties disregarding their analogous
theoretical foundation. Davidson and Fodor support this train of thought: “The analogy with
physics is obvious: we explain macroscopic phenomena by postulating an unobserved fine
structure. But the theory is tested at the macroscopic level. Sometimes, to be sure, we are
lucky  enough  to  find  additional,  or  more  direct,  evidence  for  the  originally  postulated
structure; but this is not essential to the enterprise. I suggest that words, meanings of words,
reference, and satisfaction are posits we need to implement a theory of truth. They serve this
purpose  without  needing  independent  confirmation  or  empirical  basis”  (Davidson  2001a:
222). Furthermore, “the [commonsense psychological] theory’s underlying generalisations are
defined over unobservables, and they lead to its predictions by iterating and interacting rather
than by being directly instantiated” (Fodor 1989: 7).
Again,  the  mere  fact  that  these  objects  are  theory-dependent  and  not  directly
observable should not sway us to doubt their ontic reputation, for even
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“a properly trained physicist, who can respond systematically differently to differently shaped
tracks in a cloud chamber will, if responding by non-inferentially reporting the presence of mu
mesons, count as genuinely observing those subatomic particles. The physicist may start out 
by reporting the presence of hooked vapor trails and inferring the presence of mu mesons, but 
if the physicist then learns to eliminate the intermediate response and respond directly to the 
trails by reporting mesons, the physicist will be observing them” (Brandom 2002b: 96).
Like Sellars, Brandom holds that theoretical and directly observable objects do not differ in
kind,  but  only in  whether  we access  them inferentially  or  non-inferentially  (cf.  Brandom
2002a: 362). Consequently, merely pointing out that being able to directly or non-inferentially
observe something – a  table,  a  stone – will  not  ontologically  separate  it  from theoretical
objects  whose  observation  we  take  to  be  inferred,  namely  by  invoking  a  theory  which
specifies under which conditions an objects counts as being observed, present, instantiated or
existing.
So, while there may be no ontological divide between my form of constructionism and
straightforward mental realism, a notable difference pertains to whether there is the possibility
of finding pretheoretical or purely subjective, internal mental states. What I wish to rule out
by adopting constructionism is the notion that an immediate acquaintance with mental states
is either necessary or sufficient for our knowledge about them (see section I.7). For some
form of immediate acquaintance seems to me to be the only way to escape the view that
mental  terms  are,  to  some  degree,  abstract  and  theory-dependent.  However,  allowing
immediate acquaintance to play a fundamental role does not seem too appealing to begin with,
for not only does it bring with it the bane of solipsism (see I.7.2), it also rules out all forms of
externalism, some of which will later turn out to be intrinsic to my view. Of course, none of
this implies a denial of “qualia”, qualitative experiences which are essentially internal and
subjective (see section I.9.4). I simply deny that subjective experience is all there is to be said
about the realm of mental states. 
Given the fact that theories in contemporary cognitive science are decidely committed
to  an  at  least  broadly  construed  physicalist  ontology  (i.e.  assuming  at  least  a  general
consistency with physics, and often also the hope of ultimately reconciling non-physicalist
ontologies  with  physicalist  ontologies),  mental  constructionism is  an adequate  position  to
hold. Constructionist intentional psychology is consistent with a basic physicalism, that is, the
notion that all real things are describable by physics: at their most basic, all objects should be
in some form consituted by elementary particles, forces, natural properties of space and time
and the like, which form an inventory of natural kinds in physics. The idea that objects which
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are constituted by physical kinds, and some properties of these objects, can also figure as
kinds in laws beyond physics (such as psychological laws), without assuming that these laws
relate  to  physics  in  an  interesting  way (such as  being  restatable  or  reducible  to  physics,
eliminable  by  physical  laws,  etc.)  is  compatible  with  accepting  basic  physicalism.
Reducibility and eliminability are options, but not implied.
While we commonly also describe many macroscopic objects as “physical objects”,
such as tables, paintings, or human beings, we should not mistake this for claiming that these
are themselves objects in physicalist ontologies. Rather, we should take it as shorthand for
referring  to  their  material  properties  (as  opposed  to  immaterial  objects,  such  as  ideas,
mathematical  proofs,  or  ideal  beauty).  While  tables,  paintings  and human  beings  may be
material things, they are, according to physics, not among the realest things our universe has
to offer: they are not what figures in the most basic of physical laws. In other words: They
aren’t  natural  kinds  in  physics.  The  distinction  between  material  and  immaterial  only
presupposes physics insofar as material objects are made up of physical particles by way of
composition – a composition that is defined by physical notions such as forces, space and
time. (Although, taking the stance of a quantum physicist, we would have a hard time finding
the boundary between a table and its surroundings on the quantum level – still, any point in
space within the boundary should turn out to be such on the microscopic level that it allows
for the table having its table-esque qualities on the macroscopic level). There are, of course,
various theories about how immaterial things are or could be composed of physical objects,
but  these  are  prone  to  stir  controversy  (and  here  we might  want  to  distinguish  between
immaterial  things such as mathematical proofs, whose existence at the very least does not
violate physical laws, and such things as ghosts or angels, which on many common accounts
would). For example, a rough idea for how ideas could be composed of physical objects could
hold that ideas are things that are both mental and social, and that mental things are composed
of persons and the relations between their neural mechanisms and their environment.
Certainly, physicalism offers straightforward mental realists an easy way out by urging
to just identify mental states with brain states and be done with it – even in the absence of
empirical  proof about the identity of any specific mental  state  with a specific brain state.
Don’t we readily identify many macroscopic objects with their physical microstructure, even
in the absence of knowledge about how one exactly relates to another? Would adopting the
view that thoughts are composed of elementary physical entities amount to a greater leap of
faith than the view that chairs are? If, in a physicalist framework, we so readily assume the
latter, why not the former? There are two important reasons: Firstly,  chairs have all sorts of
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properties  which  promise  to  readily  be  reducable  to  more  basic  physical  properties  of
elementary chair-parts; and some chair-properties can be neatly integrated into physical laws.
Whereas mental states have some odd properties which can’t, at least not in an obvious way –
one of them being that thoughts have intentional content. This is not to say that intentional
content  must  seem like  an  odd  phenomenon  –  it  certainly  doesn’t  when  invoked  in  the
framework of intentional psychology –, but intentionality can seem odd when viewed from a
physicalist point of view (see II.2).
Secondly,  while we generally acknowledge that objects such as chairs are identical
with their physical components, we cannot say the same about all lawlike generalisations in
which such objects figure. In the case of chairs, explanatorily valuable statements such as
“chairs  are  made  by  carpenters”  or  “chairs  are  for  sitting”  make  much  less  sense  when
referring to the physical description of a chair instead of chairs per se. Fodor made this point
exceedingly clear for the case of money:
“Suppose, for example, that Gresham’s ‘law’ [in economics] really is true. (If one doesn’t like 
Gresham’s  law,  then  any  true  generalisation  of  any  conceivable  future  economics  will  
probably do as well.) Gresham’s law says something about what will happen in monetary  
exchanges under certain conditions. I am willing to believe that physics is general in the sense 
that it implies that any event which consists of a monetary exchange (hence any event which 
falls under Gresham’s law) has a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in virtue of 
which it falls under the laws of physics. But banal considerations suggest that a description 
which covers all such events must be wildly disjunctive. Some monetary exchanges involve 
strings of wampum. Some involve dollar bills. And some involve signing one’s name to a  
check. What are the chances that a disjunction of physical predicates which covers all these 
events (i.e., a disjunctive predicate which can form the right hand side of a bridge law of the 
form ‘x is a monetary exchanged...’) expresses a physical natural kind? In particular, what are 
the chances that such a predicate forms the antecedent or consequent of some proper law of 
physics? The point is that monetary exchanges have interesting things in common; Gresham’s 
law,  if  true,  says  what  one  of  these  interesting  things  is.  But  what  is  interesting  about  
monetary exchanges is  surely not their commonalities under physical description. A natural  
kind like a monetary exchange could turn out to be co-extensive with a physical natural kind; 
but if it did, that would be an accident on a cosmic scale” (Fodor 1974: 103 f.).23
Mental constructionism honors the defining role kinds in the special sciences play in
lawlike explanation without contradicting physicalism, insofar as it holds that mental states
23 But see Boyd 1999 and Jones 2004 for criticisms of this view.
Intentional Psychology 51
are theoretical constructs invoked to explain certain physical events whose occurrence can be
explained  by  invoking  intentional  kinds.  These  are  not  themselves  explanatory  kinds  in
physical  ontologies,  but if  to exist  is  to be a bound variable  in one of our best  scientific
theories, as Quine would have it (cf. Quine 1980: ch. 1), then of course mental states are real,
since they are kinds in  one of our best  theories  to explain some physical  events,  namely
human behaviour. What I urge is to expand the notion of what our “best theories” are by
covering those which have great/indispensable/pragmatic explanatory value (for the details,
see section I.6.2). Then, scientific realism implies that mental states are very much real, in the
sense that to give an explanation in terms of mental states is to employ a theory that captures
real causal relations.
This picture is in line with how we usually take many things to be real objects, quite
independently of what physics say about them. For instance, determining how an object is
composed of physical microparticles is completely beside the point when it comes to settling
the question whether something is in fact a table, a painting, or a human being. For something
to be a table, it is usually enough for it to usually function as a table – for sitting around it
during social gatherings, for putting food on it, and so on. Once color has been applied to a
canvas using a paintbrush, once that canvas hangs in a museum, and once we judge that it has
an aesthetic quality to it,  then it has long been decided that it  is a painting.  And usually,
someone’s behaving in a human fashion says all we need to know about deciding whether we
are dealing with a human being. There are exceptions in each case, but particle physics rarely
ever have anything to do with it. (We could dream up such cases, but they would have no
bearing on the issue at hand.) Usually it doesn’t matter in the least whether we are dealing
with the most basic building blocks of our reality when dealing with tables, paintings and
human beings. That is, in all cases in which we can question the reality of these objects, and
whenever we stress that a table, a painting or a human being is a “real object”, we point to the
fact that the object in question has not been made up, imagined, hallucinated, or so on. But it
has little to do with committing to the fact that these objects are the building blocks of our
physicalist ontology. Rather, it has to do with the fact that invoking them is the right way to
provide the explanations we seek:
“The problem is (...) think[ing] that if you give the lowest-level atomic explanation, then you 
have given a complete account of the causation: that’s all the causation there is. In fact, that 
isn’t even causation in an interesting sense. (…) The problem with that is that it ignores all of 
the higher-level forms of causation which are just as real and just as important. Suppose you 
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had a  complete  atom-by-atom history of  every giraffe  that  ever  lived,  and every giraffe  
ancestor that ever lived. You wouldn’t have an answer to the question of why they have long 
necks. There is indeed a causal explanation, but it’s lost in those details. You have to go to a 
different level in order to explain why the giraffe developed its long neck. (…) If I want to 
know why you pulled the trigger, I won’t learn that by having an atom-by-atom account of 
what went on in your brain. I’d have to go to a higher level: I’d have to go to the intentional 
stance in psychology. Here’s a very simple analogy: you’ve got a hand calculator and you put 
in a number, and it gives the answer 3.333333E. Why did it do that? Well, if you tap in ten 
divided by three, and the answer is an infinite continuing decimal, the calculator gives an ‘E’. 
Now, if you want to understand which cases this will happen to, don’t examine each and every
individual transistor: use arithmetic. Arithmetic tells you which set of cases will give you an 
‘E’. Don’t think that you can answer that question by electronics. That’s the wrong level. The 
same is true with playing computer chess. Why did the computer move its bishop? Because 
otherwise its queen would have been captured. That’s the level at which you answer that  
question” (Daniel Dennett in Edmonds & Warburton 2015: 126 ff.).
What  we should  do,  then,  is  point  out  that  these  objects,  insofar  as  they are  real
objects, are important for specialised ontologies; i.e. ontologies of special sciences (compare
Fodor  1974).  Tables  are  paradigmatic  objects  in  certain  crafts,  paintings  have  a  special
bearing on crafts and sciences surrounding art, and human beings figure as important objects
in anthropology, biology, and, to some degree of abstraction, in many other sciences which
deal with characteristically human features (such as psychology, sociology, economics, and so
on). Thus, if we want to take serious the notion that it is not just physics which offers us real
things, we should concede that to be an object, and to be real, is to be a theoretical term in any
one good theory in any given scientific domain. Therefore, I adopt the view that in order for
things to be real, they should figure in good theories; but good theories exist well beyond
physics.  If  mental  states  turn  out  to  be  essential  to  good  psychological  theories,  and
psychological theories in general help us explain, understand and/or predict what’s going on
in our world, then mental states are real objects. Physicalism is not contradicted insofar as
accepting non-physical kinds does not rule out that any object instantiating such a kind is also
describable physically. Being describable physically and being an explanatory kind in physics
is obviously not the same. So, some explanatory value a non-physical kind has could be lost
under a physical description. For example, chemical kinds retain all their explanatory power
when stated in physical terms, but economic ones do not. And perhaps it is true that ballet is
particle physics; but for all we know, it isn’t prudent to expect explanations of dance moves in
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terms of particle interactions. So, it sometimes simply isn’t prudent to want to reconstruct
certain kinds in the special sciences in terms of physical kinds, even if they can or could be.
Saying that a chair isn’t just an object fashioned to sit on, but that it is also describable as a
physical object, reflects our optimism that ideally we could list all physical components of the
chair  and  their  interrelations,  with  these  components  and  relations  constituting  kinds  in
physics, even though all things which have been fashioned to sit on need not (and plausibly
are not) specifically and exclusively characterised by a physical kind term, but rather by a
disjunction  of  such terms  which  have  no  explanatory  property  in  common  that  could  be
characterised  in  physical  terms  (compare  Fodor’s  previous  quote  about  Gresham’s  law).
Under a physical description, any explanatory value the chair has in, say, woodcarving, will
be lost.24
One position which honors these insights and allows for a plurality of descriptions of
the same event (say,  as both mental and physical) is Davidson’s view (cf. Davidson 1980:
207-227). I will adapt it in the following way: Physicalism does not require each object to
itself be reducible to a physical object, but it rather requires that each event whose description
invokes non-physical objects (i.e. objects which are denoted by a kind term in a theory other
than physics) be also describable as a physical event (speaking in Davidsonian terms for the
case of the mind-body relation: that each mental event be token-identical to a physical event).
For example, an exchange of things which have similar monetary value is under at least one
description a physical event, but having a certain monetary value is not a physical property.
I have stressed that what settles ontological matters surrounding mental objects is the
role they play in robust theories. And yet, there is a crucial difference between mental states
and other theoretical terms such as centers of gravity (Dennett 1991b: 27 ff.): While the latter
can be taken to describe, explain or predict phenomena which are independent of the theories
about them, there is one sense in which mental states do fundamentally depend on theories
about them. To make this point, let me first say a bit about what a theory is. A theory about
mental states is a systematised set of intentional psychological laws such as “if A expresses
her  sincere  belief  that  she  will  attend  the  conference  tomorrow,  then,  with  a  certain
probabilistic leeway depending on her reliability, she will be at the conference tomorrow”, or
at least a set of axioms and empirical knowledge from which laws like these follow. A theory
can be more, but it cannot be less: An essential part of it is that it either consists of or implies
24 Strikingly enough, theories themselves aren’t physical objects (and possibly only in a very roundabout way
can they be said to be “composed” of physical objects), but physicalism cannot do without the notion of theories:
no physicalism without physics, and no physics without the notion of theories (cf. Chakravartty 2013). So even
physicalism itself needs to allow for some non-physical objects.
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laws such as these. And if someone has laws like these at their disposal, then they have a
psychological  theory.  If  they didn’t  have a theory,  any generalisations  like the one I  just
mentioned would not be a law (even if it were true), for it is the fact that they are part of a
nomological theory which is necessary for their being laws and not mere generalisations (see
section I.6.2).
Now, the difference between mental states and other theoretical entities such as centers
of gravity is that the latter, and those effects which lead us to positing centers of gravity at
certain points, do not care about our theories about them – at all.  We might be in dispute
about whether centers of gravity exist without our positing them (since they might merely be
an abstraction that only exists as a consequence of the theory’s positing them), but we do not
assume that, say, two specific planetoids have a specific gravitational pull on each other only
because mankind has come up with physics. Again, we can debate whether things such as a
planetoid and a gravitational pull exist outside of our theories (the words certainly wouldn’t
exist  without  our  linguistic  practice,  the  concepts  wouldn’t  exist  without  physics,  they
wouldn’t mean what they do without the theories in which they are used, and so on), but
whatever  real  event  that  is  meant  to  be  expressed  by  the  statement  “planetoid  X  has  a
gravitational pull on planetoid Y” is quite independent of linguistic and scientific practice.
What this ultimately means is that this theory, in which planetoids figure as natural kinds, is
one in which human linguistic practice does not. Some radical antirealists may still want to
deny this; but that is of no consequence for the task at hand, for what I would like them to
acknowledge is not that there is a world that is independent of our descriptions of it,  but
merely that whatever goes on in the case of centers of gravity differs crucially from what goes
on in the case of mental states. The point is not whether planetoids exists independently of
human theories (i.e. pretheoretically), but rather that human theories are not a natural kind in
physics. Of course, such antirealists should really want to say something beyond what goes on
once we’re committed to the domain of physics; but that is not what’s at stake here. What’s at
stake is that in the case of mental states, theories about them constitute a causal factor for
having them – at least in some crucial cases. What matters is that the existence of at least
some mental states cannot be made sense of without a theory about them. 
Again, consider my example of a probabilistic psychological law: “if A expresses her
sincere belief that she will attend the conference tomorrow, then she is likely to be at the
conference  tomorrow”.  In most  cases  in  which  A expresses  her  belief  –  cases  which  go
beyond those in which she is merely asked to state her belief by, say, a psychoanalyst –, she
does so to signal that she is likely to attend the conference the next day. But signalling this
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can only succeed if the person she tells this has a theory which comprises of or at least implies
said law. The latter  person literally has no other way of grasping the significance of A’s
utterance than by being sensitive to certain semantic properties of it, and than employing her
very own common-sense psychological theory in order to make sense of these properties.25 In
order to explain what is going on between a speaker and the interpreter of her utterances,
referring to non-intentional  properties of the interpreter  which could alert  her to what the
speaker is trying to get across will not suffice. Sure, there are many interesting questions to be
asked about the interpreter’s physiology, how it enables her to be able to employ a common-
sense psychological theory, or how it enables her to be sensitive to semantic properties in the
first place. But all of these explanations can only ever begin or make sense if the interaction
has been recognised qua its semantic nature. The speaker’s behaviour, expressing her belief,
would make no sense at all if the interpreter could in principle have no psychosemantic theory
at her disposal. It could be that in fact the interpreter lacks such a theory, thus rendering the
speaker’s utterance as pointless as making a promise to a rock; but the important point is that
the speaker is  justified in expecting her to be able to employ one. And that is what we, as
potential interpreters of our peers’ behaviour, usually are. At the most basic, the psychological
ability to have a theory of mind, and to have a psychological theory which enables us to infer
someone’s intention from their utterances, are preconditions for having some mental states in
the first place.
I did restrict this claim to some mental states; and these would at least be those which
are essentially interpersonally functional, such as commitments to attending conferences. That
is, it only works in those cases where having a mental state is tied to the ability of expressing
it and assigning it to others (see Davidson’s view  in section I.7.4 and I.7.5). Other mental
states might make perfect sense without anyone’s having learned any kind of theory, such as
being afraid of snakes (see I.4.5). A mental state of this sort would still be perfectly functional
if  there  was  no  one  but  the  bearer  of  said  fear  on  this  planet  (plus  at  least  one  snake).
Allowing ascriptions like these might make me seem generous in comparison to Davidson,
who argued that in fact all mental states presuppose an intersubjective practice; a claim which
makes  sense  when  taking  into  account  that  mental  states  have  content,  and  that,  given
Davidson’s notion of content,  there cannot  be any content without interpersonal  linguistic
practice (cf.  Davidson 2001b: 213, for an evolutionary perspective compare Carruthers &
Smith 1996: ch. 20). The prima facie weaker position here would be to assume, with Dennett
(see his 1987), that the ascription of mental states, such as the fear of snakes, is perfectly
25 Note that assuming that someone has a theory that enables them to understand semantic properties  isn’t the
same as subscribing to the notion that theory-theory is true (cf. Carruthers & Smith 1996).
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justified if the object, which said state is ascribed to, shows all signs of having this mental
state. Of course, we can only take Dennett’s “intentional stance” toward any bearer of mental
content because we are already part of a content-assigning practice, which itself depends, as
Davidson held,  on our having an interpersonal  linguistic  practice  in the first  place.  Thus,
Dennett’s position may in fact only be weaker at a first glance. I will just mark this point here
and explore it further in section I.7.5. What matters for my claim for now is that at least some
mental states require having a psychological theory in the sense described above. Maybe all
of them  also require linguistic  practice – and, as Davidson held,  since having a language
requires  having  a  psychological  theory  (see  I.7.4),  perhaps  all  mental  states  thus  require
having a theory akin to the one I labelled a psychological one. In any case, subscribing to the
latter view will not be necessary for what follows.
I.6. Explanation in Intentional Psychology
I.6.1. Explanation and Ontology
The  central  concept  in  evaluating  psychological  theories  is  explanation.  This  is
because,  as  I  have  argued,  mental  states  should  be  understood  as  theoretical  concepts
introduced in psychological theories, and because this is so, they are weeded out according to
their  explanatory  value.  What  matters,  once  again  following Dennett’s  “scientific  path  to
realism” (Dennett 1991b: 28), is that they make for “good abstract objects” (ibid.: 29, see also
section I.5). Ontologically, this means that psychological states exist as such because there are
good theories in which they figure, and these theories are good because they have explanatory
value.
The  concept  of  explanatory  value  itself  is  intensional  as  well  as  relative.  It  is
intensional insofar as what counts as explaining something depends on the description of what
is to be explained. Generally, that something is intensional means that matters of designation
(or “extension”) are insufficient in order to properly deal with it. Following Frege (1892), the
fact that one thing, such as planet Venus, can be referred to in several ways, such as by both
“Morning Star” and “Evening Star”,  reflect  its  various  “senses” or  intensions.  Intentional
(psychological) contexts are paradigmatically intensional: Since “Reginald Kenneth Dwight”
and “Elton John” designate the same person (thus sharing their extension), “Reginald Kenneth
Dwight composed Crocodile Rock” follows logically from “Elton John composed Crocodile
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Rock”. However, it is safe to assume that a lot more people know that Elton John composed
Crocodile Rock than that Reginald Kenneth Dwight composed Crocodile Rock. So, in order to
find out whether an individual knows whether Dwight composed  Crocodile Rock, it is not
enough to find out whether they know that Elton John composed  Crocodile Rock, but also
whether they know that Dwight goes by the name of Elton John. Here, the form of description
(i.e. the intension) matters more than just the factual identity of what the two descriptions
refer to (i.e. the extension).
Analogously,  one description may count as an explanation, while another does not,
despite their having the very same extension. To borrow an example from Davidson (1980:
17), a hurricane may explain the occurrence of a catastrophe. If this hurricane was reported on
page 5 of Tuesday’s edition of the  New York Times, then “the event reported on page 5 of
Tuesday’s  NY Times” refers to the same thing as “a hurricane”. Still, were someone to ask:
“What caused this catastrophe?”, the answer “a hurricane” will surely count as an explanation,
whereas “the event reported on page 5 of Tuesday’s NY Times” would most likely not. This is
because explaining something requires making it intelligible to someone, and what counts as
intelligible to someone depends on what this person knows. For example, were someone to
actually know that this hurricane in fact  was (exclusively) reported on page 5 of Tuesday’s
NY Times, then, too, the answer “the event reported on page 5 of Tuesday’s NY Times” would
count as an explanation.  However, we can easily imagine cases in which the lack of said
knowledge would result in the unintelligibility of this answer.
This dependence on individual knowledge establishes the intensionality of the concept
of explanation, accounting for why the fact whether something counts as an explanation of
something  else  hinges  on  the  way it  is  described.  This  is  especially  true  in  all  cases  of
semantic explanation, that is, in elaborating on what a certain concept or term means. For
example,  we might  be unaware of what  “intensionality”  means,  and an explanation of its
meaning would necessarily consist in giving another “sense” or description (intension) of the
same (i.e.  extensionally identical)  concept.  You can see this  form of explanation  at  work
throughout this very paragraph in my attempts to make the meaning of “intension” clear.
Of course, there are other important forms of explanation beside semantic explanation.
In the example just cited, we looked at one form of causal explanation, where a hurricane was
invoked to causally explain the occurrence of a catastrophe. Usually, scientific explanations
are  causal  explanations.  Their  specific  form may  differ,  and  the  form of  explanation  in
physics certainly differs from explanations in biology or psychology. Still, I believe we can
explicate all of these as different forms of causal explanation, and I will go into this in a bit
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more detail later (see section I.6.2). What I would like to point out for now is that, looking
into the sciences,  the explanatory value of a theory is  determined in relation  to  available
alternatives. For example, Newtonian physics describe a great deal of physical occurences on
a  mesoscopic  level  quite  accurately,  whether  it  be  the  curve  of  a  thrown  object,  the
acceleration of an object on which a growing force is exerted, and so on. For this reason,
Newtonian Physics has been doing a stellar job and was for a while considered the standard
for physical explanation. However, Relativity and Quantum Mechanics are far superior when
it comes to describing and explaining occurences on microscopic and astronomical levels, and
the occurences on mesoscopic levels which are so well described by Newtonian Physics can
(with a grain of salt) be derived as special cases of General Relativity. Thus, Relativity and
Quantum Mechanics can be said to explain physical occurences much better than Newtonian
Physics,  and  with  the  former’s  advent,  the  latter’s  limitations  in  describing  our  universe
became apparent. Today, Newtonian Physics is usually considered an approximation of the
reality of physical laws – that is, it does not state the “real” facts of the matter, but useful
approximations.
Applying this relativity of explanatory force to matters of psychology, it may be the
case  that  Paul  Ekman’s  theory  of  basic  emotions  (see  Ekman  1999)  can  explain  why
emotional expressions are found to be quite homogenous across different cultures. However,
if  we  had  a  complete  theory  of  the  evolution  of  emotional  expressions,  involving  an
integration of, say, migratory patterns of the human species across the planet over the past few
million years, it would certainly dwarf Ekman’s theory when it comes to explanatory power.
That is not to say that either Newton’s or Ekman’s theories do not explain things to a certain
degree;  it’s  just  that  if  there  are  better  theories,  then  we  are  more  likely  to  accept  the
ontologies of the better theories, and to view the worse theories as useful tools instead of
reflections of the reality of things.
Coming back to mental states, this means that in order to find out what mental states
are, we do not simply look to any explanatory theory, but to the best (or at least to a group of
those which are currently considered best – there may not be a decisive criterion for which
theory is actually “the” best among a group of competing theories). This notion chimes with
Quine’s idea that  what there is is not decided by a-priori ruminations, intuitions or a direct
non-inferential perecption of external objects, but by what objects are assumed by the best
scientific theories (see Quine 1980: ch. 1). Briefly, according to Quine, the question “what is
there?” – i.e. what sort of entities exist – is decided by looking at what the bound variables are
in our  best  scientific  theories.  What  the best  theories  are  will  change over  time,  but  that
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explains why our ontologies do not stagnate, and why today we are more prone to believing
that the Higgs Boson exists rather than the Pantheon of Greek Gods, even though the latter
were  invoked  to  explain  observed  events:  Hephaestus’  activities  were  meant  to  explain
volcanic activity and Zeus’ wrath to explain thunderstorms. In this sense, ontology is relative
to the theories we adopt, but this ontological relativity is neither arbitrary nor random, and
thus cannot lead to a radical skepticism concerning the existence of the external world; for
what theories we adopt is tied to what external constraints are imposed on us. We do not
adopt theories arbitrarily or at random, and the mere practice of evaluating theories according
to their explanatory value assumes that there is an external constraint which is not under our
own  control,  but  reflects  aspects  of  an  independent  world.  How  exactly  these  external
constraints interact with our theories is a different question, but I believe it is safe to say that
we may well abandon all science if we seriously came to doubt this fact, and that, conversely,
all those who have followed me thus far in conceding that the cognitive sciences actually
deserve the monicker “sciences”, and that sciences in general do exist, will also follow me in
this matter and not yield to radical skepticism.
However, it is also true that there is more to our evaluation of what a good theory is
than  the  constraints  of  an  external  world.  Not  only  do  we  have  matters  of  theoretical
aesthetics to consider – such as parsimony, symmetry and the like –, which reflect our tastes
and our mindsets  more than the things  with which the theories  are concerned (except,  of
course, in those cases where the theories are about our tastes and mindsets), but also, in order
for theories to be good, they must be able to explain matters, and as I made clear at the outset
of this chapter, being able to explain things is an intensional notion, and so their being good
should crucially depend on our mindset. While explanations in the sciences are different from
semantic explanations, scientific explanations are not free of considerations of intelligibility.
For example, there certainly is a difference between the explanations to “what does the word
bachelor mean?” and “why does the sun rise every day?”. Both questions can be taken to
demand explanations,  but the former question demands  nothing but intelligibility,  because
semantic explanations are explanations meant to facilitate linguistic understanding. Whereas
for scientific explanations, intelligibility is a requirement, but not their be-all and end-all. The
minimum requirement  is  that  someone’s knowledge is  sufficient  to  make  the  explanation
intelligible, but not  everyone’s. I imagine all of us accept a lot of scientific explanations to
actually qualify as explanations, even though we lack the knowledge to render them fully
intelligible  to  us.  However,  we would demand  that  at  least  those who have the  required
knowledge in the respective field do understand the explanation, meaning that they could give
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a comprehensive  account  of  how and why the provided explanation  actually  explains  the
matter.
It is these questions of intelligibility which leave us with more things to consider than
just objective, external constraints on our theories, even though the theories are ultimately
about these external constraints, namely, about the external world. For example, two theories
may be about the same things, but one may be more intelligible, making it superior to the
other, lending it superior explanatory value. At other times, the available evidence may make
it  impossible  for  us  to  decide  between  two  competing  theories,  even  though  they  seem
mutually unreconcilable.  And thirdly,  there may be a fundamental  indeterminacy at  work,
which may make it impossible for us to decide between competing theories, no matter how
much evidence is invoked. The latter has been claimed for the case of intentional theories,
popularly by Quine, Davidson and Dennett.
In Davidson’s case, the indeterminacy would boil down to using different “scales” in a
description of intentional states. Davidson uses this comparison to make clear  the holistic
nature of the theory of mental ascriptions:
“Just as we cannot intelligibly assign a length to any object unless a comprehensive theory 
holds of objects of that sort, we cannot intelligibly attribute any propositional attitude to an 
agent except within the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires,  intentions, and 
decisions.  There is no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis of his verbal  
behaviour, his choices, or other local signs no matter how plain and evident, for we make  
sense of  particular  beliefs  only as  they cohere  with other  beliefs,  with preferences,  with  
intentions, hopes, fears, expectations, and the rest. It is not merely, as with the measurement of
length, that each case tests a theory and depends upon it, but that the content of a propositional
attitude derives from its place in the pattern” (Davidson 1980: 221).
According to this conventionalist view of semantics (cf. Field 1975), there can be indefinitely
many  theories  of  interpretation  which  are  equally  suited  for  interpreting  the  available
evidence; this fact might not be apparent to us, since we are able to alternate between different
similarly probable theories while trying to interpret another person’s utterances. As long as it
is not entirely clear to us what an agent means, several possible theories remain suspended
and readily available – the fact that we eventually opt for one over another does not imply that
we have decisive evidence for it, but will rather reflect a pragmatic choice, such as our need
for a quickly and flexibly usable theory (cf. Davidson 2001a: 214). Since what counts as an
acceptable theory is measured by how well  it  predicts “the truth conditions  of sentences”
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(Davidson 2001a:  74,  see II.8.4.2),  it  is  apparent  that  indefinitely many theories  could in
principle satisfy this criterion, just as indefinitely many numbers can express the fact that one
object is three times as large as another (and here we shouldn’t just think of different scales,
but also all equivalent expansions of the fraction 1:3, such as 2:6, 3:9, 4:12 etc.).
Dennett, on the other hand, has a more fundamental disagreement between intentional
theories in mind, which goes beyond stating them in terms of something akin to differing
scales of measurement, and it allegedly makes him “less of a realist than Davidson (…). I see
that there could be two different systems of belief attribution to an individual which differed
substantially in what they attributed – even in yielding substantially different predictions of
the individual’s future behaviour – and yet where no deeper fact of the matter could establish
that one was a description of the individual’s real beliefs and the other not” (Dennett 1991b:
49).  The issue of indeterminacy is  a prominent  one in  theories  of intentionality (see also
Levine 1987: 272 f.), but for now, the point for me to make is simply to point out that what is
a  good  theory  depends  on  different  factors,  some  of  which  can  be  related  to  external
constraints, others to theoretical aesthetics, and still  others to matters of intelligibility and,
beyond  these,  it  is  possible  that  indeterminacy  will  still  leave  us  with  several  mutually
irreconcilable theories. However, the theories we end up with are nevertheless worth being
called “our best theories”, and they are what informs our ontologies.
I do not believe that such a picture warrants any immediate conclusions pertaining to
the reality of the concepts under theoretical consideration. If anything, the theory-ladenness of
psychological explanation does not rob the things denoted by its kind-terms of their reality,
but adds further criteria for them to meet in order to enter the theory besides their being real:
they  need  to  yield  an  explanatory  surplus.  That  is,  introducing  a  mental  state  into  a
psychological theory implies that doing so is of explanatory value; for example, being able to
ascribe a specific belief to someone implies that the belief so ascribed explains something
which the ascription of a different belief (or ascribing the lack of it) would not explain. And
that it explains something entails that there are objective properties of agents which are in
need of explaining – thus, for a mental state to explain it, it must refer to something which
has, at least in principle, aspects which go beyond what is radically subjective (see section
I.7). Mental states may also have purely subjective aspects: my childhood memory of visiting
Legoland  in  Denmark  is  associated  with  a  nostalgic  feeling  which  is  only  accessible  to
myself.  But memory itself  would not be a psychological  term,  and the memory’s  content
unascribable,  if  there  were  no  intersubjectively  accessible  properties  which  could  be
explained by ascribing this memory to me or to others.
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I.6.2. Nomological Explanation
As I have mentioned in section I.5, I take psychological explanation to be a form of
nomological  explanation  (cf.  Goldman 2012:  403).  Nomological  explanation  is  a  form of
explanation which relies on causality, laws and kinds. Elevating a certain general term to the
status  of  a  scientific  “kind”  marks  a  distinction  between  general  statements  which  are
inductively supportable by their instantiations (i.e. “projectible”, see Quine 1969: ch. 5) by
picking out causal relations between kinds, and those which are not. We call the projectible
statements “laws”; their lawlike status is what allows us to make predictions (looking to the
future) and give explanations (looking to a past event). 
To borrow an example from Nelson Goodman (see his 1983: 18 f.): The fact that all
coins in his pocket are made of silver does not give us evidence to suppose that the next coin
which is put into his pocket will be made of silver as well. Just the opposite: If this next coin
wasn’t silver to begin with, we have very good reason to believe it will in fact not turn silver
merely by being put into Goodman’s pocket. In spite of this, knowing that all pieces of butter
have always melted when heated to 150°F, we would reasonably want to conclude that if the
next solid piece of butter is heated to 150°F, it  will  melt  as well.  The notable difference
between  these  two  generalisations,  which  makes  the  latter  a  natural  law and  the  former
absurd, is that the relevant concepts (butter, change of temperature, state change from solid to
fluid) either themselves refer to natural kinds or are restatable in such terms.
Nomological explanations work by establishing that a given event falls under a general
law, and the fact that it does so explains the event in question. For example, the fact that a
given piece of butter  melts  when heated to 150°F is explained by the fact that there is  a
general law from which follows that butter melts at 150°F. That there are circumstances under
which laws fail to hold are specified by so-called ceteris paribus clauses. For example, water
fails to freeze at 0°C if it is stirred. So, for the law to be true, one of its ceteris paribus clauses
needs to exclude stirring. Laws themselves are typically explained by integration into higher-
order laws: for example, the chemical properties of water can be integrated into physical laws,
and one job of physicists consists of seeking out more general laws from which these more
specific laws can be derived.
While these ideas about nomological explanation should be applicable widely enough,
we should not assume that the term “law” always applies to the same thing across different
disciplines. To pick a field particularly unlike physics, let’s say that if some might want to
posit laws in the theory of art, then they would possibly want to do so without relying on
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anything like an inductive empirical confirmation of these laws. Others might want to hold
that there are conceptual laws – laws which mathematics, logics and philosophy make use of
–, which might, again, not have anything substantial to do with empirical confirmation. In
such  cases,  what  I  am going to  claim in  the  following  need  not  apply.  I  will  solely  be
concerned with sciences  whose laws stand in an important  relation  to  empirical  evidence
and/or can be said to govern what happens in the empirically accessible world. Whether the
use  of  the  term  law  actually  does  vary  systematically  is  not  the  subject  of  my  present
investigation – I merely suggest that, given my examples above, if we were to ask scientists
from different disciplines, we might get differing answers, and if we were to look at how they
actually use the term, we might come up with substantially differing analyses of this use. I
would not even expect to find a systematically homogeneous use of the term even within the
cognitive  sciences,  or  those  sciences  adjacent  to  psychology,  the  neurosciences,  and
philosophy of mind. All that presently matters is coming up with an analysis of this term
which can be used sufficiently similarly across the relevant disciplines. Thus, the following is
not meant as an empirical description of how scientists in the field use the term “law”, but
rather, how we can use this term (and related terms) to aptly describe what these scientists are
doing.
In the cases I just restricted my analysis to, saying that a generalisation is lawlike is the
same as saying that it is supported inductively by evidence about the properties of its objects,
the  evidence  being  singular  empirical  statements.  These  singular  statements  are  typically
observations of a specific event occuring or state of affairs holding at a given time. If this
specific event or state of affairs is confirmed to systematically reoccur or hold across different
observations,  and  there  is  an  explanation  for  this  permanence,  then  the  viability  of  the
explanation  is  said  to  be  supported  by  the  singular  empirical  statements  –  the  evidence.
Crucially, the relation between the lawlike explanation and the singular statements is not just
one of summing up the singular statements. Rather, there has to be a criterion for whether
particular singular statements can support generalisations. Compare, once again, Goodman’s
case of having but silver coins in one’s pocket – no singular statement about all coins in one’s
pocket being silver at a given time (or several such statements at several different points in
time) supports any general statement about all coins in one’s pockets having to be silver at all
times.
But what could this  criterion  be? According to Davidson, it  always  involves a  petitio
principii:
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“Lawlike statements are general statements that support counterfactual and subjunctive claims,
and are supported by their instances. There is (in my view) no non-question-begging criterion 
of the lawlike, which is not to say there are no reasons in particular cases for a judgement.  
Lawlikeness is a matter of degree, which is not to deny that there may be cases beyond debate.
And within limits set by the conditions of communication, there is room for much variation 
between individuals in the pattern of statements to which various degrees of nomologicality 
are assigned. In all these respects nomologicality is much like analyticity, as one might expect 
since both are linked to meaning” (Davidson 1980: 217 f.).
Said  petitio  principii  consists  in  a  tightly  woven conceptual  circle  between the  terms
“law”,  “natural  kind”  and  “projectibility”.  As  just  mentioned,  projectibility  is  a  general
statement’s property of being supportable by singular statements which count as evidence for
the general statement’s truth (cf. Quine 1969: ch. 5). The circle goes like this: Natural kinds
are objects which are projectible, they are projectible if they figure in natural laws, natural
laws are generalisations of singular statements about natural kinds. Virtuous as it may be, the
analytic circle is tight, and thus, on the face of it, unsatisfying. However, satisfaction can be
gained by looking at a specific example of how exactly laws get to be explanatory: Picture
water – H2O in its liquid form, between 0° and 100° Celsius – being heated to a temperature
of 100° C or more, thus vaporising, undergoing a phase transition from liquid to gaseous. An
appropriate lawlike generalisation would be “ceteris paribus, if H2O is heated above 100°C, it
vaporises”. It is lawlike because it is projectible: If H2O will be heated above 100°C, then,
ceteris paribus, it will vaporise – tomorrow, the day after, next year, or whenever. This law is
confirmed by its  singular instances: Ceteris  paribus,  any instance of H2O which is  heated
above 100°C and vaporises confirms the respective law.
While, as I pointed out, I would not dare assume that all theories in any scientific field
consist of natural kinds and laws in the same sense that theories in the natural sciences do, I
urge to concede that at least a set of analogous terms is available even to those sciences which
do not fit squarely into the category of the “natural sciences”. How and in what sense would
these  be  analogous?  For  one,  they  are  kinds,  but  not  exactly  natural.  For  instance,  Ian
Hacking, while ultimately concluding that “there is no such thing as a natural kind” (Hacking
2007: 203), sides with William Whewell (who in the mid-1800s informed the scientific use of
the term “kind”) in asserting that “Whewell was, in my opinion, on the right track when he
said that a kind is a class denoted by a common name about which there is the possibility of
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general, intelligible and consistent, and probably true assertions” (ibid.: 238).26 That Hacking
can deny the existence of natural kinds, all the while asserting that kinds do exist (namely in
the  form of  a  certain  class),  has  to  do  with  his  taking  “natural”  as  a  concept  heavy  on
irredeemable metaphysics. Consequently, he aims to rid the notion of kinds of the notion of
having to be “natural”. Hacking himself is especially concerned with kinds of humans (such
as those marked by a certain mental disorder), and thus it makes sense for him to introduce
the distinction between  interactive kinds and  indifferent kinds:  Kinds of humans qualify as
interactive kinds since
“people are agents, they act, as the philosophers say, under descriptions. The courses of action 
they choose, and indeed their ways of being, are by no means independent of the available  
descriptions under which they may act. (...) What was known about people of a kind may  
become false because people of that kind have changed in virtue of how they have been  
classified, what they believe about themselves, or because of how they have been treated as so 
classified. There is a looping effect. (…) [On the other hand, q]uarks are not aware. A few of 
them may be affected by what people do to them in accelerators. Our knowledge about quarks 
affects quarks, but not because they become aware of what we know, and act accordingly”  
(Hacking 1999: 103 ff.).
Which is  why quarks qualify as indifferent  kinds.  Similarly,  Kusch suggests a  distinction
between  social,  artificial  and  natural  kinds  (Kusch  1999:  257)  in  place  of  the  familiar
monolithic concept of natural kinds.
It is easy to see that the natural sciences, insofar as the properties of the objects they
are researching are not determined socially or agentially, could afford to rely on a monolithic
notion of “natural kinds”. As Hacking has pointed out, quarks are indifferent to our social
practices, and proper results about them are free of the determinants of human intervention.27
However, since we are wading in murkier waters, and the cognitive sciences are by definition
pervaded by interactive kinds, we would do well not to blindly accept said monolithic notion.
26 For on overview of the historical background, focussing especially on the debate about natural kinds between
Whewell and John Stuart Mill, see Snyder 2006: chapter 3.
27 Of course, observation can already be construed as intervention, especially when dealing with quantum effects.
However, the mere fact that an object exhibits an effect caused by its observation alone does not preclude the
possibility of classifying these effects as “natural” and the laws pertaining to these effects as “natural laws”.
Going back to Hacking’s quote, quarks are not aware; that is, even if observation has an effect on them, these
effects cannot be explained by their being agents or by their being social (or generally, by their being anything
but natural). Thus, the salvageable distinction is that between effects exhibited by agents and those exhibited by
indifferent  objects  (where  “indifferent”  does  not  mean “not  being  affected  by observation”  but  rather  “not
reacting  to  observation  under  agential  descriptions  or  explanations”).  (Compare  Dennett  in  Edmonds  &
Warburton 2015: 130 and section I.4.4.)
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Getting rid of it can only mean a gain in methodological accuracy, and not at all a loss in
objectivity or scientific standards: For example, in case of the neurosciences, it merely means
acknowleding that parts of human brains, whose causal properties we seek to specify (thus
making them “kinds” in neuroscientific theories), change depending on social interaction, and
that some of these interactions consist in what we subsume under “scientific practice”.  That
is, not only does something in an experimental subject’s brain change when performing a
given experimental  task,  and not  only does a  neuroscientist’s  brain change whenever  she
performs neuroscience, but theories in the cognitive sciences in general affect the properties
of those kinds which figure in such theories.  When concerned with investigating the human
mind, overlooking this interactivity would distort results.
I  take the concept  “kind” to be the basic notion about which Hacking says  that it
denotes said class “about which there is the possibility of general, intelligible and consistent,
and probably true assertions”, and I will restrict my use of it to scientific contexts. Since I am
not going to say anything crucial  about sciences which have no laws at  all,  but will  stay
within the domain of the cognitive sciences, which I assume has laws, I will further restrict it
to the use in laws. That is,  kinds are what scientific  lawlike generalisations  can be made
about. My take on what is properly scientific is rather lenient, insofar as I admit not only laws
which are supported inductively and empirically, or laws which can be stated in quantifiable
terms,  as properly scientific.  Rather,  I  admit  both quantitative and qualitative laws, and I
admit many different forms of systematic generalisations which yield explanatory surplus in
the cognitive sciences, even though some of these have a reputation of not being completely
empirical. For instance, many philosophers and psychologists suspect that psychological laws
are neither as strict as physical laws, nor could be completely rid of intentional and semantic
terminology. This is what I am going to elaborate on in the following sections.
I.6.3. Intentional Explanation
Explanation  by  intentional  mental  states  is  the  form of  psychological  explanation
which has classically been of special interest to the analytic philosophy of mind. Yet, its use
to cognitive science remains controversial.  Between Jerry Fodor, who believes there is no
serious rival to its explanatory power (cf. Fodor 1989: 6), and Patricia and Paul Churchland,
who endorse the eventual abandonment and replacement of the “propositional attitudes” by
neuronal states (see e.g. Churchland 1981), virtually every possible position can be placed. I
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am not going to discuss eliminativism here, except for the brief suggestion that, if we are to
construe it  as an unshakable faith  in a future abandonment of mental  states,  this  position
should appear as a risky gamble, depending on “presumptive theses way out in front of the
empirical support they require” (Dennett 1991b: 51). It is far from clear how current research
could support the theoretical elimination of mental states (cf. Gold & Stoljar 1999).
While  I  aim  to  make  a  stronger  case  for  the  explanatory  value  of  intentional
psychology, a minimal case can be made for the importance of taking intentional explanation
seriously for the sake of interdisciplinary communication:
“At a bare minimum, trying to understand the relationship between the  intentional stance,  
which common folk and some scientists take towards human organisms,  and the  physical  
stance—the  assumption  that  an  organism’s  behavior  has  internal  physical  (e.g.,  neural,  
biochemical) causes—seems prerequisite for effective interdisciplinary communication. No  
reasons exist to think practitioners in areas of science outside of neuroscience will completely 
abandon their appeals to folk psychological explanations of behavior, nor is the eliminative 
materialism  for  which  Paul  Churchland  (1981)  advocates  obviously  in  the  offing.  
Furthermore, given that misunderstandings between neuroscientists and ordinary folk who are 
looking towards neuroscience for answers may also arise, it seems legitimate for the sake of 
clarity for neuroscientists to be clear about how they understand the mind and how and in what
ways that differs from how non-scientists think about it” (Sullivan 2014: FN 5, 63f.).
Now, how do intentional states actually explain behaviour? For illustrative purporses,
consider the following example: Suppose Kate and Henry are invited to a social event, and
suppose also that they know they are required to bring food and beverages. Since it is more
convenient for them to split these tasks, Kate expresses her intention to Henry to bring food,
knowing that Henry will then bring beverages. If we witness Henry’s buying the required
beverages in time for the social event, we will explain this by mentioning some crucial part of
this story. And if we are to get to the bottom of the explanatory role of mental states, we ought
to give a full, non-elliptic explanation and see what it consists in. Thus, we are required to
make Kate’s knowledge that, by making explicit to Henry her intention to bring food, she
intends to persuade the latter that he’d best bring beverages a necessary part of it. The fact
that this ascription of this very mental state to Kate is essential does not merely follow from
Henry’s buying beverages in time for the social event, since Henry might very well have not
been listening to Kate at all; he could have been distracted and not register Kate’s assertion
that she intends to buy beverages, and have had an independent reason to buy them, thus
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rendering Kate’s mental  state  explanatorily  inert.  But  that  is  not  what  happened,  and our
requiring a full explanation for this case is to request more than giving an explanation of just
any instance of Henry’s buying beverages: It is to request the explanation for this special case
just as it happened at this point in time, given this  sequence of events. And in this case, we
know that Henry’s being persuaded by Kate led to his buying beverages (rather than just, say,
his knowing that beverages had to be bought by someone in time for the social event). This
insistence that only certain salient features of the environment actually explain an action, as
opposed to those features of the environment which could reasonably prompt it, hints at the
need for accounting for epistemic properties of the subject whose actions are to be explained:
Only those features of the environment which reasonably prompt an action and which are
cognitively available to the agent can count as explanatory.28 The fact that Kate’s persuasion
was effective in this case, but might not have been effective in other cases in which Henry
bought beverages for other reasons, can be highlighted by saying that Kate’s persuasion was
the  cause of Henry’s buying beverages (here, I am following Davidson’s highly influential
account of causal action explanations – see Davidson 1980: 3-18).
So, Kate’s mental state is essential for explaining Henry’s action because there is a
causal connection leading from the former to the latter. How does this connection come to
pass  –  i.e.  what  are  the  relevant  parts  of  the  underlying  mechanism?  Firstly,  it  critically
involves some properties of Kate’s which led Henry to believe that she promised to bring
food. These properties have to fulfill two requirements: They have to be expressions of Kate’s
mental  state,  and  they  have  to  be  observable  (or,  more  specifically:  in  order  to  be  of
explanatory value, a sufficient amount of these have to actually be perceived by Henry). That
they have to be expressions of Kate’s mental state is to say that Henry’s interpreting these as
being evidence for Kate’s mental state is justified. Henry could be so confused as to interpret
any perceivable set of properties of Kate’s as expressing any arbitrarily assigned mental state;
but  in most  cases,  he would be objectively wrong,  and he would be wrong according to
intersubjectively  available  justification  conditions  for  the  ascription  of  mental  states  (see
section I.7). If there were no such conditions, no one could ever be wrong in their ascribing
any mental state to any person.29 What he needs to manage is to connect Kate’s observable
28 This explains why intentional ascriptions create  intensional contexts: Contents in intentional ascriptions can
only be substituted by those which have the same extension and the agent knows about (see Quine 1980: ch. 8).
When judging whether someone knows that Reginald Kenneth Dwight has been knighted it does not only matter
that in fact  he and Elton John are the same person and that she knows that Sir Elton John has in fact  been
knighted – what also matters is whether she knows that “Reginald Kenneth Dwight” and “Elton John” designate
the same person. See section I.6.1.
29 Assuming that the practice of ascribing mental states is not a big hoax, I will take my following elaboration of
an account of what these conditions consist in to be more worthwhile than their justification. Of course, if there
is no independent, empirical proof that mental states have explanatory value, then this account will be circular:
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properties systematically to his ascription of mental states in a consistent way; among other
things, that means that he himself can explain Kate’s actions by referring to the mental states
he ascribed to her. For instance, his interpreting Kate’s observable properties as meaning that
she loves ice cream should put Henry in a position to be able to explain her grabbing more ice
cream than, say, Bob (whose observable properties allow Henry to ascribe to him the mental
state that he’s indifferent toward ice cream).
The observable properties which justify the ascription of mental states such as “liking
ice cream” will obviously have to go beyond post-hoc ascriptions. For instance, in order for
the mental ascription to be a predictor worthy of its name, the ascription should be in place
well before the bearer of the mental state in question actually goes for the ice cream in any
event which is to be predicted. Also, for mental states to exceed purely behaviourist notions,
they  should  be  more  than  dispositions  to  behaviour,  and  to  some  degree  theoretically
independent of the actual behaviour associated with them. While behaviour is constitutive (or
“criterial”)  for  ascribing  mental  states,  explanation  by  mental  states  is  not  behaviourist
explanation  (see  section  I.7.3):  psychological  states  need  not  “draw  inferences  from
behavioral evidence, [but] (…) the fact that overt behavior is evidence for (…) [them] is built
into the very logic of these concepts,  just  as the fact that observable behavior of gases is
evidence for molecular  [states] (…) is  built  into the very logic of molecule talk” (Sellars
1997: 107, §59).
It would also be mistaken to insist that behaviour being constitutive for mental states
implies  that they can only be had if  they result  in  behavior.  For example,  a patient  with
locked-in syndrome can plausibly have mental  states. She could be able to think and feel
without  any of  us  noticing,  and without  any of  her  mental  states  ever  resulting  in  overt
behaviour. What the grounding in behaviour is meant to imply is that the connection between
mental states and behavior cannot be theoretically severed: That is, mental states are kind-
terms  which  exist  because  the  theories  which  give  them their  meaning  explain  behavior.
Whenever a patient  with locked-in syndrome has a mental  state,  she has a state which is
paradigmatically invoked to explain behavior, a state whose theoretical significance lies in
explaining behavior. Still, it can practically occur without doing its explanatory job, and it just
for then it will look as though I’m assuming that mental states have explanatory value because there is a practice
of ascribing mental states, and that there is a practice of ascription because mental states are of explanatory
value. Therefore, I claim that such proof can be given independently, and I imagine this proof to proceed along
the lines of Fodor’s defense of the propositional attitudes (in his 1989: ch. 1). It consists in facts like these: If A
intends to be at a conference next Tuesday, then knowing his intention is a better predictor for A’s whereabouts
next Tuesday than any other (non-mental) fact about A.
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so happens to be unable to explain any behaviour of a patient who is physically kept from
behaving.30
Intentional explanation as just illustrated is a form of causal explanation, and it works
by stating the relevant beliefs, desires, intentions or other propositional attitudes which have
caused the explanandum. Even though, as I have made clear  in section I.2, intentional and
intended are not synonymous (i.e. intentions are a subclass of intentional states), actions are
both intentional and intended; they are intentional insofar as they are aimed at something (and
explained by mental states whose intentional objects are explanatorily related to the action in
question), and they are performed with an intention.  The general form of this explanation
(following Davidson 1980: 5) is this:
(I) A desires to bring about X
(II) A believes that doing Y leads to X
(C) A does Y (or at least intends or is motivated to do Y).
Here, Y is the explained action, and it is explained by making explicit A’s desire aimed at X
and her belief that Y leads to X. A’s doing Y is being explained by stating (I) and (II) because
it is specified by the conclusion following logically from (I) and (II).
Still, the logical form alone is not the whole story when it comes to the explanatory
force of intentional explanations. Rather, the logical form above describes what we are prone
to accept as intentional explanations. But why do we accept this form of explanation in the
first place? Or, more specifically: Why do explanations of this form explain anything in the
sense of making the respective action intelligible to us?
This  is  because  intentional  explanation  is  systematically  intertwined  with
intelligibility; namely, with meaning and understanding. Following Davidson, understanding
meaning is a matter of attributing rational intentional mental states:
“we could not begin to decode a man’s sayings if we could not make out his attitudes towards
his sentences, such as holding, wishing, or wanting them to be true. Beginning from these
attitudes, we must work out a theory of what he means, thus simultaneously giving content to
his attitudes and to his words. In our need to make him make sense, we will try for a theory
that finds him consistent, a believer of truths, and a lover of the good (all by our own lights, it
goes without saying)” (Davidson 1980: 222). “Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power
30 Compare the analogous case Block makes for patients with locked-in syndrome potentially being conscious,
while being entirely unable to report their being conscious (Block 2007: 483 f.).
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of a theory of behaviour forces us to bring more and more of the whole system of the agent’s
beliefs and motives directly into account. But in inferring this system from the evidence, we
necessarily impose conditions of coherence, rationality, and consistency” (ibid.: 231, see also
241).
That is, by attributing intentional mental states to someone, we understand them, and
their  function  of  explaining  actions  is  the  very  basis  for  attributing  intentional  states  to
someone. Since actions are intentional to begin with, they are in specific ways related to the
environment by being directed at certain parts of it. Thus, the agents’ specific directedness at
their  environment  goes  hand  in  hand  with  what  they  believe  to  be  the  case  in  this
environment,  what they desire from it,  and so on. While there are shortcuts to attributing
mental states, such shortcuts fundamentally depend on a (as Davidson says, by our own lights)
rational and consistent connection between assigned intentional mental states and observed
actions in a meaningful environment (for the details, see section I.7.4):
Usually, we do not attribute mental states to our peers from scratch – that is, we do not
have to  invoke the ultimate  bases of mental  states  in  order  to  attribute  them.  Rather,  we
simply go ahead and assume a lot of these states based on contextual cues, such as social
context, self-reports and/or third-person reports. Often, the fact that someone is a bureaucrat
alone explains a lot of their actions directly,  since we simply assume a great deal of their
intentional  states  (and  if  we  first  observe  someone’s  actions  without  knowing  they’re
bureaucrats, being told that in fact they are bureaucrats can explain a lot as well). And being
told that someone is a party member explains why they raise their hands during voting at their
party rally, in a way that being told that they are a bystander does not (compare Danto 1973:
ix f.).
I.6.4. The Normativity of Intentional Explanation
As we have just seen, psychological natural kinds may seem a bit odd when compared
to those invoked by natural sciences like physics or chemistry, since they are related to one
another not only by causal laws but by logical and normative ones as well:
“[I]t is the myth of our rational agenthood that structures and organizes our attributions of  
belief and desire to others and that regulates our own deliberations and investigations. (…) 
Folk psychology,  then, is idealized in that it produces its predictions and explanations by  
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calculating  in  a  normative  system;  it  predicts  what  we  will  believe,  desire,  and  do,  by  
determining what we ought to believe, desire, and do” (Dennett 1987: 52).
For instance, if I promise to give a speech at a conference next month,  then that promise
(together with the assumption that I understand what promises are, and that my psychological
constitution is such that I usually keep them) supports the prediction that I will be at that
conference next month. Why? Because I had better! And if I believe that keeping promises is
a good thing, and being at the conference next month is a way of keeping my promise, then
that also supports the prediction that I will be at that conference next month. Why? Because
it’s only logical! There is little doubt that by way of their predictive and explanatory power,
normative  and  logical  relations  such  as  the  ones  invoked  in  these  examples  figure  in
psychological laws, and that when it comes to predicting and explaining human actions, these
psychological laws are superior to any other laws from any other field (such as mechanics; see
Fodor 1989: 6). The latter claim is vindicated by facts such as that David Cameron’s often
heading to 10 Downing Street after his day at work is best explained by the conjunction of his
beliefs that the United Kingdom’s prime ministers resides there and that he himself currently
holds this office.
Given  that  we  usually  expect  causal  theories  to  not  rely  on  normative  notions  –
shouldn’t causes rather pick out things  descriptively? –, we need to reconcile the notions of
nomological causality and normativity inherent in intentional psychology. First, let me loosely
invoke some minimal criteria for what counts as a causal relationship. I am going to briefly
sketch how intentional psychology meets them. But more importantly, I will show how its
normative aspect is in fact conducive to its meeting them.
Firstly,  we  should  require  that  A  constitutes  a  cause  of  B  if  A  brings  about  B.
Secondly, A and B need to be types of events, not tokens. That is, singular events can only
ever counts as instantiating lawlike causal relationships if these laws apply to such events in
virtue of certain generalisable properties exhibited during these events, namely kinds. So, in
order for beliefs, desires and intentions to have explanatory power and to constitute kinds,
many  different  persons  across  many  different  situations  need  to  be  able  to  have  beliefs,
desires, and intentions (see I.6.5). Thirdly, there needs to be a theory from which it follows
that  A  causes  B.  (This  criterion  takes  care  of  our  wanting  to  support  predictions  and
counterfactual reasoning about causal relationships, such as “if A would have occurred, B
would have occured”.) Fourth, this theory should not be contradicted by  a clearly superior
theory. A theory is explanatorily superior to another if it explains more phenomena or if it
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explains the same amount of phenomena more efficiently (by e.g. being more sparse, more
consistent, better integratable into other theories we accept, or better understandable).
What counts as A’s bringing about B is related to what we scientifically know about
the world. That is, not only does fiction or ideological dogma not establish what causes are,
but neither does much of what we had thought of as science or explanatory models in the past.
Magic  is  not  a  cause  of  sickness,  phlogiston  is  not  a  cause  of  combustion,  and  male
masturbation is not a cause of depletion of the masturbator’s spinal fluid. This also means
that,  since  psychology  introduces  its  natural  kinds  and  its  notion  of  nomological  causal
relatedness between them to explain certain phenomena, psychology’s alleged causes cease to
be real if a supreme science comes along, which robs psychology of its dominant status when
it comes to explaining, say, why people often show up at the places they intend to show up
(compare I.5). Only then will mental states turn out not to be kinds and not to be causally
efficacious,  in  whatever  sense  the  new  science  requires  them  to  neither  be  kinds  nor
efficacious. Any science has to face this danger, and realistically, what we’re going to have to
deal with in the foreseeable future is not a paradigm change in the wake of the advent of a
supreme science, but new psychological theories which outdate the old ones. Revisions are
ever ongoing.
According  to  the  invoked  criteria,  either  of  the  previously  invoked  normative  or
logical relations, which form the basis of intentional laws, count as specifying causes, since
both the norm that I should keep my promise, as well as the logical syllogism constituted by
my desire to keep promises on the one hand, and my belief that attending the conference is a
way to keep it on the other hand, brings about my attending the conference (or stands in some
other nomological relation to my attending the conference, such as a probabilistic one). These
laws are broadly applicable in virtue of intentional attitudes being kind-terms which can be
instantiated  across  many  different  individuals  and  situations,  and  they  are  instantiated
according to fixed, if usually implicit, criteria for what counts as having one such attitude (see
section  I.7.1.).  The  laws  themselves  follow  either  from  the  conceptual  relations  holding
between the kind-terms (such as, ceteris paribus, desiring to drink causes drinking), from the
logical form of action explanation (inherent in said syllogism, see section I.6.3.), and/or from
rational norms or the psychological efficacy of reasons.
But does the normativity of intentional laws dilute the scientific quality of intentional
psychology? That is, does the latter have to invoke something which is completely removed
from descriptive  or  natural  facts?  Does intentional  psychology amount  to  a  mythological
narrative or a form of hermeneutics rather than a “hard” objective science? To allay such
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worries, it should be stressed that normative and logical relations do not  directly enter into
predictions or explanations of intentional psychology, and that there is a dichotomy between
describing psychological causes and what is generally logical or reasonable in a normative
sense. On the one hand, in order for a reason-explanation to work, it has to pick out a reason
that is or was in fact efficacious in the agent’s mind – one that was cognitively transparent to
her  and which  caused  her  action.  But  on  the  other  hand,  in  order  for  this  reason to  be
explanatory, it has to be applicable in a psychological law, and thus generalisable. And which
psychological law is generalisable at least partly relies on what’s rational, and thus on more
than the cognitive makeup of individual agents. That is, laws are often generalised because
they are rational: individual agents are generally trained to shape their thoughts, desires and
intentions according to what is deemed rational (both in a minimal logical as well as in a more
substantial  moral  sense)  and so instantiations  of  psychological  laws are partly  due to  the
respective law’s being rational. Thus, external norms can be cited as causes, but not merely by
being “reasonable” in an abstract sense, but by therefore being efficacious in the event that is
to  be  explained,  namely  by  causing  an  agent  to  share  this  norm  and  act  or  reason  in
accordance with it. Rationality can in this way shape our cognitive apparatus and therefore
needs  to  be  descriptively (not  normatively)  invoked  as  a  cause  for  the  structure  of  our
cognitive make-up (see section II.3).
That is: Yes, we should accept that there are in fact norms, and that they potentially
come from a not entirely scientific place, such as a social convention (e.g. about promise-
giving and -keeping). However, some norms which intentional cognitive capacities rely on are
even less conspicuous: in chapter II, my analysis will rely on evolutionary aims, which can be
explicated as indicating,  say,  that a toad  should catch worms (see also section I.8.4). This
“norm”,  of  course,  is  akin  to  a  natural  fact  (given  the  toad’s  organismic  structure  and
evolutionary history).
Some confusion is  caused by the commonly ambivalent  use of the term “reason”,
namely  as  referring  to  an  actual  psychological  cause  as  well  as  to  something  which
normatively governs psychological causes, both internally (“she reasoned that she should stop
smoking”) as well as externally (“reason demands that she should stop smoking”). To clearly
bring  out  this  distinction,  we can  pick  out  an unreasonable  (i.e.  normatively  or  logically
unsound) desire as being the reason (i.e. psychological cause) for someone’s action.31 This
reason to act is a descriptive notion when it comes to explaining action; it refers to something
31 Classically,  human psychology has often been marked using a dichotomy between reason and emotion (or
desires/passions).  This  dichotomy  is  not  to  be  transferred  to  models  of  intentional  explanation,  since
emotions/desires/passions also constitute intentional reasons (i.e. psychological causes) to act.
Intentional Psychology 75
which  descriptively  persists,  namely  an  intentionally  characterised  cause  for  an  action,
something which is part of the real psychological make-up of an agent. On the other hand,
what  has  been  called  reason  in  a  second  sense,  namely  as  a  faculty  governing  mental
processes in accordance with norms of rationality, shapes our actions insofar as we can strive
to act in accordance with it. For example, perhaps there is someone who desires apples more
than  oranges,  and  oranges  more  than  bananas,  but  bananas  more  than  apples.  Any  such
preference ordering A > B > C > A is irrational in the sense that it makes us exploitable: on a
behavioural interpretation, it means that we are willing to trade A and some sum for B, then to
trade B and some sum for C, then C and some sum for A, ad infinitum, thus losing everything
while never gaining anything – anything but the satisfaction of our irrational desire, perhaps
(cf. Ramsey 1931:  156-198 and Davidson et  al.  1955).  Yet,  while  they are in  this  sense
irrational, it may be true of anyone that they have these desires, and in such a case these could
causally explain why such a person keeps losing money. Thus, an irrational desire can explain
my actions,  and in  this  sense  constitute  a  psychological  cause.  On the  other  hand,  what
rationally justifies an action need not specify what actually causes an action: What we usually
call “reason” is a normative ideal to guide our actions, while not necessarily constituting our
actual psychological causes.  Certainly,  neither our mental states nor our behaviour strictly
adhere to what is logical, which is why we usually don’t explain actions by merely assuming
that carrying them out was logical (the fact that Mr. Spock, a prime example of someone who
would do this, hails from science fiction should drive this point home). However, once we are
educated about the fact that an irrational preference ordering such as A > B > C > A makes us
exploitable, we could be motivated to get our act together and rid ourselves of such irrational
desires.
Many desires are not formally or logically irrational but practically,  such as desires
aimed  at  excessive  consumption  –  smoking,  binge-drinking,  drug-abuse,  and  generally
addiction. There is no formal argument to be made against these, but such an argument rather
consists in pointing out that they have unacceptable practical consequences. Thus, we say that
for practical reasons it is irrational to act on desires born out of addiction, and we should do
what we can to not act on these desires (such as to seek external help). Of course, addiction
can  still  be  a  descriptive  reason  for  an  addict  to  act,  in  the  sense  of  constituting  a
psychological cause.
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I.6.5. The Generality of Intentional Laws
The explanatory value of intentional psychology hinges on two things: How general
we can expect the psychological properties specified by intentional laws to be, and what the
necessity of restricting their applicability through ceteris paribus clauses (“other things being
equal”)  implies  for  their  explanatory  value.  The  first  point  will  be  dealt  with  in  this
subsection, the second in the following one.
The  extent  of  generalisability  of  specific  psychological  laws  is  delineated  by
psychological research. Some mental properties will turn out to be stable across individuals
and populations, some will allow for regularities in terms of systems of classification (such as
personality-types which differ between individuals but are, as a type of classification, stable
across different populations), and so on. The details of such research, however, are beyond the
reach of this book. Instead, what I will be concerned with in this section is rejecting the notion
that psychological properties could be so spurious as to have catastrophic consequences for
formulating psychological laws.
What  the  notion  of  a  psychological  law  shares  with  natural  laws  is  their
generalisability  in  the form of  F → G (“if  F happens,  then (necessarily)  G happens”,  or
“something’s having the property F causes it to have the property G”). Any law is not merely
an enumeration of instances in which F leads (or has led) to G (see I.6.2). Rather, it is the
hypothesised causal link between F and G which makes us say that each instance of F leading
to G supports our theory of which it is an integral part. And F explains G because F causes G.
However, psychological laws differ from natural laws when it comes to the reliability of their
predictions: For example, the fact that massive bridges can be built, that train tracks endure
under the great stress of high-speed trains rushing over them, or that DVDs can be mass-
produced and used in many millions of homes is owed to the reliability of the laws of physics.
Psychological laws seem comparatively spurious: Being subjected to the same environment
will still have two different people thinking different things and acting in different ways. If
you’d place me in Times Square next to a stranger, chances are that our behaviour would
diverge – and that our thoughts would do so even more, to the point of diverging completely. I
could be thinking about how to continue writing this chapter, while the stranger next to me
could be thinking about the Broadway play he’s about to buy tickets for (which I’m clueless
about). There are two strategies of dealing with this apparent divergence: We could explain it
in terms of further, more detailed information, such as the stranger’s interest in Broadway
plays,  which  contrasts  with  my  cluelessness  about  them.  Since  human  psychology  is
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(evolutionarily and socially) made to be workable in everyday life, we should not expect it to
yield predictions which are accurate to the n-th degree, but rather to supply us with adequate
information about our (evolutionarily and socially) relevant environment, given supplemental
strategies readily available to us. One such strategy is to simply ask either of us about our
thoughts, and to supply our reasons for acting divergently. Far from having to depend on these
self-reports as infallible sources of (or direct access to) someone’s psychological make-up,
they constitute one of several forms of evidence for the ascription of mental states, and should
be weighed in light of all of it (cf. Davidson 2001b: 3-14).  If, say, my mental preoccupation
with writing this book explains my current disinterest in visiting Broadway, then chances are
that  I  can tell  you  about  it,  or  that  you can at  least  infer  my mental  preoccupation  from
knowing about my writing this book. This, in turn, depends on whether the psychological law
that people who are invested in some extensive endeavor on a day-to-day basis are likely to be
mentally preoccupied with it is true.
What I have said about intentional psychology so far already implies that we should
not expect our constitution to be so intricate that the information we have to gather as input
for  making  accurate  predictions  about  our  behaviour  is  so  specific  that  it  cannot  be
generalised enough to constitute a law. That divergences between psychological constitutions
cannot be so systematic and so great as to make the whole theory break down is partly owed
to the fact that intentional psychology depends on learnable norms governing how to deal
with representations. That is, if any intentional state can be traced back to a representational
cause, such as learning a language can be traced back to some fixed rules of grammar and
vocabulary, then the associated behaviour should be regular enough. For example, if any of us
would only form meaningful sentences half of the time when we are expected to, then we
would not call this person a competent language-user, and we would keep the attribution of
the  associated  meanings  from them,  and  thus  the  respective  intentional  states.  Any such
regular behaviour depends on underlying cognitive dispositions to learn languages, so from
the mere fact that language-use is a regular phenomenon we can infer that the mechanisms
enabling us to have these dispositions must have developed in a stable and general enough
way to allow competent language use. And similar conclusions can be drawn in competencies
analogous to language-use, such as our use of tools, the competent interaction with our peers
and our environment, and so on.
On  the  other  hand,  regularity  of  psychological  constitution  also  goes  beyond
representational causes: While it is true that there may be innumerable mental differences
between  any  two  persons,  our  behaviour  in  situations  which  are  highly  relevant  (i.e.  in
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situations in which we depend on predicting a sizable group’s individual actions, or in which
we  want  to  make  sure  that  behavioural  homogeneity  and  homoeostasis  obtains)  can  be
predicted  and  actually  socially  controlled  to  such  a  degree  that  it  enables  us  to  have
institutions such as governments, medical supply, universities and the like. That is, in each
instance in which behavioural  uniformity obtains,  the underlying  psychological  laws must
also obtain. Divergence has its limit.
Open  questions  remain  in  domains  in  which  social  control  and  psychological
predictability is pursued, but where it is unclear to which degree it can be accomplished. For
instance, we know that google or facebook can make significant predictions about a person’s
future biography based on statistical inferences from past biographical information. This can
be information which may seem rather obvious. For example, predicting that I will graduate
with a significant probability follows already from my pursuing a PhD degree. In such cases,
the issue is not whether there can be an algorithm for inferring one from the other, but rather
that the necessary input is available to companies running social networks or similar internet
services and that they can exploit the according output. That is, it might well be the case that
some non-public information about anyone is available to social networks because these have
(1) the algorithm which outputs this information based on the input of public information (and
they might well be the only ones able to develop this algorithm because no one else has a
statistical basis large enough to verify whether the algorithm is reliable), and they also have
(2)  the  information  needed  for  running  the  algorithm on  a  given  individual’s  data  –  for
example, it has been claimed by facebook that information about a shared circle of friends
between two romantically linked persons allows them to make statistical  inferences to the
duration of their relationship.32 What supports the statistical inferences need not exclusively
be psychological laws, but also social commitments or peer pressure; and often, one works by
employing the other. For example, as I have said, it is likely that I will graduate based on the
mere fact that I am pursuing a PhD degree, which is to say little more than that I am enrolled
at an institute which steers me toward this degree. But the fact that I am part of this institute is
based on some of my interests, just as well as my making it to the end of the program is based
on my long-term motivation, work ethic, resilience, and so forth. In all these cases, we should
expect  some  robust  psychological  laws  to  emerge  from  and  support  biographical  facts.
However,  since  it  is  predominantly  economic  and  security  concerns,  and  not  scientific
32 Facebook data scientist Bogdan State published his results under the title “Flings or Lifetimes? The Duration
of  Facebook  Relationships”  (www.facebook.com/data,  or  www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-
science/flings-or-lifetimes-the-duration-of-facebook-relationships/10152060513428859).
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interests, which direct data mining scrutiny, the large-scale experiment of gathering our social
and biographical data through the internet, for the time being, remains one-sided.
I.6.6. The Relative Strictness of Intentional Laws
Searle  points out that  “human behaviour,  where rational,  functions on the basis of
reasons, but the reasons explain the behaviour only if the relation between the reason and the
behaviour  is  both  logical  and  causal.  Explanations  of  rational  human  behaviour  thus
essentially  employ  the  apparatus  of  intentional  causation”  (Searle  2000:  106).  He
characterises intentional causation as a form of causation in which “the cause and effect work
in the way they do because either the cause is a representation of the effect or the effect is a
representation of the cause” (ibid.: 105). For example, if my wanting to drink a glass of water
does cause my drinking a glass of water, then it is my attitude (namely my desire) toward
drinking  a  glass  of  water  which  has  brought  about  my  drinking.  Thus,  the  cause  was  a
representation of the effect. Similarly,  if I correctly remember that Daniel Day-Lewis won
three academy awards, then this mental representation was caused by Daniel Day-Lewis’s
actually winning three academy awards, making the effect a representation of the cause.
Since actions are a subclass of behaviour, namely that which is caused by reasons, we
can simply refer to what Searle calls “rational human behaviour” as actions. As an illustration,
compare a knee-jerk reaction to kicking a drum. If the former is caused by a doctor’s striking
her patient’s patellar ligament with a reflex hammer, then the movement of the knee has not
been intended by the  patient,  and should be considered unintended behaviour,  just  as  we
would  a  nervous  twitch  or  a  stammer  (at  least  assuming  that  these  are  not  intentionally
performed, say, by Dustin Hoffman playing Raymond Babbitt). But if the latter is caused by a
drummer’s wanting to test his equipment, his knee movement is very much intended and thus
qualifies  as  an  action.  As  pointed  out  by  Searle  and  in  sections  I.6.3  and  I.6.4,  action
explanations work the way they do because the action is both rationally or logically derivable
from those reasons given in the explanations as well as caused by these: That is, if I just drank
a glass of water, then your knowing that I was thirsty and that I believed I could quench my
thirst  by drinking a glass of water explains my drinking (compare  Davidson 1980: 3-18).
However, logical relations like the one supporting the syllogism “Drinking a glass of water is
a way to quench thirst; I am thirsty; thus it would be reasonable for me to drink a glass of
water” do not,  by themselves,  establish that  the conclusion is  actually  caused by the two
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premises. Because even if it were reasonable for me to drink a glass of water, two things may
keep me from drinking: reasons speaking against drinking, and any type of external (i.e. non-
mental) obstacle.  We distinguish these two cases by saying that we either decided against
drinking or that we were kept from drinking. The first implies rational control of the agent,
the other  a non-mental  obstacle  (which may be a brick wall  just  as much as a disease –
meaning this obstacle does not have to be external to the body, but rather beyond agential
control). It is the first case with which we are concerned in intentional psychology, since it
says something about the agent’s mind where the latter one does not: Because even if a thirsty
person eventually decides against drinking, the fact that she had a reason for drinking is not to
be disregarded in an account of her mental state. Rather, we say that the agent had conflicting
reasons, and if we wish to continue ascribing rationality to her, we should want to say that the
stronger reason won out and caused her not to drink.33 Thus, the form of a causal explanation
is maintained, even if some reasons (such as her thirst) ultimately proved not to be causally
effective. 
In a nomological account of mental states, the relation between thirst and drinking
only holds ceteris paribus (which translates to “other things being equal”). That is, when an
agent is free to drink, then, in the absence of stronger reasons speaking against drinking, thirst
causes her drinking (compare Nachev & Hacker 2014: 200). A second precondition for such a
relation  to  hold  is  that  the  law’s  specified  consequence  is  under  agential  control  (in  our
example: that the agent is actually free to drink by not being restrained, by being able to reach
the glass, etc.).
There has  been some debate  about  whether  psychological  laws differ  substantially
from other laws, especially from those in the natural sciences, when it comes to the aspect of
ceteris  paribus  clauses  (cf.  Boyd  1999).  For  example,  Donald  Davidson  held  that  it  is
necessary to an account of the nature of physics that physical ceteris paribus laws are required
to be translatable into (or reducible to) accounts which contain no ceteris paribus clause at all
(I say “accounts” because even though we may still call them laws, they may formally be very
different from the laws we are used to). For example, if we wished to determine tomorrow’s
movement of Mars relative to our solar system, we would in this account include a finite
amount of forces which act on Mars, primarily the other celestial bodies in our solar system.
However, to accurately determine Mars’s movement, a complete account of the state of the
whole  universe would  have  to  enter  into  our  calculations.  Not  only are  additional  forces
33 Sometimes, weaker reasons may win out, in which case we may speak of akrasia or weakness of the will, and
deem the agent irrational, effectively revoking agential ascriptions (compare Davidson 1980: 21-42) – but I will
not pursue questions concerning weakness of the will here.
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exerted  on  Mars  by  celestial  bodies  external  to  our  solar  system,  but  there  may also  be
asteroids entering our solar system tomorrow, thus be “internal” to our solar system when
they are still “external” today. We would in fact have to assume that all relevant bodies and
forces will act on Mars tomorrow as we actually expect them to act (ruling out the sun’s going
nova, a radical increase in its gravity, and so on). All of these assumptions amount to ceteris-
paribus-clauses.
However, “Mars” is actually not a physical description at all: Mars is not a natural
kind in physics, but in astronomy. So, questions about the movement of Mars may not even be
coherently posable in an ideal physics. Rather, we would ask about the location of all physical
particles which make up Mars (and what “makes up Mars” is itself not a matter of physics).
The same goes for the non-physical terms “solar system” and “tomorrow”. Ideally, physics
would describe an interaction of “ultimate” physical particles, and as Davidson believed, it
would not even describe these interactions in terms of causes and effects, since the description
of ideal physics would be one of a totality of circumstances.34
While  we  run  into  similar  complications  with  interdisciplinary  reformulations  of
mental  kinds,  it  seems plausible  that,  if  Davidson was correct  and physics  can get rid  of
ceteris paribus clauses, there is in fact a crucial difference to psychology: There seems to be
no single psychological law which holds under all circumstances, even if we were to consider
the totality of all mental phenomena. For one, all psychological laws which are concerned
with internal cognitive states must at least assume that the agent’s brain doesn’t short out as a
consequence of the relevant cause, never bringing about the mental effect specified by the
law. Still, that doesn’t diminish the explanatory value of psychological laws, since firstly, the
fact that psychological explanation needs to be supported by ceteris paribus clauses meant to
exclude non-mental interferences does not imply incomplete mental explanation. (But this just
means that psychology is not a universal science: certainly not every event or phenomenon
which does, will or can manifest itself is a psychological event or phenomenon.) Rather, that
it  is  possible  for  a  mental  effect  to  not  be  brought  about  even  when  its  nomologically
specified cause holds (e.g. because some necessary neural connections break down between
the causal effect of a mental law’s antecedent and the obtaining of its consequence) does not
diminish  mental  explanations,  since  the  relevant  explanation  is  the  subject  of  non-mental
34 Davidson takes  causes  to  be singled  out  from this  totality,  in  the sense  that  they are  interest-relative  or
selective explanations. “Explanation in terms of the ultimate physics, though it answers to various interests, is
not interest relative: it treats everything without exception as a cause of an event if it lies within physical reach
(falls within the light cone leading to the effect)” (Davidson 2004: 113), whereas “mental concepts (…) appeal to
causality  because  they  are  designed,  like  the  concept  of  causality  itself,  to  single  out  from the  totality  of
circumstances which conspire to cause a given event just those factors that satisfy some particular explanatory
interest” (Davidson 2001b: 216).
Intentional Psychology 82
explanation (for example, why the neural connections broke down).35 Inversely, natural laws
can fail to hold for mental reasons: A bowl of water can fail to freeze at 0° C because I had
the desire to stir it shortly before it hit 0° C. That does not make the generalisation that water
freezes  at  0°  C  any  less  of  a  law.36 And  even  if  physics  turns  out  to  be  complete  and
psychology fundamentally incomplete, that still puts psychology in the same group as, say,
biology – a science which certainly does not explain everything, but which has no serious
rival in its proper domain.
Secondly, all mental ceteris paribus clauses are explanatorily valuable and potentially
lawlike themselves. That is, my desire to drink a glass of water can fail to cause my drinking a
glass of water because another person also desired to drink it – which she did, thus keeping
me from doing the same. Or my thirst failed to make me drink because I was in a rush and had
no time  to  do  so.  In  which  case  it  is  assumed  that,  given  the  circumstances,  I  found  it
reasonable not to drink, again maintaining the form of action explanation by citing mental
reasons which are (at least potentially) lawlike themselves. 
Thus, while conceding to Davidson that psychological laws cannot get rid of ceteris
paribus clauses, we should not jump to the conclusion that this fact fundamentally diminishes
their explanatory value; it simply highlights one limitation. For Davidson, strictness was to be
defined in singling out all relevant causes or events which could prevent a nomological effect
from obtaining (see Davidson 1980: 219). In this sense, probabilistic laws can be strict: A
probabilistic  law’s consequence may still  fail  to be brought about by the obtaining of all
antecedent conditions (this is what “probabilistic” means, after all), but the law remains strict
if there is no additional antecedent which could be cited to account for the non-manifestation
of the consequence. That is, if a probabilistic law has the form “F → G”, specifying that if F
35 Neural  breakdowns,  which  are  the  subject  of  biology,  chemistry  and  physics  can  currently  (i.e.  without
appropriate bridge laws (cf. Nagel 1961: ch. 11, Sklar 1967: 118-121) between neural and mental states) be cited
as psychological explanations only insofar as they are relevant to the obtaining of a psychological effect, without
themselves relying on psychological  laws. If  specific  neurological  facts are found to reliably correlate  with
intentional capabilities (such as forming beliefs, desires, intentions), they become part of the evidential basis of
ascription (see section I.7.1). For example, if specific lesions have been found to correlate with an impairment in
forming intentions,  someone’s  suffering  from this  type  of  lesion plausibly counts  as  evidence  against  their
having an intention. Whether or not neuroscientific facts outweigh other evidence obviously depends on the
totality of the available evidence: for instance, it is hardly justified to judge someone as not depressed when they
are showing all the behavioural signs of depression, but lack the neural ones. However, this potential conflict
only mirrors the sort of conflict that can always arise between different forms of evidence for mental ascriptions.
36 Whether anything that could happen to water at 0° C, such as my stirring it, could be subject to physical law is
at least an open question. That is, even assuming the completeness of physics, my stirring water should turn out
to supervene on physics, but it is not exactly my stirring that explains the water’s not freezing, since stirring is
not a physical kind. And, while often assumed, the completeness of physics and its relation to non-physical laws
is itself hotly debated (cf. Papineau 1991, Gillett & Loewer 2001, Gillett [unpublished], Yates 2009, Lowe 2000,
Wachter 2006, Mendonça 2010, Stapp 2009, Tiehen 2015, Vasilyev 2009, Montero 2006, Larmer 1986; also see
Morrison 2000).
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obtains then G will obtain with a given probability, then the law is strict if nothing but the
absence of F could explain why G does not obtain.
According to one form of physicalism, a physical law need not exlude all non-physical
hindrances, because physics is causally closed (see footnote 36). This notion of strictness is
not  true  for  mental  laws,  since  there  can  be  non-mental  causes  interferring  with  mental
effects. However, we have good reason to believe that if all non-mental hindrances have been
excluded, and all relevant mental causes have been cited in the mental law’s antecedent, then
its consequence would at least probabilistically come about, and the probabilistic consequence
is in fact best explained by invoking the relevant mental cause(s). In this sense, mental laws
are relatively strict – which means there are some phenomena which they explain best, even
though, say, ultimate physics may also ideally explain them. It also means that there is the
possibility  of  singling  out  all  relevant  mental  causes  or  events  which  could  prevent  a
nomological effect from obtaining, but not all possible non-mental causes. Relative strictness
is in fact true of all good sciences except ideal physics. For example, an astronomical cause
(an asteroid impacting earth) may have a biological effect (on life on earth), without there
being any possibility of restating the asteroid’s impact in biological terms, or the damage to
life on earth in astronomical terms.
I.7. Intentional Ascriptions
I.7.1. Evidence for Mental Ascriptions
For the sake of simplicity,  I will  restrict  my claims in this subsection to explicitly
apply to propositional attitudes only, that is, to ascriptions of intentional mental states which
have the  form “X Ms that  P”,  where  X stands for  a  person,  M for  a  verb  expressing  a
psychological  attitude  (such as a belief,  desire  or intention),  and P for a  proposition (see
section  I.1).  What  I  say  may  also  apply  implicitly  to  non-propositional  cases,  and  these
include cases which can be analysed analogously, but cannot be stated in terms of that-clauses
for grammatical reasons, such as emotions (“I hate heavy traffic”) or perceptions, but I will
not explicitly argue that they do. Emotions and perceptions clearly have intentional objects,
and these can often be easily turned into the objects of propositional attitudes (“I hate that
traffic is heavy”; see section I.1). But even if they cannot, the underlying logic should not be
too different. However, depending on your preferred inventory of mental states, you might
Intentional Psychology 84
also want to admit non-propositional states which differ substantially from those I invoke.
Presently, I will not consider those, and my claims might not at all apply to them.
As has been noted Cummins, the assumptions underlying intentional explanations “are
seldom if ever made explicit, just as one does not make explicit the mechanical assumptions
about springs, levers and gears that ground structural explanations of a mechanical machine.
Everyone knows that beliefs are available as premises in inference, that desires specify goals,
and that  intentions  are  adopted plans  for achieving goals,  so it  doesn’t  have to  [be]  said
explicitly (except by philosophers)” (Cummins 2000: 127). And as Lewis points out, “[t]he
theory that implicitly defines [belief, desire, and meaning] (...) must amount to nothing more
than a mass of platitudes of common sense, though these may be reorganized in perspicuous
and unfamiliar ways. Esoteric scientific findings that go beyond common sense must be kept
out, on pain of changing the subject” (Lewis 1983b: 112). Consequently, you will not find a
technical manual for mental ascriptions here (which Cummins says we all follow implicitly),
but rather an investigation of what sort of meta-psychological theories our common practice
of ascription commits us to. Mainly,  this chapter is supposed to highlight those aspects of
ascriptive practice which serve to establish, reinforce and/or clarify the connections between
psychological states and intersubjectivity, behaviour and symbolic representation and matters
of meaning in general.
But for now, here goes the rough sketch of what a guide to ascriptive practice would
look like: The most basic evidence for the ascription of mental states are (a) behavioural cues
connected to general attitudes and (b) evidence pertaining to the specific directedness of these
attitudes. For example, there are universal behavioural signs for desiring that something be the
case (such as looking forward to it, being fixated on it, being uneasy unless it transpires, being
relaxed  or  happy  when  it  does,  etc.).  Emotionally-laden  attitudes  are  the  easiest  to  spot
behaviourally (and as remarked, they may be endowed with propositional or nonpropositional
content – I can loathe that it rains or I can simply loathe the rain). Yet, behavioural evidence
may justify a broad range of ascriptions  and need to be subplanted  by further contextual
evidence (see section II.8.4.5).
As Cummins pointed out, beliefs are available as premises in inferences, so we can
infer what someone believes by figuring out what someone must believe in order to do what
they do and say what they say (etc.). For example, the mere fact that someone is riding the
train already justifies the hypotheses that she believes she is riding the train, that she desires to
arrive at one of its upcoming stops, and that she intends to get off at the very same. While
some emotions can be assigned even without having a hunch about their intentional object –
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we can readily see that someone is happy or angry or sad without knowing what they are
happy  or  angry  or  sad  about  –,  it  makes  little  sense  to  do  the  same  with  beliefs.  It’s
uninteresting to point out that someone simply “believes” without specifying the object of
said belief, while pointing out that they’re happy or angry or sad is quite informative. This,
again, is due to emotions being closely tied to typical behavioural cues, whereas belief is tied
to what is being held true. To say that someone is angry makes sense against the backdrop of
their  possibly  not  being  angry  all  the  time,  while  there  is  no  state  of  “not  holding  true
anything”  that  would be of widespread explanatory use in social  interaction.  So, it  is  the
intentional  object  of a belief  that  is  primary to  ascribing a belief,  while  no such thing is
necessarily true of emotions and similar mental states that come with behavioural stereotypes
and rather overt bodily and somatic states. As in the case of riding a train, what is held true by
someone is fundamentally ascribed by what we think they are likely to know given their
environment, given their perception of the environment, and given the decisions they must
have made and the intentions they must have had given the actions we observe them carry out.
Cummins’  pointing out  that  desire-contents  “are available  as goals,  i.e.,  conditions
whose satisfaction ends processing cycles” (Cummins 1991: 14) hints at potential evidential
bases for ascribing desires and their contents: there is observable evidence for pursuing a goal,
being invested in pursuing it,  or being emotional about its pursuit;  and the content of the
respective desire can be reconstructed from the pursuit (even though goals are not necessarily
overtly pursued). This is not to imply that psychological attitudes and their contents can be
directly reduced to (dispositions to) overt behaviour, or that they can be assigned one by one;
but there are comparably overt states which are more likely candidates for being assigned
more  straightforward  attitudes  and  contents,  and  these  can  serve  as  tentpoles  for  a
comprehensive theory of a person’s mental states. (These considerations concerning holistic
ascriptions will be further pursued in I.7.4.)
Apart  from  these  direct  sources  of  evidence,  which  depend  on  observation  of
someone’s behaviour and the relation to their environment, we often rely on many indirect
ones, such as:
(1) self-reports  about  mental  states,  as well  as  their  derivative  forms,  such as  
relayed/second-hand self-reports,
(2) second- or third-person-reports of direct evidence,
(3) inferences to what mental properties are usually connected to (i.e. inferences 
supported by psychological laws),
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(4) common social determinants of mental states, inferences to common mental  
causes or consequences of social properties (such as: this person was brought 
up at a Catholic school, so they probably know about the doctrine of the Holy 
Trinity),
(5) inferences to common diachronous developments, i.e. mental states which are 
lawfully or rationally implied as a subsequent consequence of another mental 
state  (such as the natural  progression of anger  or sadness,  the progress of  
stances toward new acquaintances or relationships etc.),
(6) conditions of rationality: If we have evidence for mental state A, and mental 
state B is rational if mental state A is held, then we are justified in concluding 
that mental state B is, ceteris paribus, likely to be held (the degree of likelihood
depending on additional behavioural or environmental cues, general judgments
of the subject’s rationality, of how catastrophic the lack of B would be for their
status as a reasonable person, etc.).
I.7.2. Do Mental Ascriptions Refer to Private States?
Psychology  is,  by  its  very name,  the  science  of  the  soul.  In  Western  culture,  the
concept of the soul stands in a long tradition of being associated with metaphysical entities
and allusions of divinity – with what today’s psychologists would not accept as scientific at
all. Early Greek notions of the soul construed it as the entity whose possession makes the
difference between being animate and inanimate,  between being alive and being a lifeless
object. Consequently, we can find ideas such as the immortality of the soul discussed by Plato
(cf. his  Phaedo,  70b, 76c, 78b-80b). This aspect has been adopted by Christianity,  whose
dogmas are closely intertwined with hundreds of years of Western philosophical tradition and
eventually enlightenment, from which psychology eventually emerged in the late 19 th century.
In the Christian tradition, the notion of the soul is closely intermingled with notions of the
divine, of the soul as being a metaphysical entity: it comes from, goes to, or exists in a realm
that  is  beyond  the  physical.  Consequently,  some  pressing  questions  about  the  soul’s
connection to the body have arisen,37 which cast their long shadow even over today’s debates,
37 Cf. St. Augustine: On the Trinity, book 6, ch. 6 and St. Aquinas: Summa theologica, part 1, question 76, art. 8;
Quaestiones disputatae de anima, art. 10; Summa contra gentiles, book 2, ch. 72.
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such as those concerned with the causal powers of mental properties (see e.g. Jackson 1982,
Kim 1993).
Famously,  discussing  such  conundrums  also  makes  up  a  substantial  part  of  René
Descartes’  philosophical  body  of  work,  and  understanding  some  of  his  considerations  is
particularly  instructive  for  one  of  our  present  problems.  The  17 th century  philosopher  is
widely seen as the first “modern” philosopher, and his modernity is evident in his scientific
approach  to  mathematics,  nature  and  the  human  body:  According  to  Descartes,  a  purely
mechanical account of human physiology, devoid of the notion of the soul, can explain much
more than what the scholastic philosophers had thought possible, namely
“the digestion of food, the beating of the heart and arteries, the nourishment and growth of the 
limbs, respiration, waking and sleeping, the reception by the external sense organs of light,  
sounds,  smells,  tastes,  heat  and other  such qualities,  the  imprinting of the  ideas  of  these  
qualities in the organ of the ‘common’ sense and the imagination, the retention or stamping of 
these ideas in the memory, the internal movements of the appetites and passions, and finally 
the external movements of all the limbs” (AT XI: 201, CSM I: 108).
Yet,  Descartes  expounded a  dualistic  conception  according  to  which  the  soul  was
made of a substance radically different and separate from the physical. Unlike Ancient Greeks
and scholastics, who would hold the soul responsible for the animate aspect of the body, he
would  trace  back  mainly  consciousness,  subjective  phenomenological  experience  and
intellectual powers to the workings of the soul (cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003: 26), and he would
locate its interaction with the body within the brain’s pineal gland:
“The part of the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is (…) the innermost
part of the brain, which is a certain very small gland situated in the middle of the brain’s
substance and suspended above the passage through which the spirits in the brain’s anterior
cavities communicate with those in its posterior cavities. The slightest movements on the part
of this gland may alter very greatly the course of these spirits, and conversely any change,
however  slight,  taking  place  in  the  course  of  the  spirits  may  do  much  to  change  the
movements  of the  gland” (AT XI:  351,  CSM I:  340).  “My view is that  this  gland is  the
principal seat of the soul, and the place in which all our thoughts are formed. The reason I
believe this is that I cannot find any part of the brain, except this, which is not double. Since
we see only one thing with two eyes, and hear only one voice with two ears, and in short have
never more than one thought at a time, it must necessarily be the case that the impressions
which enter by the two eyes or by the two ears, and so on, unite with each other in some part
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of the body before being considered by the soul. Now it is impossible to find any such place in
the whole head except this gland; moreover it is situated in the most suitable possible place for
this purpose, in the middle of all the concavities; and it is supported and surrounded by the
little branches of the carotid arteries which bring the spirits into the brain” (AT III: 19–20,
CSMK 143).  “Since  it  is  the  only solid  part  in  the  whole  brain  which  is  single,  it  must
necessarily be the seat of the common sense, i.e., of thought, and consequently of the soul; for
one cannot be separated from the other. The only alternative is to say that the soul is not joined
immediately to any solid part  of  the body,  but  only to the animal  spirits  which are in its
concavities, and which enter it and leave it continually like the water of river. That would
certainly be thought too absurd” (AT III: 264, CSMK 162).
Apart from some memories which he thought of as being partially stored in the pineal
gland and in the muscles (AT III: 20, CSMK 143; AT III: 48, CSMK 146), he also conceived
of another kind of memory which is “entirely intellectual, which depends on the soul alone”
(AT III: 48, CSMK 146). Descartes’ criterion for determining whether a function belongs to
the body or soul was this:
“anything we experience as being in us, and which we see can also exist in wholly inanimate
bodies, must  be attributed only to our body.  On the other hand,  anything in us which we
cannot conceive in any way as capable of belonging to a body must be attributed to our soul.
Thus, because we have no conception of the body as thinking in any way at all,  we have
reason to believe that every kind of thought present in us belongs to the soul. And since we do
not doubt that there are inanimate bodies which can move in as many different ways as our
bodies, if not more, and which have as much heat or more […], we must believe that all the
heat and all the movements present in us, in so far as they do not depend on thought, belong
solely to the body” (AT XI: 329, CSM I: 329).
For  Descartes  and  many  philosophers  since,  the  notorious  legacy  of  this  dualistic
metaphysical view consisted in a nagging skepticism born out of the so-called “problem of
other minds”.  Solipsism, the view that nothing exists beyond one’s own consciousness, is
intertwined  with  not  finding a  solution  to  the  other-minds-problem.  The latter essentially
consists  in  the  mystery  how anyone  can  know about  the  contents  (or  even existence)  of
another’s mind, if the only mind she has immediate access to is her own.38 Here, “access” is
construed as introspective access: a direct, immediate form of awareness of mental content
38 There  are  several  variants  of  solipsism and  the  other-minds-problem;  here,  I  am only  talking  about  an
epistemic variant, which, strictly speaking, means that there is no way to verify whether something beyond one’s
own mind exists, but does not need to entail an all-out denial of the existence of an external world.
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which is not inferred from further evidence; the form of access someone has to the content of
their  own  consciousness.  While  post-Freudian  psychology,  as  well  as  recent  studies  on
heuristics,  biases  and  ensuing  confabulation  (cf.  Sie  &  Wouters  2010:  126-128)39,  have
familiarised us with the concept of mental content which we are systematically unaware of, it
is still true that if we are aware of some content of our minds, then we are directly aware of it
without  consulting  further  evidence  since “we  seem intimately  acquainted  with  our  own
minds” (Heil 2000: 131). “The person who has a desire (or want or belief) does not normally
need criteria at all—he generally knows, even in the absence of any clues available to others,
what he wants, desires, and believes” (Davidson 1980: 15). And so, we are aware of our own
mental states in a way that is different from our awareness of the content of others’ minds:
there is an asymmetry between knowing one’s own pain and knowing that of others, knowing
one’s own thoughts and knowing those of others, knowing one’s own desires and knowing
those of others, and so on. Because if we can ever know about others’ mental states, then we
know about them indirectly: by interpreting observable evidence.
While the fact that this asymmetry exists in some form can hardly be disputed, the
Cartesian view goes wrong in supposing that mental states are essentially radically private
states, and that the only epistemically justifiable access to them is the first-person access, it
being the only  direct or  immediate form of access. On such an account, accepting that any
access to someone else’s mental state can only happen indirectly results in nagging doubts: it
may be possible that every single time I ascribe mental properties to someone else I am in fact
wrong, and thus it ultimately appears conceivable that no one beside me has ever actually had
a  mental  state  and  that  the  only  mind  that  exists  is  my  own.  That  such  solipsistic
considerations are entailed by this theory is perhaps its most fundamental weakness.40 
While the Cartesian account captures some important facts about mental states, it also
conveniently  neglects  others,  and  draws  many  unwarranted  conclusions  (for  a  broader
criticism see Ryle  1949:  ch.  1).  It  is  right  about  there being an asymmetry  between first
person and second/third person mental state ascriptions; it is right about the fact that when we
ascribe mental states to ourselves we often do so immediately, without consulting evidence;
and it is right about the possibility of our third-person ascriptions being wrong in each single
instant. What it conveniently neglects to acknowledge is that our first-person ascriptions are
far from infallible as well, and that they can also work much like our third-person ascriptions
do: sometimes, we do not actually know what we really think, plan or desire until someone
39 Also see Tversky & Kahnemann 1974, Gigerenzer 2008 and Sunstein 2005.
40 For a modern version of Cartesian solipsism see Putnam’s “brain in a vat” scenario (Putnam 1981: 1-21),
which was popularised by the 1999 movie The Matrix.
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points it out to us, or until we come across compelling evidence. It neglects to mention that
our first person ascriptions come with the same built-in capacity for being wrong as third-
person ascriptions do: that is, each first-person ascription which we can think of as a plausible
hypothesis rather than an immediate expression can also be wrong. This may not apply to
expressions of inner states such as “I have a toothache”, which, if expressed sincerely, directly
expresses  an  immediate  feeling  of  pain;  but  it  does  apply  to  many  common  intentional
ascriptions: we can ascribe any number of beliefs, intentions and desires to ourselves and be
wrong about them. We can be wrong about the fact that we believed, intended or desired what
we thought we did, we can be wrong about the content of our mental states, and we can even
be mistaken in our use of the concepts with which we express them.
The  easiest  cases  of  mistaken  first-person  ascriptions  are  certainly  those  that  are
concerned with a wrong use of concepts, or self-ascriptions of knowledge: A few years ago, I
may have believed that supervenience was an implausible stance to take on the mind-body
relationship; but now I know that my belief was not in fact a belief  about supervenience,
because I actually did not properly understand what supervenience was (and I only thought I
did). So, we can have beliefs which we later find out to be mistaken because we did not get
their content right; and we can believe that we know something to be the case and later find
out that we did not know at all.
Trickier ways in which we can be mistaken are concerned with beliefs we ascribe to
ourselves based on circumstantial evidence, such as someone’s taking the hypothesis “I have
read several of Murakami’s books, so it may well be the case that I like reading Murakami” as
a good reason for believing that  she likes reading Murakami.  If this  person were to later
reconstruct that the real reason for her repeatedly reading Murakami was that his books were
most convenient to come by, she might revise her belief about liking to read Murakami. Such
cases are based on the role of mental states as action explanations and not so much on any
immediate  feeling  or  awareness  we  might  have  that  introspectively  connects  us  to  their
content. Often, we simply know better what we do or have done than what we believe or
desire, and so the latter may be inferred from the former.
These  considerations  suggest  that  while  there  is  an  asymmetry  between first-  and
third-person ascriptions, there are many cases in which they work analogously or similarly,
and that we had better not take those cases which are dissimilar as exclusively delineating the
characteristics for what we adopt as our view of mental states. My stating that, say, Tom is
mad can only ever be justified if Tom’s madness is an intersubjectively evaluable fact. If the
only facts about mental states are of a subjective nature, and if the only access to them is a
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direct one through the inspection of one’s own mind,  of an immediate  acquaintance with
one’s mental states by way of introspection, then this view quickly leads us to said skeptical
problem: How can I  really know that  anyone beside myself  has mental  states? If  we are
Cartesians, the only possible answers seems to be: We can’t and we don’t. This skepticism
about  other  minds  is  thus  intimately  intertwined  with  the  view  that  mental  states  are
exclusively inner, private, immediate states.
What  the  Cartesian  picture  is  resistant  to  legitimise  is  the  empirical  method  of
gathering information about someone’s mental state. I cannot know whether Tom is mad right
now without  knowing some facts  about  the  world  which  I  can  only find  out  by way of
empirical observation. It may not even be required of me to directly observe Tom; maybe I
can also find out about Tom’s mental state by inquiry (which is just to say: by observing
someone or something else). What matters is that I have no direct access to Tom’s mental
state, no access that could be completely independent of empirical data.  We cannot know
anything about someone else’s mental state without observation (where “observation” is used
in the rather broad sense I just established, namely as: gathering data about something beyond
the immediate content of my own mind). Of course, in order to gain this data, I will have to
make  it  accessible  to  my  mind,  thus  eventually  making  it  potentially  also immediately
available to me through introspection. But this point may lead us onto to the wrong route,
namely  to  supposing  that  subjective  knowledge  (i.e.  immediate,  introspective  knowledge
about one’s own mind) is the basis for all other knowledge: for intersubjective knowledge (the
knowledge about other minds) and for objective knowledge (the knowledge about empirical
facts in the world; compare I.7.4).
How do Cartesians,  who would  suppose that  subjective  knowledge is  the  form of
knowledge based on which they must establish other forms, go about in trying to justify the
ascription  of  other  people’s  mental  states?  Ad  hoc,  plausible  strategies  could  involve  a
justification from similarity – I observe objects which look and behave similarly as I do, so
perhaps their properties are similar to mine; Having mental states is a property of mine;
hence, I can assume that those looking and behaving similarly also have mental states – or
justification from causal relations, “arguing from one effect back to its cause and out again to
another effect” (Jackson 1982: 134) – my mind seems to me to be the cause of my actions;
these actions have observable properties; I can observe these properties in events not caused
by my mind; perhaps these are effects caused by other minds –, but it is not at all clear how
the  relevant  inferences  are  themselves  justified  (this  unclarity  is  marked  by  my  use  of
“perhaps”  in  either  inference).  Given  the  Cartesian  picture,  what  norm governing  mental
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ascriptions can itself justify that the ascription of mental states should hinge on non-mental
properties? Even if there is one such norm, the ascriptions of mental states to others always
seem considerably weaker than ascriptions based on immediate acquaintance. In fact, in the
case of immediate acquaintance, we are tempted to not speak of an “ascription” at all, but
rather of “just having” these mental states: of directly knowing that we have them and what
they consist in. So, ascriptions are based on evidence, but in the first-person case, there is no
evidence necessary at all: we do not infer that we are angry, we just know it.
These considerations  are  prominently on display in Descartes  famous “cogito ergo
sum” (cf. Descartes 1965): The immediate acquaintance of my mental states – in his case: the
fact that  I am thinking (cogito) – comes with absolute epistemic certainty: it is self-evident.
Thus, the logically weaker claim that  I exist (sum) is certain as well. But the downside to
Descartes’ being able to cash out said view in exactly this way is the idea that subjective
access to mental states is the benchmark for what we can know about them, and it instantly
devalues  all  other  forms of  access,  and all  other  forms  of knowledge.  So,  if  we want  to
acknowledge that the Cartesian ego is not potentially the only being with a mind in the entire
universe we’d better come up with an alternative view.
Before we get to that, let me briefly preempt a potential misunderstanding: the claim
that mental states are “inner states” in the sense discussed here should not be misunderstood
as directly pertaining to any claims about how anything  within the human body relates to
mental states. “Inner” is only used to distinguish between what belongs to the mind and to
what is external, and thus between immediate access and empirical access. The claim that
mental states are literally “internal”, i.e. states which are characterised by what is within the
human body, is distinct. So, the problem of not having direct epistemic access to our peers’
mental states should not be confused with any problems about not having epistemic access to
their inner physiological states (after all, such troubles could be remedied by invoking x-rays,
fMRI,  surgery  or  the  like).  Neither  does  the  view  that  we  have  a  form  of  immediate
acquaintance with our own mind amount to a claim about having direct access to our own
physiological  states,  and while somatic  states (such as those marking excitement,  anxiety,
exhaustion and the like) do stand in a causal and/or informative relation to the state of our
mind (cf. Damasio 1996), the Cartesian sort of introspective access we have to our mind does
not amount to a rundown of our physiological facts or somatic states. Conversely, adopting or
rejecting this view will not directly impact one’s view on physiological facts, including the
physiological foundations of our mental states. For example, I believe the “inner states” view
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to be inadequate while holding on to the view that our mental states are partly based in our
physiology.
I.7.3. Are Intentional Terms Behavioural?
The classic view I just laid out has treated mental properties as radically internal, as
something that was only immediately accessible through the intellect’s  turning on itself in
introspection,  and  as  removed  from  observable  evidence.  In  the  mid-20th century,
behaviourism caused the pendulum to swing into the other direction.  “The behaviorists took
[developing a scientific  psychology that  was on a par with the physical  sciences]  (…) to
require  the  rejection  of  nineteenth-century  introspective  psychology,  its  method  of
introspection and “its subject matter consciousness”” (Sullivan 2014: 54 f.). Behaviourism so
conceived urged that we should solely concentrate on what’s observable, methodologically
allowing  nothing but  behavioural  evidence  to  justify  psychological  attributions:  “consider
only  those  facts  which  can  be  objectively  observed in  the  behavior  of  one  person in  its
relation  to  its  prior  environmental  history.  If  all  linkages  are  lawful,  nothing  is  lost  by
neglecting  a  supposed  nonphysical  [i.e.  mental]  link”  (Skinner  1974:  14).  According  to
behaviourism, some “mentalistic things or events (…) can be ‘translated into behavior’, others
discarded as unnecessary or meaningless” (ibid.: 19).
Just like Cartesianism, behaviourism got many things about mental states right, while
conveniently neglecting others and drawing some unwarranted conclusions. The behaviourist
is certainly correct in stressing the importance of observability and empirical methods for
mental ascriptions (which Cartesianism treated so disrespectfully), and in holding that what is
observable in the context of mental properties will in common situations amount to behaviour.
As we have learned from Davidson’s,  Fodors and Sellar’s  quotes,  mental  states are often
taken to be abstract and unobservable (see I.5), so observing behaviour should be the next best
thing.
From what has been said about behaviourism so far, it seems to imply that a type of
human behaviour can be explained without recurring to mental properties, namely “those facts
which can be objectively observed in the behavior of one person in its [lawful] relation to its
prior environmental history”. If that were true, then for the postulation of mental states to
explain anything at all, we should only (have to) introduce them in those situations in which
they go beyond behaviourism, i.e. in which the details of a person’s “prior environmental
history” do not by themselves lawfully link to behaviour. So, introducing mental states would
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make  sense  if  prior  environmental  history  fails  to  fully  explain  objectively  observed
behaviour. Any case in which someone’s behaviour cannot be fully derived from her prior
environmental history would thus qualify as a potential object of mental explanation.
However,  while  some interaction  of mental  states  which fails  to  be fully stated in
terms of prior environmental history is at times needed to properly account for an explanation
of some instances of behaviour (and I will get to such cases shortly), the underlying picture
gets something essential wrong. Because mental states do not merely serve to explain what
environmental histories cannot, but rather, as I have shown in section I.6, they explain how
environmental histories and behavioural reactions are systematically linked in the first place.
That is, a behaviourist theory of higher human cognition might superficially get rid of mental
states by admitting only such laws as “whenever their sibling dies, sane persons react with
sorrow”, where the death of the sibling and the person’s sanity, for the sake of the argument,
is stated in terms of the person’s prior environmental history, and the sorrowful reaction is
stated as behaviour. But should we say that such a theory has really gotten rid of mental states
in favour of behaviour? I am inclined to argue that the fact that under said circumstances
someone reacts with sorrow is to say something essential about her mental properties: It says
something about what she believes (namely,  that her sibling died), about what she desires
(namely, the well-being of her sibling), and how this belief and this desire interact to cause a
reaction. And even if as much as I have conceded can be stated in non-mental terms, it is the
connection between the world, her perception of it, her belief that is based on the perception,
the interaction between the resulting belief and her desire, and the consequent feeling without
which  we  could  not  explain  the  connection  between  prior  environmental  history  and
behavioural effect. Because the following psychological law remains true: Were it not for all
these mental properties, then the behavioural effect would not occur (or, if it  did occur, it
would be unexplained).
But what except a mental apparatus could said lawful linkage be based on? Even if
there were an extremely robust statistical relation between a persons’ sorrow and the prior
death of their sibling, it would by itself not amount to a law, since we usually (but certainly in
this kind of scientific context) speak of laws when the connection between two things (or
events) is causal (see I.6.2). In fact, since we are prone to taking statistical connections as
indicators for some (direct or indirect) causal connection, we would be bewildered if there
were absolutely no causal connection that could explain why two events show a robust and
rather  exclusive  statistical  connection  (i.e.  where  a  particular  kind  of  event  reliably  and
exclusively follows another kind of event). And that we would be bewildered just means that
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we would not take the statistical connection itself to already be of explanatory value. Rather,
its  value  is  heuristic,  tracking  potential  causal  relations.  In  the  case  we  are  presently
discussing, it is only because we can in fact understand how someone comes to feel sorrow
upon  the  death  of  her  sibling  that  we  can  postulate  the  lawful  linkage  between  prior
environmental history and behavioural effect. That we can understand this means that there
are facts explaining the linkage. And what explains it is that we know that there is not just a
statistical relation between the death of someone’s sibling and her sorrow, but that there are
instantiations of psychological laws in which one is (ceteris paribus) a cause for the other.
Now, the behaviourist could reply that in her theory, some robust statistical linkages
simply reflect “behaviourist laws”, which may be all sorts of things except mental – or that
the relevant psychological laws  are in fact just behaviourist laws. The difference between
these  laws  and  mental  laws  would  be  that  in  behaviourist  laws,  the  external  cause  (the
sibling’s death)  and the behavioural  effect  (sorrow) would themselves  be lawfully linked,
whereas mental laws rather hold that the  belief about the external event is what causes an
effect which is mental  and behavioural – sorrow being a state of mind that comes with a
behavioural signature. Still, this move on the behaviourist’s part would not suffice, as such
behaviourist laws still lack explanatory value, since there is nothing in the behaviourist theory
which would explain in virtue of what they hold (and how could there, when clearly what
stands between an external  event and a behavioural  reaction is not itself  behavioural,  but
cognitive?). The question “why does she show sadness-behaviour as a consequence of the
death of her sibling?” cannot merely be answered by “because the two events are lawfully
linked” or “because sadness behaviour usually occurs after the death of a sibling”. In mental
theories, on the other hand, we can say that under favourable conditions, the external event –
the death of a sibling – causes the respective belief, and the belief, interacting with the desire
for  the  sibling  to  be  well,  causes  sadness,  which  in  turn  has  behavioural  expressions  or
consequences. So the behaviourist theory lacks an explanation the mental theory doesn’t.
But even beyond this explanatory weakness, note that the behaviourist cannot even
admit  notions  such  as  “being  informed  about  (their  sibling’s  death)”  into  her  theoretical
vocabulary.  Clearly,  prior  environmental  histories  do  not  by  themselves  explain  the
behavioural reactions the behaviourist aims to explain: someone’s sibling can very well die in
the vicinity without the former feeling sorrow at all, merely by not being informed about it.
Even a rat in the “Skinner Box” has to be somehow informed about its reward in order for
conditioning to work; no behavioural reaction to an environmental event can occur without
the subject’s being at least in the most minimal sense informed about it. The behaviourist can
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try to amend her laws by replying that the rat’s gaze must be directed to the reward at some
point, but of course that would beg the question why the gaze is a relevant factor, if not for
mental  reasons (the same applies  to behaviour  connected to attention and perception,  and
many  complex  forms  of  learning  –  explanatory  gaps  which  eventually  brought  about
behaviourism’s downfall and ushered in the cognitive turn; cf.  Sullivan 2014: 55). Mental
laws can explain this fact very well: again, it is the belief that causes the sorrow, and such
beliefs depend on being informed about external  circumstances.  Behaviourist  amendments
about gaze direction and the like will only serve to point out a gap which mental explanations
were made to fill.
Thus, if we either want to fill this gap, or lend said behaviourist laws any explanatory
power, or both, we must already assume a mental apparatus. To be sure, mental laws can
predict behaviour, and behaviour may serve as the prime evidence for mental ascriptions. But
while they can in some instances be formulated in purely behavioural terms (i.e. in those not
covered by the example above, such as more complex forms of learning),  even then all of
their “lawful linkage” is due to mental properties. As noted, what stands between an external
event and a behavioural reaction is what goes in someone’s head, and, among other things,
it’s  these  goings-on which  mental  state  ascriptions  aim to  capture.  Thus,  it  is  not  at  all
necessary that we come up with cases in which someone’s behaviour cannot be fully derived
from her “prior environmental history” for introducing mental states into our theory (although
there  additionally are such cases). We find psychological laws at work even when we can
infer someone’s behaviour from nothing but prior environmental histories.
In any case, behaviourism took a commendable stand against an unwarranted focus on
“inner” determinants of behaviour which unduly neglected external determinants and against
using introspection as a psychological method to access the former: “By directing attention to
genetic and environmental antecedents, [methodological behaviourism] offset an unwarranted
concentration on an inner life.  It  freed us to study the behavior  of lowers species,  where
introspection (…) was not feasible” (Skinner 1974: 16). If  we had stuck to the Cartesian
picture, elevating mental properties to something radically internal, something only the “self”
can have certain access to, then we would never have gained an adequate view of mental
properties.41
Note  that  we  can  find  matters  of  psychology  to  be  intertwined  with  matters  of
semantics: On the classic Cartesian model, where the soul was seen as an entity beyond the
physical realm and matters of inner experience and intellect could be relegated to this realm,
41 For a reconciliation of a weaker form of behaviourism with the kind of philosophy of mind which I am partial
to see Sellars 1997: 98-107 (§53-59).
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the corresponding semantic theory must have held that the meaning of terms referring to these
mental states must comes from beyond too. So, mental state ascriptions could only be made
because they referred to ideas in the mind, and these ideas did not necessarily have to be
learned,  but  came from “beyond” as well  (and there is  a certain analogy to views which
postulate  internal  mental  objects  as  referents  of  intentional  states,  see  I.3).  But  once  we
change our  views about  semantics,  abandoning the  notion of  such Platonic  ideas  – ideas
which are not learned, but remembered –, the mental theory must change accordingly. If the
most plausible construal of concepts is as things that are learned through social interaction,
which are subject to rules of public discourse, and meaning can no longer simply fall from the
Platonic Heavens but is acquired by associating stimuli (such as the perception of symbols)
with objects, contexts or other concepts,  then mastering concepts requires their  associated
meaning to be publicly accessible. This is the kind of construal I am going to elaborate on in
the following section.
If mental state ascriptions are intertwined with public criteria, then there is no good
reason to doubt that they are readily intersubjectively available. Consequently, any criteria for
ascribing mental  states  beyond immediate  self-ascriptions  (such as “I have a tooth-ache”)
must be based on observable evidence. That is, if the mental state ascription “Tom is angry
right  now”  is  fit  to  be  viewed  as  referring  to  a  fact,  then  the  evidence  for  justifiably
establishing this fact must be empirical. What empirical facts about mental states do we have
access to? As pointed out  in I.7.1, these will often be  behavioural facts:  “We know about
other minds by knowing about other behaviour, at least in part. The nature of the inference is
a matter  of some controversy,  but it  is  not  a matter  of controversy that  it  proceeds from
behaviour. That is why we think that stones do not feel and dogs do feel” (Jackson 1982:
134).
When Jackson says that behaviour only partly informs our knowledge, I take him to
allow that there may be, say, ways of transmitting information about mental states which is
not behavioural itself. For example, someone may utter a justified mental state ascription, and
someone else might record it. Given that I have good reason to believe I am witnessing the
recording of a justified mental state ascription, I gain knowledge about the fact expressed by
this ascription, even though the way I gained it is witnessing a recording. The recording might
consist  in  a  recorder’s  transducing  acoustic  signals.  The  recorder’s  transducing  acoustic
signals is not behavioural. Thus, I did not gain knowledge about the mental state ascription by
way of behavioural facts.  However, the recording can only be reasonable grounds for my
gaining knowledge if  it  can be traced back to behavioural  facts.  In fact,  there can be no
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reasonable  grounds  for  gaining  knowledge  about  someone’s  mental  state(s)  without  the
grounds  being  at  least  indirectly  behavioural.  There  may  be  all  sorts  of  transmitters  and
reports  inbetween  the  original  behaviour  and  my  gaining  knowledge  about  the  subject’s
mental  state,  but they could not report  any non-behavioural  facts.  That is,  either they are
reports about mental states; then they are informed by behaviour. Or they are reports about
behaviour; then they can be grounds for mental state ascriptions. Or they are inferred from
contextual  information,  which  depends  on  a  notion  of  what  kind  of  behaviour  would  be
appropriate given the respective context.
Sometimes, matters are less straightforward, as in the case of a self-report: If Tom tells
me that he is angry, then his telling me that he is angry is both a mental state ascription as
well as behaviour. Sometimes, a liar’s report that he was not lying when he stated that X can
be grounds for calling him a liar (namely when we know that X is not the case). Similarly,
someone’s  denial  of  a  mental  state  ascription  can,  given  other  evidence,  be  grounds  for
ascribing this mental state to him. If Tom is gritting his teeth, grimacing demonically and
stomping his feet while telling me that HE IS NOT ANGRY AT ALL, then I will not only
disregard or overrule his self-report in face of the rest of the evidence; rather, since I know
that Tom tends to be in denial when angry,  I will explain his self-report as a behavioural
consequence of his mental state, namely anger, and thus as additional grounds for ascribing
anger to him.
This firm connection between mental state ascriptions and observations of behaviour is
not merely rooted in what seems like a regrettably restrictive fact, namely that we are often in
no position  to  observe  more than  behaviour.  Of course,  some will  say,  we are  currently
attempting to rectify just that by looking into people’s brains! However, the more significant
root is that mental states are theoretical terms which are largely used to explain behaviour;
that is, even if we can observe them in a way that does not directly rely on observation of
behaviour, such as through observations of brain activity, there is no reason to suppose that
brain activity will suddenly take the place of any theoretical notions we had derived from
systematically different methodical grounds. The value of mental states is not measured by
whether  they  are  good predictors  for  what  we can  find  in  our  brains,  but  for  the  causal
determinants  of  behaviour  (compare  II.8.4.5).  While  brain  activity  will  belong  to  these
relevant causes (behaviour is directly caused by brain activity after all), matters external to the
brain will also belong to them, because they are part of the characterisation of our abstract
states. For example, we can identify witnessing a celebration as the cause of opening a bottle
of wine, and we can also trace this action back to its being elicited by specific brain activity.
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Yet, the respective brain activity itself will have to stand in a systematic relation to witnessing
the celebration, thus making witnessing the celebration a vital part of the causal explanation
of  the  action  –  even  in  cases  in  which  we  have  command  of  an  ideal  brain  scanning
methodology using which we can directly observe and find out everything there is to find out
about the relevant brain activity.
I.7.4. The Davidsonian View of Mental State Ascriptions
It is one of the great contributions of 20th century philosophy and psychology to have
resulted  in  a  viable  solution  to  Cartesian  skepticism  and  to  have  shown  how  mental
attributions based on evidence are systematically justified, all the while treating them with the
proper  respect  they  were  denied  by  behaviourism.42 As  is  often  the  case,  virtue  lies  in
moderation, and it is the moderate position inbetween radical subjectivism, that comes with
the threat of solipsism, and radical behaviourism, which endeavoured to take the mind out of
psychology,  which is  most  prudent  to  adopt.  On the one  hand,  we should  recognise  that
attributions of mental states to other persons are systematically justified,  in the same way
empirical hypotheses are justified: they can be wrong in each instance, but it is nonsensical to
doubt  the  sheer  possibility  of  justifying  any empirical  hypothesis  based  on  observable
evidence.  For  example,  there  can  without  a  doubt  be  good  evidence  for  justifying  the
judgment that a given object is made of stone, but of course this does not imply that every
time someone is justified in judging that something is made of stone, she has to be right about
it. Analogously, we may judge someone to be angry based on her displayed behaviour, and it
is the observability of this behaviour which justifies the hypothesis that she is angry. It may
turn out that she actually isn’t; but it is nonsense to doubt that a proper cause of behavioural
signs  of  anger  is  someone’s  being  angry and that,  thusly,  angriness-behaviour  constitutes
proper grounds for the justified hypothesis  that the person in question is angry.  One such
moderate stance is Donald Davidson’s position. Adopting it, we can also give clearer meaning
to the claim that mental states are theoretical entities.
42 I say “theoretical”, because solipsism may pose a pressing theoretical problem, but never a pressing practical
problem: No significant amount of solipsists, if any have ever actually existed, have ever consistently behaved as
if no external world consisted. As construed in the present context, solipsism is essentially a systematic gap in
the justification of (mental) attributions, but which we regularly engage in anyway. (On a side note, Piaget has
suggested that infants in fact undergo a solipsistic stage of development and have to consequently “convince”
themselves that what they perceive are actually the effects of external objects, cf. Flanagan 1991: 144 ff.. Even if
that’s the case, said gap in justification is surely an independent matter.)
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“Sometimes skepticism seems to rest on a simple fallacy, the fallacy of reasoning from
the fact that there is nothing we might not be wrong about to the conclusion that we might be
wrong about everything” (Davidson 2001b: 45). That it is true that we could err in any single
instant does not establish that we cannot err systematically in all instances at once. The logic
of this fallacy is similar to inferring the wrong statement “all Catholics could be elected Pope
at the same time” from the true statement “any Catholic could be elected Pope”. In discussing
the Cartesian view I have already mentioned one root of this fallacy,  namely holding that
intersubjective  knowledge  is  inferred  from  subjective  knowledge.  Davidson  argued  that
subjective, intersubjective and objective knowledge are interdependent: having or being able
to have one kind requires being able to have the other two, and none is reducible to any other
form.  “There  are  (…)  no  ‘barriers’,  logical  or  epistemic,  between  the  three  varieties  of
knowledge. On the other hand, the very way in which each depends on the others shows why
none can be eliminated, or reduced to the others” (ibid.: 214).
Davidson bases this view on what he calls “Triangulation” (ibid.: 212 f.). According to
this view, the acquisition of language, and consequently, mastering subjective and objective
concepts,  requires  intersubjectivity  along  the  following  lines:  learning  a  language  means
acquiring  dispositions  to  react  to  similarly  perceived  stimuli  with  similar  utterances  (see
Figure  3).  Our  ability  to  do  so  can  be  explained  evolutionarily  (ibid.).  What  is  required
beyond an underlying cognitive mechanism which produces these consistent perceptions is a
social situation in which this association of stimuli and utterances can be learned: “it is only
when an observer consciously correlates the responses of another creature with objects and
events of the observer’s world that there is any basis for saying the creature is responding to
those  objects  or  events  rather  than  any other  objects  or  events” (ibid.:  212).  Expressions
which can be directly bound to non-linguistic stimuli, much as the uttering of “lo, there is a
rabbit” can be bound to the presentation of a rabbit-stimulus, are what Quine calls “stimulus
meaning” (cf. Quine 1960: 32-36). And linguistic expressions themselves can serve as stimuli
which, by way of further conditioning, will elicit more utterances. This form of conditioned
meaning will  only indirectly be tied to non-linguistic stimuli,  and thus any statement that
relies on more than just stimulus meaning will be less easy to relate to empirical goings-on.
Davidson’s analogy is geological triangulation, in which an object is scrutinised from two
different  points  of  view;  in  the  geological  case,  the  object’s  distance  or  height  can  be
determined  (depending  on  which  of  the  two  variables  is  known),  while  in  language
acquisition, the concept’s meaning can be determined:
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“Without  [a] sharing of reactions to common stimuli,  thought and speech would have no  
particular content – that is, no content at all. It takes two points of view to give a location to 
the  cause of  a thought,  and thus to  define its  content.  We may think of it  as a form of  
triangulation: each of two people is reacting differentially to sensory stimuli streaming in from
a certain direction.  Projecting the incoming lines  outward,  the  common  cause is  at  their  
intersection. If the two people now note each other’s reactions (in the case of language, verbal 
reactions), each can correlate these observed reactions with his or her stimuli from the world. 
A common cause has been determined.  The triangle which gives content  to  thought  and  
speech is complete. But it takes two to triangulate” (ibid.: 212 f.).
Figure 3: Davidsonian Triangulation.
This triangulation is the basis for ascribing mental content, and therefore symbolic content is
public in nature:
“When we start learning a language, we associate linguistic expressions with our different  
anticipations and other dispositions on the basis of publicly accessible evidence. (…) [A]s  
soon as we extrapolate from the perceptual realm into more theoretical domains, the interplay 
between theory and meaning becomes more pervasive. (…) In these areas it is important that 
we not regard meaning as something that first exists in our mind and then gets expressed  
through language. There are no proto-meanings in our mind, as [Jerry] Fodor and many others 
maintain  [see  I.5.5].  There  are  intimate  and  interesting  connections  between  mind  and  
meaning. But we get a wrong picture of these connections if we fail to take seriously the  
public nature of language” (Føllesdal 1975: 43).
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While meaning is a social matter, it is objective insofar as it is not determined socially,
or reducible to social facts. Even an ideal complete description of social matters – of how all
forms  of  individual  behaviour  have  been tied  to  or  correlated  with environmental  cues  –
underdetermine  meaning,  much  as  empirical  facts  underdetermine  theories  in  the  natural
sciences (and as Quine and Dennett would argue, the indeterminacy goes even further;  see
I.6.1). On the Davidsonian view, theories of meaning are supported by empirical evidence,
but this relation of support is not one of direct implication. Since theories have a potentially
infinite amount if instances they govern, they cannot be reduced to a finite set of evidence.
Likewise, no definite meaning can be given for any linguistic entity; for linguistic meaning
springs from an ever-ongoing process that consists in associating sentences, or parts of it, with
non-verbal stimuli and/or other sentences (cf. Quine 1960: 9 ff.).
It should be noted that accepting a fundamental indeterminacy which goes beyond the
way in which theories  in  the  natural  sciences  are  underdetermined by empirical  evidence
would fundamentally distinguish psychological theories from those in the natural sciences.
For instance, dealing with neurobiological methods, just as with methods of physicochemical
measurements in general, we would be extremely wary of them if they systematically yielded
contradictory results. Spoken in everyday, macroscopic terms: In the place of an apple, there
can’t also be an orange. It can be next to it, or on top of it, or under it, but not in the exact
same place. Similarly, if two measurements of ion-concentrations in the same neuron at the
same time would contradict each other, we would assume one measurement to be wrong, and
our apparatus to be faulty. Not so with psychological measurements, because all we can ever
measure empirically is the evidence for the ascription of psychological states rather than the
psychological  state  itself,  and  if  indeterminacy  is  true,  these  states  are  not  singularly
determined by it. That is, psychological questionnaires will yield definite statements, or show
definite  boxes  being  ticked;  our  inspection  of  someone’s  facial  expression  may  yield  a
definite grimace, a behavioural description will yield a definite sequence of movements in
space and time – but what we make of all  of these is  subject to a schema of intentional
interpretation. I will accept the latter point; but what kind of indeterminacy follows from it I
will leave open. If it is merely a Davidsonian one, which is best expressed as the kind of
indeterminacy that always exists between using different scales of measurements, then we’re
on a safer side than if we go with the Quine or Dennett kind (see I.6.1).
In a Wittgensteinian sense, knowing the meaning of a word or sentence is knowing
how to use it – knowing the rule according to which it is used (compare Wittgenstein 1953:
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§43, also  see section I.4.1). And these rules, in turn, cannot be entirely extrapolated from
empirically gathered data: At any given time, there is an infinite amount of potential rules
which would chime with past linguistic behaviour (compare Kripke 1982 and II.8.2). And the
problem is not just one of extrapolating a determinate, independently existing rule to govern
linguistic meaning from verbal and non-verbal behaviour, since our peers, who we would like
to learn meaning from by extrapolating the rules governing  their linguistic  behaviour,  are
essentially  in  the  same  boat:  They,  in  turn,  have  learned  semantic  rules  by  trying  to
extrapolate rules from other persons’ linguistic behaviour as well. So, in learning language,
we  extrapolate  rules  governing  others’  linguistic  behaviour  which  is  in  turn  guided  by
extrapolated rules, ad infinitum.
So, knowing the semantics of a language consists in having a theory about the rules
that  govern  linguistic  behaviour,  and  every  set  of  rules  that  conforms  to  the  evidence
constitutes a workable theory. Since the linguistic behaviour that serves as evidence is in no
way  independent  from  the  semantic  theories  which  are  tested  in  comparison  with  this
evidence, revising a theory can be weighed against revising linguistic behaviour itself (such as
by pointing out that a given term has been used mistakenly):  “there will  always be cases
where all possible evidence leaves open a choice between attributing to a speaker a standard
meaning and an idiosyncratic pattern of belief, or a deviant meaning and a sober opinion”
(Davidson 1980: 257). Which option we choose will also be influenced by considering criteria
of  theoretical  simplicity (cf.  Quine 1960: 19 ff.).  This whole picture is  strikingly akin to
theory-formation  in the natural  sciences:  We are confronted with a  complex multitude  of
observable phenomena, and we try to structure, explain and predict them by coming up with a
theory  (cf.  Davidson  2001a:  222).  Meaning  is  the  operative  aspect  in  such  theories  (cf.
Davidson 1980: 256 ff.), and in this sense it is fundamentally theory-dependent. There is no
“free-floating, linguistically neutral meaning” (Quine 1960: 76).43
Now, one might paint the alternative picture that we have some sort of naturally built-
in semantic organ which informs us about what meaning certain symbolic entities have. While
it is true that some of our intentional attitudes are unconditioned (much as we can viscerally
extrapolate the notion of being in danger from the appearance of a roaring lion in our direct
vicinity), and that human beings are also equipped with a natural disposition to use symbols in
manifold ways,  learning certainly does play a crucial  role in endowing many entities with
meaning. For instance, we are not free to replace the visceral “meaning” a roaring lion has for
us  with  some other  stimulus  in  the  way that  we are  free  to  introduce  the  convention  of
43 Here, I urge to take “linguistic” in a broad sense; i.e. as applying to all symbolic systems which carry meaning.
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meaning 3.14159... by using the symbol π. A “semantic organ” could not explain such matters
of acquired (i.e. conventional) meaning; and since the kind of meaning which is not acquired
(i.e. “sparse”, see I.4.4) can be cashed out in terms of non-representational causality (see II.4
and II.6), assuming any such organ in order to explain matters of meaning would eventually
prove superfluous.
Following Quine, what is important for an individual to acquire a semantic theory is
characterised functionally (also compare Cummins 2000: 125 f.).  While there has to be a
hard-wired  basis  on  which  our  linguistic  abilities  can  flourish,  a  potentially  unlimited
multitude of different (neural) routings could enable us to partake in linguistic practice. That
is, having a semantic theory, and being able to speak a language, are functional descriptions
which can be implemented in a variety of (neural and other) ways.44 Primarily because it is
not  the  individual  body-state  which alone  determines  meaning,  but  what  intersubjectively
follows from it.  For instance,  “square” refers to any “objective” square, even though in a
situation where several observers are standing around a tile, the subjective stimulus is a retinal
projection consisting in “a scalene quadrilateral which is geometrically dissimilar to everyone
else’s” (Quine 1960: 7) retinal projection. Compare also the following:
“To look deep into the subject’s head would be inappropriate even if feasible, for we want to 
keep clear of his idiosyncratic neural routings or private history of habit formation. We are  
after  his  socially  inculcated  linguistic  usage,  hence  his  responses  to  conditions  normally  
subject  to  social  assessment.  [Visual  stimulation  by  way  of]  ocular  irradiation  is  
intersubjectively checked to some degree by society and linguist alike, by making allowances 
for the speaker’s orientation and the relative disposition of objects” (Quine 1960: 31).
Since  linguistic  behaviour  is  conditioned  to  observable  stimuli,  it  is  the
intersubjectively  interesting  and  characteristic  features  which  take  primacy  in  the
characterisation of meaningful expressions, rather than the subjective quality of the stimulus;
even though the subjective quality has to be reliably associated with intersubjective features
(by being “intersubjectively checked”) in order to explain why a given individual can produce
44 Which is not to say that any neural basis has to be sufficient for knowing a language, but that a potentially
necessary neural basis can take any shape that satisfies the specified function. This point is independent of any
view pertaining to reductionism: it is compatible with the radical reductionist view that knowing a language
entirely  consists  in  having  a  certain  neural  structure  (namely  if  there  is  or  can  ever  be  only  one  neural
implementation of the given function) as well as with the moderate view that a neural basis is necessary, but not
sufficient (i.e. that non-neural factors also play a necessary role in determining whether a given language is
spoken).  For the radical  non-reductionist,  who claims that  a  neural  basis isn’t  even necessary for  linguistic
knowledge, this whole issue won’t even arise: For her, musings about natural organs and idiosyncratic neural
routings are completely beside the point.
Intentional Psychology 105
the respective meaningful behaviour in the first place. By way of learning and using language,
we are conditioned to use intersubjective meanings. We are still able to refer to subjective
experience, describing feelings, dreams or pains, but that is only because we and our peers
have been conditioned to use the words “feeling”, “dream” and “pain” under intersubjectively
available conditions (compare I.9.4).
Davidsonian Triangulation is a variant of semantic externalism; but unlike Putnam’s
(see sections I.4.3 and I.8.3), it does not consist in identifying causal chains between objects
and  concepts  (cf.  Putnam  1981:  chapter  1),  but  in  developing  common  dispositions  in
response to objects that are perceived as similar. Just as in Putnam’s case, this guarantees the
object’s independence of the subject’s mental state: thus, mental states can refer to matters of
fact which go beyond what goes on in the mind. This establishes the connection between
subjectivity and objectivity and the fact that any of our statements can be wrong (cf. Davidson
2001b:  chapter  2).  In  this  sense,  objective  knowledge  is  not  derivable  from  subjective
knowledge, but the two depend on each other.
Taking triangulation as paradigm for the acquisition of language guarantees  us the
interdependence of subjective, intersubjective and objective knowledge: In order to acquire
subjective knowledge – knowledge about the content of one’s own mind –, it is necessary to
be able to ascribe propositional attitudes in accordance with a psychological theory, which
can only be acquired through intersubjective triangulation. In order to know what it means to
have a belief, one has to understand that beliefs can also be had by others:
“Until a base line has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point 
in saying one’s own thoughts or words have a propositional content. If this is so, then it is  
clear that  knowledge of another mind is  essential  to all  thought and all  knowledge.  (…)  
Knowledge of the propositional contents of our own minds is not possible without the other 
forms of knowledge since there is no propositional thought without communication. It is also 
the case that we are not in a position to attribute thoughts to others unless we know what we 
think since attributing thoughts to others is a matter of matching the verbal and other behavior 
of others to our own propositions or meaningful sentences. Knowledge of our own minds and 
knowledge of the minds of others are thus mutually dependent” (Davidson 2001b: 213).
So, self-ascriptions of mental content are only viable if the concept with which these
are  ascribed  have  been  learned  in  the  context  of  triangulated  objects,  thus  requiring  an
intersubjectively shared external world: “Knowledge of another mind is possible, however,
only if one has knowledge of the world, for the triangulation which is essential to thought
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requires that those in communication recognise that they occupy positions in a shared world.
So knowledge of other minds and knowledge of the world are mutually dependent; neither is
possible without the other” (ibid.). Objectivity is also guaranteed in another sense: Mastering
the ascription of intentional mental states also requires acknowledging that they can be true or
false, depending on states of affairs in an external world. We can call this view about the
interdependence  of  subjective,  intersubjective  and objective  knowledge  Epistemic  Holism,
meaning it entails that the ability to acquire any single form of knowledge depends on the
possibility of acquiring all forms.
Another basis for establishing that other-minds-skepticism rests on a fallacy is Mental
Holism, a position which we can also find prominently argued for in Davidson’s writings and
which has its roots in Quine’s views (cf. Quine 1980: 20-46).45 Mental holism is the view that
the ascription of mental properties can and does not proceed one by one, but rather by taking
their  entirety into  account.  That  is,  both truth  and meaning of  an  individual  mental  state
ascription  depend  on  the  totality  of  mental  state  ascriptions  as  well  as  on  the  available
evidence for these:
“We interpret a single speech act against the background of a theory of the speaker’s language.
Such a theory tells us (at least) the truth conditions of each of an infinite number of sentences
the man might utter, these conditions being relative to the time and circumstances of utterance.
In  building  up  such  a  theory,  whether  consciously,  like  an  anthropologist  or  linguist,  or
unwittingly, like a child learning its first language, we are never in a position directly to learn
the meanings of words one by one, and then independently to learn rules for assembling them
into meaningful wholes. We start rather with the wholes, and infer (or contrive) an underlying
structure. Meaning is the operative aspect of this structure. Since the structure is inferred, from
the point of view anyway of what is needed and known for communication, we must view
meaning itself as a theoretical construction. Like any construct, it is arbitrary except for the
formal  and empirical  constraints we impose on it.  In the case of meaning,  the constraints
cannot uniquely fix the theory of interpretation. The reason, as Quine has convincingly argued,
is that the sentences a speaker holds to be true are determined, in ways we can only partly
disentangle, by what the speaker means by his words and what he believes about the world. A
better way to put this would be to say: belief and meaning cannot be uniquely reconstructed
from speech behaviour” (Davidson 1980: 256 f.).
45 See  Lycan  2000:  chapter  8  for  an  introduction  to  Quine’s  semantic  theory  and  Duhem 1906/54  for  the
historical root of his position.
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Davidson  derived  his  main  argument  for  mental  holism from the  work  he  had  done  on
decision theory (cf. Davidson, Suppes & Siegel 1957). A central aim in decision theory is to
predict and explain decisions made between viable options, and this can be done in terms of a
preference for one option over another. Preferences can in turn be explained by two kinds of
mental attitudes: The desire to bring about a certain event (in technical terms: the “expected
utility”,  cf.  von  Neumann  & Morgenstern  1944)  and  the  subjective  probability  which  is
assigned to the realisation of this event. Let’s look at the following example:
“Suppose an agent is indifferent between getting $5.00, and a gamble that offers him $11.00 if
a coin comes up heads, and $0.00 if it comes up tails. We might explain (i.e., ‘interpret’) his 
indifference [either] by supposing that money has a diminishing marginal value for him: $5.00
is midway on his subjective value scale between $0.00 and $11.00 (…) [or by the agent’s  
belief that] tails are more likely to come up than heads; if he thought heads and tails equally 
probable, he would certainly prefer the gamble, which would then be equal to a straight offer 
of $5.50” (Davidson 2001a: 145).
These two alternative explanations illustrate the fact that preferences are vectors of
said mental attitudes: Of “the relative values the chooser places on the outcomes,  and the
probability  he  assigns  to  those  outcomes,  conditional  on  his  choice”  (ibid.).  Choices  or
preferences are the relevant observable evidence we have for the ascription of both subjective
probability and relative value (or “utility”),  which serve to explain the observable events.
“Support for the explanation doesn’t come from a new kind of insight into the attitudes and
beliefs  of  the  agent,  but  from  more  observations  of  preferences  of  the  very  sort  to  be
explained. In brief, to explain (i.e., interpret) a particular choice or preference, we observe
other choices or preferences; these will support a theory on the basis of which the original
choice  or  preference  can  be explained”  (ibid.:  146).  According to  this  notion,  utility  and
subjective  probability  are  abstract  concepts  of  a  theory  which  we  can  use  to  impose  a
systematic, holistic structure with inherent explanatory value on observable data, and they are
theoretical concepts because they only have meaning in the context of such an explanatory
theory.
According  to  Davidson’s  view,  mental  states  and  meaning  make  up  a  vector
analogously  to  that  of  expected  utility  and  subjective  probability:  “behavioural  or
dispositional facts that can be described in ways that do not assume interpretations, but on
which a theory of interpretation can be based, will necessarily be a vector of meaning and
belief”  (ibid.:  148).  Furthermore,  decision  theory  and  interpretation  theory  are  closely
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connected: “it is not reasonable to suppose we can interpret verbal behaviour without fine-
grained informations  about  beliefs  and intentions,  nor is  it  reasonable  to  imagine  we can
justify the attribution of preferences among complex options unless we can interpret speech
behaviour”  (ibid.:  147).  Likewise,  “except  in  the  cases  of  the  most  primitive  beliefs  and
desires, establishing the correctness of an attribution of belief or desire involves much the
same problems as showing that we have understood the words of another” (Davidson 1980:
237).
However, how are we to tackle the problem that matters of mental states and matters
of semantics form one vector which we cannot unravel merely on the basis of observable
evidence? Deviously, the meaning we ascribe to someone’s utterance depends on what they
believe to be the case, and what they believe depends on what they mean by their utterances.
Let’s assume we hear someone say “il pleut”. If we can assume that what she means by her
utterance is “it rains”, then this utterance is evidence for ascribing to her the belief that it
rains.  On the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  it  rains  can  only ever  constitute  evidence  for  her
meaning  “it  rains”  by  the  utterance  “il  pleut”  if  her  belief  which  she  expresses  by  this
utterance is not mistaken. But if our ascribing to her said belief is only justified if we know
what she means, and we can only know what she means if we know what she believes – so
what  are  we to  do?  Again,  the  only observable  evidence  we have  at  our  disposal  is  the
utterance “il pleut” and the observation of the utterance’s context, namely whether it rains.
But these alone cannot help us untangle what someone means from what she believes. So,
how can we enter this circle?
“The interdependence of belief and meaning springs from the interdependence of two
aspects  of  the  interpretation  of  speech  behaviour:  the  attribution  of  beliefs  and  the
interpretation  of  sentences”  (Davidson  2001a:  195).  To start,  Davidson proposes  that  we
should take the vector constituted by said observables to represent the attitude of holding a
sentence to be true: for if we know that someone holds a sentence true, and we also know
what the sentence means, then we know what she believes; and alternatively, if we know that
someone holds a sentence true, and we additionally know what she believes, we know what
she means by it.  Crucially,  we can know whether someone holds a sentence true without
having to invoke semantic knowledge:
“On the one hand, most uses of language tell us directly, or shed light on the question, whether
a speaker holds a sentence to be true. If a speaker’s purpose is to give information, or to make 
an honest assertion, then normally, the speaker believes he is uttering a sentence true under the
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circumstances. (…) In order to infer from such evidence that a speaker holds a sentence true 
we need to know much about his desires and beliefs, but we do not have to know what his 
words mean” (ibid.: 161 f.).
Now we also need to determine one of the two remaining factors: “we must have a theory that
simultaneously  accounts  for  attitudes  and  interprets  speech,  and  which  assumes  neither”
(ibid.: 195). “It makes no sense to suppose that we can first intuit all of a person’s intentions
and beliefs and then get at what he means by what he says. Rather we refine our theory of
each in the light of the other” (Davidson 1980: 258).
Davidson’s  solution  consists  in  embracing  the  fact  that  we  cannot  help  but
methodically assume a speaker’s utterances to be mostly true. This point goes back to Quine’s
“radical  translation”  (cf.  Quine  1960:  ch.  2):  If  we  have  only  limited  knowledge  of  a
language, we can’t help but assume that all sentences which are held true by speakers express
true  propositions,  otherwise  we  could  not  even  begin  to  understand  them.  According  to
semantic holism, two speakers need to share many beliefs in order to be able to mean the
same thing with individual statements:
“If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we understand the meaning of 
each item in the structure only as an abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it  
features, then we can give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the meaning 
of every sentence (and word) in the language. Frege said that only in the context of a sentence 
does a word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added that only in the context of 
the language does a sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning” (Davidson 2001a: 22).
So, for two persons to mean the same thing when uttering “the sun is high up in the sky“, they
need to share many beliefs about the sun and the sky. This doesn’t exclude the possibility that
either could be wrong – but it requires that they can only be wrong in individual cases, but not
generally. In order to be able to find out which of their statements are false, we need to find
out what they mean – and we cannot do that if we do not assume that, looking at the whole of
them, they are mostly correct. That is the essence of holism: assigning the value “true” to as
many  held-true  sentences  as  possible,  and  it  is  a  methodological  requirement  both  for
ascribing  meaning  as  well  as  for  ascribing  intentional  mental  states.  The  principle  that
consists of assuming that someone is mostly right with what they say is called “principle of
charity”.  Its application is necessary to untangle the vector of holding-true into belief  and
meaning; and its application is also justified, since the possibility of error can only come into
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play after determining meaning, and thus assuming general agreement (cf. Davidson 2001a:
200; also compare Lewis 1983b: 113 and Dennett 1987: 19, fn. 1).
The principle of charity unites two sub-principles: the “principle of correspondence”
and the “principle  of coherence”.  The principle  of  correspondence holds  that  we need to
assume general agreement between a speaker and her interpreter:
“Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with the ability to interpret words, the only possibility
at  the start  is  to assume general agreement  on beliefs.  We get  a first  approximation to a  
finished theory by assigning to sentences of a speaker conditions of truth that actually obtain 
(in our own opinion) just when the speaker holds those sentences true. The guiding policy is to
do this as far as possible, subject to considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of 
social conditioning, and of course our common-sense, or scientific, knowledge of explicable 
error” (Davidson 2001a: 196).
According to this principle, people share most of their beliefs if and only if they are able to
understand  each  other,  i.e.  if  they  speak  translatable  languages  (or  at  least  translatable
fragments). This ties into the holism of meaning: in order to be able to converse about the
same thing, we need to share a whole “web of beliefs” into which the concepts we use are
embedded (cf. ibid.: 200; Quine & Ullian 1970).
Apart from maximising correspondence, we also need to maximise coherence: That is,
we need to assume that those we interpret  are mostly consistent  and rational.  In order to
understand a speaker, “we will try for a theory that finds him consistent, a believer of truths,
and a lover of the good (all by our own lights, it goes without saying)” (Davidson 1980: 222).
This  requirement  of  rationality,  the  principle  of  coherence,  is  as  indispensable  as  that  of
correspondence:
“Coherence  here  includes  the  idea  of  rationality  both  in  the  sense  that  the  action  to  be  
explained must be reasonable in the light of the assigned desires and beliefs, but also in the 
sense that the assigned desires and beliefs must fit  with one another. The methodological  
assumption of rationality does not  make it  impossible to attribute irrational  thoughts and  
actions  to  an  agent,  but  it  does  impose  a  burden  on  such  attributions.  We  weaken  the  
intelligibility of attributions of thoughts of any kind to the extent that we fail to uncover a  
consistent pattern of beliefs, and, finally, of actions, for it is only against a background of such
a pattern that we can identify thoughts.” (Davidson 2001a: 159). “[I]f we are intelligibly to  
attribute  attitudes  and beliefs,  or  usefully to  describe motions  as  behaviour,  then we are  
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committed  to  finding,  in  the  pattern  of  behaviour,  belief  and  desire,  a  large  degree  of  
rationality and consistency” (Davidson 1980: 237). 
It should be noted that the form of rationality that is required here is weaker than our
common understanding of rationality (compare section I.6.4): It requires a form of internal
consistency, both in terms of mental states (i.e. two openly opposing beliefs should not be
held at the same time) and in terms of behaviour (actions should be somewhat consistent with
what is believed and desired). There’s a pervasive idea that human beings are notoriously
irrational creatures, an idea that seems to be supported by much recent psychological research
(see footnote 39). However, when accusing someone of irrational behaviour in everyday life,
we usually mean that they seem to act against plausible norms governing actions, not that
there couldn’t possibly be understandable reasons for their actions. (In fact, calling someone
irrational is often akin to calling out their reasons as stupid or immoral, not as inconsistent).
The Davidsonian version of rationality means the latter: it requires that someone’s actions can
be explained in terms of any reasons which are internally consistent and can be consistently
tied to external circumstances (but not necessarily to plausible norms governing actions – they
may very well be tied to what we deem immoral, stupid or short-sighted norms).
We may  also  sometimes  lack  the  cognitive  capacity  to  be  consistent  even  in  this
weaker sense, but such failures can be amended by simply ascribing an additional mental state
that explains the unawareness of the respective inconsistency. That is, it is plausible for me to
hold two inconsistent beliefs if I have good reasons for being unaware of how they contradict
each other. Someone may also act irrationally by, say, avoiding to board planes because of a
fear that it might crash, while regularly playing lotto. Again, amendments can be made to our
mental  state  descriptions  which  would  explain  such  discrepancies.  However,  the  point
remains that our actions and mental attitudes cannot be grossly inconsistent,  for then they
would be uninterpretable. Similarly, by giving up on amending our mental state ascriptions of
others, we undermine our potential  for understanding them: “To the extent that we fail to
discover a coherent and plausible pattern in the attitudes  and actions of others we simply
forego the chance of treating them as  persons” (ibid.: 221 f.). Also, a being we would find
grossly  uninterpretable  is  rather  arational than  irrational,  meaning  that  our  principles  of
rationality simply do not apply.  The adjective “irrational” is better  applied to single cases
against a backdrop of understandable, rational attitudes: That is, if I am a generally relatable
and interpretable person, I may occasionally do irrational things, like checking under my bed
before going to sleep.
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Consequently we should distinguish between two different uses of the term “rational”:
We may say that if Anne were rational, she would vote for the Green Party, and mean that for
her actions to reach a maximum of consistency with her mental states (such as her political
beliefs about environmental policies), she should vote for the Green Party. This falls squarely
into the domain of mental ascriptions, for we would strive to find a way to make her voting
behaviour consistent with her beliefs (and perhaps we would try to convince her to vote in
what we perceive as a consistent manner). On the other hand, we might say the same thing,
namely that if Anne were rational, she would vote for the Green Party, and mean something
entirely different by it: namely that if her actions were to be most consistent with what we
perceive to be the state of the world, she should vote Green. We might perceive the state of
the  world  to  be  one  of  threatening  global  warming  and  waning  natural  ressources,  and
consequently think it only right to vote Green – even if none of Anne’s beliefs are actually
consistent with voting Green (as she might steadfastly deny global warming and the waning
of natural ressources).  This use of “rational” does  not fall into the domain of psychological
attribution, but into the domain of ethics, namely of determining what values should guide our
actions: what’s good and what’s bad.46
For example, we can find Bertrand Russell lament: “Man is a rational animal — so at
least I have been told. Throughout a long life, I have looked diligently for evidence in favor of
this statement, but so far I have not had the good fortune to come across it, though I have
searched in many countries spread over three continents” (Russell 1950: 71). Here, Russell
does not mean to imply that human beings generally fail to weep over a loved one’s death, fail
to  value  acts  of  kindness,  fail  to  eat  when  hungry  and  presented  with  food,  or  fail  to
understand why insurgents would not freely surrender their children to the oppressor. Rather,
he  means  to  criticise  failures  of  critical  and  long-term  thinking  and  the  like:  a  lack  of
adherence to what he sees as reasonable values. Such criticism is warranted, but does not
touch the fact that we have to assume a basic form of rationality in order to render someone’s
actions and mental states intelligible.  I have sometimes found people to reject Davidson’s
claims on the grounds of such laments – but such rejections rest on an utter confusion of what
form of rationality Davidson is talking about.
46 There is also a tendency in recent moral psychology to want to substitute reason with an assumed process of
deliberation which supposedly causes (and thus precedes) decisions, judgments or, generally, actions. However,
since what we can find as usually preceding actions seldomly deserves the name “reasoning”, but rather appears
as an emotional impulse or an intuitive, automatic process, this operationalisation of reason has led to either of
the popular claims that reason is not a cause of action at all, that humans are not reasonable beings, or that no
such thing as reason actually exists. Jumping to such conclusions stems from confusing reasoning – a process
which aims to conform to a normative ideal of what’s reasonable – with a descriptive notion of an individual
psychological process (compare Sauer 2012).
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The application of the principle of charity with its sub-principles is both necessary and
justified, since it is
“not an option, but a condition of having a workable theory, [and thus] it is meaningless to 
suggest that we might  fall  into massive error by endorsing it.  Until  we have successfully  
established a systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held true, there are 
no mistakes to make. (…) If we can produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal 
conditions  for  a  theory,  we  have done all  that  could  be done to  ensure  communication.  
Nothing more is possible, and nothing more is needed” (Davidson 2001a: 197).
In this way, we are making “maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others” (ibid.).
Maximising agreement between interpreter and speaker is justified since “each interpretation
and attribution of attitude is a move within a holistic theory, a theory necessarily governed by
concern  for  consistency  and  general  coherence  with  the  truth”  (ibid.:  154).  This  is  why
“[g]lobal confusion, like universal mistake, is unthinkable, not because imagination boggles,
but because too much confusion leaves nothing to be confused about and massive error erodes
the background of true belief against which alone failure can be construed” (Davidson 1980:
221).
Davidson’s reliance on observability, behavioural evidence and the interdependence of
subjective,  intersubjective and objective knowledge entails  that private states alone cannot
constitute a basis for intentionality and semantic properties: “Perhaps someone (not Quine)
will be tempted to say, ‘But at least the speaker knows what he’s referring to’. One should
stand firm against this thought. The semantic features of language are public features. What
no one can, in the nature of the case, figure out from the totality of the relevant evidence
cannot  be  part  of  meaning”  (Davidson  2001a:  235).  Here,  Davidson  does  not  deny  the
existence of private mental states, but he firmly denies that they can figure (directly) into a
theory of interpretation. “The crucial point on which I am with Quine might be put: all the
evidence for or against a theory of truth (interpretation, translation) comes in the form of facts
about what events or situations in the world cause, or would cause, speakers to assent to, or
dissent from, each sentence in the speaker’s repertoire” (Davidson 2001a: 230).
While the private subjectivist view is thus rejected, it should be just as clear that, on
the other hand, nothing about this picture implies radical behaviourism: The statement “she
was angry all the time, yet she never showed it” does not come out as contradictory; and the
fact that someone displays calm behaviour at all times does not logically imply that she has
never been angry. Rather, the idea is that there is a general connection between angriness-
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behaviour and being angry, and that this connection generally justifies attributions of anger.
Other mental states are justified analogously.
I.7.5. Full-fledged versus Attenuated Intentional States
Davidson famously held that for any belief to qualify as being about a tree, the belief’s
bearer must have “many general beliefs about trees: that they are growing things, that they
have leaves or needles,  that they burn.  There is  no fixed list  of things someone with the
concept of a tree must believe, but without many general beliefs, there would be no reason to
identify a belief as a belief about a tree, much less an oak tree” (Davidson 2001b: 98, also
compare Searle 2000: 107). Yet, there plausibly are weaker construals available of what is
required in order to have meaningful thoughts. We should want to say that mice may fear
snakes, for instance. Mice could not mean snakes by way of reference, since they have no
symbolic system to rely on – and even if they had, nothing having to do with their being
afraid qualifies as a symbolic action. They also cannot have the same full-fledged concepts of
snakes that we do: If we are able to use the concept “snake” then because we have learned it.
No such thing would be required of mice for them to be able to fear snakes. That is, if we are
to attribute some concept of snakes to mice, then it would be a quite sparse concept, relating
sensory sensitivity  to  certain  stimuli  associated  with  snakes  to  fearful  behaviour.  On the
human side, invoking symbolic reference has a huge explanatory benefit when explaining the
mind, and the fact that we can have certain thoughts which mice cannot have depends on our
having developed concepts and symbolic reference culturally and on having grown up in an
environment which is in large parts characterised by forms of symbolic reference. Animals
may not lack meaningful mental states tout court, but they certainly lack some that are at our
disposal,  and  our  ascription  of  mental  states  to  animals  usually  marks  this  difference,
attributing attenuated concepts to them at best. There is a controversial and ongoing debate
about  to  what  extent  and how exactly  we should ascribe  concepts  and mental  content  to
animals, which I will not indulge in here (see Jamieson 2009 for an overview); however, it
should be clear that human psychology is distinctive insofar it is at least to a degree shaped
and formed by our access to symbolic communication.  Beliefs about quarks and hopes of
rising stock markets would constitute prime examples (cf.  Deonna & Teroni 2012: 23 f.),
whereas we might fear snakes in a similar way as mice do. Yet, even in the latter case, we are
able  to  develop  a  mental  state  which  is  impossible  for  mice  to  have;  for  example,  an
ophidiophobic herpetologist could certainly have a more complicated fear of snakes than mice
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do.  So,  human  psychological  make-up  ranges  from  areas  which  are  not  necessarily
characterised by high-level intentionality to others which are.
The distinction between high-level and low-level capacities reflects the fact that some
of the propositions we can have attitudes towards require higher cognitive capacities than
others. For instance, in order to be able to fear stock market crashes or to be enticed by the
beauty of a mathematical proof, we need to be able to have an attitude toward abstract objects
– mice would certainly have a hard time sharing these mental states. In other cases, all that is
required of anyone to have a certain mental state is that they show consistent behaviour as a
consequence of certain environmental  cues,  where the cues are  describable  in cognitively
sparse  terms  (such  as  fearful  behaviour  when  snakes  are  around).  For  example,  Daniel
Dennett’s deeply pragmatical view accommodates  ascribing the intention to make a chess
move to Deep Blue and the belief that the room is too cold to thermostats (cf. Dennett 1987:
22 ff.). The ascribed state may be “an attenuated sort of belief” (Dennett 2007: 87) and merely
ascribe  “hemi-semi-demi-proto-quasi-pseudo  intentionality”  (ibid.:  88)  in  contrast  to  full-
fledged intentionality: “Just as a young child can  sort of believe that her daddy is a doctor
(without full comprehension of what a daddy or a doctor is), so a robot – or some part of a
person’s  brain – can  sort  of believe  that  there is  an open door  a  few feet  ahead,  or  that
something is amiss over there to the right, and so forth” (ibid.: 87 f.).
Without settling the matter how intentionality itself can come in degrees, we should
acknowledge  that  Dennett’s  motivation  to  ascribe  intentional  states  even  when  the
requirements  for the full-fledged attribution are not met  is that it  may just  turn out to be
exceedingly  practical:  The  “intentional  stance  (…)  pays  off  handsomely,  generating
hypotheses to test, articulating theories, analysing distressingly complex phenomena into their
more comprehensible parts, and so forth” (ibid.: 87) and it can be adopted when faced with
similar abstract functional structures between persons and person-like systems (compare ibid.:
89). As he goes on to say:
“For years I have defended [the attribution of intentional states] (...) in characterising complex 
systems ranging from chess-playing computers to thermostats and in characterising the brain’s
subsystems at many levels. The idea is that, when we engineer a complex system (or reverse 
engineer a biological system like a person or a person’s brain), we can make progress by  
breaking down the whole wonderful person into subpersons of sorts[,] agentlike systems that 
have part of the prowess of a person, and then these homunculi can be broken down further 
into still  simpler,  less personlike agents,  and so forth – a  finite,  not  infinite  regress that  
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bottoms out when we reach agents so stupid that they can be replaced by a machine” (ibid.: 
88).
Suffice to say, the criteria for ascribing these attenuated intentional states can be considerably
more permissive than requiring being capable of having attitudes toward, say, abstract objects.
At first sight, a view like this contrasts with one like Davidson’s.  Obviously, children and
robots often do not satisfy his holistic requirements. Still, it is important to note that Dennett
does in fact  accept  the requirements  Davidson voices  – namely,  as requirements  for  full-
fledged intentional states. That is, we can stick with strict Davidsonian requirements, while
allowing a more permissible pragmatic application of Dennett’s intentional stance in other
cases,  ascribing  hemi-semi-demi-proto-quasi-pseudo  intentionality.  We should  simply  pay
attention not to confuse the two versions of intentional ascription, since higher-level cognitive
skills may not be shared by non-persons such as animals, robots or brain parts, or at least they
do not presently figure into our criteria for ascribing mental states to any of these (yet, we
could imagine this fact changing with the development of new technology or with a change in
our granting rights of personhood to animals, and it will also depend on insights concerning
the cognitive capacities of the subjects in question).
I.8. Narrow vs Broad Content
I.8.1. The Central Issue
What does mental  content depend on? Traditionally, two claims are distinguished: That
the content  of  mental  states  either  depends on properties  intrinsic  to  those  who have the
respective  mental  state,  or  that  it  depends  on  something  extrinsic  to  these,  such  as  the
individual’s environment (and a third position may hold that it depends on both). Now, we
know that the truth of the belief that there is a glass full of water on my desk trivially depends
on the environment, namely on whether there actually is a glass full of water on my desk. But
does  the  fact  that  my  belief  is  about  a  glass  full  of  water  on  my  desk  depend  on  the
environment? Or,  generally:  Does any mental  state’s content depend on the environment?
(See section I.3.) In a nutshell, to claim that mental content is broad is say that it does depend
(inclusively or exclusively) on the environment, and to say that it is  narrow is to say that it
does not. I am going to argue for the view that mental content is broad in an inclusive sense.
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(Broad content is also sometimes interchangeably called “wide content”, but I will only use
the former term.)
An intuitive assumption, which is likely to be held by many whose mindset has not been
swayed by recent analytic philosophy, is that I can have any belief completely independently
of what is going on beyond my own mind. We know that we can dream up or hallucinate all
sorts of things – things which can at times have no representational relation to our actual
environment at all. Historically, this assumption was most famously expressed by Descartes:
in his Meditationes de prima philosophia, he explored a form of radical doubt in our beliefs,
taking it to be plausible that the world could be entirely different from what we perceive
and/or  believe  it  to  be.  In  fact,  he  took  a  methodically  skeptic  approach  as  a  basis  for
reconstructing our entire epistemic inventory (i.e. the sum of our knowledge), and thus as one
basic form of methodology for philosophy (see Descartes 1965: II., 7-10). However, I suggest
we should primarily take his as an epistemic point: If at any given time, our perceptions may
deceive  us,  then how can we actually  know  whether  our  beliefs  are  grounded in  reality?
(Compare section I.7.)
But the matter becomes far more enigmatic when it comes to questions of content, which
Descartes did not address directly: While a systematic sensory access to the world is certainly
a basis for knowledge, it is not all that clear how mental  content is formed depending on
sensory input, and what difference exactly a potential independence of sensory input from
reality would make to semantic matters. Eventually, it very much depends on what you take
the nature of mental content to be. For example, if you happen to believe that concepts are
God-given Platonic ideas in the mind, and forming true beliefs about them amounts to the
enterprise of somehow matching them with what is real, then whether sensory perception is
independent from how the world actually is may impact your epistemic faith (in the truth of
your beliefs), but it has no bearing on mental content at all, since content is merely a matter of
forming beliefs out of these God-given ideas which have no traction with reality anyway.
Given such a view, one could have the belief that there is a full glass on my desk no matter
whether there actually is a glass on my desk, or whether I have actually ever been in the
presence of one,  or whether  any glasses and/or desks have actually ever existed.  All that
would matter is that such ideas can exist in the mind.
Then again, why should we be satisfied with a view which does not even begin to explain
how  anyone  can  arrive at  such  a  belief,  true  or  not?  Ultimately,  the  question  we  want
answered is this: What facts about me and/or the world decide what my mental states are
about? (And I take it that “they simply are given to us this way” is not a satisfying answer.)
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On the one hand, we certainly require specific cognitive abilities in order to have meaningful
mental states. That is, we have to be able to know, at least in principle, what a glass of water
is to have a belief about it, and we have to be at least in principle able to use the associated
concept  somewhat  properly  (which,  on  a  weaker  reading,  does  not  need  to  amount  to
linguistic capacities, but instrumental knowledge, such as knowing what to use a glass for,
and  connecting  it  to  related  concepts  such  as  transparency).  On  the  other  hand,  these
capacities are developed in interaction with certain external matters of fact, if only because I
have to learn many of them in interaction with my environment. So, in order to employ them
properly, I need to be cognitively able to learn the relevant concepts, which points to internal
facts, and I need to actually learn them, which points to external facts. Hence, an interaction
between cognitive “internal” and environmental “external” facts should be assumed.
Elaborating on these matters in detail is what is necessary to address the question whether
mental content is narrow or broad. As I have mentioned, I do not believe the Cartesian view to
help us iron these out, although what we should note is that the mere fact that he believed in
the possibility of all our beliefs being wrong implies assuming independence of content from
environment. That is, if our senses have been systematically deceiving us, then we must have
acquired mental content in a way which is independent from our sensory connection to the
world. Still, this mere assumption won’t lead us far.
In opposition to Cartesian skepticism, Quine and Davidson took mental content to have a
firm basis in what the world is like (see section I.7.4). The question what an utterance is about
is ultimately settled by checking whether the utterance has a systematic connection to certain
environmental (i.e. objectively assessable) stimuli (see Quine 1960: chapter 1). And mental
content is essentially reconstructed from assertions, thus dependent on the meaning and truth
of utterances (see e.g. Davidson 1980: 256 f.). It is no surprise that Quine and Davidson have
fashioned this view into a thorough rebuttal of the Cartesian skeptic: The wrongness of all our
beliefs at once is entirely inconceivable, since the content of these very beliefs depends on
what the world is like; and beliefs are ascribed by creating a maximum of correspondence
between what is true and what is believed (cf. ibid.). In fact, we should expect all theories
which take content to be intimately connected to things or events in the world to be more or
less suited to oppose Cartesian views, and to not allow us to conceive of the world as being
radically  different  from what  we believe.  I  will  elaborate  on  one  other  example,  namely
Putnam’s causal theory of meaning as underpinning an argument for broad content, in more
detail in section I.8.3.
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While  I  have  now only sketched two radical  alternatives  –  the  mind’s  directly  given
access to content versus taking content as the operative aspect of empirical psychosemantic
theories –, ultimately, the question whether mental content is broad or narrow will decisively
be settled by whatever picture we lean towards. Thus, the ultimate goal of this section consists
in my clearing up what exactly follows from my own theory about the content of mental
states, and how it follows. But first: some preliminaries.
I.8.2. Dependency, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
First off, to say that mental content depends on anything can mean a number of different
things. The weakest explication of this dependency is that the properties in question have
some  effect  in  bringing  about  the  mental  content  in  question.  To  use  an  analogy,  any
particular sound depends on the space it occurs in, yet the space is only one factor in how the
sound turns out.  Without  knowing some of the sound’s other properties,  merely knowing
about  the space it  occurs  in  will  not  be very helpful  in  learning what  the sound is  like.
Analogously, some believe that some mental states can only be had by beings who speak a
language (see section I.7.5), and in this sense mental content would depend on having learned
a language. Yet, merely knowing that a particular person has learned any language will not be
enough to learn the exact content of their thoughts.
On the other end of the spectrum, the strongest explication of this dependency is to hold
that  mental  content  is  completely  determined  by  the  respective  properties  (and  perhaps
derivable from and/or reducible to these).47 To say that it is determined can once again mean a
number of things: for example, if a set of properties {P} determines content C, it can mean
that it does so by (natural) law, and that there is a causal relationship between {P} and C,
which may enable us to derive knowledge about C from knowledge about {P}. The latter
explication of dependency is stronger than the former because you can know about all sorts of
factors  which  are  required  to  bring  a  certain  phenomenon  about  and still  not  derive  this
phenomenon from said factors (such as the quality of a sound from the space it occurs in, or
47 In this paragraph, I included both ontological and epistemological ways of stating the respective dependency
relations,  even  though  these  may be  held  independently  of  one  another.  That  is,  it  may be  the  case  that,
ontologically, A is completely reducible to B, without A’s ever actually being derived from B. Of course, the
case becomes more complicated for abstract objects: If A and B are abstract entities (which I take mental states
to be), then what other reason could we have for judging A to be reducible to B other than A’s being derivable
from B (i.e. that our knowledge about A depends on nothing but our knowledge about B)? Consequently, I am
leaning towards epistemic formulations, and have been concentrating on these a bit more than on ontological
ones – a trend which is to explicitly continue in this section.
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the content of a thought from someone’s spoken languages). Thus, I take the relevant claims
about dependency relations to be situated in a range between the weaker “being necessary
for” and the stronger “being sufficient for”: “C depends on {P}” can mean anything between
“{P} is  necessary for (there being)  C” and “{P} is  sufficient  for C” (or,  as an epistemic
alternative: “C is derivable from {P}”).
Secondly, while I have introduced the distinction between broad and narrow content in
terms of dependency on the environment, you may want to ask what exactly mental content
depends on if it does not depend on the environment, and how to characterise the distinction
between the  mental  state’s  bearer  and her  environment.  An ad hoc answer to  both these
questions consists in pointing toward the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties:
Narrow  mental  content  only  depends  on  intrinsic  properties  of  the  individual,  whereas
extrinsic properties are had in virtue of an individual’s place in her environment. For example,
my currently being warm is due to my sitting next to a heater, and I assume most will thusly
want  to  construe  it  as  an  extrinsic  property  of  mine.  However,  there  are  numerous
relationships between this extrinsic property and my intrinsic properties: Maybe you believe
that the properties of all molecules I am made up of make for nicely intrinsic properties. Yet,
their movement is undoubtedly caused or at least crucially influenced by my sitting next to a
radiator – so shouldn’t it rather count as an extrinsic property? Undoubtedly, things which are
intrinsic to myself, such as the molecules I am made of, will have many of their properties due
to extrinsic factors. If we were to go through a list of my properties, I assume many will not
uncontroversially fit into either the category labelled “intrinsic” or the one labelled “extrinsic”
(see also Lewis 1983a).
So, if we are to thoroughly build on the instrinsic/extrinsic distinction, our first aim should
be to give it a more solid footing. I propose that what we can do is exploit the conceptual
proximity of the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction to the “internal/external” distinction on the one
hand and to the “essential/non-essential” distinction on the other. The former, at least if taken
literal  in  the  way we usually do in  everyday  talk,  is  close  to  the  individual/environment
distinction,  since both are  usually characterised and informed by organismic concepts:  by
concepts of our physical bodies, of what’s beneath our skin, and so on. (And it is no surprise
that Putnam’s respective slogan reads “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head!” [Putnam 1975: 227]
–  see  my discussion  of  his  view  in  the  following  section.)  A distinction  based  in  these
concepts can occasionally get fuzzy: When we are dealing with technological implants, when
our minds  are  in  some form controlled  externally  (through “brainwashing” of  any form),
when we expand our minds into technology (compare Chalmers & Clark 1998), or the like.
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Still, this is probably the most familiar and intuitive distinction at play here, and we should
expect especially the notion of our environment to be informed by notions of what’s beyond
our body.
Current  research  in  the  cognitive  sciences  has  a  lot  to  say  about  the  psychological
mechanisms underlying  our phenomenal  body image (see e.g.  Botvinick  & Cohen 1998).
However, once we go beyond phenomenology – beyond what  feels like it is our body, and
what  doesn’t  –,  it  is  hard  to  find  anything  inside  our  body  which  is  in  a  strong  sense
independent of the environment. We will at least find that every part of our body is part of our
body because of the environment – because the genetic blueprint for our body has evolved in
interaction  with  a  specific  environment,  because  our  body  is  built  and  maintained  by
nourishment  (i.e.  literally  taking  in  parts  of  the  environment),  and  so  on,  down  to  said
molecular movement. Thus, our criterion for judging whether anything is intrinsic will have to
be  considerably  weaker  than  demanding  a  complete  (causal,  explanatory  or  conceptual)
disconnectedness from the environment if it is to be applicable at all. Such a criterion is far
easier to come by for a biological concept than for a purely physical one. Thus, I will define
what counts as intrinsic as follows: a physical object inside our body is intrinsic if and only if
its being inside the body can be traced back to organismic functions (i.e. if it either serves an
organismic purpose, or because it happens to be inside us because of bodily functions). Again,
I need to stress that what underlies this criterion is not a purely physical notion, but one of
biological organismic function. Only insofar an organism makes use of physical objects and
processes  are  these  graspable  as  distinct  (or  in  this  sense  “independent”)  from  the
environment, and hence as intrinsic.
However, what about properties we usually take to belong to ourselves, to characterise us
and  define  us  as  who  we  are  –  such  as  our  social  and/or  judicial  status,  and  many
psychological characteristics such as our character traits –, properties we tend to think of as
intrinsic and essential to our personal identity, which are clearly not literally “inside” us, i.e.
inside  our  bodies?  Bodily  changes  are  often  connected  to  other  personal  changes:  Bob
Hoskins ceased to be an actor because of Parkinson’s disease; but in a very important sense,
during its progression he did not cease to be Bob Hoskins, or the person who starred in “Who
Framed Roger Rabbit?”. In fact, no conceivable change in his nervous system would have
been able to change that. And most citizens will remain citizens for all their lives, no matter
the manifold bodily changes taking place between their births and deaths. Apparently, many
defining aspects of our identity are entirely unaffected by bodily changes. This is because the
criteria by which we judge someone to remain the same often depend on social institutions, on
Intentional Psychology 122
social  relations,  and all  sorts  of things which may not themselves  be fully describable as
intrinsic  properties  of  the  person,  and  for  whose  establishment  and  maintenance  bodily
changes are not decisive, much less anything physical making up the body.
Many properties we tend to think of as essential to us will consequently not be intrinsic in
the biological sense specified above, and vice versa. For example, the fact that I am 1,90m tall
might not go a long way to clearing up questions about my identity as a person, but it is a
property I have, and it also is intrinsic to me right now. Granted, measuring someone’s height
does depend on the environment in many ways: on the institutionalised scale of measurement,
on a certain stage of scientific progress, on the sheer possibility of using an external object in
order to measure myself – what else does measuring something mean beside putting it into a
definite  relation  to  the  environment?  Still,  we  can  certainly  distinguish  between  the
preconditions for measuring and the property which is measured. And all I have said so far
about a dependency on the environment  only applies to measuring  my height,  not  to my
having the respective property of being 1,90m tall. Thus, it should still count as intrinsic.48
I.8.3. Two classic arguments for broad content
Given said difficulty of coming up with intrinsic properties which go beyond physical
properties in relation to organismic functional terms, it comes with no great surprise that the
most famous argument  for broad content was delivered in terms of physical properties of
bodies. Specifically,  Hilary Putnam asked us to imagine two “physical twins”; that is, two
48 On a side note, it just so happens that the property of being 1,90m tall is identical to the property of being ten
times as tall as the wavelength of the GPS L-band frequency. Being ten times as tall as the wavelength of the
GPS L-band frequency certainly is an extrinsic property, since it depends on the environment in numerous ways
(on the properties of the respective frequency, on its being used for GPS, and so on). Also, my being 1,90m tall
implies that I am considerably smaller than the Eiffel Tower – again, an extrinsic property. Still, my height is
only coincidentally identical to ten times the wavelength of the GPS L-band frequency, and only coincidentally
implies my being smaller than the Eiffel Tower. That is: If my environment were significantly different – if the
GPS wavelength were different, and if the Eiffel Tower only existed as a miniature, or not at all – then I would
not have these properties (despite my still being 1,90m tall). Which is not only the same as saying that these
properties are extrinsic themselves, but also that their being related to (i.e. their being identical with, or implied
by) my intrinsic property of being 1,90m tall is extrinsic.
This problem can be solved twofold: by either introducing modality and insisting that the supposedly intrinsic
property, namely my height, which also happens to be describable in terms of many extrinsic properties, should
be characterised as a property which is necessarily intrinsic (i.e. for which there is no property which is identical
with it and which is intrinsic in all possible worlds). Or we could make being intrinsic relative to descriptions: A
property is intrinsic iff it is intrinsic under one or more possible true descriptions. For example, my currently
being in Munich is not intrinsic under any description, and thus extrinsic. My being 1,90m tall is intrinsic under
at  least  the  description  that  I  am 1,90m tall,  and  can  thus count  as  intrinsic,  even  though  there  are  many
alternative descriptions available,  such as  that  I  am ten times as tall  as the wavelength of  the GPS L-band
frequency.
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people whose physical states and histories are exactly alike, but who live on different planets
(cf. Putnam 1975). In this thought experiment the twins’ respective environments are also
alike (at least in terms of the effects they have on the twins’ bodies), except that what is water
in our setting is replaced in the other, which Putnam calls “twin earth”, with a liquid which
shares its macroscopic properties with water. However, its molecular structure is not H2O, but
XYZ – a fact which the twins have no access to (much as it was until the late 18 th century,
before  Henry  Cavendish  discovered  the  chemical  composition  of  water).  Thus,  they
developed the linguistic dispositions underlying their intentional properties based on identical
observations, making both competent users of the concept “water” (or, depending on what
you take to be necessary to make them competent speakers, perhaps the totality of observed
properties in a crucial part of the linguistic community). For example, they would both readily
assert that water is usually wet, transparent, and so on. Now, given that in this example, the
molecular structure of water had no hand in shaping their dispositions, we should intuit that
one such twin’s thoughts about water in the H2O setting do indeed mean water, whereas the
other twin’s thoughts mean XYZ. This is because the term “water” refers to a natural kind,
something whose underlying structure explains its observable phenomena, such as wetness
(also see Kripke 1980 and section I.4.3). And matters of the underlying structure are matters
external to the twins’ thoughts.49 So, the bottom line of Putnam’s argument is this: Whenever
we are thinking about natural kinds, whose essential properties we may not always be aware
of, and knowing which is not necessary in order for us to be able to refer to them, the content
of our thoughts depends on what the physical world is like.
But perhaps we can even say something about mental content which is not about natural
kinds? Tyler Burge has done just that with his argument for “anti-individualism” (see Burge
2007: Introduction). According to his argument for broad mental content, which is also known
as “semantic deference”, we can competently use certain concepts, even while deferring exact
knowledge about them to experts in the respective field. On this view, the referents of some of
the concepts I am thinking about depend on my environment insofar as they depend on what
the experts have to say about them. For example,  we might concede that a layperson can
believe that she has arthritis without having exact medical knowledge about arthritis. Thus,
the content of the layperson’s belief depends on her social environment.
49 The objection has been voiced that the two cannot be physical twins, since the one’s body in the water-setting
would be composed of more than 70% water, whereas the other would in its place be composed of XYZ. Since
the molecular structures are different, the two bodies cannot be physically identical. Putnam’s argument should
in principle be salvageable though – how about we swap water for mercury or the like?
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If we accept both arguments, then we should accept that mental content is broad if the
respective mental states are about natural kinds or about terms whose referents are decided by
experts. Still, this leaves us asking about a lot of other potential referents, and whether the
content of my thoughts about these, too, depends on the environment. In what follows, I will
take a more general approach to mental content, and I will argue that mental content, by its
very nature, is broad.
I.8.4. The Derivability Argument for Broad Content
As we have seen, what we take to be constitutive of or essential to someone can easily go
beyond what is literally inside their bodies. In many cases, this is plain to see, as in the case of
social heritage or relationship-status. In others, such as those pertaining to mental properties,
it is controversial. But the claim that mental content is narrow apparently clashes with our
methodology of relating internal properties of agents to the mental content they have. That is,
in  reconstructing,  inferring  or  deriving  mental  content  from  internal  properties  (or  in
“reducing” it to internal properties), we cannot help but take the environment into account.
The narrow content  claim in terms of derivability means  that mental  content  needs to  be
reconstructible from internal properties only. If this cannot be done, then mental content at
least epistemically depends on environmental factors.
For any B to be derivable from A a relationship between A and B is  required which
supports this derivation. We can describe this relation as a function “f(A) = B”, specifying
which B can be derived from which A. If nothing else enters into A but internal properties of
an agent, this means that the derived mental state B is independent from the environment –
that all possible external factors are irrelevant. So, it seems that for the narrow content claim
to be true, every property from which a mental property is derived, inferred or reconstructed
has to be intrinsic (best understood in the organismic sense, see I.8.2).
However, for the mental state to completely depend on intrinsic properties, it is not only
necessary that said function does not require taking anything external into account, but that it
never  does. That is, in order to practically establish a derivation function [f(A) = B] from
intrinsic property to mental content, we need to first find out how As systematically relate to
Bs.  If  the  exclusion  of  environmental  factors  were  a  methodological  requirement  for
establishing  relations  between  intrinsic  and  mental  properties  in  the  area  of  cognition,  it
would surely usually be violated. For example, while we may be able to infer a particular
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toad’s ability to perceive prey from the toad’s internal make-up, it is the sheer fact  that the
toad’s ability to perceive prey depends on the environment  which  enables us to trace this
ability to its internal make-up in the first place (cf. Ewert et al. 1996 and my section II.6). For
in order to establish mental content dependency on internal features, the cognitive function of
an internal  feature has  to be identified  as  such, and this  is  tied  to  identifying  the proper
environmental  “aim”,  i.e.  the  proper  input/output  relation  of  the  underlying  (neural)
mechanism (cf. Sullivan forthcoming). That is, we only know whether the function of a given
neural  mechanism  is  related  to  prey-capture  if  we  can  trace  its  activity  to  predatorial
behaviour, and predatorial behaviour is characterised in relation to behaviour aimed at actual
prey (i.e. the predator’s environment).
The notion of cognitive function is also tied to the environment in a second way, namely
in conceiving the mechanism as being evolutionarily selected in an environment in which it
has proven advantageous. Compare Millikan’s and Neander’s teleofunctional accounts: “A
proper function of (…) an organ or behaviour is, roughly, a function that its ancestors have
performed that has helped account for the proliferation of the genes responsible for it, hence
helped account for its own existence” (Millikan 1993: 14), and “some effect (Z) is the proper
function of some trait (X) in organism (O) iff the genotype responsible for X was selected for
doing Z because doing Z was adaptive for O’s ancestors” (Neander 1995: 111).50 Again, what
this tells us is that cognitive directedness is only ever properly construed as such by taking an
agent’s (or its species’) environment into account.
So, our knowledge about an agent’s interaction with the environment plays a crucial role
in  establishing  this  relation  between  its  internal  (cognitive)  features  and  their  output  as
functions. Thus, the latter will not at all be reconstructed purely from internal properties, but
rather,  the  external  properties  become  background  conditions  for  the  function(s)  which
allow(s) us to infer one from the other. So, the sketched argument for narrow content from
derivability  must  fail,  since  the  demand  that  the  relevant  derivability  function  takes  into
account  nothing  but  internal  features  will  never  be  satisfied.  Since  our  methodology  of
understanding cognitive  mechanisms  always  requires  environmental  knowledge (since  the
environment  is  both  a  conceptual  part  of  cognitive  functional  characteristics  as  well  as
teleosemantics), the mental function associated with this mechanism cannot be described in
50 These accounts are called “teleofunctional” because they tie a mechanism’s specific function to its inherent
functional “aim” (Greek  telos, τέλος). This notion does not require that evolution itself is directed towards an
aim, but rather that the functionality of biological traits is tied to evolutionary explanation (compare Thompson
2008: 78 f.). For an overview of teleofunctional accounts see Hazlett 2013: 182 ff..
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terms of narrow mental content – just the contrary. For this reason we should think of it as
broad.
So far, I have argued against claiming that apparent cases of mere derivability of mental
content  from  internal  bodily  (i.e.  organismically  “intrinsic”)  features  are  sufficient  for
claiming that the content in question is narrow. What has to be ensured is that the principles
underlying this derivation, namely the relation between internal features and mental content,
have  been  arrived  at  without  taking  external  features  into  account  –  and  this  cannot  be
achieved in principle. In the cited case of reconstructing a toad’s behaviour from its internal
features, the point should be clear: we know about the toad’s cognitive function because we
have  observed  its  predatorial  behaviour  in  relation  to  its  internal  features  (i.e.  the
implementation  of  the  cognitive  mechanism  in  the  toad’s  nervous  system).  If  we  hadn’t
observed the predatorial behaviour – which is a feature of the toad within its environment –
we hadn’t arrived at the necessary principles. The analogy between such cognitive capacities
and  psychological  attitudes,  roughly  sketched,  is  this:  The  fact  that  we can  have  mental
content rests on our having certain cognitive functions, and if we had principles of deriving
content  from  features  of  functional  implementation,  we  would  only  have  these  because
environmental features would have entered into them. This point will also be further explored
in my discussion of “mindreading” experiments in chapter II.4.
I.8.5. The Constructionist Argument for Broad Content
In what follows, I will show how a dependency of mental content on the environment
follows from my own account of mental states. It crucially rests on the constructionist idea
that  mental  states  are  real  objects  in  virtue  of  being  explanatorily  valuable  concepts  in
psychological theories. In this concluding section to my discussion of narrow versus broad
content, I will place my basic constructionist premises into a larger context of explanation in
psychology versus explanation in terms of cognitive mechanisms and especially exploit the
notion  that  reliance  on  semantic  content  is  a  characteristic  of  intentional  psychological
explanation, while the latter is a form of causal explanation.51
It has been objected by Fodor (1989 and 1991), that whatever distinguishes broad from
narrow content is not causally efficacious. Thus, the type of content central to psychological
51 In the literature, we can occasionally find an antagonism between semantic and causal explanation (cf. e.g.
Smolensky 1988). On my account, intentional psychological explanation is both semantic and causal. However,
it should be understood that there are forms of explanation which are either only semantic or only causal.
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theories cannot be broad, since what is important to psychological theories is that they explain
behaviour in terms of being caused by mental content (the basic idea being that our beliefs,
desires  and  intentions  causally  explain  our  actions).  Fodor  originally  supplied  an
individualistic analysis  of causal powers (in his 1989: chapter 2), which holds that causal
powers of an individual are rooted in their intrinsic properties. One response could consist in
outrightly rejecting this analysis of causal powers (see Rechenauer 1994: 75) and argue for
the position that “causally relevant mental states, which are implicitly or explicitly invoked in
normal practice and scientific theory, are individuated externally” (my own translation from
German of ibid.: 71). I will indeed do just this; however, it  will not crucially rest on any
specific analysis of causal powers as rooted in either intrinsic or extrinsic properties, and thus,
I feel that discussing Fodor’s analysis at length would only unnecessarily complicate things
here.52 Ultimately, I aim to show how to reconcile a picture of intentional psychology as a
form of causal explanation with the insistence that the content invoked in these explanations
is broad, and I hope that by the end of this chapter it will be clear how an account such as
Fodor’s relates to my own.
Firstly,  mental states are attributed on the basis of observable evidence.  This need not
exclusively be behaviour, but it undoubtedly plays an important role. For example, looking
through my drawer may lead you to attribute both a certain degree of absent-mindedness and
compensatory practicality to me. A friend’s report may lead you to do the same. In neither
case did you observe my behaviour, but in both cases, the connections to my behaviour are
evident. In fact, it seems very hard to understand being absent-minded or practical not as at
least implying a certain regularity in specific kinds of behaviour. Thus, in turn it is reasonable
to assume that the evidence used for any such ascription relies at least in part on behaviour.
Secondly,  we know that behaviour is crucially tied to neural coding. As Fodor rightly
points out,  it  is  “preposterous  to suggest  that  neurological  (or biochemical;  or molecular)
states should be taxonomised by reference to the sorts of properties that distinguish [physical]
twins”  (Fodor  1991:  11,  fn.  9).  Here,  going back to  Putnam’s  thought  experiment  I  just
sketched in section I.8.3, the idea of physical twins means two persons who share all physical
properties,  and Putnam invoked  these  to  show that  the  content  of  their  mental  state  can
nonetheless  differ.  What  Fodor  calls  preposterous  is  the  notion  that  anything  the
neurosciences  could  find  out  about  these  two  physically  identical  “twins”  could  differ
52 For a better impression of Fodor’s analysis, see his 1991: 9 ( for his “Schema F”) and ibid.: 24, where he goes
on to claim that “for the difference between being [one causally relevant property and being another] to be a
difference of causal powers, it must at least be that the effects of being [one] differ from the effects of being [the
other]. But, I claim, it is further required that this difference between the effects be nonconceptually related to
the difference between the causes”.
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between them,  i.e.  the suggestion that  neurological,  biochemical  or molecular  taxonomies
should  have  to  refer  to  anything  which  could  potentially  differ  between  two  physically
identical twins. (And on my view, this is really just to say that neurobiological statements do
not invoke semantic/intentional  content.)  Consequently,  if  sameness  of physical  properties
implies  sameness  of  intrinsic  properties,  then  so  should  sameness  of  “neurological  (or
biochemical; or molecular) states”.
Thus, there is at least the following way of relating behaviour to intrinsic properties: A
certain  stimulation  of  the senses  leads  to  a  neurological  coding which  in  turn  leads  to  a
behavioural output. There are some caveats in this description; for example, senses can be
stimulated without outward behaviour to occur. The important point,  however, is that any
stimulation of an organism’s senses causes a change in its neural networks, and that its motor
behaviour has to be completely explainable in reference to the causally relevant state of the
connected  neural  network  (namely,  by  way  of  its  nerves  eventually  innervating  and
stimulating  the  muscles  responsible  for  movement).  So,  far  from insisting on a  complete
derivation of behavioural output from sensory input, the importance lies in methodologically
assuming that motor behaviour is explainable by nothing but neural activity, which in turn is
at least modulated by sensory stimuli. Any other determinants of the neural network, such as
internal  chemical  changes,  are  construed as  intrinsic  properties  as  well.  For  example,  the
discharge of one neural transmitter at a specific place in the nervous system might cause the
discharge of another neural transmitter at another place. Construing things this way, we arrive
at a purely intrinsic description of behaviour: The stimulation of sensory organs is a physical
state of the organism in question, just as the states of the neural network and its eventual
motor output. If an organism’s behaviour is in exactly this sense taken to be a purely internal
disposition to react to certain stimuli in such-and-such a way, and if this is all there is to an
account of the individual’s causal powers, then of course these are intrinsic.
It should be noted, though, that the concept “behaviour” used in this context is ambiguous:
I have tried to stress that what we are really after is “motor behaviour”, i.e. an activity of the
organism’s muscles. If this is so, then we have failed to give any intentional weight to the
behaviour in question: That is, we did not say whether the organism’s movement is intentional
– whether it is actually aimed at whatever has caused the sensory input, or related to it in a
psychologically  interesting  way.  Behavioural  descriptions,  as  belonging  to  the  proper
inventory of intentional psychology, are couched in intentional vocabulary, at least in order to
take an organism’s systematic and/or functional relations to the environment into account.
This applies even in the most sparse attributions of intentional states: That a toad aims to
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catch a worm is to describe its behaviour as intentional in this sense; it  is, of course,  not
intentional in the full-fledged intentional psychological sense that the toad needs to invoke
any semantic content in order to catch the worm, but it is insofar as the description is not
about  a  stimulus,  but  about  a  worm,  and  not  about  resulting  motor  action,  but  about  a
movement  within  the  environment,  with  an  inherent  aim  that  lies  beyond  the  toad’s
organismic boundaries.
Here, I will briefly have to come back to the conceptual complications which lay at the
outset of my considerations regarding the distinction between narrow and broad content. This
is because, even when trying to formulate an input-output relation along the lines I have just
attempted  in  intrinsic  terms,  we cannot  help  but  conceive  of  the  causes  of  both  sensory
stimulation and the nervous system’s origin, which is tied to its function, as lying outward:
The  perception  of  anything  that  is  not  just  hallucinated  obviously  depends  on  the
environment,  and so does the evolution of the brain.  We can conceive of any number of
environmental changes which might either change our sensory stimuli or the evolution of our
nervous system, and thus we cannot avoid as thinking of either as crucially depending on the
environment.  Yet,  the  physical  state  of  Putnam’s  twins  was  certainly  caused  by  the
environment in this sense as well; and if we accept his notion of intrinsic properties, then I
have just shown a way of relating these to behaviour. I feel that this is ultimately a definitorial
choice, depending on how strongly or weakly we’d like a given feature’s dependency on the
environment  to  be  in  order  for  us  to  call  it  intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  I  have  suggested  an
organismic notion as most favourable; what matters here is that the distinction between such a
conception  of  intrinsic  properties  still  significantly  contrasts  with  a  conception  of  mental
content as  not depending on intrinsic properties understood in this way. That is, even if we
accept that our physical state, including the state of our brain, depends on the environment,
there  still  is  the  possibility  of  distinguishing narrow from broad content:  Narrow content
depends on our physical properties, broad content depends on more than those, or on features
which  are  not  only  caused  by  the  environment,  but  which  are  necessarily  described  as
depending on the environment (for the unwieldy details, see footnote 48). Remember Fodor’s
suggestion  that  neurological  states  should not  be taxonomised in  terms of the differences
between physical twins: This implies that, if there is broad mental content, then at least some
(environmental)  properties  which have the  power to  change this  content  would leave  our
physical and neurological properties unchanged. That is: If the notion of broad content is true,
then it has to be conceivable that my being transported from one environment to another (such
as Putnam’s twin earth, see I.8.3) changes only the content of my belief without changing my
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physical state. That my physical state also depends on the environment in some ways is an
unfortunate byproduct of the fuzziness of the concept of dependence. To say that a property
is intrinsic iff it does not depend on the environment is too vague for there to be anything that
is fully intrinsic, even our physical states.
But here is where the fuzziness ends, and where we can highlight the characteristics of
intentional mental states in order to sharply bring out the contrast between this special notion
of intrinsic versus extrinsic properties (namely a notion which allows for physical properties
of the body to be intrinsic). As pointed out in section I.7.5, Dennett permits the ascription of
“an attenuated sort of belief” (Dennett 2007: 87) to a thermostat (cf. Dennett 1987: 22-34),
such as the belief that the room is too cold. I take an ascription of “hemi-semi-demi-proto-
quasi-pseudo intentionality”  (ibid.:  88)  along these  lines  to  work because  it  captures  two
important  things,  namely that  (1) the thermostat  possesses (or is  made up of) an internal
mechanism which causally relates its sensor to its adjusting the heater and (2) a norm which
describes a well-working thermostat (i.e. only a specific adjustment of heating relative to the
sensor is adequate,  otherwise the thermostat  counts as being broken or maladjusted).  This
norm is responsible for a properly working thermostat’s adjusting the heater in a specific way
depending on its sensor. Of course, the thermostat itself need not know anything about or
partake in anything that produces this norm. It cannot suffer from cold, and it cannot ascribe
beliefs to its fellow thermostats about their feeling too cold, or to anyone else. And it doesn’t
need to, because the norm for a well-working thermostat is not determined by the thermostat
itself but supplied externally – by its designers, manufacturers and installers, who can feel
cold and who can hold beliefs about whether a group of friends in their living room is feeling
cold and whether they should therefore turn up the heat (cf. Dretske 1988: 40, Dennett 1987:
33).
And that’s the difference between thermostats and intentional agents: intentional agents
don’t have anyone to normatively “adjust” them beside other intentional agents. Thus, they
not only have to possess the mechanism underlying the belief-ascription (i.e. the mechanism
yielding the behavioural output which counts as evidence for the belief  ascription given a
sensory input, which we were indeed able to describe in terms of intrinsic properties of our
nervous systems before;  also see II.8.3), but the ascriptions themselves crucially require the
norm which relates the mechanism to the environment. For example, explaining someone’s
turning on the heat by saying that she believed that it was too cold is not just to say that she
felt  too cold,  but also that  there is  a psychological  relation between feeling too cold and
turning on the heat. If there were no relation of the latter kind, then anyone’s feeling cold
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could not explain their turning on the heater. This relation is not an intrinsic property of any
intentional agent: it is a workable law of psychology. And given mental constructionism (see
I.5), only when we have such laws is it possible and fruitful to ascribe content to ourselves
and our peers. And it is exactly in this sense that the content of intentional states depends on
the environment, and in which it is broad. It depends on the environment not necessarily in
the sense that swapping environments would change one content for another (although we can
envision these cases too, such as in Putnam’s thought experiment), but in that without certain
features of the environment, there would be no content at all.
This  is  why intentional  states  are  not  merely  alternative  descriptions  of  states  of  the
intrinsic mechanism(s) underlying them, to be automatically replaced by these when we know
all about them, and of whatever intrinsic causal powers these may have: they are at the same
time providing information about the conditions under which this mechanism is adequate.
That is, they incorporate both information about the agent’s internal cognitive state as well as
information about the environment.
To thoroughly drive this point home, I’ll once again invoke the example of the toad, and
how  its  cognitive  mechanism  underlying  its  predatorial  behaviour  depends  on  the
environment:  Toads have a cognitive mechanism which,  on the level  of sensory stimulus,
operates on the perception of an elongate apparition. It can be shown that the toad shows
stereotypical  predatorial  behaviour  when  confronted  with  stimuli  which  produce  this
perception (for the details  see section II.6). Thus, we know that the toad uses a cognitive
mechanism which takes  a  definite  stimulus  as  an input  and produces  definite  (ranges  of)
behaviour as an output. The stimulus, namely the elongate apparition, can be construed as the
“intentional object” of the mechanism, in the sense that the mechanism “aims at” such stimuli.
However, this whole story would be rather mysterious if we could not also assume that the
toad’s environment  was such that this  mechanism would be favourable for it.  That is,  its
environment has to be such that the mechanism allows the toad to consistently catch prey
when perceiving elongate things. However, in the physical make-up of the toad, there is no
such thing as an additional cognitive encoding of elongate apparations  as worms. Rather, if
placed in an adequate environment, no such additional encoding is needed.53
That something internal represents something external is not an intrinsic fact. The toad’s
neural network, which we take to implement the respective cognitive mechanism, could not
53 This point is adapted from “Simon’s Ant” (see Haugeland 1995: 209). There, the idea is that the at times
beautifully complex paths ants take are tracable back to rather simple cognitive algorithms, and the ensuing
complexity is a result of the interaction between the cognitive mechanism making use of the algorithm and the
environment.
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possibly hope to encode “worms themselves” – for there is no such thing as an encoding of
worms  themselves.  There  are  internal  cognitive  mechanisms,  which,  in  favourable
environments, produce behaviour which is aimed at worms. Just as it is in the case of human
agents:  The  fact  that  we  have  intentional  states  is  nothing  which  could  be  directly  (or
“intrinsically”)  encoded  as  part  of  our  cognitive  make-up.  Rather,  the  fact  that  there  are
certain objects in the environment which we are aimed at in manifold and intricate ways is,
once we are the subject  of psychological  theorising,  described by systematically invoking
intentional states – by interpreting the cognitive makeup of agents as standing not merely in
causal relations to the world, but in largely rational ones (see I.7.4).
Still, there is a certain ambiguity in what we are really aimed at – in the toad’s case, is the
toad not really aimed at elongate objects rather than worms? That this is in fact not so is only
ensured by the toad’s environment,  which produced the respective mechanism, and which
ensured that there were enough worms making up for those elongate objects which were not
worms, which, intentionally speaking, can “deceive” the toad. Consequently, I propose we’d
best  distinguish  between  a  proximal  “stimulus  content”  (namely  all  things  the  toad’s
mechanism can be “tricked” with) and a distal “functional content” (namely the mechanism’s
proper  object).  The  latter  being,  if  psychological  theorising  permits,  the  object  of  an
intentional mental state, or, much the same, the content of a mental state. Narrow content thus
equates to proximal content: The intrinsic properties of agents are such that under a given
stimulus condition, they output a certain behaviour (and how this happens exactly is under
investigation  by the neurosciences).  Broad content  equates to distal  content:  The intrinsic
properties of agents, which determine them to react in such-and-such a way to such-and-such
stimuli, make sense, or are justified, and are ultimately described as intentional states, only
when we add information about the environment.
Here, I am sympathetic to Ned Block’s “mapping theory” (cf. Block 1991), which says
that, given a particular environment, a narrow content is that which determines a particular
broad content – that is, narrow content maps environments onto broad contents. (It should be
clear that the relevant environment is not just the one the subject is currently in, but rather
also the environment in which she acquired the relevant beliefs and other mental states.) Of
course, I hasten to add, a particular environment only “determines” broad content by way of
intentional methodology, namely interpretation. And interpretation, as we know from Quine
and  Davidson,  does  not  yield  definite  content,  but  an  indeterminate  range  of  ascribable
contents, with this range being constrained by principles of coherence and correspondence
(see section I.7.4).
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This notion of mental content being broad in the sense explicated above chimes with the
view  that  intentionality  is  established  in  interaction  and  not  specified  individualistically.
Rather,  if  an  individual  has  certain  cognitive  dispositions  to  develop  the  foundation  for
intentional states, then she can learn to partake in the practice of mutually ascribing these.
And we should expect this  interaction to have specific  effects  on the development  of our
nervous system.  Obviously,  the  claim that  partaking in any practice  changes  our  nervous
system is trivial, since everything we experience changes our nervous system. The claim is
rather a combination of two points. One is made by Quine in reference to the acquisition of
linguistic capabilities: “Different persons growing up in the same language are like different
bushes trimmed to take the shape of identical elephants. The anatomical details of twigs and
branches  will  fulfill  the  elephantine  form differently  from bush  to  bush,  but  the  overall
outward results are alike” (Quine 1960: 8). Another is made by Buller in reference to the
evolutionary advantage gained by our brain’s plasticity:
“According to our best evidence to date, the brain structures that perform specialised cognitive
functions — and that would have been involved in generating cognitive solutions to adaptive 
problems throughout our species’ evolutionary history — develop through a process of diffuse
proliferation of brain cells and connections followed by a “pruning” that shapes this diffuse 
connectivity  into  relatively  specialised  structures.  That  is,  functionally  specialised  brain  
structures are produced by a process consisting of both “additive” events (the formation and 
migration of brain cells and the formation of neural connections) and “subtractive” events (the 
pruning of synapses through cell death and axonal retraction) (Elman et al. 1996). In this  
process, gene-directed protein synthesis is involved in the additive events that build the diffuse
connectivity with which brain development begins. The subtractive events, however, are not 
under genetic control. Rather, the subtractive events occur through cell competition, whereby 
cells with the strongest patterns of innervation (primarily from sensory inputs) retain their  
connections and the others die.  Thus,  genes specify the proteins involved in the additive  
events during brain development, but the forms and functions of brain structures are then  
shaped by environmental inputs. So the specialised brain structures we have are primarily  
environmentally induced,  not  “genetically specified”” (Buller  2006:  200 f.;  also compare  
Selemon 2013).
Taken  together,  the  picture  is  this:  There  is  both  a  phylogenetic  (invoking  distal
environmental influences having happened in our evolutionary history) and ontogenetic story
(invoking proximal environmental influences happening in our lifetimes) to tell about how we
develop  cognitive  mechanisms  underlying  intentional  states.  The  way  our  cognitive
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mechanisms are aimed at the environment is determined by this environment at least as much
as it is determined by the make-up of the mechanism itself, or more specifically: the fact that
the mechanism exists and has such-and-such a make-up depends on (= is explained by) the
environment, while the fact that the mechanism operates in such-and-such a way (i.e. provides
a certain output) given a specific environment (and a certain input), depends on its make-up.
Cognitive  mechanisms,  as  implemented  in  our  nervous  systems,  are  embedded  in  the
environment  in  this  way.  Insofar as we can describe some of these mechanisms as being
aimed at certain features, this property of being aimed at them is only explainable by invoking
features of the environment.  And underlying our intentional capacities is a pruning (using
Buller’s term) or a trimming (using Quine’s term), which shapes our internal features as a
consequence of interaction. That is: the fact that we have intentional psychological theories
and that they are used in our communities enables us to have cognitive mechanisms which can
operate on inputs distinct from those in communities in which this isn’t the case, and they can
operate on those in ways specific to our community.  My favourite examples include being
afraid of stock-market crashes (compare I.4.5 and I.7.5) – an intentional state depending on a
wholely community-made phenomenon.
And  returning  to  the  toad’s  cognitive  mechanism:  Its  being  aimed  at  elongate
apparations,  and  ultimately  at  worms,  is  explained  by these  elongate  apparations  usually
coinciding with the presence of worms, and with worms being sources of nourishment. There
are two ways  of looking at  this:  Either  the mechanism is  described as being sensitive  to
elongate  apparitions,  which  can be described in  terms  of  intrinsic  properties  (i.e.  sensory
stimuli), or it is quasi-(hemi-semi-demi-)intentionally described as being aimed at worms. In
the first case, the environment is invoked to explain why this mechanism has evolutionarily
developed in  this  specific  way in  the  first  place.  In  the  second case,  the  environment  is
invoked  to  interpret  the  mechanism’s  interaction  with  the  environment  as  the  toad’s
predatorial intent being the capture of worms. That it is aimed at worms is, as in the case of
Simon’s Ant (cf. Haugeland 1995: 209), not an intrinsic feature of the toad, but a result of its
being placed into the environment which is interlocked with the specific cognitive mechanism
at the toad’s disposal.54 Intentional  state  descriptions  should be taken as analogous in  the
54 It should be noted that if cognitive features are enacted as they are in the example of Simon’s Ant (i.e. if the
complexity of the path an ant takes is due to the interaction of a simple algorithm embedded in the ant’s brain
with  the  location’s  geology,  see  footnote  53),  the  most  promising  way  to  entangle  this  interaction  is  by
performing an investigation into the underlying neural properties. Since this is possible in the case of the ant (and
the toad; see section II.6), we can arrive at the insight that there is in fact no additional encoding of the path (or
the worm) in their brains. In humans, this disentanglement will be much harder, since the primary insight into the
neurological  correlates  of  cognitive  function  are  acquired  through  neuroimaging.  As  Sullivan  points  out,
“[i]dentifying the neural basis of a cognitive capacity is assumed to be achievable by correlating (a) subjects’
behavioral  performance on experimental tasks or their subjective reports with (b) measurable brain activity”
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following way: Saying that someone has a specific intentional mental state is to say that they
(1) have a suitable cognitive mechanism at their disposal, which may well be described in
terms of intrinsic properties, such as properties of their nervous system, but also that (2) there
is a psychological law which implies that the mechanism is interlocked reasonably with the
environment, which  is  described as  an extrinsic  property.  Without  the  psychological  law,
there would be no content.
Psychological  laws  depend on extrinsic  properties  because  they  rest,  among  other
things, on conceptual relations between mental states (see the very beginning of section I.6.6).
The content of such mental states, which is what determines the explanatory roles they can
play,  in  turn  rests  on  what  Quine  calls  observation  sentences,  which  express  external
circumstances. Observation sentences – i.e. sentences whose truth depends only on observable
circumstances  – are  “the primitive  source of the idioms of belief  and other  propositional
attitudes. Without the aid of the observation sentences, it is not possible to make statements
about the beliefs and values” (Bhat & Sahu 1998: 403). “Observation sentences even in this
ultimate sense [as observables of a whole speech community] are reports not of sense data
still,  but  of ordinary external  circumstances  (...).  Many are nevertheless  learned by direct
conditioning to sensory stimulation, and all of them could be. Hence their epistemological
significance  as  a  link between our  sensory stimulation  and our theories  about  the world”
(Quine 2008: 369).
However, this point does not imply that the content of mental experience stands in an
inferential  relation  with  non-conceptual  states  –  a  potential  fallacy  harshly  criticised  by
McDowell as succumbing to the “Myth of the Given” (cf. McDowell  1994; for a concise
summary see Zeglen 1991: 117-128). Quine carefully avoids this fallacy when pointing out
that  “[s]ome of my readers have wondered how expressions that are merely keyed to our
neural intake, by conditioning or in less direct ways, could be said to convey evidence about
the world. This is the wrong picture. We are not aware of our neural intake, nor do we deduce
anything from it.  What  we have learned to  do is  to  assert  or assent  to  some observation
sentences in reaction to certain ranges of neural intake. It is such sentences, then, thus elicited,
that serve as experimental checkpoints for theories about the world. Negative checkpoints”
(Sullivan 2015a: 33). Imagine the only way to analyse the ant’s neural properties were by neuroimaging: we
would correlate the observable behaviour (i.e. the complex path) with its neural activation. Nothing gained from
this correlation would straightforwardly tell us what the correlated activity actually represents: a simple “if path
is obstructed, go right”-algorithm, or a complex path-description. Considerations of parsimony could lead us to
suspect that if a simple algorithm could do the required work, then that is what is neurally embedded. However,
this hypothesis is not a consequence of the imaging data, but of theoretical considerations. I believe this mirrors
what  is  currently happening in  the field of  enacted  cognition,  where  hypotheses  about  sparse  encoding are
guiding both empirical  investigation in biological  nervous systems as well  as the construction of artificially
intelligent systems.
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(Quine 1993: 110 f.).  The picture of how we have learned to  assert  or assent  to specific
observation sentences in reaction to certain ranges of neural intake is to be modelled after
Davidson’s triangulation (see section I.7.4), where giving content to one’s and others’ mental
states depends on social and environmental interaction.
A  concluding  cautionary  remark:  While  this  interlocking  of  mental  state  and
environment  works  somewhat  analogously  to  the  toad’s  mechanism  being  evolutionarily
interlocked with its environment, I have suggested that it also goes beyond it (namely, by way
of mutual interpretation in communities) and thus needs to be distinguished from it. To say
that something is reasonable is, of course, different from claiming that it  is evolutionarily
fruitful.  Claims  about  evolutionary  advantages  are  not  verified  by  saying  that  a  specific
mechanism serves an advantageous goal – this is but a heuristic assumption for formulating
hypotheses about evolutionary origins –, but also that it in fact  was this specific advantage
which led to its persistence in a specific population of the mechanism’s bearer’s ancestors
(compare Millikan’s and Neander’s quotes in my “derivability argument” above, as well as
section II.7.1.). Claiming that something is rational is obviously very different: To say that an
action is rational is to say that, given the agent’s knowledge about the relevant instrumental
relations  between  action  and  desire,  the  agent  can  expect  the  action  to  bring  about  the
consequences she desires. Claiming that a belief is rational is to say that it is largely coherent
with other beliefs held by the person in question, and that the belief stands in a certain relation
to what we know about the agent’s knowledge about the world (which we will often try to
learn by observing how the agent interacts with her environment, compare section I.7).
Now, to say that someone has a specific mental state with its respective content is to
assume that they are to some degree rational,  but it would be absurd to demand that any
content we can assign to her contributes to her evolutionary fitness (and is thus evolutionarily
determined). The idea is rather that, insofar as the general capacity to have intentional states
has such advantages, it can be explicated evolutionarily. For example, the connection between
evolutionary favour and epistemic faculties such as the capacity to form true beliefs has been
repeatedly made, be it by Quine (“Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind”, Quine 1969: 126) or
Dennett (“the capacity to believe would have no survival value unless it were a capacity to
believe truths”, Dennett  1971: 101). None of this  is to say that the specific  attribution of
content to these intentional states is in any interesting way determined, or traceable back to,
evolutionary constraints. I have cited the case of fearing stock-markets; I can go on to cite
cases of desiring to be supreme ruler of Asgard, to draw unicorns, to live in the times of Isaac
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Newton, believing to read a thesis, planning to go to Ireland, and so on. Some of these states
may have roundabout connections to evolutionary constraints of our epistemic faculties; but
their specific contents are probably as far removed from them as from the toad’s endeavors to
catch a worm.
I.9. Non-propositional Mental States
I.9.1. Non-intentional Psychological Explanation
Talking  about  “psychological  explanation”  is  prone  to  cause  misunderstandings,
especially  between  philosophers  and  psychologists.  This  is  because  in  philosophy,
psychological explanation has been prominently explicated as intentional explanation, that is,
the explanation of behaviour by invoking intentional mental states (see e.g. Cummins 1983
and Levine 1987).  In psychology,  this  need not be the case.  While  going into the details
regarding the nature and role of non-intentional states is beyond the scope of this book, there
are some important connections to intentional states which I am going to explore briefly.
Bechtel & Wright (2009) give an overview over forms of psychological explanation
which  are  “diverse  and  heterogenous”  (ibid.:  113)  but  firmly  at  home  in  academic
psychology: For instance, in psychophysics the Weber-Fechner-Law aims to give descriptions
of regularities between physical and psychological phenomena with the “same formal rigor as
description  of  laws  between  physical  phenomena”  (ibid.:  114).  In  information-processing
psychology,  tests  have  been  devised  for  investigating  whether  subjects  use  serial  or
simultaneous  search  mechanisms  when  searching  for  items  on  a  list  (cf.  ibid.:  115).  In
physiological psychology, it has been found that the stimulation of certain brain areas serves
as a rewarding stimulus (cf. ibid.: 116). Also, damages to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
can be invoked to explain sociopathic  tendencies  (cf.  Roskies 2003). Even though it  may
sometimes  seem  like  intentional  and  non-intentional  causes  compete  for  what’s  really
explaining  a  certain  mental  event,  such  results  do  not  pose  a  challenge  to  intentional
explanation. Acknowleding intentional causes as real causes does not mean precluding that
“there is no difficulty in general in explaining mental events by appeal to neurophysiological
or physical  causes;  this  is  central  to  the analysis  of  perception  or memory,  for example”
(Davidson 2004: 180). And asserting that “there is no difficulty in general” does not mean
that there is no methodological difficulty involved in coming up with specific explanations,
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but rather that intentional and non-intentional explanation are readily reconcilable. Showing
this is one of my aims in this section.
But first, let’s look a bit further into what characterises non-intentional explanation.
The explanatory relations between variables as just described are commonly referred to as
psychological effects instead of laws (cf. Cummins 2000), and 
“appeals to effects are typically not explanatory. Instead, they serve to describe phenomena 
that in turn require explanation and elucidation – i.e., the explanandum. (…) The strategy  
described in many philosophical accounts is to explain empirical laws by deriving them from 
theoretical laws. (…) The challenge in applying this strategy to psychology is that [it  is]  
unclear  what  the  theoretical  laws  are  to  which  one  might  appeal  in  explanations.  An  
alternative  is  to  appeal  to  the  laws  of  more  basic  sciences  (e.g.,  neurophysiology).  
Unfortunately,  this approach is likewise problematic, as there are even fewer examples of  
relations  called  laws  in  physiology  or  biology.  (…)  [W]hen  psychologists  (as  well  as  
physiologists and many other investigators in the life sciences) offer explanations that go  
beyond  the  empirical  laws  or  effects  they  identify,  they  frequently  suggest  that  such  
explanations model a mechanism — i.e., a composite system whose activity is responsible for 
the  target  phenomenon.  (...)  [F]or  the  purposes  of  characterising  information-processing  
mechanisms, the key point is that those mechanisms use (...) representations to coordinate the 
organism’s behaviour with respect to or in light of the represented features of its environment”
(Bechtel & Wright 2009: 118 f.).
Bechtel and Wright propose that such mechanistic notions serve to integrate “a variety
of explanatory projects in psychology” (ibid.:  126), such as those marked by said diverse
“effects”, under one explanatory paradigm:
“[M]echanistic  explanations  both explain lawlike regularities  and appeal  to  other  lawlike  
regularities  to  characterise  the  operations  constituting  the  mechanistic  activity  (...)  [cf.  
Glennan  1996].  [Their  decomposition  along  these  lines  is]  clearly  reductionistic;  (…)  
[however,]  the  organisation  of  components  parts  and  operations,  both  spatially  and  
temporarily, are crucial to a mechanism’s activities, and this is not provided simply by lower-
level laws or even knowledge of the component parts and operations themselves. (…) [W]hile 
mechanistic explanations are in part reductionistic, they also accommodate the emergence of 
higher levels of organisation and the need for autonomous inquiry into the regularities found 
amongst the denizens of these higher levels” (ibid.: 125).
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As they also note, mechanistic explanation need not exhaust psychological explanation. Other
explanatory accounts include dynamical  systems theory and evolutionary theory (cf. ibid.;
also  see sections II.7.1 and II.7.2), and their use stems from connecting psychological and
biological forms of explanation (cf. Braillard & Malaterre 2015; compare I.8.4 and II.2).
Such  forms  of  explanation  are  clearly  non-propositional,  and,  unlike  common
descriptions of non-propositional psychological phenomena such as feelings and experiences
(see section I.1), the way they are described offers no hopes of connecting them to the way
representations appear in the propositional form. So, even if some of the non-propositional
forms of psychological explanation exploit some notion of representation, this notion won’t be
easy  to  connect  to  that  of  representation  as  used  by  intentional  psychology.  (The  larger
question in what way these non-propositional states or objects are representational/intentional
will be dealt with in chapter II.) This gap between the two distinct forms of representation is
underpinned  by  systematic  differences  between  non-propositional  forms  of  psychological
explanation  and intentional  psychology:  Namely,  the psychological  effects  described non-
propositionally,  as  well  as  the  mechanisms  underlying  them,  are  usually  independent  of
considerations of agential  control,  and thus, they are independent of the considerations of
methodological  restrictions  of  charity  which  is  characteristic  for  the  ascription  of
propositional attitudes (see section I.7.4). The way we experience the intensity of a stimulus,
the way we search for items on a list, and the way our neural make-up reacts to stimuli is
independent of agential considerations.55 So, since agential descriptions have no systematic
place in the kinds of non-propositional psychological explanation as just described, it makes
sense that they are independent of ascriptions of semantic content, and in this sense also non-
intentional.
However, non-intentional explanations can have a bearing on intentional/propositional
states.  For  example,  they  can  modulate  behaviour  which  we  commonly  seek  to  explain
intentionally, but whose modulation can thusly be explained non-intentionally. For example,
the  severity  of  moral  judgments  can  be  influenced  by  inducing  emotions,  particularly
disgust.56, 57 Intentional justification usually leaves room for a certain range of behaviour, so
55 This insight is accommodated by “folk psychology”, insofar as it does not justify holding people responsible
for the way they are “hard-wired”. Once we find out that a certain aspect of an action was not under agential
control, holding the agent responsible for it is unjustified. While psychological results can push the boundary of
what we hold an individual responsible for, they do not support a global skepticism regarding rationality and
agential control. Rather, they point us to cases in which we err in ascribing agential control.
56 See Wheatly, Haidt 2005, Valdesolo, de Steno 2006, Schnall et al. 2008a, Schnall et al 2008b, Jones, Fitness
2008, Horberg et al. 2009, Horberg et al. 2011, Eskine et al. 2011, Inbar et al. 2012.
57 There is some controversy about whether the term “moral judgment” refers to a “cold” motivationally inert
cognitive state or a motivationally charged state, i.e. whether one can judge X to be morally right without having
any motivation to do X (under appropriate circumstances). Motive Internalism is the view that to make a moral
judgment is to necessarily be motivated to act accordingly (see Roskies 2003, 2006 and Cholbi 2006a, 2006b). In
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the fact that a moral judgment was influenced by emotions which in turn are not part of a
rational justification basis need not outrightly conflict with the intentional explanation, but
can complement it by specifying a value within this range. However, in cases in which we
learn that induced behavioural effects exceed rational justification, agential ascriptions need
to be retracted. (Except if the agent in question was wantonly negligent by ignoring that her
judgment could be swayed by exposing herself to such conditions.) Generally, when tasks
which should be under agential control are unduly influenced by a- or irrational mechanisms,
explanation by non-intentional properties should not be viewed as undermining intentional
explanation,  but  rather  as  specifically  telling  us  what  went  wrong.  Knowing  that  moral
judgments are influenced by untidy workplaces supplies us with a good reason to see to it that
relevant workplaces are tidy rather than with a reason to abandon all  hope in morality or
agential  descriptions.  Analogous lessons can be learned from studies on biases in general
(although  the  question  how much  or  whether  anything  can  be  done  to  counteract  a  bias
depends on the details of the bias and the underlying mechanism; see footnote 39).
This complementarity of intentional and non-intentional explanation harkens back to
the  formers’  normative  aspect,  which  distinguishes  it  from other  kinds  of  psychological
explanation. If behaviour is found to be in conflict with norms of rationality, we are prompted
to criticise the agent for not being in accordance with their reasons. Whereas if the behaviour
is “in conflict” with other psychological effects that do not stand in a justification relation to
actions then there are no grounds for criticising the agent. That is, there are no grounds for
criticising someone for not conforming to interpersonally stable statistical effects which are
unrelated to matters of justification and rationality. For example, if an agent does not conform
to an effect such as the influence of induced emotions as mentioned above, the fact that she
did not let  herself be influenced rather appears as resilience to unwanted influence and is
praiseworthy. The respective psychological research should not be viewed as contradicting
intentional explanation, but as educating us about confounders of rational behaviour: “Time-
pressure and emotional arousals (e.g. anger) are considered to be confounders for appropriate
moral  and  rational  considerations.  (…)  Research  that  shows  that  intuitions  or  emotions
influence our moral judgments is more than welcome as it specifies the effect of confounders”
(Triskiel 2016: 88 f.).
holding this view,  one asserts that  being motivated becomes part  of the ascriptive basis of making a moral
judgment.
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I.9.2. Know-How
Many of us know how to ride a bike, how to operate a computer, how to get from our
homes to our workplaces, but if pressed for a verbal description of these technical and motor
skills, words might fail us. “You do it like this!” – pointing to an action, miming that action,
training someone by making them repeat a certain action, that is what seems more proper in
these cases. Of course,  actions can be described, proper tool usage can be described, and
experience may be simulated. Yet, even if words do not completely fail us, by coming up with
these descriptions it often seems like we are only clumsily translating something which could
be communicated much easier non-verbally. This  procedural knowledge, this know-how, is
often easily accessible mentally,  yet  in its original form it is not readily propositional (cf.
Fridland 2015). Even if there might  be a weaker notion of intentionality,  which does not
require propositional form, it is far from apparent how we could bend the concept around the
notion of procedural knowledge. If I know how to ride a bike, does my knowledge refer to the
bike? If I know how to operate a computer, does my knowledge refer to the computer? To
how many things does your knowing how to operate a computer actually refer? In some way,
if it refers to the skill, then why shouldn’t it refer also to your hands, with which you possibly
operate it? Does it refer in different ways to computers and your hands – does it explicitly
refer to the former and only implicitly to the latter?  Such questions stem from taking the
concept of reference out of a context in which it is explicable and plunging it into rather
murky waters. Reference can easily be explicated as symbolic reference – taking a signifier to
mean something else –, but it is hard to see how our skills have anything to do with symbolic
reference.  While  in  some contexts,  such as  theatrical  performances,  we can  symbolically
operate a computer, our skill does not require symbolic reference in order to be a skill. The
difference to thoughts and emotions, which always are to be about something to begin with,
thus requiring symbolic reference, should be apparent.
I.9.3. Psychological Dispositions
Psychological  dispositions  such as being daring,  quick-witted,  mild-mannered,  hot-
tempered and the like are likely to be among the first things people will think of when asked
to  name  some exemplary  mental  states,  rather  than  propositional  attitudes  like  beliefs  or
desires  (or  least  those unspoiled  by research in  analytic philosophy of  mind  will).  These
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dispositions are the subject of differential psychology, and they are of particular interest to us
as social animals because they explain variations in behaviour between different individuals.
Within any given population, psychological differences will appear more striking than close
similarities,  which  might  explain  why  the  associated  mental  states  are  quicker  to  be
mentioned.
That  is,  the  general  psychological  law  that  if  people  intend  to  attend  a  certain
conference, then they are likely to show up there, might be exemplified by both Sam and
Max, but Sam might be consistently more reliable in that regard than Max. Thus, to the people
who know both Sam and Max, the fact that Sam is reliable, while Max is spurious, will be
more striking to them than the law just mentioned – because there is, quite simply, usually no
need to point out the obvious –, and the according differential psychological dispositions will
enjoy more limelight, despite the respective intentional law being the basis for the evaluation
of  said  dispositions.  So,  differences  in  dispositional  ascriptions  reflect  differences  in
evidential bases for ascribing such states to different individuals. If the threshold for showing
angriness behaviour is lower than average in a particular individual, we mark this threshold by
saying that she’s got a violent temper,  but this means just the same as: typical conditions
under which we are justified in anger do apply, but with differing intensity. Much the same
goes for individuals whose psychological  attitudes persist  for shorter or longer times than
average, and which we mark with adjectives such as spurious, resentful, or the like. These
adjectives really describe properties of propositional attitudes or modifiers of their ascriptive
basis.
While  I  do not  wish to  claim that  all  psychological  dispositions  are  derived from
propositional  laws  in  the  manner  I  just  used  as  an  example,  I  do  suspect  that  in  an
overwhelming amount of cases, the connection will be rather intimate,  and the worry that
differential dispositions are either completely detached from the propositional form, or that
they are more prominent or interesting per se, dominating the field of human psychology,
should prove to be unfounded.
I.9.4. Qualia
One fundamental divide within mental phenomena is between those which are private
experiential  states  and  those  which  are  not.  Since  the  former  are  characterised  by  their
qualitative  aspect,  they  are  traditionally  called  “qualia”  (see  Lewis  1929,  Jackson  1982,
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Dennett 1990 and 1991a). They are taken to be immediate experiences of mental states, as
opposed to indirect experiences: we can experience another person’s mental state by way of
observation, or by way of whatever consequence it may have on us, but we do not experience
it directly, immediately, introspectively, like we do our own mental states. If this notion of
privacy and subjectivity is taken to be the primary characteristic of mental states, it results in a
form of  classic  skepticism,  characterised  by  conundrums  such as:  how do we know that
another person really has a mind, as opposed to just appearing to have one? How do we know
they  aren’t  just  a  convincingly-made  android,  or  some  other  form  of  soulless  creature?
Skeptic  anxieties  such as  these suggest  that  we cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  of  mental
solipsism, the view that there exists no other mind in the universe but one’s own. It assumes
that  the  only  form  of  evidence  for  really  knowing  whether  someone  has  a  mind  is  its
immediate qualitative introspective acquaintance.  Since this acquaintance can only ever be
given for oneself,  mental  solipsism cannot be ruled out.  A skeptic view along these lines
would, for mental ascriptions to be properly justified, not only require someone to show all
outward signs of having a mind, but for them to also have the subjective experiential quality
that comes with it (see section I.7.2).
In this  section,  I will  show how a commitment  to the reality of qualitative mental
states can be reconciled with an antiskeptical position as laid out in I.7.4. (A quick reminder:
in that section I showed that private states are not exclusively characteristic for our picture of
mental states, and that mental states, at least insofar as they are intentional, are public states
and intertwined with intersubjectivity and objectivity.) Like Shoemaker, I believe that  “it is
essential for a philosophical understanding of the mental that we appreciate that there is a first
person  perspective on it, a distinctive way mental states present themselves to the subjects
whose states they are, and that an essential part of the philosophical task is to give an account
of mind which makes intelligible the  perspective mental subjects have on their own mental
lives” (Shoemaker 1996: 157). What I am going to argue for is that this view does not conflict
with the view that mental states are a public matter.
Crucially, taking a skeptic stance as outlined goes beyond merely stating that mental
states  are  accompanied  by  an  immediate  experiential  quality  for  those  having  them.
Accompaniment alone could be interpreted in several ways that do not imply other-minds-
skepticism: the relationship between qualia and mental states could be accidental, coincidental
or functional, and each of these relations would not pose the skeptic’s challenge. That is, it
may  be  the  case  that  the  human  mind  just  happens  to  be  fashioned  in  such  a  way that
immediate  experiential  qualities  accompany  mental  states,  but  only  insofar  as  this
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accompaniment is an accidental fact about the world we live in, and we could well envision
our minds as having been fashioned in a different way. Or, as a second alternative, it might be
the  case  that  immedate  experiential  qualities  simply  happen  to  temporally  and/or  locally
coincide with mental  states,  but are otherwise completely unrelated to  them – just  as my
neighbour might coincidentally take out her trash at the exact same times as I do, but without
us ever interacting.  Or, as a third alternative,  we could take these experiential  qualities to
serve a function: If an agreeable feeling accompanies my belief that I have helped someone
dear  to  me,  then  it  is  more  likely  for  me  to  want  to  repeat  helping  others  than  if  the
accompanying  feeling  were  to  disagree  with  me  (cf.  Strohminger  2015).  Similarly,  the
function of pain is to result in an immediate averse reaction to what caused the pain. This
reaction  may in  many instances  be  controlled,  sublimated  or  refrained  from and in  such
instances  remain  unobserved;  but  the  general  function  obtains. In  this  sense,  experiential
qualities may have properties which serve a specifiable function (this function could be social
in  nature,  related  to  self-preservation,  or  what  have  you).  Now,  since  functions  can  be
implemented in various ways, any such function, in which an experiential quality plays a role,
could also be fulfilled  without  experiential qualities playing any functional role (even if we
were to find out that we all happen to be wired in a way that it is exactly those experiential
qualities which are conducive to fulfilling our mental functions). To give another example,
one prominent hypothesis about the nature of consciousness is that it is a functional property
of the brain, making mental content available through a specific pattern of neural activation,
thus allowing us to react more efficiently to our surroundings. But this functional “access
consciousness”,  so  described,  could  very  well  be  implemented  without  requiring  any
qualitative states and thus, these would not appear in an explanatorily valuable description of
the former:  “To explain  reportability,  for  instance,  is  just  to explain  how a system could
perform the function of producing reports on internal states. To explain internal access, we
need to explain how a system could be appropriately affected by its internal states and use
information about them in directing later processes” (Chalmers 2010: 6; also cf. Block 1995:
229).
These views are all compatible with the assertion that there are immediate experiential
qualities associated with our mental states, meaning that this assertion alone does not lead to
skepticism by default. That is, if we construe qualitative mental experiences as accompanying
certain mental states, but don’t construe qualia as the be-all and end-all of the mind, then we
do not have to accept skeptic criteria for what qualifies as having a mind in the first place. We
can very well be realists about qualia without having to seriously consider mental solipsism.
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In effect, skeptic views require us to believe that mental states are  only mental in virtue of
their experiential quality, and we have to concede no such thing. I take it as evident that we do
have qualitative states, because in fact there  is a taste that goes with my eating chocolate,
there is a feeling that goes with wind on my skin, and there is an elation that goes with my
listening  to  Beethoven.  However,  it  is  just  as  evident  that  mental  states  can  be  ascribed
without having any direct experiential access to the qualia that accompany them – I know for
a fact  that  many people  share  my feeling  of  elation,  or  my taste,  without  needing direct
introspective access to  their qualia, and that mice generally fear snakes, without having to
concede that the mental experience of a mouse is similar to mine. That is, even those mental
states  which  are  subjectively  characterised  by  a  certain  qualitative  experience  are  also
characterised  by  intersubjectively  accessible  features.  (I  dare  anyone  to  come  up  with  a
mental  state  which  is  so  radically  private  that  it  cannot  even  in  principle  potentially  be
connected to publicly observable features; and I double dare them to take this mental state as
characteristic for the human mind in general.)
It should also be noted that many mental states we have immediate access to are not
even accompanied by any characteristic qualitative experience, and no qualia whatsoever are
required for identifying them as the mental states they are. For example, I have immediate
access to my belief that 2 + 2 = 4, or my belief that Socrates was male – yet it would be hard
for me to associate  these beliefs  with any characteristic  qualitative  feeling.  Thus,  what  is
mental does not generally coincide with what has a specific experiential quality.
The crucial follow-up question is whether the privacy and subjectivity of qualia render
them opaque to  scientific  research  – and if  not  completely,  to  which  degree science  can
investigate them, or whether we need to devise some ingenious new research strategy. David
Chalmers appropriately dubbed questions having to do with these qualitative aspects “the hard
problem of consciousness”, since, unlike in the case of “easy questions”, at present we do not
even have a vague notion of how such problems are to be solved (cf. Chalmers 2010; see also
section II.5). While in many areas of science we pursue a strategy of research leading up to an
epistemic goal, it seems in the domain of qualitative mental states we lack even a general
strategy. Thomas Nagel took the qualia’s inherent subjectivity as keeping them from currently
being the subject of objective research (cf. Nagel 1974). However, I do not think that the
distinction between qualitative and and non-qualitative aspects of mental states coincides with
the distinction between what is beyond and what is within the domain of proper science.
Rather, I would like to offer what I hope are some helpful distinctions within the domain of
qualitative states, which offers room for their exploration.
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The qualitative experience of mental states can be explored in three different ways: By
way of phenomenological description, by way of their intentional object, and by way of a
correlation with objective facts. While we have to accept that the experienced quality itself
cannot  be  intersubjectively  shared  or  accessed,  this  does  not  have  to  keep  us  from
scientifically investigating the objective features that come with it. While it is true that some
qualitative experiences are rather unique and impossible to relate,  others are common and
have  intersubjectively  evaluable  properties.  The  former  are  usually  associated  with
exclamations like “you simply have to be there!”, “you just have to taste it!”, “you won’t
believe what it sounded like!”, and so on, implying a lack of helpful description, thus eluding
our objective grasp (although not completely,  since the sensory modalities in question are
always  being  explicitly  referred  to,  and  the  assertion  that  the  content  is  in  some  way
“indescribable”  does  communicate  something  quite  specific).  The  latter  can  be  traced  to
assertions like “the rides at the Oktoberfest don’t hold a candle to those at Coney Island”,
“grapes are sweeter than lemons”, “Hitchcock’s movies are more emotionally immersive than
Kubrick’s” and so on. The fact that assertions like these are alive and well means that we
readily acknowledge that certain kinds of subjective experiences are shared by many (if not
all)  people,  and  that  they  can,  at  least  to  some  degree,  be  compared  both  inter-  and
intrasubjectively.  And  the  degree  to  which  they  are  comparable  isn’t  even  supposed  to
systematically differ from the comparability of external, objective, quantifiable facts. If I take
a trip today, and one next week, I’ll probably be able to pick the one I liked better, and if I
talk to someone who took the same trip as the one I took, we are likely able to exchange our
opinions  and give reasons as to  why we thought  it  was a nice one or not.  Judgments  of
personal  taste,  especially  when  they’re  not  marked  as  such,  may  occasionally  dilute  the
intended objectivity,  but they do not render the comparison itself a hopeless endeavor. To
give a further example, judging whether the screen in a movie theater is dimmer during a 3D
presentation is a common and well-justified subject for objective debate among passionate
movie-goers, all the while resting on subjective experience. (Also, qualitative experience can
not only be tied to intersubjective concepts qualitatively, but also quantitatively, such as in
psychophysics,  see I.9.1.) The list of potential examples for productive talk about subjective
experiences goes on and on.
Delving into the semantic features underlying this talk about qualia, it should be noted
that any terms referring to them could not refer to radically private phenomenological states if
their privacy implies their singularity (i.e. that it is conceivable that only one person ever has
them) or their being completely detached from public aspects or correlating conditions which
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we could exploit to make them intersubjectively accessible. We could not understand words
which are used strictly idiosyncratically, and the practice of conversation would break down
if, where observable behaviour is guided by questions of semantics,  semantic rules would
wildly differ or change arbitrarily between speaker and interpreter, and where they could not
be fixed in relation to intersubjectively available conditions.
Rather,  a  considerably  more  plausible  view  is  that  in  expressions  referring  to
qualitative  mental  states  we  should  expect  to  find  phenomenological  and  public  aspects
intertwined.  In  the  following excerpt  from  his  famous  “private  language  argument”,
Wittgenstein asks:
“If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word “pain” means –
must  I  not  say the same of other people  too? And how can I  generalise the  one case so
irresponsibly?
Now someone  tells  me  that  he knows  what  pain  is  only from his  own case!  –  Suppose
everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone
else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it
would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even
imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word “beetle” had a use in these
people’s language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box
has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be
empty. – No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of
‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant” (Wittgenstein: PI
§293).
Here, Wittgenstein criticises the Cartesian model (see I.7.2) as misguided. If the meaning of a
concept that is used in public discourse is radically private (“No one can look into anyone
else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle”), then
the meaning is bound to “drop out of consideration”.  “What this shows is that it cannot be
correct to construe the “beetle” language game on the model of ‘object and designation’. On
this model, the object is crucial to the use of the designating expression; it makes a difference
to the use. So where the putative object makes no difference to the use of a term, it makes no
sense to insist that the grammar of the term is that of a designator” (Williams 1999: 32). The
initial persuasive power inherent to Cartesian skepticism turns out to rest on a confusion of
treating supposedly radically private things as contributing to public discourse. For there to be
Intentional Psychology 148
the word “pain”, we must already assume that it was learned under public conditions, which
implies that criteria of its use are based on observable evidence.  So, at the very least,  the
“private” aspects of pain are intertwined with its publicly observable aspects. Again, this does
not imply that there is no such thing as a private, subjective feeling of pain, or that there aren’t
any  potentially  unobservable  “internal”  aspects  to  pain;  just  that  we  cannot  neglect  its
“accoutrements”  (ibid.:  30  ff.),  that  is,  the  external,  public  aspects  of  pain  which  pain-
discourse and pain-ascriptions are necessarily based on.
Now, the one question left to answer is: How do we fashion intersubjectively available
concepts which have subjective states as their referents? While it is true that only one person
ever  immediately  experiences  their  own  qualitative  subjective  state,  there  are  forms  of
intersubjective  access.  Indirect  as  they  may  be,  they  are  sufficient  for  intersubjective
conceptualisation.  Subjective experiences  are  tied to behaviour  after  all,  and having them
stands in a systematic relation to observable behaviour. And when it does not, self-reports can
bridge the gap between ego and alter ego. For example, imagine Tyler going down the street
with  Marcia,  when he  sees  someone  spitting  on  the  street,  narrowly  missing  his  shoe  –
something which Marcia remains unaware of. Tyler consequently experiences a bout of cold
anger, causing him to exert some grip on himself in order not to let Marcia be on the receiving
end of  his  anger.  So,  even though there may be no observable  behavioural  difference  to
Marcia, Tyler may, through his acquaintance with Marcia, very well be justified in expressing
his anger to her, telling her that he needed to exert some degree of self-control. Marcia may
trust his self-report,  knowing that Tyler is a trustworthy person, and she knows that he is
because he often behaves in accordance with what he says. For instance, whenever he lets her
understand that he is angry, she may observe him to react more tensely in stressful situations.
Just as in our present case: If Marcia does not know right away whether Tyler is being honest
or joking, she may continue to observe his behaviour more closely over the next few minutes.
It is through this web of various forms of intersubjective access that we ultimately come to the
result of unwaveringly believing that most human beings, and even many animals, share some
subjective qualitative mental states, even though there can never be more than one person
having their own experiences. And through this interplay of different forms of access, this
belief  has much stronger support than all  the nagging doubt that has been proliferated by
skeptics  and  solipsistic  thought  experiments  through  the  ages,  by  stories  about  zombies,
clones without souls, human-like robots, and the like.
Thus, the initially puzzling question of how we manage to arrive at objective facts
when  starting  out  from  subjective  experience  can  be  answered  three-fold.  Firstly,
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phenomenological  description  is  a  form of  description  after  all,  and  as  such,  it  requires
language.  Language  is,  among  other  things,  a  way  of  connecting  subjectively  perceived
stimuli to intersubjectively accessible and employable entities: concepts. As far as we are able
to describe our experience using established concepts, we can rely on intersubjectively stable
dispositions to react similarly under similar conditions (cf. Quine 1960: 7), ultimately arriving
at a discourse allowing for objective topics. Our talk about subjective experience qualifies as
one such form of discourse, since our concepts about sensory perception, impressions and
tastes have proven enormously stable: we talk about our experiences all the time, and even
though we know that we may not be able to directly share them, we can justifiably expect our
talk about them to be understood (and we can also to some degree expect to evoke similar
sensations as those we have experienced ourselves in others, by bringing someone whom we
know to have tastes and dispositions similar to our own into a context which shares relevant
conditions with the one which evoked our own sensation). We can expect others to understand
what we mean when we say that we feel elated,  indignated,  or that we enjoy the taste of
chocolate. So, wherever there’s a concept, there’s something intersubjectively learnable.
Secondly, insofar as we can express our experiences as having an intentional object,
we can relate them this way: My experience of tasting chocolate is comparable to someone
else’s experience of tasting chocolate in virtue of their being tasting sensations  of the same
intentional object. These intentional objects are usually individuated externally, and then there
should be no doubt that they are intersubjectively accessible. Some experiences may be purely
internal – they may be experiences of stomach ache, or even of some internal state which
cannot be related to any external cause or condition. In these cases, intentional objects are
only helpful insofar as they can yield generalisable concepts, such as the concept of stomach
ache. But when they are external, which should be the case in an overwhelming amount of
subjective experiences, then the following holds: As much as our experiences when riding the
ferris wheel can differ, they are both experiences of riding the ferris wheel. Any person can in
principle make them, and any person can in principle repeat them. Thus, the intentional object
is a part of analysing the subjective experience: It is fundamental to the experience of riding
the ferris wheel that it was an experience of riding the ferris wheel instead of, say, tasting
chocolate.  And  even  qualitative  differences  in  making  these  experiences  are  in  principle
accessible:  If my riding the ferris  wheel made me feel good, and someone else bad, then
feeling good and feeling bad can be explicated in terms of generalisable concepts (that is, they
are applicable over different persons and situations – feeling good or bad can apply to any
number of situations and be experienced by many). Thus, whenever some parts of expressions
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relating to subjective experience cannot be analysed in terms of external intentional objects,
they may still be analysed in terms of concepts referring to generalisable properties.
And thirdly, the most common way of referring to qualitative experiences is to relate
them to objective facts, be it by way of causation or correlation: We talk about the sensation
we have when seeing the color red, when tasting chocolate,  when feeling warm. Whether
something is red, whether it is chocolate or whether it is warm is closely tied to objective
facts.  There  are,  of  course,  cases  in  which  this  connection  seems  more  loose  or  more
controversial than in other cases: for chocolate will always remain chocolate (marginal cases
of chocolate/vanilla hybrids or similar ambiguities excluded), whereas whether it is warm is
relative  –  i.e.  a  more  or  less  arbitrarily  chosen  point  or  area  on  an  objective  scale  of
measurement –, and whether something is red can be up to debate: we can point to a certain
objective property of light which under some optimal condition causes most of us to see a
color we call red, but whether that objective property is to be identified with the experience of
seeing red is itself not an objective fact. At best, their identity is guaranteed by our pragmatic
decision that it should be identified in the way as is usually being done. On the other hand,
whether we’re all “really” seeing red when being exposed to a certain wavelength is usually
not up for debate (i.e. save for some pathological cases), but only whether we all use the
concept “red” correctly. What is required here is nothing more than to consistently use the
concept whenever we are prompted by the according wavelength stimulus; the only way in
which subjectivity sneaks in is by the subjective consistency of the stimulus, i.e. by judging
whether the wavelength elicits the same stimulus now as in previous instances. On the one
hand, comparing my belief today that 2 + 2 = 4 to my belief yesterday that 2 + 2 = 4 does not
at  all  depend on subjective sameness  of experiential  quality,  since it  constitutes  a perfect
example  of  an  intentional  mental  state  whose  content  does  not  refer  to  any  phenomenal
quality  at  all.  On the  other,  objectively comparing  my sensation of  redness  today to  any
sensation of redness I might have had in the past seems completely hopeless for lack of any
objective standard. In the absence of such a standard, the subjective comparison which we are
left with seems like a leap of faith, pragmatically validated by external reinforcement in every
case in which our comparison is deemed successful by our peers, who in turn have taken the
same leap of faith  in the accuracy of their  senses.  Said comparison itself  is  well  beyond
objectivity, and there can be no epistemic grounding for it; it can be causally explained by our
evolutionary heritage,  insofar  as  we need to  have  a  built-in  way of  judging sameness  of
stimulus (see Bhat & Sahu 1998: 406), but that is really not what is at stake here; because
once  this  subjective  comparison  has  passed  its  intersubjective  test  of  showing  consistent
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prowess at using the concept “red”, our sensations of redness are objective insofar as they are
sensations  of  redness –  i.e.  of  something  which  can  be  referred  to  by  a  concept  which
evidently works intersubjectively.  We often have reason to believe that people are actually
seeing red when they’re saying they do, even in the absence of independent proof (e.g. on the
phone),  since checking their  reactions to external  conditions  is  the basis for ascribing the
mastery of such concepts to them (compare the concept of triangulation in I.7.4).
Neither is the question whether qualia are “really” intersubjectively alike, comparable
or similar of pressing importance. Expressions which can be directly bound to non-linguistic
stimuli, much as the uttering of “lo, there is a rabbit” can be bound to the presentation of a
rabbit-stimulus, thusly have what Quine calls a “stimulus meaning” (Quine 1960: 32-36, see
also section I.7.4). Quine has argued for the irrelevance of likeness of stimulus meaning for
observation sentences, and I believe that if in the following quote you substitute “stimulus
meaning”  for  “experiential  quality”  and  “observation  sentence”  for  “concept”  (i.e.
intersubjectively available semantic content), the argument works much alike:
“The view that I have come to, regarding intersubjective likeness of stimulation, is rather that 
we can simply do without it. The observation sentence ‘Rabbit’ has its stimulus meaning for 
the  linguist,  and  the  observation  sentence  ‘Gavagai’  has  its  stimulus  meaning  for  the  
informant [i.e. the speaker whose utterance is to be translated into the interpreter’s language]. 
The linguist observes natives assenting to ‘Gavagai’ when he, in their position, would have 
assented to ‘Rabbit’. So he tries assigning his stimulus meaning of ‘Rabbit’ to ‘Gavagai’ and 
bandying ‘Gavagai’ on subsequent occasions for his informant’s approval. Encouraged, he  
tentatively adopts ‘Rabbit’ as translation” (Quine 2008: 371).58
To  sum  up,  I  take  it  that  inner  experiential  states,  insofar  as  they  matter
intersubjectively, are individuated intentionally; that is, they are usually individuated by their
intersubjectively accessible  content,  which  can  be expressed propositionally,  such as  “the
feeling that it is warm”, “the sensation that I am perceiving the world as a bat would”, etc.
That is, insofar as subjective states can be individuated by way of propositional content, they,
too, have a firm stand both in the realms of the intersubjective and the objective, even without
ever being “felt” (i.e. directly accessible) by more than one person.
58 One could object that Quine’s argument deals with stimuli which are intersubjectively accessible to begin
with. However, the point is that the private “meaning” only (at best) indirectly determines the intersubjective
meaning. Rather, it is the intersubjectively accessible stimulus (which is related to the qualitative experience)
which forms the basis of communication. In this sense, we can do without intersubjective likeness of stimulation
– i.e. without asking whether the stimulus, as it is subjectively perceived, is “really” alike.
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There is still the nagging doubt whether some qualia could actually be individuated by
their quality alone, but I have some difficulty in coming up with examples for these cases,
possible expressions likely being “the feeling I have now” or “this vague fuzzy sensation I
sometimes  get”,  or  the  like.59 But  these  expressions  do  have  at  least  some external,
intentionally expressible  correlates,  such as a time index (e.g.  “now”) or another  external
qualifier (“fuzzy”), allowing for indexical or demonstrative reference. Some of these may be
but presymbolic or -linguistic, in the sense that they only lack a proper expression, but are not
inexpressible  per  se.  Some  others  may  be  intentional  (insofar  as  they  have  indexical  or
demonstrative content), but genuinely non-linguistic, non-propositional and non-conceptual. I
will come back to this open question in section I.9.5.
None of what I have said in this chapter was designed to meet the skeptic challenge of
fundamentally doubting that any other mind except one’s own really exists. Rather, I have
suggested that the view from which skeptic doubts follow does not lend itself to begin with.
What I have said is that qualia come with a host of objectively evaluable, intersubjectively
available properties, and that we can refer to these properties symbolically – by making them
the content of symbolic representation. To briefly venture into science-fiction territory: We
should expect a computer with suitable algorithms and sensory and/or motor modalities to be
able to perfectly learn our language, down to expressions referring to qualitative experiences,
even if this computer can have none. Thus, speaking our language cannot constitute proof that
one has these experiences;  but  we should not  expect  any language to  be able  to  refer  to
something  inherently  private,  as  such  a  language  could  not  be  learned.60 Yet  all  of  us
constantly use language to express our experiences, and we can do so because they are linked
to intersubjectively available facts. We know this to be true, yet there is no compelling reason
to believe that we should take them to be all there is to mental states. Our inner experiences
are linked to intentional objects, to concepts and external things because they have a purpose;
because none of  our  inner  feelings  is  fully  behaviourally  inert.  This  is  not  to  follow the
behaviourist  dogma  that  all  there  is  to  human  psychology  is  behaviour,  but  rather  to
acknowledge that the cognitive processes underlying our behaviour have a purpose which
goes beyond their own private experiential realm. Our mind is not self-sufficient. Rather, it
exists to connect us to the world.
59 Compare Quine’s saying that “just a few [observables from scientists], such as the indescribable smell of some
uncommon gas (...) would resist reduction” to observables of the whole speech community (Quine 2008: 369).
60 Compare Wittgenstein’s “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) – meaning a private
mental state cannot be adequately discussed without public criteria for identifying it. If there is something purely
private about mental states, then they are irrelevant for the meaning of mental terms, since meaning is tied to
public linguistic behavior.  Mental states we can talk about cannot be strictly  private.  And vice versa:  if we
consider something to be strictly private, it follows that we cannot talk about it (compare section I.7.2.).
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I.9.5. Non-conceptual Content
There has been a controversial debate about whether non-conceptual content actually
exists  and  what  it  could  exactly  amount  to,  and  not  just  in  the  domain  of  qualitative
experience.  For  example,  “[i]t  is  compelling  to  think  of  (…)  [some]  beings  as  having
experience (...) [who] are unable to communicate thoughts to us; we are unable to understand
– from the inside – how they are responding to the world; we are unable to impose our world
on them” (Cussins 1990: 134). It is tempting to take the intentional  stance toward beings
which “need not have those concepts” (ibid.) when these ascriptions yield some explanatory
surplus for us (cf. Dennett 2007: 87 f.), such as in cases of ascribing mental states to robots,
thermostats, “very young human infants (before the acquisition of the object concept, say), or
very senile people, or certain other animals” (Cussins 1990: 134). On the other end of the
spectrum,  Davidsonian  holism  commits  those  who  adopt  it  to  denying  the  ascription  of
content to beings who do not possess concepts, since saying that a dog believes a cat to have
climbed a tree would require attributing to the dog “many general beliefs about trees: that they
are growing things, that they have leaves or needles, that they burn” (Davidson 2001b: 98) –
which, of course, is more than doubtful.
There  is  no  harm  in  admitting  that  ascribing  an  attenuated  form  of  belief  to  a
thermostat  is  justified  by its  doing some explanatory  work (within  the  boundaries  of  the
attenuated  ascription,  see  section  I.7.5),  even  while  admitting  that  the  thermostat  itself
possesses no concepts at all. Here, saying that the thermostat quasi-believes that the room is
too cold does not imply that the thermostat possesses the concepts “cold” or “room”. This is
because the ascription is not made “from the inside” (as in: what the thermostat is supposed to
be  thinking),  but  just  to  highlight  the  connection  between  the  external  world  and  the
thermostat’s reaction (namely, heating the room).
But are there mental states which we cannot even in principle ascribe conceptually or
propositionally? Cussins invokes the example of a perceived sound: “Evidently the content is
indexical or demonstrative since, were we to express the content in words, we would say that
perception presents the sound as coming from “that location,” or “from over there”” (Cussins
1990: 143). He judges this form of content to be non-conceptual on the grounds of its being
indexical  or  demonstrative,  not  of its  being a  qualitative  experience  (ibid.:  139 f.).  Now,
Cussins may be correct depending on the framing of his example, but generally, if we were
after a proper description of perceived acoustic content,  I believe it would be much more
plausible to describe it in terms of its qualities rather than its source. Of course, this depends
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on how apt we are at  expressing the quality of our perceptions – but the same thing also
applies to expressing our beliefs: if we are not apt at using, say, concepts from mathematics,
we might refer to a certain mathematical proof in an indexical or demonstrative way (“the
proof Professor Ein was lecturing us about in Zurich”). But this does not keep the proof from
being expressible in a proper conceptual way (such as “the proof was about the Fibonacci
sequence”).
Analogously, acoustic engineers can be apt at describing qualities of the sounds they
hear,  and  so  the  resulting  description  would  very  likely  neither  be  indexical  nor
demonstrative. For example, envision someone who can describe their acoustic experience in
terms of notes, harmonies or acoustic frequency: either of these would qualify as concepts if
we think of a concept as something that “divides up the world into objects [or] properties”
(ibid.: 134), “which presents the world to a subject as the objective human world about which
one can form true or false judgments” (ibid.: 133) and which is formed “relative to a theory”
(ibid.: 134). Notes, harmonies and frequencies can also figure in propositional belief, desire
and intention ascription just as any linguistic concept (“I desire to hear her sing in A minor”,
“I  believe  I  heard a  sparrow’s  trill”).  So we can  grant  that  if  some content  can only be
expressed indexically or demonstratively, it cannot be conceptual; but, at least from Cussins’
example, we cannot conclude that there is any content that is only expressible indexically or
demonstratively. I have failed to come up with such examples, but of course I cannot rule out
that they do exist. If they do, they are well beyond the scope of my claims in this book.
I  should  stress  that  my  own  view  on  this  topic  is  limited  by  what  I  think  can
reasonably be called  “content”,  and of  course there  are  alternative  views available  (for  a
comprehensive overview, see Gunther 2003). As evidenced in the previous sections, my view
is bound to matters of symbolic representation rather than a complete inventory of cognitive
operations in humans. People who believe that mental content is the proper form of content
and that non-mental  content  is derivative (see section I.4.4) are likely to have a different
conception of content: For them, something’s being mental or cognitive is by itself already a
good heuristic for its having content, while I believe that something’s being representational
(or at least standing in a necessary relation to symbolic reference) is the proper criterion for its
having content, insofar as such phenomena are the only ones which present us with the more
tricky  aspects  of  content-ascriptions  (see  ibid.).  I  have  previously  mentioned  Searle  as
advocating the former view (“All linguistic meaning is derived intentionality”, Searle 2000:
93), but in fact, Cussins does so too: “There are derivative uses of the notion in application to
the communicative products of cognition, such as speech, writing, and other sign-systems (…)
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but these uses must ultimately be explained in terms of a theory of the primary application of
content in cognitive experience” (Cussins 2003: 133). However, as I have argued in section
I.4.4, there is no fruitful way of characterising some of our interactions with the world as
intentional if not by invoking symbolic practice. The catch is that without it, all interactions
between cognitive apparatus and external world would boil down to causal processes. But
since we do have symbolic representation at our disposal, we can sort these causal processes
into two different processes: those which are intentional, and those which are not. If mental
intentionality were primary and symbolic intentionality derivative, we should be able to sort
our  cognitive  processes  into  intentional  and  non-intentional  processes  independently  of
symbolic properties; but of course we can’t. The fact that we have mental content implies that
we have a theory of the causal laws underlying it, and that these are individuated by reference
to  objects  in  the  world.  And  there  is  no  way of  formulating  theories  without  exploiting
symbolic properties.
If all there was to our fearing snakes was our cognitive way of dealing fearfully with
snakes  –  of  processing  stimuli  associated  with  snake-appearances,  of  outputting  aversive
behaviour, of forming traumatic memories of snake-incidences etc. – then these wouldn’t be
intentional.  Why?  Because  they  would  be  completely  describable  in  non-representational
causal terms – down to said memories –, and there would be no need at all to come up with
intentional terminology. They only become intentional once we come up with something that
signifies a snake, and once we come up with the cognitive apparatus enabling us to deal with
these signifiers. Whether these be grunts, words or signs – they need to signify snakes. Once
they do, our mental life is enriched by intentionality. Until then, our “internal representations”
merely stand in a non-representational causal relationship to what they purportedly are about
(and while it is sometimes said that this is in effect all it takes, I beg to differ – see II.4 and
II.6). Thus, once again, mental intentionality is not primary to symbolic practice, even though
symbolic practice depends on cognition.
So, I believe our best reason for speaking of a cognitive state as having content is that
it is describable in intentional terms, and this requires conceptual description. There may be a
wide variety of such descriptions available, since what our mental states can be about can be
grasped using any concept from any theory. I have invoked examples from natural language,
mathematics and music,  but of course there are many,  many more.  So, finding that some
property is non-conceptual is likely to point towards its not expressing any content in the first
place. For example, in Cussins’ case, the property “of having an active hypothalamus (...) is
characterised  by  means  of  the  concept  hypothalamus,  but  an  organism  may  satisfy  the
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property without  possessing this  concept.  Therefore (…) [it] is  a nonconceptual  property”
(ibid.: 135). And having a hypothalamus is “not a content property, obviously” (ibid.: 160, FN
8). I already pointed out that I do not take the fact that there are beings whom we ascribe
content  to,  but  who  themselves  lack  concepts,  as  implying  that  there  is  non-conceptual
content. Rather, ascribing beliefs to infants, thermostats and robots only requires the ascriber
to possess these concepts, and to employ these to explain the infant’s, thermostat’s or robot’s
reaction as an effect of some psychologically salient cause. (Since having the psychological
concepts implies having the psychological theory, being able to apply the concepts and being
able to explain the phenomena is much the same.)
The reasons why the psychological laws hold are different in these cases: In the case
of the thermostat or the robot, an engineer has fashioned the system with the express purpose
that the law should hold – so we ultimately explain the fact that the law holds via reference to
someone who does grasp the relevant concepts. That is, the engineer’s grasping the concepts
is  the  cause  for  the  thermostat’s  having the  “belief”  -  and in  this  sense,  it  is  much  less
attenuated than we might  previously have suspected,  when we thought that  the ascription
referred exclusively to an internal state of the thermostat. As I have insinuated in section I.6.4,
to  be  able  to  explain  something  by  psychological  law  is  to  explain  it  not  just  as  an
instantiation of an intentional law, but to also (at least implicitly) specify the cause of why the
law holds (also see I.8.5). In the case of the robot and the thermostat, while the first condition
is satisfied in virtue of the relation between context (i.e. the cold room) and the system whose
behaviour we are to explain pseudo-intentionally (i.e. the thermostat), the second is satisfied
only via reference to the engineer. In the case of the infant, both are satisfied by reference to
the infant. Thus, the example of the infant catches our notion of “attenuated belief” much
better  than  the thermostat,  since in  the  infant’s  case,  there is  no full-fledged grasping of
concepts involved in either explanation.61 If a psychological law applies to an infant who has
not mastered one of the concepts we use in the ascription that requires this law to hold, then
the fact that the law holds cannot be due to the causal implications of having mastered the
full-fledged concept (see I.7.5). So we say that we actually use  attenuated concepts in our
ascriptions (cf. Dennett 2007: 87 f.) in order to stress that the lawlike explanation implied by
the  theory  holds  without  actually  requiring  the  subject  of  the  explanation  to  have  any
intentional/symbolic cognitive capacities related to the holding of intentional laws, and also to
61 Although the cases might also work analogously if the infant’s cognition depended crucially on having learned
something; then we would have to ultimately explain its psychological property via reference to the external
cause  of  his  cognition,  which  might  very  well  involve  mastery  of  concepts.  (This,  of  course,  is  the  same
difference as between explaining something as innate and explaining it under the social learning paradigm, cf.
Levy 2004.)
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highlight that adjacent psychological laws which might hold in the case of a person who has
fully mastered the respective concept might not in this case.
I.10. Summary
Intentional  psychology explains  agential  phenomena  by  ascribing  to  agents  states
which have content. With some exceptions, these states are classically taken to be so-called
propositional  attitudes:  Attitudes  such as  beliefs,  desires,  intentions,  etc.  (sometimes  also
called  “intentional  modes“)  toward  a  propositionally  formulated  semantic  content  (I.1).
Intentionality is the property of having such content, i.e. of referring to the objects, events,
processes (etc.) or of being “aimed” at such objects, events, etc. (I.2). Content is individuated
externally, in reference to matters beyond the agent, or, to be more precise: descriptions of
intentional content take both internal cognitive properties of an agent into account as well as a
relationship between the agent and the external intentional object (I.3). Having some kinds of
intentional content and ascribing it to others both require social conventions which serve to
establish what kinds of things refer to what kind of content, or, in other words, to establish
symbolic representation (I.4.2). Causal chains between tokened symbols and their instantiated
meaning can explain how the material parts of these symbols are associated with their specific
meanings and how individual agents can acquire knowledge about symbolic representation.
Yet,  this  explanatory  relation  between  meaning  and  causality  does  not  establish  that
representations are reducible to causes or effects (I.4.3). 
While some believe that symbolic forms of representation are derived from mental
intentionality (a view called “mentalism“), I argue that both of these are in fact interlocked, at
least  in those cases which have been typically invoked to argue for derived intentionality
(I.4.4). In such cases, mental intentions can in fact only be properly explicated as mental
states referring to symbolic meaning. Thus, they cannot be primary to matters of symbolic
meaning. The hypothesis that thought is itself linguistic cannot make any headway toward
clearing  up  matters  of  mental  meaning,  since  it  only  pertains  to  formal  (“syntactical“)
conditions  for  acquiring  meaning.  Further,  both  computationalist  as  well  as  connectionist
principles can satisfy such requirements for neural processes to be interpretable as processing
certain symbolic forms of content (such as linguistic content).
Since  there  are  mental  states  which  have  content  but  on  whom norms  governing
symbolic content have no bearing, I call such content “sparse”, distinguishing it from “rich”
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content which is had by those mental states on whom such norms do exert formative influence
(I.4.5). Typically, rich content – which intentional psychology explanatorily invokes – is the
kind of  content  which  gives  naturalistically  inclined  philosophers  a  run  for  their  money,
because it depends on non-natural properties such as rationality and normativity.
Mental  states  are  theoretical  objects  insofar  as  they  primarily  depend  on  the
explanatory roles they fulfill in psychological theories. Intentional psychological terms are
also  not  defined  over  directly  observable  objects,  but  rather  criterially  inferred  from
(potentially)  observable  phenomena.  Consequently,  I  suggest  that  debates  about  mental
ontology  should  be  led  in  terms  of  what  is  explanatorily  valuable  (I.5  and  I.6.1).  So,
committing to the view that mental states are essentially theory-dependent does not mean
committing  to  an  antirealist  view.  If  we focus  on explanatory  value,  we also  needn’t  be
bothered by the distinction between “natural” kind-terms in scientific laws and those which
are  “unnatural”.  Of  course,  the  distinction  between  kind-terms  which  denote  things  that
depend on agents (such as mental states) and those which don’t (such as chemical properties)
is  worth salvaging,  but  the  insinuation  that  what  is  natural  is  in  some way more  real  or
scientifically more reputable is left by the wayside.
Intentional explanation is a form of lawlike and causal explanation: It invokes laws
(i.e.  general  relations  between projectible  kinds) to  explain singular  instantiations  of such
kinds, and it treats positive instantiations as evidence supporting the respective general law
(I.6.2.). Intentional explanation can be construed along the lines of the classical deductive-
nomological model of scientific explanation: as a practical syllogism stating a general law and
the instantiation of its antecedent as premises and the logically derivable consequent as the
explanandum  (i.e.  post  factum)  or  prediction  (i.e.  beforehand)  (I.6.3).  Beliefs,  desires,
intentions  and similar  propositional  attitudes  are  statable  in  this  syllogistic  form,  so  that
actions follow logically.  Thusly,  given an instantiation of the mental states invoked in the
premises, the derived action, motivation, or reason to act, is explained or predicted relative to
an agent. Such explanations do not merely depend on said states being relatable logically, but
on being ascribable to the agent in question. To this end, the agent has to fulfill some minimal
requirements of rationality: namely, her actions must be so systematic in relation to obtaining
external  circumstances  as  to  be  interpretable  as  being  caused  by veridical  and  consistent
mental states (I.6.4). Also, in order for psychological laws to be explanatory, they need to be
sufficiently generalizable (I.6.5) and relatively strict (I.6.6).
That mental states are theoretical kinds means that they are the kinds of things we can
have  theories  about.  Thus,  they  are  systematically  tied  to  observable  phenomena  (I.7.2),
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especially those they explain: behavioural or behaviourally relevant phenomena. Yet, they are
not restatable in purely behavioural terms (I.7.3). In building on the work of W.V.O. Quine,
Donald  Davidson argued that  mental  states  are  intimately tied  to  meaning,  insofar  as the
acquisition of the means for symbolic representation depend on the ascription of such states,
thus requiring the employment of psychological theories, and vice versa. He also ironed out
how the rationality of an agent is necessary for her interpretation. I am following him in both
regards  (I.7.4).  However,  I  do not  follow him in  tying  having mental  states  to  linguistic
competence. I believe that ascribing mental states to animals, robots and thermostats can be
well justified, even though we should mark such ascriptions as attenuations (I.7.5).
Building on this view, I aim to cement the notion that the individuation of an agent’s
mental  content  relies  on more  than her  inner  workings (I.8.1,  I.8.2).  While  I  follow both
Putnam and Burge in their  arguments  for “broad” (i.e.  externally individuated)  content  in
special cases (I.8.3), I aim to cover more ground by providing two arguments for the claim
that all kinds of rich content are individuated externally. The first says that even if all that is to
know about the content of an agent’s mental representations was determined by her intrinsic
properties, we could not find out what these are if we did not look to matters beyond the agent
(I.8.4). While this is an epistemic argument, its scope expands when considering that content
can only come into play once we have developed a psychological theory. If no theory about
content can assign it without taking matters external to an agent into account, then there is no
“narrow” content (i.e. content which is internally individuated).
To  make  my second  argument  (I.8.5),  I  point  out  that  an  agent’s  inner  workings
always underdetermine the actual content of her mental representations, and that we cannot
simply retreat to the view that her content should then be described as the specific  form of
underdetermination. This is because our mental states, no matter whether rich or sparse, do
not merely refer to what is describable intrinsically, namely the proximal aims of cognitive
mechanisms. For example, a toad’s cognitive worm-detector is proximally aimed at certain
elongate  shapes  and  their  movement.  But  detecting  and  processing  such  shapes  and
movements only makes sense when assuming that they are reliable indicators of nourishing
external  objects,  and it  is these external  objects  which explain the whys  and hows of the
cognitive mechanism. Sure, there can be intrinsic descriptions of such mechanisms, but these
do  not  explain  what  theories  invoking  content  are  meant  to  explain.  In  fact,  intrinsic
properties can be explained without referring to content at all  (and if we follow Fodor in
holding that mental content ascriptions pick out intrinsic causal powers of agents, content as a
kind-term itself  vanishes).  Rather,  what  intentional  theories  also explain  – beside placing
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functional  constraints  on  internal  causal  processes  –  is  a  mechanism’s  presence  and
endurance, and they do so by pointing out or at least implying which functional aim (sparse)
or  norm (rich)  has  been instrumental  for  either  or  both.  So,  if  we want  an explanatorily
valuable kind of psychological theory, we cannot stop at intrinsic analyses.
To conclude the chapter, I also took a cursory look at other prevalent kinds of mental
states which are either representational but lack standard forms of being assigned content, or
which are taken to be mental but possibly not representational (I.9). I concluded that many if
not all  forms of intentionality  are  systematically  dependent  on the kind of intersubjective
practice of ascription delineated in I.7 and excluded those which potentially do not from my
present analysis.
II. Intentionality in Cognitive Neuroscience
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II.1. Representations in the Cognitive and Neurosciences
In  psychology  and  the  cognitive  sciences,  “cognition”  usually  means  information
processing  related  to  psychological  functions  (see  e.g.  Anderson 2009:  introduction).  For
example, if one of our cognitive abilities is to react aversively to snakes, then the respective
function is fulfilled by a process associating an informative representational input, namely
perceptions of snake-like things, with the appropriate output, namely aversive behaviour. We
can tell the same story about higher cognitive functions such as the ability to identify correctly
formed English sentences:  here,  the respective function is  also fulfilled  by associating  an
input,  namely perceptions  of sentence-like structures,  with the appropriate  output,  namely
corresponding judgments of correctness or incorrectness (see Levine 1987: 250). Properties
such as representing, carrying information or generally “being about” something are called
semantic,  and  what  representations  represent  or  information  informs  us  about  is
correspondingly called semantic content (in this context, sometimes also “mental content” or
just  “content”,  compare  section  I.4.1).  In our example,  the primary pieces  of  information
involved are that what is perceived is a candidate for being an English sentence, like a string
of words or characteristic phonemes, and that it is either correct or incorrect.
The  notion  of  representation  is  central  to  the  cognitive  sciences.  For  instance,
according to Thagard, 
“the central hypothesis of cognitive science [is this]: Thinking can best be understood in terms
of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those 
structures. Although there is much disagreement about the nature of the representations and 
computations that constitute thinking, the central hypothesis is general enough to encompass 
the current range of thinking in cognitive science, including connectionist theories” (Thagard 
2005:  10).  “Without  a  doubt,  (…) [this  hypothesis] has  been  the  most  theoretically  and  
experimentally successful approach to mind ever developed. Not everyone in the cognitive  
science disciplines agrees with [it] (...), but inspection of the leading journals in psychology 
and other fields reveals that (…) [it] is currently the dominant approach to cognitive science” 
(ibid.: 11).
One branch of cognitive research is cognitive neuroscience: the investigation of how
the brain’s properties relate to or underlie cognition (cf. Sullivan 2015b: tba). In humans and
many animals, the brain is a prerequisite (or the “basis”) for cognition, insofar as its activity is
necessary for cognition to occur. This view is commonplace in the cognitive sciences and
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recent philosophy of mind: “mental phenomena are biologically based: they are both caused
by the operations of the brain and realised in the structure of the brain” (Searle 1983: ix; see
also Davidson 2004: 180 and Cummins 2000: 133).
Three major sources of evidence for this assumption are, firstly, lesion studies, where
the severe damage to or the complete lack of a certain brain region (or in general, a neural
pathology that impairs  the activity of certain brain areas) is associated with the failure to
perform certain cognitive functions: some “evidence about brain functioning is gathered by
observing the performance of people whose brains have been damaged in identifiable ways. A
stroke, for example, in a part of the brain dedicated to language can produce deficits such as
the inability to utter sentences” (Thagard 2005: 9). Secondly, neuroimaging studies suggest
that  certain  brain  activity  is  systematically  correlated  with  cognitive  performance,  or  as
Haynes and Rees put it very generally,  “many human neuroimaging studies have provided
strong evidence for a close link between the mind and the brain” (Haynes & Rees 2006: 523;
for more information both on lesion studies and functional  correlations  see D’Esposito &
Wills  2000).  Furthermore,  fulfilling  psychological  functions  consists  of  properly  relating
environmental cues, internal states and behaviour: If I am asked to recognise a larch from
quite a distance, then my perception of the faraway larch, my memory of what larches look
like, my estimation of what larches would look like from quite a distance, and my behaviour,
signalling my recognition of the larch,  need to be properly related.  In all  instances,  these
relations  require  or  consist  of  cognitive  processing;  so  the  fact  that,  thirdly,  the  brain’s
physiognomy and activity is what crucially connects and regulates perception, internal bodily
states and behaviour also singles it out as the prime candidate for the basis of cognition. For
these  three  reasons,  I  will  take  the  brain’s  proper  functioning  to  be  a  necessity  for
paradigmatically cognitive functions.
In  the  first  chapter  we  have  seen  how  some  forms  of  psychological  analysis  are
intertwined with the notions of information, representation and content. Holyoak goes so far
as to view these notions as some of the field’s defining features: “Psychology is the science
that investigates the representation and processing of information by complex organisms” (in
Wilson  &  Keil  1999:  xxxix).  But  how  does  semantic  content  figure  in  cognitive
neuroscience?  Curiously,  just  like  Holyoak does  in  the case of  psychology,  Albright  and
Neville emphasise that  “cognitive neuroscience is (…) a science of information processing”
(in Wilson & Keil 1999: li). Now, since insights about the brain’s role in cognition are often
obtained by correlating brain activity with performance during psychological tests, we know
that at least due to this significant methodological overlap cognitive neuroscience inherits one
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notion of representation from psychology (again, see D’Esposito & Wills 2000, but also Gold
& Stoljar 1999). However, the claim that cognitive neuroscience is a science of information
processing  would  be  rather  trivial,  and much  less  of  a  defining  characteristic,  if  it  were
exclusively true due to the fact that it  is intertwined with  another  field about information
processing, namely psychology. Rather, what I take Albright & Neville’s claim to mean is
that cognitive neuroscience is the science of information processing in the brain, in the sense
that  neural  properties  are  justifiably  and  truthfully  describable  as  having  representational
features.  So,  our  concern  in  this  chapter  is  not  with  how  descriptions  in  cognitive
neuroscience can inherit the psychological notion of representation, but rather, how the brain
itself  can  properly  be  described  as  carrying  semantic  features.  Cognitive  neuroscience’s
relation to psychology is what may lend us the methodology and the theoretical framework to
identify neural properties  as  carrying information,  but ultimately,  what interests us is how
neurobiological  features themselves get  to  have  semantic  properties.  Thus,  the  principal
question I will be concerned with is not  how representational features in the brain are to be
identified – although I will say a few things about this issue as well – but why some features
of the brain are representational in the first place.
II.2. Are Representations at Odds with Naturalism?
In order  to  see  how the  notion of  representation  connects  with neuroscience,  it  is
helpful to distinguish between neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience the way Gold and
Stoljar do:
“According  to  one  conception  of  neuroscience,  perhaps  the  more  traditional  conception,
neuroscience  is  to  be  understood as  the  science  we will  call  biological  neuroscience,  the
concern of  which is  the  investigation of  the  structure  and function of  individual  neurons,
neuronal ensembles, and neuronal structures. For simplicity, we will  stipulate that biological
neuroscience includes only neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, and neurochemistry, and we will
take it to be synonymous with neurobiology.
According to another conception, neuroscience is taken to be what is often called  cognitive
neuroscience (see Gazzaniga 1995; see also Kosslyn & Andersen 1992 and Kosslyn & Koenig
1995) (...). Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the mind,
the concern of which is the integration of the biological and physical sciences – including in
particular biological neuroscience – with the psychological sciences to provide an explanation
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of mental  phenomena.  Although biological  neuroscience is  interested in understanding the
biology of the brain, cognitive neuroscience attempts to synthesize biology and psychology to
understand the mind. Cognitive neuroscience therefore includes biological neuroscience as a
proper part but is not exhausted by it” (Gold & Stoljar 1999: 813).62
In  spite  of  its  carrying  biology  in  its  name  rather  than  physics,  neurobiology  is
ultimately couched in physicalist theories: the brain itself is expected to be wholly describable
in physical terms (such as electrical properties or physical properties of neurons) and chemical
terms (such as the chemical features of neuro-transmitters) (cf. Griffin & Baron-Cohen 2002:
104). Combined with my earlier remarks, the question now becomes: how do some physical
objects, namely brains (or some of their spatiotemporal parts), get to have representational
content? Not only does our taking them as representational follow from interpreting Albright
and Neville’s definition in a non-trivial sense, but  calling  them this way is standard in the
scientific literature (see the following section for some examples). So the initial conundrum is
that we take physical objects to be representational, while being representational is itself not a
physical feature:  “A natural definition of representational content only refers to concepts of
the natural sciences, which themselves neither are intentional nor draw on the interest of an
external observer”63 and “a naturalistic theory of semantics [is one] where representations,
their  content,  their  truth  or  falsehood  are  defined  without  recurrence  to  terms  which
themselves are already intentional” (Zehetleitner & Schönbrodt 2013: 197).
Seeking to integrate the notion of representation into the natural sciences in general or
neurobiology specifically,  we are faced with the challenge of naturalising representational
descriptions,  i.e.  coming  up  with  alternative  (coreferential/coextensive/coexplanatory)
descriptions  which  contain  nothing  but  physical  terms.  These  attempts  have  proven
problematic for various reasons (see e.g. Fodor 1974). However, variants of naturalism which
are  not  strictly  physicalistic  have  proven more  fruitful,  insofar  as  they  have  pointed  out
strategies for swapping representational terms for non-representational terms, such as those
from biology (cf. Dretske 1981, Millikan 1989, Zehetleitner & Schönbrodt 2013) or dynamic
systems theory (cf. Bischof & Zehetleitner 2015, Zehetleitner forthcoming; see section II.7.2).
Such naturalistic programs are not strictly physicalistic, insofar as they use teleological terms
(see I.4.5 and Braillard & Malaterre 2015: 9-15) such as “function” or “organism” which are
62 I take Gold & Stoljar to mean that neurobiology’s methodology and conceptual inventory is a proper part of
cognitive neuroscience, but not its entire domain. That is, neurobiology can also say something about brain parts
which are not cognitively relevant (such as those partaking in internal bodily regulation).
63 Quoted from a presentation held by Michael Zehetleitner at the LMU’s Research Center for Neurophilosophy
and Ethics of Neuroscience on Oct 22nd 2013. A similar phrasing can be found in Zehetleitner & Schönbrodt
2015 on p. 197.
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not  a  proper  part  of  physics  (which  does,  however,  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  such
theories will prove reducible to future physicalistic theories.64 However, see  Sullivan 2009:
518 for some of the problems reductionism currently faces in neuroscience).
In the following, I will take non-physicalist naturalism to provide sufficient criteria for
what counts as scientific analyses of representational properties. Compared to physicalism,
this non-physicalist  naturalism requires little more than accepting that biological kinds are
respectable scientific terms, and that accepting teleological, functional notions into scientific
theories does not amount to heresy. I will certainly not attempt to show how representations
reduce to strictly physical terms, but rather that they can still be cashed out in thoroughly
scientific terminology and that proper cognitive sciences need not be afraid of them. My point
is not that there cannot be physical descriptions of representations, but rather that,  even if  it
turns out that  they cannot or will  not be reduced, physical  theories  by themselves  do not
provide the kind of explanation we seek in the cognitive sciences. That is, perhaps we  will
arrive at physical descriptions of, say, psychological kinds; but since physics does not have
any nomological use for such objects, as psychology would, they would cease to be such
kinds and thus cease to explain what they were meant to explain (cf. Fodor 1974 and section
II.8.4.4). It is far more likely that these redescriptions of non-physical terms in physical terms
would create “big data” that is hard to cash out as an explanatory surplus; and whenever big
data about psychological properties does explain something, it usually does so by algorithms
which  themselves  do  not  rely  exclusively  on  physics  (–  How does  facebook  predict  our
behaviour? By statistically correlating certain biographical properties with other biographical
properties; see section I.6.5).
II.3. Neural Representations are Sparse
What is it that makes some physical object a carrier of information? And what exactly
are these “semantic properties” which we assume neural features to have? First off, of course
64 Coming  out  of  early  20th century  positivism,  scientific  naturalism  has  often  been  taken  to  amount  to
physicalistic naturalism, and reducibility to physics as a criterion for what counts as a respectable scientific
theory (see e.g. Carnap 1931; for a weaker version, namely reducibility as an empirical “working hypothesis”,
see Oppenheim & Putnam 1958). However, this physicalist optimism has been waning over the past 100 years
(see, again, Fodor 1974). While it is generally accepted that laws and natural kinds in biology and psychology
are less strict than in physics (see section I.6.6), this realisation has led to widening the scope of what counts as
scientific rather than depriving everything less strict than physics the status of being a science. (Also, our picture
of physics itself has changed considerably over the past century, contributing to this widening.) Of course, there
is much more to say about the successes and failures of physicalism and its relation to cognitive science, but that
is beyond the scope of this book.
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no one expects neural representations to be straightforwardly like other forms of symbolic
representations familiar to us (see I.4.2): we are not going to literally find signs, pictures or
words in the brain, and we should not expect anything in the brain to have representational
features outrightly similar to these.65 For example, if something green is perceived, then the
corresponding representation within the brain will of course not be a green picture – and not
just because “[b]rain processes are not the sort of things to which colour concepts can be
properly applied” (Place 2002, 59). Firstly, for X to represent Y, X is generally not required to
share any characteristic property with Y (compare Danto 1981: chapter 1).66 Representing a
meadow does not require a green picture (just take a look at any of Van Gogh’s many non-
green representations of nature). For this reason alone, imagining anything green does not
require our cognitive apparatus to have any green properties.
This is not to say that  similarity cannot play a role in an object’s  representational
features: We often do decipher an image intuitively if it looks like what it depicts. The point is
rather  that  similarity  can  only  ever  explain  a  small  part  of  what  makes  a  representation
representational (also see I.4.2). It explains a part of pictorial representation (namely those
images which look like what they depict), but another significant part of it, such as abstract art
or signs, remains unexplained. Linguistic representation, which does not rely on similarity at
all,  also  remains  grossly  unexplained.  And  the  form  of  representation  we’re  presently
concerned with would remain unexplained as well, since the only instance in which a neural
representation is substantially similar to what it represents is when it carries information about
neurons.  (Sometimes,  neuroscientists  may  even think  about  the  neurons  they’re  currently
using  to  think  about  these  neurons.)  In  the  cases  of  pictorial  and  especially  linguistic
representation, the explanatory gap can be filled with theories about association, learning or
convention: if we do not immediately see what a word or sign is meant to represent, we can
learn to associate one with the other – which is one of the most important cognitive abilities
underlying pictorial or linguistic representations. However, no such process can give physical
properties  of  brains  representational  qualities:  just  as  absurd  as  the  expectation  to  find
anything green in the brain is the idea that something in the brain represents anything by
65 Perhaps under one of its more implausible interpretations, Fodor’s “language of thought”-hypothesis could
indeed be said to assume word-like entities floating around in the brain. But even so, these entities would not be
words in any straightforward sense. Rather, as I have argued in I.4.4, LOT should more plausibly be interpreted
as being true if it turns out that neural processes underlying cognition satisfy certain (syntactical) requirements
which languages generally satisfy. For instance, they should be interpretable as implementing a formal structure
which supports compositionality. As I have also pointed out, this interpretation runs the danger of making LOT
compatible with connectionism, but that is the price I believe we must pay for plausibility.
66 Compare also Danto’s second chapter, in which he introduces a striking analogy to the theory of action, which
underlies intentional psychology. The basic analogy, briefly: Two identical physical objects can radically differ
in meaning (i.e. in their roles as signifiers), and so can two identical instances of behaviour (also compare Danto
1973: ix f.).
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convention  (because  there  are  no homunculi,  no  little  agent-like  objects  in  the  brain,  for
whom these conventions would be significant; cf. Kenny 1971: 65 f. and Levine 1987: 254).
Thus,  far  more  illuminating  than the first  reason why we should not expect  green
pictures in the brain, namely that they needn’t be green in order to represent green, is the
second  one:  that  neural  representations  are  not  symbolic,  insofar  as  they  rest  neither  on
similarity  nor  convention.  This  point  may  seem  obvious  enough,  but  many  theoretical
problems dealing with representations in the cognitive sciences (including many issues about
the relations between mental states and brain states) are tracable back to this simple mix-up.
When we find someone bemoaning the fact that rationality and normativity, aspects which are
inherent to matters of representations as understood in intentional psychology, are a stumbling
block  for  the  cognitive  sciences,  we  must  assume  they  have  mixed  up  one  form  of
intentionality  for  the  other.  I  have  distinguished  between  rich  and  sparse  notions  of
intentionality in section I.4.4, and none of said problems come with sparse notions (compare
footnote  101).  Which does  not  mean  that  an  account  of  how sparse notions  can  support
semantic ascriptions of information is trivial (an account which I am about to develop in the
following sections) – it just means that there are several distinct problems associated with
intentionality, and just saying that we are dealing with representations does not imply that we
have to deal with all of them at once.
For example, let’s assume that there’s a pattern of activation in the brain’s fusiform
face area (FFA) which represents a certain face (cf. Kanwisher 2001). Clearly, one does not
represent the other by way of convention: it has never simply been conventionally decided to
associate  one  with  the  other.  Sure,  conventions  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  neural
processing: The fact that we associate the word “bridge” with any particular bridge is by way
of convention; and associating the word “bridge” with the perception, memory,  sound and
function  (etc.)  of  an  actual  bridge  is  thanks  to  neural  processing.  Thus,  representing
something symbolically requires shaping our neural processing. (Which is not saying much
more than that everytime we learn how to use a symbol, our brain has to follow suit.) Of
course,  none  of  this  implies  that  whatever  in  the  brain  represents  bridges  does  so  by
convention. The difference being that our learning about the fact that there is a conventional
association between the word “bridge” and actual bridges causes the brain to rewire itself so
as to fulfill the associated cognitive function. Thus, said linguistic convention that “bridge”
means bridges is a cause for something happening on the neural level, but whatever happens
on the neural level does not itself represent by convention.
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To drive this point home, compare Cummins’ theory of psychological explanation:
Analogously to what I have said thus far, he takes psychological capacities to be characterised
by carrying out information-processing (see Levine 1987: 250 f.). According to his account,
whatever  device  implements  such an  information-processing  programme  (read:  the  brain)
need not have access to a  representation of the programme’s instructions it is carrying out.
What matters is rather that said device’s causal structure is so organised as to yield the desired
(correct or adequate) output dependent on a given input. The representation itself is not a
separate element of the causal stream between in- and output (ibid.: 256). And yet,  Fodor
seems to disagree: “What distinguishes what organisms do from what [non-cognisers] do is
that a  representation of the rules they follow constitutes one of the causal determinants of
their behaviour” (Fodor 1975: 74, fn. 15, author’s emphasis). However, both Cummins’ and
Fodor’s points are right on target and readily reconcilable: Namely, Fodor’s point is that a
representation  of the  rules,  say,  a textbook of the English  language,  is  one of  the causal
determinants of an English-speaking student’s linguistic behaviour (compare section I.4.4).
So,  if  this  student  has  picked  up  English  by  a  textbook,  then  the  textbook  is  both  a
representation of the rules the student follows as well as a causal determinant of her behaviour
(cf. Levine 1987: 259). The same goes for everyone who has ever learned anything: Who- or
whatever has been key in teaching them is a causal determinant of their learned behaviour.
Now, Cummins’ point is  that  the device which allows the learner  to carry out the
learned program – in this  case our brain,  which allows us to correctly form and react  to
English sentences – does itself not consult an “internal textbook” or the like while producing
English sentences. Insinuating that there’s a tiny “homunculus [in the brain] pulling a volume
off  the  shelf”  (ibid.:  254)  whenever  we  produce  these  sentences  is  willfully  misleading.
Rather, the brain’s part in allowing us to speak English consists in causal neural sequences –
causal sequences which ultimately owe their manifestation to external textbooks (or similar
sources  of  learning).67 This  is  what  it  means  to  say  that  external  representations  and
conventions can have causal impacts on neural structures, while at the same time, there are
neither textbook-like nor conventional representations in the brain.68
67 This  is  what  Paul  Churchland  would  call  “third-level  learning”,  i.e.  cultural  learning  depending  on
communication  (cf.  Churchland 2012:  chapter  5),  rather  than first-level  learning,  which is  described  as  the
shaping  of  neural  networks  through  gradual  alteration  of  synaptic  weights  between  neurons  and  Hebbian
plasticity (ibid.: chapter 2).
68 Here, Cummins uses the term “representation” more restrictive than I do by only applying it to things like
textbooks and not to neural structures. But this is only a terminological issue: Of course I agree that if textbooks
are the paradigmatic example for representations, then there is no such thing in neural form. However, I am
using the term “neural  representations” in a distinctly defined technical  sense which is meant to encompass
things radically different from textbooks, and I have already stated that neural representations do not represent
by way of convention. (However, it should be noted that Cummins does not generally use the term in this sense,
compare footnote 96).
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So,  the  fallacious  idea  of  finding  pictures  (or  the  like)  in  the  brain  is  rooted  in
mistaking sparse for rich notions of representations. What we find in neurobiology are sparse
notions of representations to whom intentionality is of no integral explanatory use. In other
words, semantically individuated kinds are not neurobiological kinds (at least not in virtue of
their semantic individuation). On the most basic level, specific non-representational causal
notions do the explanatory work (see footnote 51). Such a sparse notion of representation goes
like this:
“[w]hen the firing pattern of a neuron is significantly correlated with the presence of some  
feature  of  a  stimulus  that  an  organism is  currently  experiencing,  that  pattern  is  said  to  
represent that feature. [It is assumed] that the relationship between a neural representation and 
whatever it is about is causal: a neuron will only exhibit a significant increase in its firing rate 
above baseline in response to that stimulus feature that causes it to fire. Whatever stimulus  
feature causes it to fire in this way, it represents (...). Support for this assumption comes from 
cognitive neurophysiological investigations of predominantly sensory neurons. For example, 
neurons in auditory cortex fire in response to auditory stimuli, neurons in insular cortex to  
taste stimuli, and so forth for other sensory systems” (Sullivan 2010: 876 f.; for the technical 
details see Dayan & Abbott 2001: chapter 10).69
If we take this as a definition,  “neural pattern A represents X” should be taken as
synonymous with “A is significantly correlated with the presence of X” and/or “A is caused
by X”. While we have seen that sometimes representational properties are established by way
of causal linkage (see section I.4.3), a causal relationship between two objects is by itself not
sufficient for establishing that the effect semantically represents the cause. (Sullivan is still
correct,  because  it  is  true  that  neuroscientists  treat  neural  events  or  processes  which  are
significantly  correlated  to  semantic  properties  or  stand  in  a  causal  relation  to  these  as
representations and that they are justified in doing so. However, it is wrong to say that they
are justified in doing so merely because these are correlated in this way or stand in said causal
relationship.) If the causal relationship between neurons and what they are said to represent
were all that connected them, this notion of representing would be sparse indeed: It would be
so  sparse  that  semantic  notions  could  be  completely  discarded  in  favour  of  non-
representational causal explanations.  If the intentional explanation yields no surplus at all,
then ascribing intentional properties to neural structures would not be justifiable. And if that
were the  whole story there is  to tell  about  representation,  then  we could just  scratch the
69 This  notion  that  an  organism O represents  X as  R if  X causes  R in O can  be  traced  back  to  Lockean
Covariance (see Cummins 1991: ch. 4). Also compare Block’s writings on Correlationism in his 2007: 485-487.
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problem of intentionality in neurobiology off our list. However, as I am going to show in the
next section, this is not the case.
For now, consider some other examples, which are all paradigmatic for the use of the
term “representation” in neuroscience:
• Canonical neurons represent affordances of objects, such as a cup’s being suited for
being handled with a precision grip (cf. Grèzes et al. 2003).
• Mirror neurons are neurons which fire both when an action is performed and when the
same action is observed. This mechanism has been hypothesised to represent other
people’s actions, their intentions when performing them, their emotions (related to the
means of their expression), and/or other mental states (cf. Di Pellegrino et al. 1992,
Iacoboni et al. 1999).
• The cortical homunculi represent body areas: one related to somatosensory properties,
another to motor properties (cf. Penfield & Rasmussen 1950).
• Internal maps: “Place cells are said to ‘represent’ (...) locations and are taken to play a
role in the formation of ‘cognitive or spatial maps’ (...). Spatial maps are thought to be
representations that are distributed across place cells, with each place cell contributing
that aspect of the environment it represents to the map” (Sullivan 2010: 879).
All  of  these  forms  of  neural  representation,  on  the  face  of  it,  do  not  require
representational notions to analyse their functioning. Therefore, such analyses are sparse. To
reiterate: A representation is sparse if it can be analysed without recurring to any form of
symbolic representation.70 Such analyses can be readily supplied for our examples: Canonical
neurons are an integral part of the following mechanism (and others like it): when perceiving
a tool whose handling requires a precision grip, the motor functions that enable us to execute
a precision grip are activated automatically by perceiving this object. In the case of mirror
neurons,  “representing  another  person’s  emotion  internally”  is  shorthand  for  “perceiving
another  person’s  emotional  state  activates  a  functional  equivalent  to  the  other  person’s
70 If you happen to believe that symbolic representation can itself be reduced to non-symbolic representation,
then  the  distinction  goes  like  this:  Representation  is  sparse  if  its  analysis  does  not  require  invoking  what
symbolic  representation characteristically reduces  to.  Even reductionists will  have to concede that  symbolic
representation requires more than sparse representations such as those invoked in these examples, even if this
“more”  does not  consist  in  irreducible  semantic  properties.  That  is,  if  semantic  properties  reduce  to  causal
relations, they still reduce to a specific set of causal relations, not to all of them; and thus, being a causal relation
is not sufficient even to pick out reducible semantic properties. Rather, this subset of causal properties has to be
marked as being what semantic properties reduce to, and this need for marking means that semantic properties
are real and explanatory.
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neuronal state underlying this emotion, which is isomorph with the neuronal state my own
brain would display if  I were in that emotional  state”.  Saying that the cortical  homunculi
represent (parts of) the body means that there is a certain amount of neurons in the primary
motor  cortex  and  the  primary  somatosensory  cortex  dedicated  to  (non-representationally)
processing the relevant properties of each corresponding body-part.71
It’s  harder  to  come up with  a  concise  non-representational  rephrasing  of  the  way
internal  maps  work,  because  when  asked  to  specify  what  those  neurons  whose  activity
underlies cognitive maps actually do, we tend to summarise what actual maps enable us to do.
In fact, the reason why they are called “internal maps” in the first place is  because internal
maps enable us to do what we usually associate with what maps enable us to do. However, the
fact  that  we  can  orient  ourselves  using  external  maps  depends  on  a  rich  notion  of
intentionality,  insofar  as  it  depends  on  our  understanding  that  the  map  (conventionally)
represents the respective area. That is, the non-intentional properties of the map alone are not
sufficient for it to function as a map: it needs to be embedded into a symbolic practice which
uses physical objects such as maps to signify geographical properties. Nothing of this sort is
true for internal maps: the physical properties of internal maps alone are what makes them
implement the orientation function. So, while specific properties of some hippocampal cells
are in important ways analogous to properties which are represented by maps, it would be
fallacious to hold that this analogy establishes their being representational. If, say, the relative
strength of the connections between the cells is the same ratio as the relative distance between
the spots in which the respective cells are active, then the important analogy consists in the
ratio, not in any intentional property.72 In a nutshell, internal maps do serve similar functions
as looking up an external map does, but the brain certainly does not “look up” an internal map
in the way we look up external maps.
Note that we do not merely concentrate  on the  causes of  neural  representations  in
order to determine whether and what they represent, but also on their effects: we also invoke
knowledge (or assumptions and hypotheses) about what type of behaviour or cognitive output
71 Note that the homunculi stand out from the other examples by being pictorial representations of anatomical
divisions in the brain to begin with; thus, they are to some degree entangled with symbolic representation. That
is, the motor homunculus is a representation in much the same way as a schematic depicting the mechanical
relations between a toy car’s remote control and the toy car itself is.
72 On a side note, the functionality and representational quality of external maps is entangled in a way which
differs from other forms of representation: For example, if the ratio of the distances between points on the map
and the distances between the represented geographical points is not the same, then the map cannot be said to
accurately represent these points. No such thing applies to pictorial or linguistic representation. In this way, maps
are more accurately characterised as akin to speedometers, which I briefly discussed  in section I.4.2. For this
reason, functional analyses should be expected to reveal important analogies between internal and external maps,
even though orientation using internal maps does not require intentional capacities, whereas orientation using
external maps does.
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is associated with the firing of these neurons. For example, neural representations of faces in
the FFA are what causes our recognitional behaviour. Harris et al. do much the same in their
stipulation  of  what  beliefs  are  on a  neuronal  level:  “The capacity  of  the  human  brain  to
believe or disbelieve ostensible statements of fact (eg, ‘You left your wallet on the bar.’ ‘That
white powder is anthrax.’) is clearly part of its machinery for the initiation and control of
complex behaviour” (Harris et al. 2008: 141). Here, they take the operationalisation of the
notion of representation even further by stating what causal role specific forms of intentional
states, such as beliefs, play when framed in a neural context.
Considering  that  ascriptive  practice  plays  such  an  important  part  in  intentional
psychology, let me add some cautionary remarks. An operationalisation along said lines needs
to be distinguished from common folk-psychological practice, otherwise it would be subject
to what Bennett & Hacker call the mereological fallacy. According to them, brains don’t think
just as stomachs don’t eat – the respective predicates apply to whole persons only, but not to
their parts (cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003: chapter 3). In Harris-type examples, however, its use
is justified for two reasons: On the one hand, the neuronal firing correlates to the intentional
states, suggesting a systematic connection, and on the other, neural activity is instrumental in
causing behaviour that provides evidence for assigning intentional states. That is, if the FFA
provides causal grounds for face-recognitional behaviour, then we are justified in saying that
the FFA plays an important part in recognising faces. Prima facie, this violates Bennett’s and
Hacker’s criteria, on whose view the assignment of intentional states is exclusively justified
on the grounds of common ascriptive practice (ibid.: chapter 3.9; see also section I.7), and it
would  certainly  be  wrong  to  insinuate  that  the  grounds  on  which  we  judge  the  FFA to
represent  faces  are  analogous  to  those  on which  we commonly  assign intentional  mental
states. But of course calling some neural activity representational is meant to insinuate no
such thing. It may occasionally cause confusion for the layman, but the surplus for theories in
the cognitive sciences more than justifies adapting the notion of representation for patterns in
the  auditory  cortex,  the  FFA and  the  like.  As  Dennett  has  pointed  out,  while  there  is  a
distinction between concepts we use at the personal and subpersonal levels (cf. Wittgenstein
1953: §281), this point
“has occasionally been misconstrued (…) as the lesson that the personal level of explanation is
the only level  of  explanation when the subject  matter  is  human  minds  and actions.  (…)  
[Rather, t]he recognition that there are two levels of explanation gives birth to the burden of 
relating them, and this is a task that is not outside the philosopher’s province. (…) There  
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remains the question of how each bit of the talk about pain is related to neural impulses or talk
about neural impulses” (Dennett 2007: 79).
Furthermore, to say that theories about neural activity stand in an explanatory relation
to mental states, or behaviour which amounts to evidence for the ascription of mental states, is
not  to  commit  to  the  claim  that  these  theories  can  fulfill  the  same  roles  as  kinds  from
intentional psychology. For example, while we can imagine there being different explanations
of  the  same  behaviour,  one  psychological,  one  neuronal,  the  explanations  serve  different
roles. Consider that one explanation might read “Sam got angry because he saw Max being
mistreated unjustly” [E1], while another might read “Sam got angry because his amygdala was
stimulated” [E2]. Let’s assume that, in their respective fields, these are valid explanations for
the  same  state  of  angriness  which  Sam experiences.  Now,  E1 and  E2 can  be  differently
illuminating. What follows from E1 is that, if Sam’s anger is righteous, then we should see to
it that Max’s unjust treatment is rectified.73 However, if Sam’s anger is misdirected, E1 implies
that we should see to it that Sam realises that Max’s treatment was in fact justified (or that
Max was not mistreated at all). On the other hand, if Sam’s belief is not rooted in an actual
state-of-affairs, that is, if he hallucinated, or suffers from an illness that causes him to see
people being treated unjustly, then we might consider a therapeutical intervention. All of this
follows from E1, while nothing of the sort follows from E2. Yet, E2 provides us knowledge
necessary to medically intervene in the latter  case or insight into how to build AIs which
could simulate angriness by way of neural networks, or the like.
II.4. Encoded Information, Mindreading and Correlations
While in the previous section I have shown that causes and effects of neural structures
are characteristic for their being treated as representations, I am also going to argue that there
is far more to neural representation than that. A first step on this path consists in pointing out
that the notion of neural representation is not merely grounded in the notion of causality, but
also in  the  assumption  that  such representations  carry  encoded information.  So,  what  we
should really expect to find in the brain is neither symbolic representation nor mere correlates
of  external  semantic  properties,  but  genuine  information  which  is  encoded in  the  brain’s
properties and its activity.
73 Analogously, matters of irrationality are only applicable given an intentional explanation (cf. Davidson 2004:
180).
Intentionality in Cognitive Neuroscience 175
Usually, the idea of information being encoded means that someone came up with an
encoder which translates one set of representations to another, according to a set of fixed
rules. Of course, no such thing is true for the brain, since neither did an agent create its neural
code,  nor  does  the  brain  consult  rules  (see  the  previous  section).  Rather,  saying  that
information is encoded in the brain assumes a technical use of the term: it means that there is
a translational algorithm by which this information could be extracted. That there “is” such an
algorithm implies that the neural encoding has a certain property which makes it in principle
decodable, not that there actually (or currently)  exists some method of decoding it.  So the
algorithm exists in an abstract sense, not necessarily in an actual sense. Consequently, said
property is abstract in nature: it is the property of correlating with semantic content.
As far as the actual existence of such algorithms goes, we should look to the ongoing
development  of  “brain  decoders”,  in  virtue  of  which  some  specifics  of  neurally  encoded
information have been uncovered. The decoding method has come out of the development of
brain-computer interfaces (BCI):
“A typical BCI setup is as follows: EEG electrodes are fixed to the patient’s scalp. Potential
differences due to electrical  currents in the brain,  originating from neural activity,  are fed
through an amplifier and into a computer. Algorithms are trained to recognise two conditions,
such as imagined hand or foot movement, by repeated recordings (trials) of such imagination
tasks done by the patient. This classification of two conditions allows the patient to choose
letters or  other elements  on a computer  screen,  thus enabling communication between the
patient and the outside world.“74 “Such voluntarily controlled brain signals can subsequently
be used  to  control  artificial  devices  to  allow subjects  to  spell  words or  move  cursors  on
computer displays in two dimensions. Interestingly, subjects can even learn to regulate signals
recorded  using  functional  MRI  in  real-time.  It  might  be  possible  to  achieve  even  better
decoding when electrodes are directly implanted into the brain, which is possible in monkeys
(…) and occasionally also in human patients. Not only motor commands but also perception
can,  in  principle,  be  decoded  from the  spiking  activity  of  single  neurons  in  humans and
animals.  However,  such  invasive  techniques  necessarily  involve  surgical  implantation  of
electrodes that is not feasible at present for use in healthy human participants” (Haynes &
Rees 2006.: 524).
Using non-invasive methods of functional imaging, it has recently been found that
some neural activity allows semantic content to be extracted from it by being measurably
74 Quoted  from  the  website  of  Tübingen  University:  http://www.ti.uni-tuebingen.de/BCI.856.0.html?&L=1,
retrieved on May 14th 2013.
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correlated with it (see Thirion et al. 2006, Kay et al. 2008, Naselaris et al. 2009, Nishimoto et
al. 2011). Coming up with these algorithmic decoders is instrumental in investigating which
information is stored where and when, and whether some specific information is stored in the
brain at all – as opposed to being “enacted”, i.e. being a result of the interaction between an
organism’s  cognitive  apparatus  and  its  environment  (compare  Haugeland  1995).  Such
“mindreading” decoders also come with the hopes of uncovering covert attitudes, just like lie
detectors would (see Haynes  & Rees 2006: 528 f.),  and of improving said brain-machine
interfaces. One major development in recent mindreading algorithms consisted in successfully
decoding the information acquired through the perception of natural images (as documented
in Nishimoto et al. 2011):
“Natural scenes pose an even harder challenge to the decoding of perception. They are both
dynamic  and  have  added  complexities  compared  to  the  simplified  and  highly  controlled
stimuli used in most experiments. For example, natural visual scenes typically contain not just
one  but  many  objects  that  can  appear,  move  and disappear  independently.  Under  natural
viewing conditions, individuals typically do not fixate a central fixation spot but freely move
their  eyes  to  scan specific  paths.  This  creates  a  particular  problem for  decoding spatially
organised patterns from activity in retinotopic maps, as eye movements will create dynamic
spatial shifts in such activity” (Haynes & Rees 2006: 527).
The fact  that  certain  neuronal  firing  patterns  are  correlated  to  processed  semantic
content, which is the methodological means for extracting information from the brain, can be
traced back to a systematic relation between semantically characterised functions and their
neural implementation: Say, let’s assume that some salient features of a given environment
provide an agent with information which we know she can extract from these (such as her
watching movies about aeroplanes; see Nishimoto et al. 2011: 1644). For reasons  stated in
section II.1, we should also assume that it is her brain which enables her to do so by initiating
neural activity – activity which, if it is systematic enough, should be correlatable with the
information the agent extracts from this environment. So, by identifying what kind of neural
activity needs to feed into a decoding algorithm, we are provided with information about the
neural  implementation  of  a  behaviourally  observable  function.  Since  the  execution  of  the
respective  cognitive  function  was  verifiable  behaviourally  to  begin  with  (i.e.  there  is
behavioural evidence for judging whether the person in question gains the knowledge that a
given movie is about aeroplanes from watching it), and since we can assume that there needs
to be a systematic neural cause for this kind of behaviour, we can expect that, using the right
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methods, we can find neural activity which is correlated with the retrieved information. That
is, if an agent can retrieve said information and if we can assume that this retrieval is directly
caused by neural activity (and indirectly by the original source of information, in this case a
movie),  then  behavioural  expressions  of  retrieval  (such  as  saying  “the  movie  featured
aeroplanes”)  must  be  realised  by  motor  activity  initiated  by  specific  neural  firing.
Interpretating our correlations causally, we can hypothesise that the “encoded information”,
i.e. the neural activity feeding into the algorithm, is efficacious in the process leading up to
the behaviour which counts as retrieval.  We can err  by mistakenly assuming coincidental
correlations to reveal causal efficacy, but we methodologically assume that there needs to be a
causal  neural process which leads  from an agent’s watching a movie about  aeroplanes  to
behavioural expressions such as saying “the movie features aeroplanes”. In this way, in- and
outputs must be neurally connected, and tracing this connection as an at least temporally and
individually  localised  correlation  between  semantic  properties  and  neural  activity  then
depends on the quality of the employed method.
No formal  requirements  are  placed  on this  encoded information  other  than  that  it
stands in a causal  relationship to the pre-encoded information (such as the content  of the
movie) and that it specifically leads up to its retrieval: This process need not be modelled as a
deductive implication or as a deterministic causal sequence in order to arrive at the conclusion
that it will still correlate with the information that is retrieved. Even if it turns out that the
relevant  parts  of  the  brain  were  to  operate  rather  chaotically  and  would  only  ever  yield
statistical results, it would still suffice. The only requirement, as Haynes & Rees concisely
state,  is this:  “In theory,  if the responses at any brain location differ between two mental
states, then it should be possible to use measurements of activity at that brain location to
determine  which  one  of  those  two  mental  states  currently  reflects  the  thinking  of  the
individual. In practice it is often difficult (although not always impossible) to find individual
locations where the differences between conditions are sufficiently large to allow for efficient
decoding”  (Haynes  & Rees:  523).  So,  we  need  not  generally  decide  at  what  level  brain
properties are supposed to be “read” – at the level of fine-grained neural activity, fMRI-data,
or anything inbetween –, since what matters is merely that what is used as an input for the
decoder supports an “inverse inference” (Thirion et al.  2006: 1104) from neural to mental
state. Note that this requirement allows for mindreading to have been accomplished when
what is in fact “read” is only a good enough indicator for the respective mental state, and not
the mental state itself. For example, it may be the case that the neural correlate of a folk song
is what is activated and effectively detected in fMRI when thinking of a singer, so that the
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former is a reliable indicator for the latter, even when the respective study boasts about having
read the subject’s mind as thinking of the singer (cf. Beck 2014: 22).
Therefore,  the  fact  that  we can  find activity  within  the  brain  that  is  correlated  to
information  which  we  know  the  agent  can  extract  (such  as  said  movies  being  about
aeroplanes) is more informative of our technological and methodological advancement than
regarding  a  fundamental  insight  into  why our  brains  have  representational  capacities:  “it
should, at least in principle, be possible to decode what an individual is thinking from their
brain activity. However, this does not reveal whether such decoding of mental states, or ‘brain
reading’, can be practically achieved with current neuroimaging methods” (Haynes & Rees
2006: 523). So, we should regard recent “mindreading” studies as demonstrating that brain
activity can indeed to some degree be decoded using current methods, and that there are hopes
of using future methods to improve upon this decoding. As Haynes & Rees note regarding
some of the specific methodological problems, which have been successfully circumvented in
some recent studies,
“[m]any detailed object features are represented at a much finer spatial scale in the cortex than
the  resolution  of  fMRI.  (...)  Nevertheless,  recent  work  demonstrates  that  pattern-based
decoding of BOLD contrast  fMRI signals acquired at  relatively low spatial  resolution can
successfully predict the perception of such low-level perceptual features  (…). For example,
the orientation, direction of motion and even perceived colour of a visual stimulus presented to
an individual can be predicted by decoding spatially distributed patterns of signals from local
regions of the early visual cortex. These spatially distributed response patterns might reflect
biased low-resolution sampling by fMRI of slight irregularities in such high resolution feature
maps (…). Strikingly, despite the relatively low spatial resolution of conventional fMRI, the
decoding  of  image  orientation  is  possible  with  high  accuracy (…)  and  even  from  brief
measurements of primary visual cortex (V1) activity” (ibid.: 525).
So, what is essentially up to discovery (and genius of engineering) are the details of
the  retrieval  process;  underlying  this  discovery  is  the  hypothesis  that,  if  we conceptually
require  outward  retrieval  behaviour,  such  as  saying  “the  movie  featured  aeroplanes”,  to
ultimately be caused by having watched a movie about aeroplanes, and the only things which
mediate  between watching the movie and retrieving the information are neural properties,
then some of these must correlate with the respective information. The crucial insight we gain
from  mindreading  experiments  is  finding  out  which  firing  pattern  specifically  carries
retrievable information (and, once we have a comprehensive view of the brain, this insight
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should be continuous with insights into the nature and further steps of the processing which
said firing pattern is a constitutive part of). However, what these studies tell us – namely that
some of the brain’s spatiotemporal parts are correlated with semantic content – does not settle
the  question  we’re  contemplating,  namely  what  makes a  spatiotemporal  part  of  the  brain
representational.  As just  laid  out,  the  fact  that  those  parts  which  are  representational  are
correlated with semantic content, and should thusly be decodable, is a basic requirement of
their being representational. Still, it is not sufficient: the fact that they are representational is
nothing but an assumption at this point, and what we gain from successful mindreading is but
the knowledge that there are correlations between brain activity and semantic information.
Why is this not sufficient? Well, picture that some brain structures, once they receive
input  from  aeroplane-perceptions,  will  initiate  firing  patterns  which  our  mindreading
algorithms have been able to significantly correlate with pictures of aeroplanes.75 As pointed
out by Haynes and Rees, the only requirement for this correlation to hold is that the neural
activity systematically differs between two mental states. So, what successful mindreading
tells us is that the neural effect of a semantic (i.e. information-carrying) cause is (measurably)
different from the neural effect of a different semantic cause. This may count as satisfying a
physicalist notion of information: namely, saying that if a cause can be reconstructed from its
effect, then the effect carries information about the cause (cf. Shannon 1948). Since what is
reconstructed in many mindreading studies is essentially information that is present in visual
perception, this physicalist notion – i.e. reconstructing the perceptual cause from the neural
effect  –  is  the  sole  requirement  for  this  version  of  mindreading  to  work.76 In  other
mindreading studies, which are concerned with covert attitudes, causes of or dispositions to
actions (such as the infamous Libet  et  al.  1983),  we should be able  to tell  similar  causal
stories.
75 One tacitly assumed requirement for these representations to be triggered is that the cognitive system is in fact
ready to process aeroplane-perceptions. That is, certain top-down processes related to attention should not hinder
the system from processing aeroplanes, similar to how they could hinder a gorilla to be perceived in Simons’ and
Chabris’ famous test (Simons & Chabris 1999).
76 At least in principle. Given current imaging methods, which are constrained by low resolution, it may be
required to depend on additional areas, which are to a higher degree sensitive to semantic cues than early visual
areas: “fMRI data and a structural encoding model are insufficient to support high-quality reconstructions of
natural images. (…) However, by applying an additional semantic encoding model that extracts the information
present in anterior visual areas, we produce reconstructions that accurately reflect semantic content of the target
images as well” (Naselaris et al. 2009: 903). “There is evidence that brain areas in anterior visual cortex encode
information that is related to the semantic content of images” (ibid.: 905). “Our results show that the semantic
encoding model accurately characterises a set of voxels in anterior visual cortex that are functionally distinct and
anatomically separated from the structural voxels located in early visual cortex. The structural voxels in early
visual areas encode information about local contrast and texture, while the semantic voxels in anterior portions
of lateral occipital and in the AOC encode information related to the semantic content of natural images” (ibid.:
907).
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However, knowing that whatever caused a certain firing pattern can be reconstructed
from it is far from saying that the firing pattern represents it.  Picture a chain of dominos,
whose  sequential  pushing  and  falling  happens  in  a  straightforwardly  causal  manner,  and
where  falling  correlates  with  being  pushed;  and  where  (ceteris  paribus)  we  could  even
reconstruct  information  about  the  force  and  angle  of  the  cause  (push)  from knowing  its
precise effect (fall).  Still,  any instance of falling certainly does not represent any force or
angle in the sense that, say, the fusiform face area represents faces – even though carrying
information in the physicalist sense may be (part of) the method by which the FFA represents
faces.  Again,  this  is because such a correlation is  but a  condition for the representational
relation: If a certain firing pattern is the correct neural representation of a salient feature of the
environment, such as a movie depicting an aeroplane, then we should expect this pattern to be
reliably triggered by the appropriate cue,  thus producing correlations.  Given that we have
reason to assume that neural events won’t merely coincidentally be correlated with cognitive
processing but  track causal processes underlying  it,  this  means that being correlated  with
semantic  properties  is  an  adequate  heuristic  for  identifying  neurally  implemented
representations. But we are only justified in using this heuristic because we already assume
that whatever in the brain correlates with aeroplane-perceptions, -memories or -associations is
actually  representational.  So,  our  real  job  is  finding  out  the  ultimate  reason  for  such  an
assumption.
As we have seen in section I.4.4, Ned Block also construed the picture of the brain as a
syntactic engine driving a semantic engine in terms of a correlation:
“[I] mentioned a correlation between causal interactions among symbolic structures in our  
brains  and rational  relations  among  the meanings  of  the  symbol  structures.  This  way of  
speaking can be misleading if it encourages the picture of the neuroscientist opening the brain,
just seeing the symbols, and then figuring out what they mean. Such a picture inverts the order
of discovery, and gives the wrong impression of what makes something a symbol.
The way to discover symbols in the brain is first to map out rational relations among states of 
mind, and then identify aspects of these states that can be thought of as symbolic in virtue of 
their functions. Function is what gives a symbol its identity,  even the symbols in English  
orthography,  though  this  can  be  hard  to  appreciate  because  these  functions  have  been  
rigidified by habit  and convention.  In  reading unfamiliar  handwriting,  we may notice  an  
unorthodox symbol, someone’s weird way of writing a letter of the alphabet. How do we  
know which letter of the alphabet it is? By its function! Th% function of a symbol is som-
%thing on % can appr%ciat% by s%%ing how it app%ars in s%nt%nc%s containing familiar 
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words whos% m%anings w% can gu%ss. You will have little trouble figuring out, on this  
basis, what letter in the last sentence was replaced by ‘%’” (Block 1995b: 398).
To clarify: What we’re dealing with here is not merely the methodological issue that,
using  current  methods,  we  can  only  discover  correlations  rather  than  actual  causal
relationships (although we should neither deceive ourselves into believing that the latter can
ever be identified merely by looking – positing causal relationships will usually result from an
inference to the best explanation of a given data set, at least in the cases we are dealing with).
In the mindreading case, decoders are based on correlations, and we could hypothesise that
with finer methods, we might be able to trace the firing patterns which correlate with semantic
content to causal sequences rooted in the physicochemical properties of neurons, and thus
swap correlations (C) for laws (L):
(C1) [Perception of movies featuring aeroplanes] correlates with [Neural Firing N1]
(L1) [Perception of movies featuring aeroplanes] causes [Neural Firing N1]
However, this is not the point here. The point is that even if we have good reasons to interpret
correlations causally, or even if hypothetically we had some ideal method allowing us to get
to actual  causal sequences,  we would still  not gain an answer regarding why these firing
patterns actually represent what they do. Compare what’s the case with laws of intentional
psychology:
(LIP1) [Perception  of  movies  featuring  aeroplanes]  causes  [Belief  that  the  movie
features aeroplanes]77
In this case, the description of the belief alone, namely that the movie features aeroplanes,
conceptually  implies  that  the  content  of  the  psychological  state  is  “the  movie  features
aeroplanes”. However, no such thing is the case for L1: It does not conceptually follow from
any proper description of N1 alone that it has the content “the movie features aeroplanes”, or
any representational content, for that matter. So, mindreading may establish all sorts of Cs,
and future methods may establish all sorts of Ls, but that does not settle our question how
neural firing patterns gain their intentionality (see Figure 4).78
77 It goes without saying that C1, L1 and LIP1 all need appropriate ceteris paribus conditions in order to hold.
78 Brigitte  Falkenburg  stresses  that  “we  are  dealing  with  statistical  evidence  rather  than  the  definitive
identification of certain thoughts based on patterns of activity” (my own translation of Falkenburg 2012: 194 f.).
Since  she  is  more  concerned  with  matters  of  jurisdiction  (i.e.  mindreading  as  lie  detection)  than  with  the
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Figure 4. Neural firing correlates with the perceived presence of intentional (i.e. signified) objects and
may even be caused by the perception of some, but this does not settle the question whether it’s a
proper part of the set of meaningful entities (i.e. signifiers).
The  point  has  been  made  that  physical  properties  can  be  found  to  correlate  with
semantic content, while actually not representing anything – another reason supporting the
claim that correlations alone are not sufficient to identify representations. Searle has famously
contributed to this debate by stating that
“[f]or  any  program  there  is  some  sufficiently  complex  object  such  that  there  is  some
description of the object under which it is implementing the program. Thus for example the
wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, because there is some
pattern of molecule movements which is isomorphic with the formal structure of Wordstar.
But if the wall is implementing Wordstar then if it is a big enough wall it is implementing any
program, including any program implemented in the brain” (Searle 1990: 27).
Many have criticised Searle’s point (see e.g. Chalmers 1996, Block 2003, Haugeland 2003) to
the  effect  that  mere  isomorphism  is  insufficient  for  a  physical  structure  to  qualify  as  a
computing system. Rather, for something to count as an implementation, it must be a causal
process which reliably carries out the specified operations. Yet, what is common to either
position is that mere correlation with an information-processing structure is not sufficient for
something to count as an information-processing system itself.
attribution of mental states, it should be clear that statistical errors will be less tolerable. However, we should
keep in mind that psychological attributions only ever apply with a certain probability, based on the quality of
evidence at our disposal. So, we should be willing to admit statistical evidence into intentional psychology.
Intentionality in Cognitive Neuroscience 183
To illustrate this point, picture the patterns male pufferfish create on the seabed in
order to attract females (see Figure 5 and Kawase et al. 2013). Certainly,  pufferfish create
these patterns in virtue of a causal process which reliably carries out specified operations. The
similarity of spatial properties between these patterns and the doilies my grandmother used to
crochet is sufficient to establish a correlation between them. For example, imagine an eye
feeding signals related to visual contrast to a neural network. Whatever the network’s activity
exactly  consist  in,  as  long  as  it  systematically  depends  on  the  signals  it  receives  it  will
correlate in the instances of the eye’s scanning the pufferfish pattern and the doily. Still, one
activity clearly does not represent the other or carry information which is about the other
(even ignoring the additional problem that representation is asymmetric, while correlation is
symmetric; crucially, here we find no representational relation in either direction).
While  this  illustration  taps  into  some  intuitions  we  have  about  what  it  means  to
represent or carry information, there is an additional point to make which goes beyond an
appeal  to  intuitions.  (Perhaps  neural  representation  is  so  novel,  idiosyncratic  and
counterintuitive  a  notion  as  to  resist  such  appeals.)  Namely,  it  is  the  concept  of
misrepresentation which is integral to matters of representation (cf. Clarke 2004: 50 f., Shope
1999: 279-281, Neander 1995): Since representations have satisfaction conditions – if they
truthfully represent their objects, they are true, if not, they are false (cf. Searle 1983: 10) –
some  causal  or  covarying  effects  will  have  to  be  marked  as  “proper”  and  others  as
“improper”,  some as truthfully representing and some as fallaciously representing.  But no
such  concepts  are  to  be  found if  we merely  look  at  matters  of  cause  or  covariance  (cf.
Cummins 1991: ch. 4-6, Ramsey 2007: 118–150). Sometimes, a toad will mistake a stick for a
worm, and sometimes we will see faces in clouds, and any notion of representation that aims
to live up to its name has to allow for marking these as instances of error. So, representation
cannot be merely cause or covariance tout court; and if it  is to be formulated in terms of
either, we need to invoke additional means of marking them as proper.
  Figure 5: A schematic of patterns created by male 
  pufferfish on the ocean floor, measuring about 2 
  meters (7 feet) in diameter. See Yoji Ookata’s 
  photos at http://ookatayouji.amaminchu.com/ 
  archives/2012/09/post_459.html.
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So, the argument so far is this:
[P1]  We have good reasons  to  believe  that  if  some spatiotemporal  brain-part  Nx reliably
correlates with content Cx, then Nx represents Cx. 
[P2] Correlations  between any physical  object  P and any content  C are not sufficient  for
concluding that P represents C.
[P3] Nx is a P.
[Conclusion] We must have some additional reason for supporting the inference stated in P1
than just its antecedent (namely, that N1 correlates with C1).
Our present question can now be sharpened to the point: What additional reason do we
have which is needed to infer that if neural firing-patterns are correlated with some content,
then  they  represent  this  content?  If  we  take  certain  neural  properties  to  be  carriers  of
information, then this cannot be solely on the grounds that we find them to correlate with the
respective content, but because of other facts we know about the brain (or which we at least
expect to be true of it). For this reason, I am going to investigate these further facts – namely,
some facts going into the general model of scientific explanation in cognitive neuroscience.
So, let’s look at how research in this area formally proceeds.
II.5. Functional Analyses of Intentional States
II.5.1. The Hard Part of the Easy Problem
David Chalmers famously divided the scientific research of consciousness into a hard
and  an  easy  problem.  “The  easy  problems  are  easy  precisely  because  they  concern  the
explanation  of  cognitive  abilities and  functions”  (Chalmers  2010:  6),  whereas  the  hard
problem of investigating experience (i.e. qualitative conscious states) goes “beyond problems
about the performance of functions” (ibid.: 8). Functional explanations might play a role in
coming up with an explanation of conscious experience, but any “key insight that allows an
explanation of experience (…) will be an extra explanatory reward” (ibid.) beyond functional
explanations.  More  than  twenty  years  earlier,  Thomas  Nagel  had  already  noted:  “If  we
acknowledge that  a physical  theory of mind must  account  for the  subjective character  of
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experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this
could be done” (Nagel 1974: 176).79
So,  the  comparatively  easy  problems  –  which  as  Chalmers  stresses,  are  only
comparatively easy,  since “getting the details right will probably take a century or two of
difficult empirical work” (Chalmers 2010: 5) – “are those that seem directly susceptible to the
standard  methods  of  cognitive  science,  whereby  a  phenomenon  is  explained  in  terms  of
computational  or  neural  mechanisms”  (ibid.:  4).  What  is  required  for  their  solution  is
thoroughly analysing  the mechanisms which perform cognitive  functions.  Crucially,  these
mechanisms are themselves integratable into physicalist theories: Any such mechanism is but
an arrangement of physical parts and whose interactions in space and time are governed by
the laws of physics.
Mechanistic explanation is one of the key explanatory concepts currently employed by
the  cognitive  sciences,  and  it  essentially  connects  neuroscience,  which  in  turn  integrates
sciences such as physics,  chemistry and biology,  with psychology (see Bechtel  & Wright
2009). Here, the basic idea is that internal mechanisms, which are formally or functionally
described  by  any  theoretical  cognitive  science  and  tested  on  a  behavioural  level  by
experimental psychology,  are implemented on a neuronal basis, thus lending “naturalistic”
physical grounding to the realm of human cognition.80 So, if we seek to make headway with
the  tools  currently  employed  in  the  cognitive  sciences,  and  if  we  seek  to  relate  human
cognition to fundamentally physicalist theories, mechanistic explanations are a promising way
to go.
One particularly interesting “easy problem” Chalmers mentions is “the integration of
information by a cognitive system” (Chalmers 2010: 4), and to explain this phenomenon, he
says,  “we  need  only  exhibit  mechanisms  by  which  information  is  brought  together  and
79 I’m not going to  go  further  into what  Chalmers  calls  the “hard  problem”,  but for  a  striking criticism of
separating the empirical investigation of consciousness from its functional construal see Cohen & Dennett 2011:
“All theories of consciousness based on the assumption that there are hard and easy problems can never be
verified or falsified because it is the products of cognitive functions (i.e. verbal report, button pressing etc.) that
allow consciousness to be empirically studied at all. A proper neurobiological theory of consciousness must
utilise these functions in order to accurately identify which particular neural activations correlate with conscious
awareness” (ibid.: 358). Rather than negating that there is a hard problem, I take it as an emphasis of what makes
the hard problem so hard: finding some way of empirically operationalising qualitative aspects of mental states.
80 Sullivan criticises this notion of  mechanistic explanation as not doing justice to what  is  actually done in
neuroscience, and that it is in fact “little more than an optimistic promissory note” (Sullivan 2009: 528; see also
her  2015b).  If  it  is  true  that  methodological  and  explanatory  pluralism  is  the  proper  way  to  describe
neuroscientific practice (Sullivan 2009: 536) then we certainly have a problem in reconciling it with the widely
accepted view that explanation depends on a certain unity of the explanatory scheme. Specifically, to say that an
effect is explained if it can only be explained with this single method in this single lab flies in the face of such
expectations.  It  is  an  open  question  what  to  do if  actual  neuroscientific  research  does  not  live  up  to  this
explanatory ideal. But I wouldn’t be so quick as to suggest that it is the ideal which should be so modified as to
fit the research.
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exploited by later processes” (ibid.). This problem is especially interesting, since information
is  the  primary  mechanistic  currency in  cognitive  science.  Mechanisms  are  categorised  as
cognitive because they process information – that is, because both their input and output are
describable  as  information,  and  specifically  as  the  information  whose  processing  is  the
primary function of the respective mechanism –, and if we are to give a physicalist account of
mechanisms, then we should at the same time give an account of information which ties into
it.  Yet,  once we look at  this particular easy problem more closely,  as I’m about to do, it
appears to have a hard part.
II.5.2 Analysing Cognition
Beyond describing  what is done on a functional level,  analysing cognition requires
describing how it’s done (on a mechanistic level, or the level of physical implementation) and
why it’s done (on an organismic and/or evolutionary level). For an example, let’s look at he
ability to distinguish nourishment from poison. Here, the relevant function is described as
assigning  the  proper  output  value  (nourishing  or  poisonous)  to  a  given  input  value  (the
perception  of  something  that  could  be  either  nourishing  or  poisonous).  For  example,  by
pointing that, say, if red mushrooms with white dots are typically poisonous and it is (ceteris
paribus) advantageous to have a cognitive mechanism which assigns the value “poisonous” to
perceived  red  mushrooms  with  white  dots,  then  we  already  have  rough  ideas  about  the
organismic  purpose  as  well  as  the  functional  description  of  this  cognitive  ability  at  our
disposal. As we can see, these functional and organismic analyses are closely intertwined (cf.
Sullivan forthcoming); in fact, the main reason why we speak of the assignment of a semantic
value in the first place is because it  encapsulates the teleological notion of an organismic
purpose (cf. Dretske 1986, Millikan 1989 & 1993, Neander 1995; see also section I.8.4). Said
purpose is stated in terms of a relation to an external object, where the external object (plus
explanatorily  relevant  contextual  conditions)  are  stated  as  the  input  and  the  meaningful
reaction to it as the output. In our example, “there are mushrooms of such-and-such a kind in
the vicinity” serves as an input, whereas the output “poisonous” can serve as shorthand for all
sorts  of  cognitive  mechanisms  associated  with  producing  averse  behaviour,  as  well  as
knowledge about  counterfactual  conditions  (“if  I  or someone like me were to eat  it,  they
would be likely to fall ill”, etc.).
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While  an  organism’s  sensory organs  only ever  enables  it  to  perceive  certain  cues
which are usually caused by the relevant object, such as a certain shape, redness and white
dots, these cues are not necessarily emitted by the object which a cognitive mechanism is
meaningfully/teleologically  tuned  to,  nor  are  they  usually  exclusively  emitted  by  it.  For
example,  poisonous  mushrooms  may  not  appear  red  when  perceived  under  unfavourable
lighting conditions or they may have been damaged so as to have lost the parts which are red
while retaining the parts that are poisonous; and not all red mushrooms with white dots need
be  poisonous.  So,  analyses  which  refer  to  perceived  properties  only  will  suffer  from an
explanatory shortage, since they cannot tie an organism’s reaction to the property of being
poisonous, but only to that of appearing red (etc.; and that perceptions of redness are linked to
poisonous mushrooms is itself not a perceived property,  of course). Under such perceptual
descriptions,  functional  description  is  eschewed,  and  meaning/teleology  must  remain
mysterious. It is invoking semantic descriptions which enables us to lift the veil and include
information about functional purpose (cf. Cummins 1991: 10). In other words, we must first
know the relevant functional relations before we can carve up neurobiological descriptions
mechanistically:  “The  way  to  discover  symbols  in  the  brain  is  first  to  map  out  rational
relations among states of mind, and then identify aspects of these states that can be thought of
as symbolic in virtue of their functions” (Block 1995b: 398).  Crucially, we can distinguish
between  these  two  types  of  description  in  the  following  way:  Under  the  functional
description, error is possible: For example, an animal can eat a poisonous mushroom because
said  mushroom  did  not  cause  the  perception  which  the  animal’s  internal  mechanism  is
sensitive to. Merely describing the internal processing related to perception,  no such error
appears: Since the perception which would have elicited averse reactions simply did not occur
in said case, no averse reaction was caused. But taking the external object into the picture –
the poisonous mushroom – we can say that the animal made a mistake (while the information
present  in  the  non-teleological  causal  description  of  the  internal  processing  is  retained).
Similarly, we are likely to find neural mechanisms which allow us to form correct sentences
with a certain statistical probability and to conceive of the remaining cases as mistakes – a
conception  which  does  not  follow  from  any  non-semantic/non-teleological  physical
description alone.
In order to fully understand how said cognitive ability works, we need to identify the
mechanism which is responsible for what we have described as the functional assignment of
semantic  values  to  environmental  cues.  This  mechanism processes  information  about  the
environment, namely that there are (or seem to be) red mushrooms with white dots in the
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vicinity, in such a way that it outputs information about whether these objects are nourishing
or poisonous. Once identified, we need to understand how, on a physical level, this processing
works. And in order to complete our analysis, we need to learn the reasons for our having this
mechanism: in this  case,  because the interaction with our environment  has been regularly
presenting  us  with  the  need  for  distinguishing  between  nourishment  and  poison.  For  an
organism which  evolved  in  an  environment  that  offers  nothing  but  nourishment,  such  a
mechanism would be redundant, and the claim that it has said mechanism because it needs to
distinguish between nourishment and poison would simply be wrong.
Given  that  the  most  dominant  ways  of  investigating  cognitive  abilities  rely  on
functional analyses (cf. Cummins 2000: 125 f.), an evident idea is that the general purpose of
a cognitive mechanism is to process whatever informationally salient or meaningful cues are
part of the input and consequently yield the proper output. And while such information might
be apparent on a behavioural level – we check the fridge to assess information about what it is
filled  (or not  filled)  with,  etc.  –,  this  notion of  information  is  hard to  reconcile  with the
physicalist picture, which becomes more prominent as we go further down in our analysis,
namely to the physical basis of the associated mechanism. For reasons stated in II.1, we must
assume that the relevant mechanism in humans will be neural in nature, and neural causality
does not offer teleological notions supporting the required construal of informational concepts
(ibid.: 127 f.). (And while we may be faced with non-neural forms of processing in artificial
systems, or we may even envision different forms of cognitive processing in animals radically
different from humans, as far as we actually have them, are working on them or can envision
them, these would also be based on structures obeying physicochemical laws.)
The  principal  problem,  then,  is  to  conceptualise  information,  or  semantic
representation in general, in physical terms. It should be clear that at the bottom, we have
nothing but physical terms to base our descriptions on, since the mechanisms whose function
it  is  to  process  information  are  physical  in  nature.  At  the  top,  namely  the  functional  or
behavioural level, it should be just as clear that descriptions rely on notions of semantics and
information. So, how do we bake this semantic cake “using only physical yeast and flour”
(Dretske 1981: xi)? To say that an organism’s cognitive function is to distinguish nourishment
from  poison  is  just  to  say  that  the  organism  can  extract  semantic  information  from
environmental cues in order to yield semantic outputs such as “this is nourishing” or “this is
poisonous”. At intermediary levels, the notion of information persists when we individuate
physical mechanism by the information they are dedicated to processing. Yet, whatever it is
that is processed by the physical mechanism, our analysis cannot end at saying that something
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physical “represents” the environment, since “representing” is not a physical property. This
problem is the root of attempts to “naturalise representation”, which means the attempts to
replace the non-physicalist notion of representation with a physicalist one, and it is the root of
a complication of what Chalmers thought of as an easy problem.
II.5.3. Syntax vs Semantics, or: Why is the easy problem so hard?
Since functionalist analyses of the mind systematically neglect the experiential quality
of mental states (see II.5.1), modern versions of phenomenology (cf. Gallagher 2003 & 2012),
of tackling questions of the self (cf. Qin, Duncan & Northoff 2013) and of consciousness (cf.
Overgaard 2015, Nagel 2012) have emerged to fill this gap in recent cognitive science. While
I am not going to delve into these, I wish to point out that,  in light of Chalmer’s classic
distinction between “easy” functional analyses and “hard” phenomenological analyses, what
has not been duly recognised is that both problems face some analogous difficulties. Thus, the
severity  of  some problems thought  of  as  “easy”  has  been underestimated.  In  the  case  of
consciousness,  we  can  find  research  to  proceed  by  employing  strategies  to  analyse
mechanisms that underlie conscious states (again,  cf.  Gallagher 2012 and Qin,  Duncan &
Northoff 2013). Yet, Chalmer’s stance was that even if we find such mechanisms, we can
hardly treat the problem as solved. For the question always remains why the characteristics of
the specified mechanism produce, or coincide with, a specific qualitative state – and since that
is an integral part of investigating consciousness, without its being solved it cannot be any
“hard problem” that can be considered solved. (At best, an adjacent “easy problem” has been
solved.)
However, a similar point can actually be made for functional analyses. Given a general
picture of intentional  states  which is  akin to  the one I  have been expounding so far (see
especially sections I.5 and I.7.4, but also the previous subsection), the analysis of such states
can  be  married  to  functional  analysis,  and  the  latter  can  be  characterised  in  terms  of
information-processing.  As sketched in the previous section, investigating intentional states
then  crucially  becomes  a  matter  of  finding  cognitive  mechanisms  which  carry  out  the
respective information processing which is believed to underlie a given intentional state. For
example, it takes cognitive information processing for anyone to arrive at an intentional state
(i.e.  to  react  with the  proper  attitude  to  the  intentional  content,  which is  itself  arrived  at
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through  information  processing,  or  to  arrive  at  one  type  of  intentional  attitude  as  a
consequence of information processing).
Still,  a  frequently  slighted  point  is  that  the  description  of  how  this  information-
processing is carried out is purely formal (or “syntactic”) in nature, while what is processed is
characterised  semantically.  So,  a  question  that  is  analogous  to  the  hard  problem  of
investigating consciousness can be posed: Why do the formally specified characteristics of the
identified mechanism produce, or coincide, with some specific semantic content? I believe
this is in fact the crucial problem in investigating intentionality, of giving a plausible account
of how formal systems acquire semantic (i.e. intentional) properties. Given that the orthodox
view is that semantics is irreducible to syntax, it seems like enough of a hard problem, and it
is  not  solved  at  all  by  giving  functional  explanations.  This  problem should  therefore  be
construed as the hardest problem connected to endeavors of naturalising representations.
What exactly are the reasons for holding said orthodox view? First off, syntax and
semantics  are  basic  properties  of  representational  systems.  Syntax means  a  set  of  rules
describing how potentially meaningful entities are properly constructed. For example, given
knowledge about the syntax of Portuguese, anyone would be put into a position to judge that
“uma carta para um filho sobre seu pai” is well-formed, without necessarily understanding
what it means. We might even be able to judge that we’re likely dealing with a description (or
a general term) rather than a complete sentence. Once we are provided with the information
that the supposed description translates to “a letter to a son about his father”, we are provided
with its meaning. Given this limited information about syntax and semantics, it should already
be evident  that  there  is  a  notable  distinction  between both:  In  order  for  something  to  be
meaningful,  it  needs  to  be  grammatically  well-formed,  i.e.  to  not  violate  syntactic  rules.
However,  merely being well-formed does  not  yet  imply being meaningful,  as  Chomsky’s
famous example of the well-formed sentence “colourless green ideas sleep furiously” proves
(Chomsky 1957: 15).
One  prevalent  idea  in  cognitive  science  is  that  brains  are  effectively  “syntactical
engines”: that they process information by way of formal steps (see I.4.4 and II.4). “We treat
the mind as a semantic engine, yet when we look at the brain all we see is a syntactic engine,
where the shape and orthography of neurons and neurochemicals are intrinsically causal, and
it’s hard to see how to get semantics out of syntax” (Griffin & Baron-Cohen 2002: 104). Here,
it  is  important  to  understand that  the way the brain is  described,  namely in  terms  of  the
interaction of the “shape and orthography of neurons and neurochemicals”, only allows for
any processing that happens in the brain to be implemented by means of physicochemical
Intentionality in Cognitive Neuroscience 191
causality. Yet, we also take the brain to implement semantic functions which we describe in
terms of processing. So, the corresponding requirement is this: For any processing that yields
B from A to be implemented in the brain, the physical implementation of A must (reliably)
cause the physical implementation of B. Under a given semantic interpretation, A and B carry
information,  and  thus  we  can  speak  of  them  as  having  mental  content.  However,  the
immediate  causal  relations  in  the  brain  hold  in  virtue  of  the  physical  properties  of  its
constituents,  not  in  virtue  of  semantic  ones.81 That  a  relationship  holds  in  virtue  of  its
physical/causal features is here called “syntactical”, since the corresponding relational rules
are  merely  formal,  insofar  as  they  are  not semantic/representational/intentional/
interpretative.82
So, much like what happens in a computer, processing that happens in terms of neural
mechanisms is seen as the sequential computing of rules such as “if input is A, then output is
B”.  As  emphasised,  neurobiologically  described  structures  are  only  sensitive  to  the
physicochemical features of the input – so any of its semantic properties only apply to neural
descriptions in virtue of being physicochemically implemented. And just as formal logic can
be described as a set of syntactic  relations between symbols,  so neural processing can be
described as a sequence of formal rules which are implemented by such causal processes: For
example, “if B follows from A, and C follows from B, then C follows from A” can be a rule
of logic as well as a description of a causal sequence. Either way, it is purely formal and
syntactic.  For  this  form  of  deduction  or  processing,  the  semantic  properties  (or
“interpretations”) of A, B and C do not matter, since  any meaning that can be attached to
[A→B] & [B→C] will adhere to the formal conclusion that [A→C] (assuming classical logic,
at least).
So, while under a functional description the output is a semantic value, the mapping of
output to input happens according to a purely formal  procedure.  For example,  maybe our
81 I  say  “immediate”  to  avoid  confusion  with  an  earlier  point  I  made  regarding  Cummins’  theory  of
psychological explanation in section II.3. There, the point was that certain neural mechanisms only exist because
they perform a required cognitive processing. Under such circumstances, it is also correct to say that the causal
relations underlying such processing hold because of semantic properties, namely those which caused someone
to learn the required processing.  Still,  these semantic  properties  are  not the immediate  cause  of  any causal
goings-on in our brain; the immediate causes are still physicochemical properties. Rather, under the influence of
external semantic properties our cognitive “hardware” can be shaped so as to run specific kinds of “software”,
such as speaking English, doing calculus or rating movies.
82 The view that the brain executes mental functions “formally” or “syntactically” does not imply a commitment
to  any  particular  form  of  logic  such  as  “the  assumption  that  [the  logic  which  formalises  common-sense
inferences] is about deductive inference and completeness proofs” (Labuschagne & Heidema 2005: 146). The
brain  can  represent  things  by way of  a  different  form of  logic  than  that  inherent  to  the  things  which  are
represented, just as a calculator can be implemented in many ways which are themselves not representable by a
calculator. Analogously, the fact that someone can dabble in first-order logic does not imply that the process by
which her brain enables her to do so can or needs to be fully described in terms of first-order logic.
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cognitive mechanism for judging whether something is edible or not has a rule such as “if [red
mushroom with white dots] is perceived, then output [is poisonous]”, where “[red mushroom
with white dots]” is handled much like the previously quoted Portuguese sentence would be
handled by anyone who does not speak Portuguese: namely, as a purely syntactically defined
entity.  Much  as  the  Portuguese  sentence  to  speakers  unfamiliar  with  Portuguese,  the
mechanism could handle it as a semantically opaque variable: its meaning would not figure
into the processing, but only its formal properties. These formal properties would be defined
by the causal features relevant for our nervous system, such as those picked up by our sensory
organs.  Again,  the  point  is  not  that  our  brain  aren’t  sensitive  to  semantic  properties  (see
footnote 81), but that neural processing is, by mere virtue of its being purely physical/causal,
a non-interpretative, non-representational, non-intentional, non-semantic process.
II.5.4. Reconciling Semantic Properties with Naturalism
Imagine you were handed a piece of paper that says “uma carta para um filho sobre
seu  pai”,  and someone  told  you  that  everytime  you  receive  a  piece  of  paper  with  these
markings, you give it to Zachary. While you would thereby execute the function “if [paper is
marked with “uma carta para um filho sobre seu pai”] then [give it to Zachary]”, you need not
understand how the consequent  semantically follows from the antecedent – even though it
does, as a speaker of Portuguese who has seen the documentary “Dear Zachary” would assure
you. So, we can see how semantic functions can be executed purely syntactically.  A case
similar  to  this  was  influentially  discussed  by  Searle  in  his  “Chinese  Room”  thought
experiment (see Searle 1980). His point was to show that, since syntax does not determine
semantics, the latter can’t be reduced to the former:
“Computation is defined purely formally or syntactically, whereas minds have actual mental
or semantic contents, and we cannot get from syntactical to the semantic just by having the
syntactical operations and nothing else. To put this point slightly more technically, the notion
“same implemented program” defines an equivalence class that is specified independently of
any  specific  physical  realisation.  But  such  a  specification  necessarily  leaves  out  the
biologically specific powers of the brain to cause cognitive processes” (Searle 2010: 17).
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Searle’s thought experiment remains controversial to this day, so I’d rather not rely on
it too much. (Specifically, I won’t even begin to mention any of his criteria for what counts as
intentionality or consciousness.) However, any notable controversy is not about the fact that
the brain executes semantic functions formally, but about whether mental content can actually
be reduced to what the brain does: “Formal symbols by themselves can never be enough for
mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have no meaning (or interpretation, or
semantics) except insofar as someone outside the system gives it to them” (Searle 1989: 45).
The opposing view claims that semantics can in fact be reduced to syntax.
I  suggest  that  the  entire  controversy  is  traceable  back  to  an  overstatement  of  the
respective irreducibility: Of course such irreducibility does not imply a kind of metaphysical
dualism, in the sense that something supernatural has to swoop down from the skies and lend
quasi-spiritual meaning to some physical properties. Rather, what irreducibility affirms is two
things: (1) That assigning mental content to a cognitive mechanism requires the notion of
function, which is non-physical:
“An example may help to clarify how functional talk is not [merely] causal talk. A physicist
would say that heating a gas causes it to expand, and could provide laws that would make this
predication. A biologist would say that heating a mammal  causes it to sweat,  and that the
function of sweating is to keep the animal’s temperature constant. The physicist would never
say that the function of the gas expanding was to keep its temperature constant, even though
that is precisely what happens. Thus, functions are effects, not causes, and can not be seen
from the physical stance alone. A claim such as ‘the heart pumps  in order to  circulate the
blood’ is teleological, not causal, because effects do not bring about their causes” (Griffin &
Baron-Cohen 2002: 108, FN 4).83
What the irreducibility  claim also affirms is  (2) that  mental  content  is  relational,  i.e.  that
assigning it implies a relation between their implementation, such as neural properties, and
something beyond these:
“Many in philosophy,  Dennett included, subscribed to a form of externalism,  according to
which contentful states are seen as relational properties,  and are identified by reference to
entities outside the brain. Thus, if content ascriptions are extrinsically relational, then they can
not refer directly to the local, causal, nexus in the brain” (ibid.: 104). 
83 In a sense, evolutionarily advantageous effects do bring about their causes, namely the mechanisms producing
them.
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Searle goes a bit further, adding that “[a]s far as nature is concerned intrinsically, there are no
functional facts beyond causal facts. The further assignment of function is observer relative”
(Searle 1995: 16). Similar reservations are expressed by Churchland, Koch and Sejnowski in
an article that is considered one of the defining expressions of the project of computational
neuroscience:
“A physical system is considered a computer when its states can be taken as representing  
states of some other system; that is, so long as someone sees an interpretation of its states in 
terms of a given algorithm.  Thus a central feature of this characterisation is that whether  
something is a computer has an interest-relative component, in the sense that it depends on 
whether someone has an interest in the device’s abstract properties and in interpreting its states
as representing states of something else. Consequently, a computer is not a natural kind in the 
way that, for example, an electron or a protein or a mammal is a natural kind” (Churchland et 
al. 1988: 48).
In  a  similar  vein,  Dennett  stresses  the  importance  of  our  interpretational  interests  for
functional/intentional ascriptions:
“It is not that we attribute (or should attribute) beliefs and desires only to things in which we
find internal  representations,  but  rather that  when we discover  some object  for which the
intentional strategy works, we endeavor to interpret some of its internal states or processes as
internal representations. What makes some internal feature of a thing a representation could
only be its role in regulating the behaviour of an intentional system” (Dennett 1987: 32).84
Just imagine how gleefully Brentano would read these passages (see I.2) – even almost a
hundred years after his death, the divide between physical and intentional objects seems to be
alive  and  well!  For  all  these  poignant  descriptions  of  what  makes  a  physical  system
representational, there are two major concerns at work here which we must deal with: Firstly,
that whatever endows these systems with their representational features is “not natural” (see
II.2), i.e. that it is not traceable back to natural kinds, and secondly, that it is observer-relative.
Now, these points are taken to be interdependent – namely, the fact that something’s being
representational is observer-relative is taken to be the reason for its not being natural (you can
find this  line of reasoning in all  three quotes:  Searle’s,  Churchland/Koch/Sejnowski’s and
Dennett’s) –, but I would still like to address them separately.
84 I am grateful to Michael Zehetleitner for alerting me to this and the previous quote.
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To  address  the  first  concern:  It  is  a  misconceived  emphasis  on  what’s  “nature
intrinsically”,  which  tempts  us  to  eschew  representational  facts  as  unnatural.  And  the
temptation goes: If representations are not to be found within “nature proper”, then shouldn’t
natural science get rid of it? But that, of course, would amount to scientific euthanasia by
negating the whole enterprise of cognitive neuroscience, when we do have compelling reasons
for not pulling the plug. Playing into this temptation is the fact that the concept “natural kind”
is  too  often  used  evocatively  rather  than  literally.  Used  literally,  it  is  merely  meant  to
designate kind-terms which are independent of human practice (as opposed to Hacking-type
interactivity, see I.6.2). Being a natural kind means: Being a proper term about which laws of
nature can be formulated (again,  see I.6.2; for an overview of the debate see Carroll 2004).
But rather than to talk about natural (or unnatural) kinds, I urge that we substitute the word
“natural” in “natural kind” for the form of law in which it is used: For example, if something
is  a  kind-term in  physical  laws,  then  it  should  properly  be  called  a  “physical  kind”.  If
something is a kind in biological laws, then it should be called a “biological kind”, and so
forth. Distinguishing kinds by their scientific fields rather than by how “natural” they are does
not imply that there can be no (perhaps reductive) interrelations between physical, biological
and other scientific kinds, but it lessens the temptation to see some of these kinds as the one,
true, essential  form of thing and others as bogus (compare footnotes 64 and 106). This is
another move in my attempt to move away from painfully abstract discussions about how
“real” an object is to a pragmatic discussion of their explanatory value (see I.5). Because my
ultimate point is not that organisms are “as real as” H2O, but rather that the reality of either
thing,  which  is  referred  to  by  a  kind-term,  hinges  on  the  explanatory  value  it  has  in  its
respective discipline. For example, the fact that one of the major prerequisites of cognitive
neuroscience is that there are such things as organisms should not by itself discredit the field,
just because organisms aren’t a proper part of our physical vocabulary. What really matters, at
least for the current state of science, is that they’re part of our basic vocabulary when doing
cognitive  neuroscience  –  just  as  functions  are.  Since  biology  and  neuroscience  count  as
natural sciences, then content has been naturalised if it is properly explicated in terms of the
two respective fields, even if it has not or cannot be properly explicated in strictly physical
terms (compare II.2).
Secondly,  the fact that a certain phenomenon is observer-relative does not by itself
place it beyond scientific inquiry. In fact, in our case the reverse is true: that we can construe
the execution of organismic functions as being at the basis of mental content means that the
analysis  of  these  functions  in  relation  to  the  organism  is  the  proper  method  of  a
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neuroscientific inquiry into intentionality. So, it is not that observer-relativity drags cognitive
neuroscience  down  into  some  murky  field  of  subjectivity,  but  rather  that  cognitive
neuroscience  gives  us  a  promising  stab  at  dealing  scientifically  with  certain  aspects  of
subjectivity.  To be sure, this inquiry cannot be a purely neurobiological one (in Gold’s &
Stoljar’s sense; see section II.2), since “individual neurons, neuronal ensembles, and neuronal
structures” will not provide us with the necessary inventory of organismic concepts to tackle
questions pertaining to mental content (but this is just my previous point restated: “function”
is not a physical term, but still a scientific one).
Picture  what  descriptions  of  brain  states,  which  could  potentially  instantiate
neuroscientific laws, take into account: the spatial distribution of neurons, or their network
properties;  the physicochemical  properties of brain cells  and of the media they operate in
(such as charged fluids etc.); electrical properties and timescales of discharges; innervations
of muscles and sensory organs and their properties, and so on. Any such description would be
lawlike in virtue of physical laws, since all of these properties can be construed as kinds in
physics, and thus, physics fully describes their causal interaction. Yet, their representational
or functional roles do not directly follow from these physical descriptions, since no law in
physics exists which marks the state of a physical structure as representational or functional.
Rather,  some states, or segments of such states,  are representational  in virtue of a further
relational property,  namely a certain functional role it inhabits. For example, to say that a
certain herb is a cure is to say that its physical properties function in a certain way when
related to other properties (namely those of a person exhibiting symptoms of illness). While it
certainly functions as a cure  in virtue  of its  physical  properties,  its  being a cure is  not  a
description merely of its physical properties, but of its effects in relation to what it is effective
on. Similarly, we should think of a physical state as being representational when it satisfies a
certain  relational  property.  So,  representational  and physical  kind terms need not  refer  to
different objects, but rather, some physical  kinds will be representations in virtue of their
fulfilling specific functional roles, just as some are also organisms in virtue of the relations
they have to one another within the organismic system, and to what is conceived as laying
outside the organismic boundaries (see I.8.2).
So,  in  order  to  mark  these  functional  rules,  additional  methods  will  have  to  be
invoked, such as those from biology and psychology, and all we have to make sure is that they
will provide us with analyses of said “observer-relativity” which does not equal subjectivity
with random, non-repeatable results. And this can be done because the relevant notion of
observer-relativity does not imply some form of radical subjectivism at all, but, just as the
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term says, it expresses the fact that some facts about organisms are relative to the organism
itself.  So,  we  might  as  well  replace  the  intimidating  term  “observer-relativity”  with
“organism-relativity” – and who would be intimidated by the fact that some properties of a
given organism are specific to, say, its evolutionary history? For example, we should expect
that  the  ultimate  reasons  for  a  toad’s  cognitively  representing  worms  as  prey  will  be
evolutionary in nature. Ultimately, such a sparse understanding of “observer-relativity” is all
that is needed for an analysis of cognitive functions, and that is what I will proceed to show.
So, representational features need to be cashed out in objective terms. And to briefly
apply this criterion to our three quotes: In Churchland et al.’s case, there should be objective
conditions for when a computer can count as representing certain states. In Dennett’s case,
there should be objective conditions for when the intentional stance is beneficial. In Searle’s
case, there have to be objective facts about functions. These objective facts will most notably
be derived from biology and psychology, since biology provides us with analyses for what a
representation’s “role in regulating the behaviour of an intentional system” (Dennett 1987:
32)  consists  in,  and  psychology  provides  us  with  accounts  of  mental  function  and
performance.
To sum up, semantic  irreducibility as understood in said two claims – that mental
content  requires  the  notion  of  function  and  that  it  is  relational  –  hardly  qualifies  as  a
stumbling block for the neurobiological investigation of cognition. On the contrary, it is very
much  reconcilable  with its  current  scientific/naturalistic  framework:  Namely,  that  relating
intentional states to cognitive mechanisms implies individuating the latter in reference to the
intentional objects, crucially using the notion of function. And since we can assume that the
brain supplies  the physical  basis  for  executing  cognitive  functions,  and that  it  can  do so
formally, there is quite simply no further need for somehow reducing semantic functions. And
so, Chalmers was right (see section II.5): all we really need to do is analyse how exactly the
brain executes these functions, and Searle’s point, that the physical makeup of a system alone
does not determine its function, already follows from a straightforward biological reading of
“system”  in  terms  of  its  beneficial  environment-relations.  For  instance,  describing  an
organism as erring, as being tricked or as misrepresenting its environment is only possible
when we can describe the aim of the cognitive mechanism it employs as distinct from the
physicochemical  processes underlying it.  In the following section I  will  invoke a specific
example  in  order  to  show how teleological  and neurobiological  descriptions  of  cognitive
mechanisms go hand in hand and how matters of subject-relativity play into these.
Intentionality in Cognitive Neuroscience 198
II.6. The Neural Basis of Cognition
One important cognitive ability consists in being able to distinguish between things in
our environment which are nourishing and those which are not (compare II.5.2). For example,
take the common toad (Bufo bufo), which preys on worms. Ewert et al. identified a neural
mechanism which allows it to direct its predatorial behaviour at worms with an evolutionarily
advantageous statistical rate of success (Ewert et al. 1996). They have found tectal neurons
which are active when the toad is presented with certain worm-like features, such as those
exhibited  by  elongate  objects  moving  parallelly  to  their  longitudinal  axis  (see  Figure  6).
Crucially, it has been found that the toad fails to direct its predatorial behaviour specifically at
such objects once said neurons are removed.
Figure 6: The toad’s predatorial behaviour is elicited by the “worm-configuration” (after Ewert 1970
and Wachowski & Ebert 1996).
Ewert  et  al.  note:  “One  might  be  tempted  to  call  the  tectal  T5.2  neurons  ‘worm
detectors’. However, one should be also aware that these neurons, like toad’s prey-capture,
are responsive preferably but not exclusively  to wormlike moving objects. (…) [T]heir output
is a measure of the probability that a visual stimulus fits the figural prey category determined
behaviourally.  The  term  feature  detector is  appropriate”.85 Since  this  mechanism is  only
sensitive to certain observable features strongly correlating with those of worms, it is not
necessarily specific to the perception of worms. That is, toads can be tricked into preying on
all objects which share the features their mechanism is sensitive to, but which are not worms.
85 Quoted from Ewert’s website, retrieved on July 6th 2014 [http://www.joerg-peter-ewert.de/3.html].
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Evolutionarily,  it  is  advantageous  for  toads  to  have  developed  a  mechanism  which  is
especially sensitive to these features, as long as it inhabits an environment which provides
them with a big enough statistical rate of success at catching prey using this mechanism (i.e.
an environment in which the toad is not regularly tricked). So, the mechanism’s effectiveness
depends on the fact that a toad’s typical environment does not provide it with a whole lot of
elongate  objects  moving  parallelly  to  their  longitudinal  axis  whose  ingestion  would  be
detrimental to the toad’s health.
In line with our previously developed picture of analysing cognitive processing, we
can say that, on a functional level, the toad’s neural mechanism processes observable features
of its environment to yield the semantic value “prey” or “non-prey”. And the empirical work
just outlined specifies what the corresponding neural implementation consists in. Note that a
behavioural description  is  the  basis  for  singling  out  the  prey-capture  mechanism  as
distinctively  being  part  of  the  toad’s  cognitive  repertoire.  However,  strictly  speaking,
behavioural  descriptions  themselves  are  not  part  of  the  neural  description  (in  the  sense
specified by Gold & Stoljar, see II.2). In the case of the toad’s prey-capture mechanism, the
latter firstly consists in a description of how exactly the toad’s sensory organs are sensitive to
objects  exhibiting  properties  of  the  “worm-configuration”.  It  secondly  consists  in  a
description of how the activity of the tectal neurons elicit said behaviour (by innervation of
the toad’s muscles, the release of hormones, etc.). And thirdly, these descriptions highlight
neural properties in whose virtue the respective neural processes instantiate physicochemical
laws: how the physical basis of said sensory excitation causes a selective excitation in tectal
neurons, how the activity of tectal neurons causes activity in the toad’s muscles, and how
additional organismic properties contribute to this process. All of this amounts to a physical
description of how the toad’s nervous system makes it possible for the perception of a certain
stimulus to elicit directed behaviour, depending on what we can semantically describe as an
internal cognitive architecture.
As previously pointed out, the upshot of this neurobiological description in a strict
sense is that it does not by itself entail the semantic or functional description. So far, what we
ideally get is a lawlike entailment  of an effect,  namely directed behaviour,  from a cause,
namely perception of the worm-configuration.86 Compare my earlier example of tipping over
dominos: Nothing about a purely causal description of a sequence of falling dominos implies
that anything specific to this causal reaction has any representational properties (cf. Ramsey
2007: 118–150). Certainly, nothing purely physical about a domino’s falling over establishes
86 Note that this follows only if certain criteria regarding an explanatory method have been met, see footnote 80.
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that it represents the pushing (see II.4). Imagine that the causal chain between the perception
of  a  worm-configuration  and the  resulting  behaviour  were  to  resemble  such  a  sequential
tipping of dominos – under which condition would such a causal mechanism represent the
environmental property which is associated with the cause (i.e. worm or prey)? The causal
chain is describable as implementing a function, and thus semantically interpretable, once it is
assigned an aim: if the causal chain makes up a mechanism whose purpose is being sensitive
to the object which reliably starts the causal chain. The assignment of an aim is what lends
intentionality to the neural mechanism: The neural mechanism does not only have the neural
properties associated with it as outlined above, but there are also facts about its evolutionary
origin or its acquisition by way of learning which warrants this teleological description (see
footnote 50). So, saying that an individual mentally represents something, that their neural
mechanism processes information about something,  and that  its  output assigns a semantic
value depends on using this additional teleological information about its origin, which is not
inherent in purely neurobiological analyses of individual nervous systems, neural events or
processes.
In the toad’s case, what exactly is it that makes its neural processing a processing of
“worm-like features”, of shapes and movement, and not just a domino-like causal chain of
sequential  patterns  of  excitation?  It’s  the  fact  that  these  patterns  of  excitation  stand in  a
functional relation to said features of the environment (i.e. to the worm itself, as opposed to
just standing in a causal relation to the perception of the worm-configuration). What makes
the toad’s elicited behaviour predatorial,  or aimed at prey? Its functional relation to actual
prey. Thus, saying that the toad cognitively represents prey is to say that the toad’s neural
mechanism stands in a specific functional relationship to the toad’s environment:  Namely,
that in order to maintain its physical integrity in the face of constant energy-loss, or entropy, it
needs to consume energy, and that there are organismic features of the toad which allow us to
conceive  of some of its  physical  processes  as mechanisms achieving this  organismic  end
(compare Schrödinger 1992: 67-75). In our example,  the neural process outlined above is
construed is a characteristic part of the toad as an organism, namely as satisfying its need to
single out objects to devour.
One of the problems laid out earlier was that a set of signals or a set of syntactic rules
alone cannot allow us to decide about the information carried by the signals, or about the
semantics associated with the syntactic rules. Much the same applies here: A complete and
lawlike physical description of the nervous system explains why a certain input-state (in the
toad’s case: the excitatory pattern at its sensory organs) causes a certain output-state (namely,
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a certain movement of its muscles). That this causal relation is part of a mechanism which is
beneficial to the organism is a wider description, adding features of the environment (namely,
information about the object which caused the initial excitatory pattern) and a teleofunctional
principle (such as Millikan’s or Neander’s,  see section I.8.4). In a strict sense, it does not
follow from a neurobiological description of an individual alone. Thus, it is what is called
“non-individualistic” in the philosophy of mind (see Burge 1979, 1986 and Rechenauer 1997
and section I.8.5).
However,  the  individualistic  description,  i.e.  that  which  only  takes  an  organism’s
intrinsic  facts  into  account  (such  as  physical  descriptions  of  neural  mechanisms),  also
contributes to the representational description. Recall that Ewert et al. noted that the toad’s
tectal neurons are not worm-detectors but worm-like-feature-detectors. So, knowledge about
the neurons’ sensitivity  constrains the possible reference of the semantic description, but it
does not determine it. If the toad cognitively represents anything, it represents something that
usually takes the shape of elongate objects moving in a parallel direction to their longitudinal
axis, but not all of these things. Otherwise, all things which we can trick the toad with, i.e.
which satisfy the worm-configuration’s criteria while not being nourishing, would then count
as being represented by the toad’s mechanism as well. So, while it is true that the toad’s tectal
neurons are sensitive to things which are not worms, saying that the toad neurally represents
worms is still true, since this fact is included in the higher-order functional description, which
takes into account that (1) the neurons’s sensitivity, combined with the toad’s environment,
lets it catch prey efficiently, and that (2) the fact that these neurons are sensitive to elongate
objects moving in a parallel direction to their longitudinal axis is due to the evolutionarily
relevant continued presence of actual prey in the toad’s environment. Again, this description
is not neurobiological in Gold & Stoljar’s sense, but it is neuroscientific in a wider sense,
insofar as the characteristic features of this neural mechanism are ontogenetically explainable
only  by  adding  functionally  relevant  information  about  the  toad’s  environment  and
evolutionary history.  And insofar as this is an essential part of the analysis  of a cognitive
ability, it is part of the description that the toad cognitively represents prey, even if it is not
derivable from physical information about the nervous system alone.
To add a bit of speculation: Would this be different if the toad’s neurons were in fact
sensitive only to worms, instead of elongate objects moving in a parallel direction to their
longitudinal  axis? That  is,  could the proximal  (i.e.  the perceived stimulus) and distal  (i.e.
proper functional) contents (see I.8.4) conflate if the neural mechanism would be so sensitive
as to constrain its potential objects down to its one correct intentional object? Well, for one,
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for any complete set of observable worm-features, we know that a mechanism that is sensitive
exclusively to this set would be evolutionarily efficient only in an environment in which any
mechanism  that  is  more  sparse  (i.e.  sensitive  to  a  subset)  would  lead  to  a  significant
evolutionary disadvantage. Secondly, for a neural mechanism to be sensitive only to Xs, those
properties characteristic of and specific to X would have to be directly observable, since the
very notion of a cognitive mechanism only makes sense if there is something observable for
the mechanism to process as an input. So, we can still envision tricking any such mechanism
with things which share all characteristic observable features with worms, but which are not
worms  (i.e.  pseudo-worms  which  have  an  added  non-observable  toxic  ingredient).  As
Zehetleitner & Schönbrodt note:
“It seems to be rather easy to find examples, where indicator representations are used (...)  
compared to finding cases, where the success relevant feature is directly sensed. (...) The only 
example we were able to think of, where the success-relevant variable is identical with the  
indicator  feature  (…),  is  phototaxis  in  photosynthetic  organisms  (...).  Phototaxis  is  a  
“behavioral  migration-response  of  an  organism toward  a  change  in  illumination  regime”  
(Hoff et al. 2009, p. 25). Positive phototaxis is a migration towards the light source, which is a
successful  action  for  photosynthetic  organisms.  It  seems  that  apart  from  photosynthetic  
organisms,  light  sensors  (such as  eyes)  rather  generally produce indicator  representations  
(similar  to  sound waves  picked up  by ears,  or  odours  picked up  by olfactory  sensors)”  
(Zehetleitner & Schönbrodt 2013: 213).
So, whenever the perceived indicator for a characteristic property a cognitive mechanism is
attuned to does not conflate with the characteristic property itself, deceit is possible. Since this
is rarely the case,  mechanisms which are so sensitive as to only be directed toward their
(proximal) intentional object will be just as rare.
On the other hand, it can be the case that environments are simply too poor to afford
any object a given mechanism can be deceived with, such as when, for example, there happen
to be no elongate objects moving in a parallel direction to their longitudinal axis other than
worms in a given toad’s habitat.87 In such cases, the mechanism would in fact be directed to
its intentional object in each possible instance, even though its distal and proximal contents do
not  conflate.  In  any case,  the  crucial  point  here  is  that  the  teleological  description  of  a
cognitive mechanisms is not decisively influenced by how many observable characteristics it
is sensitive to (i.e. how well it captures the objective features of the object it is aimed at), but
87 Vice versa, none of this implies that representing an object entails being absolutely undeceivable about it. In
fact, it does not even entail knowing about all its characteristics (again, compare Burge 2007: Introduction).
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rather how this sensitivity allows the organism to interact with the represented objects in a
way  that  is  functional  for  the  organism.  Thus,  it  may  even  “objectively”  misrepresent
indicators  as  long  as  this  misrepresentation  is  functional  (cf.  Zehetleitner  &  Schönbrodt
2013).
The  points  I’ve  made  so  far  are  only  consistent  with  the  previous  quotes  about
intentionality not being natural (see II.5) if we modify these a bit. Compare Searle’s stating
that “as far as nature is concerned intrinsically, there are no functional facts beyond causal
facts”. In our case, this point would be specified as: there are no teleological facts as far as
physics is concerned. If Searle were to be taken literally, I would have to disagree: yes, there
are functional  facts  in  nature,  since  organisms  are  functional  entities,  and  since  what  is
functional can in fact be grasped by the causal relationships as described by natural sciences
such as biology. But, again, that is just to say that the natural sciences are not exhausted by
physics.
In the following sections I will review the currently most important and promising
strategies  to  supply  functional  descriptions  of  cognitive  skills:  evolutionary  theory,
dynamic/living systems theory and the social learning approach. I believe that either of them
or their combined application guides most forms of content-attribution in cognitive science.
II.7. Methods for Determining Cognitive Content
II.7.1. Evolutionary Psychology
II.7.1.1. Explanations in Evolutionary Psychology
In evolutionary psychology (from now on referred to as “EP”), the central focus lies
on explaining a set of psychological features exhibited by a given organism by tracing these
back to  a relation between the respective species and their  environment:  a  relation called
“adaptiveness”,  which tracks the impact this property has on the longevity of the species’
genes  in  a  specific  environment.  In  what  follows,  I  will  focus  on  some  necessary
preconditions  characterising  theories  belonging  to  this  field.  Underlying  this  focus  is  an
understanding of EP as “a field of inquiry, defined not by any specific theories about human
psychology, but only by a commitment to developing such theories within the framework of
evolutionary  biology”  (Buller  2006:  197),  as  opposed  to  EP  as  a  paradigm  entailing  “a
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number of specific doctrines regarding the nature and evolution of the human mind (…) [,
consisting of] a tightly interwoven web of theoretical claims, methodological commitments,
and empirical results” (ibid.).88 My reason for this commitment is that taking EP as the latter
would entail that a theory could be taken as belonging to EP in virtue of mere consistency
with one or several of these theoretical claims, such as the theory that the mind consists of a
large number of genetically specified modules (cf. ibid.: 199 ff.).
For  instance,  Mercier  and  Sperber  argue  that  we  have  erroneously  conceived  of
reasoning as serving an epistemic function when it actually serves an argumentative one: “In a
classical framework, where reasoning is seen as geared to achieving epistemic benefits, the
fact that it may be used to justify an opinion already held is hard to explain” (Mercier &
Sperber 2011: 66). They offer some testable predictions such as that since, according to them,
“the main function of reasoning is to produce arguments to convince others rather than to find
the best decision (…) we predict that reasoning will drive people towards decisions for which
they can argue – decisions that they can justify – even if these decisions are not optimal”
(ibid.: 61). However, their evolutionary claim – whether the respective function (or rather, the
physiological  basis  for  the  associated  behaviour)  was  acquired  evolutionarily –  is  in  fact
tested by none of their predictions and thus cannot be supported by any of the evidence they
deliver (ibid.: 61–71). Their investigation of the function of human reasoning positions itself
as belonging to EP solely by invoking consistency with some of its theoretical claims (cf.
Mercier & Sperber 2011: 58). In fact, they humbly remark that “while there can hardly be any
archaeological evidence for the claim that argumentation already played an important role in
early human groups, we note that anthropologists have repeatedly observed people arguing in
small-scale traditional societies” (ibid.: 60). Such anthropological observations are supposed
to amount to evidence by hinting at an ancient genetic foundation of the psychological trait in
question. Yet, Mercier and Sperber’s hypothesis that reasoning serves an argumentative rather
than an epistemic function is not validated merely by providing a functional explanation for
the systematic flaws that exist in our reasoning processes; rather, the explanation itself still
awaits validation by empirical evidence which would support their evolutionary origin story.
And  this  validation  seems  especially  pressing  in  light  of  the  revelation  that  cognitive
machinery,  whose rigidity had been sought to have been traceable back to the generation-
spanning rigidity of amino acids, turns out to at least sometimes reflect the rigidity of social
norms (cf. Henrich et al. 2010: 66). Making the distinction between a universal genetically
inherited trait and a pervasive social rule requires additional evidence.
88 For a broader picture of the content of EP as a paradigm see Buss 1995 and Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow 1992.
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So, what kind of evidence actually qualifies as supporting evolutionary theories? The
popular  practice  of  spinning  tales  about  some  form  of  selection  pressure  in  an  ancient,
evolutionarily relevant environment certainly won’t do. We will all too often find ourselves in
situations in which we can verify that a given organism can perform some function, yet lack
evidence which tells us which, if any, of the offered evolutionary ad hoc stories is true, or
whether the function even qualifies as a biological or genetic trait to begin with. These stories
serve to generate hypotheses, but without additional evidence, they lack the force to one-up
other “just so” stories. As Gould and Lewontin point out, “the criteria of acceptance of a[n
evolutionary]  story  are  so  loose  that  they  may  pass  without  proper  confirmation.  Often,
evolutionists use consistency with the data as the sole criterion and consider their work done
when they concoct  a  plausible  story”  (Gould  & Lewontin  1979:  588).  This  looseness  of
criteria is so pervasive that it  has recently spawned a “festival of bad ad hoc hypotheses”
(bahfest.com),  at  which presenters are asked to defend deliberately ludicrous  evolutionary
hypotheses in front of a live audience.
The enterprise of EP crucially depends on tying psychological traits closely to their
genetic  substrate.  The  central  explanatory  form  of  evolutionary  explanation  consists  in
claiming that a given function has either been directly relevant for the survival of a given
organism’s  ancestor  who bears  that  function,  so much so that  this  ancestral  function  has
survived in the current organism’s genes, and that consequently the current function is a trait
of this organism exactly because it has genetically inherited its substrate (see section I.8.4).
Thus, if F is a mental function, O is our current organism which displays F, G is the gene (or a
set of genes) which leads to the expression of F and A is O’s ancestor, we can formulate the
following hypotheses central to evolutionary explanation:
1. The primary explanation for O’s having F is that O has G.89
2. That G was relevant for A’s survival under evolutionary pressure was the cause
for its originally having been passed on (while other factors not necessarily related to
adaptiveness may have contributed to retaining the genome).
The initial challenge faced by evolutionary explanations of psychological functions is
construing a psychological function as a trait which is tied directly to the expression of a gene.
So, in order to yield a valid evolutionary explanation, it is necessary that the explained feature
be the effect of gene-expression. We shouldn’t understate evolutionary explanations by only
89 Here, “primary” means both specifically and sufficiently. If G allows for several mental functions, then G does
not explain F primarily.
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requiring them to provide genes whose expressions are necessary for a certain feature. Such
attempts at evolutionary explanations would provide too little specificity to actually make for
a primary explanatory value: A lot of genes might be necessary to express a certain feature
without  actually  being  specific to  the  feature’s  expression.  For  instance,  since  my  being
unable to breathe would seriously impair my ability to think, genes relevant to developing
lungs are necessary to perform cognitive functions, while at the same time not sufficiently
explaining these. And if we’re dealing with learned cognitive functions, then even those genes
necessary for developing a functioning brain, while being necessary for cognitive functions in
general, do not explain these learned cognitive functions as an effect.90
So,  what  makes  a  property  evolutionarily  explainable  is  (1)  that  it  is  genetically
inherited  and  (2)  that  the  reason for  its  being  genetically  inherited  is  that  the  associated
function  is  adaptive  and was  subject  to  selection  pressure.  I  will  take  any evidence  that
pertains to (1) and (2) as “direct evidence”. Direct evidence can still range between strong and
weak: ideally, showing that an identified set of genes makes the difference between exhibiting
the property in question would count as exceedingly strong evidence, whereas anthropological
evidence such as the one mentioned by Mercier and Sperber would be considerably weaker,
even though it also pertains to (1) and (2). We will usually have to rely on comparably weak
evidence,  since  genetic  studies  on  humans  of  the  sort  just  described  –  experimentally
switching  genes  on  and off  and  observing developmental  effects  –  are  not  an  option.  A
stronger  form  of  evidence  than  anthropological  anecdotes  can  be  supplied  by  studies
correlating the presence of specific genomes and specific traits.
Based  on  ideas  connecting  characteristics  of  adaptation,  genetic  inheritance  and
selection pressure specific theories in EP have been developed, such as the modularity of the
mind (cf. Seok 2006). The argument for it goes: “First, our ancestors encountered a diverse
array of adaptive problems, and each adaptive problem ‘domain’ required its own ‘domain-
specific’ solution. Second, no single ‘domain-general’ psychological mechanism could have
successfully solved widely different adaptive problems. Therefore, a distinct psychological
mechanism evolved for each distinct adaptive problem our ancestors faced” (Buller 2006:
199). There are two options for supporting such theoretical arguments with evidence: we can
either support them with direct evidence (such as findings which show that gene-expression is
linked to the development of cognitive modules; see Baron-Cohen et al. 1985 & 1986 for a
related, if not directly genetic, argument) or with indirect arguments boosting their theoretical
90 Here,  “learned” obviously means: Not automatically developing merely due to gene expression. This may
sound circular at first, but the fact that there are such learned functions – driving a car, finding your way around
the local mall, doing evolutionary psychology – justifies this circle.
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plausibility.  Any  evidence  which  neither  pertains  to  (1)  nor  (2),  yet  boosts  theoretical
coherence I will  call  “indirect  evidence”.  That  is,  the discovery of a fact  which does not
amount to direct evidence for theory A, but is more smoothly integratable into A than into a
competing theory B, boosts the plausibility of A. For example, finding that a given cognitive
mechanism  is  modular  indirectly  supports  modularity  claims  about  similar  cognitive
mechanisms. Yet, it does not amount to direct evidence, since it establishes nothing about
actual genetic properties. The most common form of indirect evidence comes in the form of
said ad-hoc stories: Telling a story meant to establish that a certain function was adaptive in a
past environment, based on which a hypothesis about its being a biological trait with a genetic
substrate is inferred.
Note that my distinction between direct and indirect evidence does not run between
empirical and non-empirical evidence. Indirect evidence may very well be empirical, such as
in the case of finding empirical evidence for a given cognitive mechanism’s being modular,
which would indirectly support analogy claims. Note also that direct evidence for a claim only
ever amounts to support rather than verification (cf. Popper 1959), and falsification is not a
matter of falsifying singular statements or hypotheses derived from the theory, but rather of
discrediting the theory as a whole (cf. Quine 1980: ch. 2). At best, indirect evidence amounts
to boosting  the  plausibility  of  an  ad-hoc story;  but  no matter  how plausible  or  coherent,
without direct  evidence it  will  remain a hypothesis,  rather than itself  providing evidential
support.  This  is  not  because  non-empirical  plausibility  is  generally  to  be  disregarded  in
constructing scientific theories, but because the very requirements for something to count as
evidence for EP is empirical to begin with: Namely, if a gene is shown to produce a specific
trait, then the theory implying that this gene produces it is directly supported empirically –
such a finding would do much more than merely boosting the theory’s coherence.
One proposal specifying said evidential requirements for psychological functions is
provided by Buss, who holds that an evolved psychological mechanism “exists in the form it
does because it (or other mechanisms that reliably produce it) solved a specific problem of
individual  survival  or  reproduction  recurrently  over  evolutionary history”  (Buss  1995:  6).
Consequently,  an evolutionary explanation of a specific psychological mechanism has two
objectives: Explaining  why organisms display the features they do, and  how these features
came to be this way. That is, it assumes a functional analysis of psychological mechanisms
(see  the  previous  section),  and  ties  this  function  to  its  evolutionary  origin.  Any  such
explanation  is  vindicated  by  gathering  evidence  supporting  the  how-explanation,  and  by
establishing  that  the  how-explanation  has  a  bearing  on the  why-explanation.  So,  how an
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organism acquired a specific property needs to be connected to why it still has it: Generally,
the  how-answer  will  supply  details  regarding  the  mechanism’s  adaptiveness,  and  its
contribution  to  an  organism’s  adaptiveness  will  be  connected  to  its  being  genetically
inherited,  which  answers  the  why-question.  This  connection  is  crucial,  since  we  are  not
merely looking for functions which share a common ancestry; we are looking for functions
which serve a  purpose, and we aim to root this purpose in its contribution to adaptiveness.
Since the purpose is a necessary part of the mechanistic explanation, we can determine the
mechanism’s intentionality: its specific directedness at external circumstances.
Evolutionary explanations do not just compete among each other, but also with non-
evolutionary explanations. While the latter need not hold that there is no evolutionary basis at
all for the traits an organism exhibits, they have to at least establish that evolutionary facts
have no primary (sufficient or specific) explanatory bearing on the function which is to be
analysed. Non-evolutionary explanations deny the central claim of EP, namely that a given
psychological  mechanism is  possessed  by  an  organism because  it  posed  an  evolutionary
advantage for its ancestors. In order to defend EP against non-evolutionary explanation it is
not sufficient to merely establish that this mechanism poses or posed an advantage for an
organism of the respective species, but also that it was this advantage which led to its being
genetically  passed  on  to  its  offspring.  So,  non-evolutionary  explanations  will  focus  on
claiming that non-evolutionary reasons for its being possessed by an organism yield a specific
and sufficient explanation (cf. Levy 2004: 463 ff.).
II.7.1.2. Main and Side Effects of Adaptive Mechanisms
EP can explain a given property either as a main or as a side effect of adaptive gene-
expression. Consider the following hypothetical example: Imagine a planet which has neither
provided  light  nor  carbon  dioxide  during  the  time  frame  in  which  a  certain  species  of
organisms has evolved. If we were to find out that these organisms are in fact able to perform
photosynthesis  whenever  provided  with  light  and  CO2,  the  claim  that  any feature  of  the
current organisms has evolved in order to perform photosynthesis is wrong, since the relevant
selection pressure has in fact never been exerted. Yet, there should be an evolutionary account
of why these organisms have developed traits which allow it to perform photosynthesis by
explaining  this  function  as  resting  on  some  other  function  which  is  evolutionarily
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advantageous even without the presence of light and CO2.91 While such an evolutionary origin
story explains the organism’s producing photosynthesis, it does not explain it on functional
grounds;  therefore,  there  is  need for  some theoretical  revision,  namely  in  the  connection
between evolutionarily selected function and de facto performed function (i.e. the connection
between “why” and “how”).  Notice that  this  form of explanation exploits  the brackets  in
Buss’s definition of an evolved mechanism (see previous section): There are evolved traits
which  enable  the  organisms  in  question  to  “reliably  produce”  a  mechanism  performing
photosynthesis;  yet  it  does  not  exist  due  to  its  solving  “a  specific  problem of  individual
survival  or  reproduction  recurrently  over  evolutionary  history”,  but  only  because  “other
mechanisms  that  reliably  produce  it” solved  this  problem.  This  means  that  whenever  a
specific psychological function is the main factor for its being evolutionary selected, we need
to skip Buss’s bracketed qualifier:
[DEF. EP-Main] If it is an evolutionary main effect, a psychological mechanism exists
in the form it does because it solved a specific problem of individual survival or reproduction
recurrently over evolutionary history.
But  whenever  the  psychological  function  is  a  side  effect  of  other  evolutionarily  selected
mechanisms, then the bracket is in effect:
[DEF. EP-Side] If it is an evolutionary side effect, a psychological mechanism exists
in the form it does because (an)other mechanism(s) that reliably produce(s) it solved a
specific problem of individual survival or reproduction recurrently over evolutionary
history.92
The  bottom  line  is  this:  Whenever  an  evolutionary  explanation  applies  and  a
psychological function is perfomed as a side-effect, then evolutionary selection has no bearing
on it, but selection has to have a bearing on the mechanism which produces it as a side effect
91  I chose a hypothetical example for the sake of clarity. Some actual examples: Current obesity is a side-effect
of  an originally  adaptive  mechanism, namely of  storing energy  for  times of  need.  The fact  that  we cannot
willingly correct the perception of optical illusions, even if we are aware of seeing an illusion, is a side-effect of
effective visual processing. Also, see Pinker 1997: 39 for pregnancy sickness as a possible side effect, 223 ff. for
the optical illusion “magic eye” and 534-538 for music as evolutionary side-effects. Also: “‘high-level’ modular
architectures, such as the cognitive structures underlying chess skill, are probably tokens of module-generating
developmental processes designed for other functions” (Barrett & Kurzban 2006: 640). I am indebted to Lara
Pourabdolrahim for pointing these examples out to me.
92 I modified the bracketed part, since what is important for this definitorial revision is the distinction between
main factor and side-effect, not between being produced by one and being produced by a combination of several
mechanisms.
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(cf. Jackson 1982: 134). Note that whether the function is produced as a main effect or as a
side effect does not decide whether it is currently advantageous or not; due to changes in the
environment, evolutionarily selected main effects may turn out to currently be a disadvantage
(such  as  today’s  misplaced/dysfunctional  ingroup-outgroup  behaviour  in  multicultural
societies),  and  side  effects  may  turn  out  to  be  advantageous  (such  as  our  hypothetical
photosynthesis example).
In side-effect cases, there is no practical divide between verifying that an organism is
able to perform a certain function, and verifying that this function has been evolutionarily
selected  for  –  because  any function  can  only be performed  on the necessary basis  of  an
evolutionarily  acquired  hardware,  radical  artificial  enhancement  notwithstanding.  The
distinction between main effects and side effects get lost in purely functional characterisations
– what counts for the latter are merely input-output relations, and both main and side effects
are simply parts of the same output. So, we will have to make a theoretical adjustment by
introducing causal notions: We need to add that the main effect  was a cause of its  being
evolutionarily selected (i.e. a cause for its being present in offspring), while the side-effect
wasn’t. That the notion of cause and effect are necessary to make this distinction between
main and side effect shows that evolutionary explanation is a type of causal explanation, and
consists  in  giving  the  evolutionary  cause  for  a  psychological  effect.  When psychological
effects are main effects, they both figure as causes and effects, if they are side effects, they
figure only as effects. But in both cases, they are effects of evolutionary causes.
II.7.1.3. Evolutionary Explanations as Secondary Explanations
In  some  attempts  at  tracing  organismic  functions  back  to  evolutionary  origins,
evolutionary  explanations  turn  out  not  to  serve  as  primary  explanations.  Consider  social
functions which are not determined by genetic  make-up:  For example,  being a voter (i.e.
competently participating in elections) can be primarily analysed in terms of sociopolitical
requirements. Here, the primary explanation is given by a description of the political system
which  provides  the  conditions  for  these  requirements.  An  evolutionary  explanation  can
provide  further  (i.e.  secondary)  explanations  for  why  a  person  can  fulfill  these  basic
requirements for being a voter, such as by describing cognitive skills required for making a
mark  on  a  piece  of  paper  and  participating  in  political  decisions.  Yet,  evolutionary
explanations cannot explain the difference between a person who has such competences and is
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not a voter, and one who has it and is – for example, living in a society in which people can be
voters.
The same can be said for learning specific languages versus being disposed to learn
any language:  “Researchers  who  think  that  language  is  an  adaptation  do  not  deny  that
different languages are acquired in cognitive development” (Mercier & Sperber 2011: 101).
Accordingly,  we  should  distinguish  between  a  primary  evolutionary  explanation  and  a
secondary  one.  To  explain  a  given  property  primarily  is  to  explain  it  specifically  and
sufficiently (see II.7.1.1), to give a secondary explanation is to explain the disposition to or
the  necessary  basis  of  this  property.  So,  if  the  disposition  to  speak  a  language  is  an
evolutionary  adaptation,  then  evolutionary  facts  about  its  development  would  explain  the
current  disposition  primarily.  However,  being  proficient  at  speaking  English  is  explained
primarily by social facts, namely the details of being part of a community of English speakers.
Still, evolution potentially provides a secondary explanation by explaining how an English
speaker is disposed to pick up any language (or any sufficiently similar  to English). This
secondary  explanation  would  be  concerned  with  explaining  necessary  psychological  and
behavioural  dispositions  to  fulfill  the  required  function  (compare  other  examples  such as
mastering C++ in section I.4.4).
Such explanations are secondary because having the ability to perform (or performing)
the specific function that is to be explained does not follow from them directly. What follows
is  rather  a  general  template  for  fulfilling  diverse functions  which  evolution  has  equipped
human  beings  with.  For  example,  much  as  anyone  who  can  pick  up  English  is  (ceteris
paribus) also genetically equipped to pick up French, we are not restricted to either using cars
or to using bicycles.  So, one single function – getting from A to B – might very well  be
fulfilled in several distinct ways, with distinct cognitive capacities underlying these: learning
how to ride a bike does not cognitively enable you to drive a car, and vice versa. On the other
hand, speaking two different languages might exploit some of the same cognitive functions
(namely linguistic capacities), while the social function might differ: The function of speaking
French is to get along well in France, not to get along well in Germany (and we can go so far
as to construe narratives in which speaking one language systematically leads to survival, and
another doesn’t, thus potentially being of evolutionary relevance). So, since it is possible to
have a pairing of one cognitive basis with two functions just as well  as a pairing of two
functions with the same cognitive basis, no immediate connection to evolution needs to be
presupposed  across  the  board  when  it  comes  to  explaining  the  relation  between  mental
function  and  the  underlying  cognitive  ability.  In  such  cases,  domain-general  learning
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mechanisms can explain how functions which are eventually shaped or determined socially
can be fulfilled by genetically inherited mechanisms (cf. Buller 2006: 199). On a neural level,
phenotypic plasticity can implement such learning mechanisms:
“Phenotypic plasticity is the capacity of a single genotype to produce more than one adaptive 
phenotype – more than one anatomical form, physiological state, or psychological mechanism 
– in response to environmental conditions. And research in developmental neurobiology has 
shown that mechanisms of neural development embody a plasticity that produces, through  
interaction with the local environment,  brain structures that  perform relatively specialised  
cognitive functions” (ibid.: 200).
Once  again,  note  that  it  is  always  possible  to  make  a  minimal  claim  about  the
secondary relevance of an evolutionary explanation: Namely that the architecture underlying a
given cognitive mechanism, insofar as it depends on gene expression, has an evolutionary
origin. In connecting the notion of psychological  properties and traits  tied to evolutionary
origins, EP is concerned with attempting to provide a primary explanation, which is why it
sometimes competes with non-evolutionary explanations which also claim to be of primary
explanatory value.
II.7.1.4. Challenges to Evolutionary Explanations
The decisive question that has to be answered in order to determine whether a given
evolutionary  explanation  applies  is  whether  the  respective  psychological  explanandum
constitutes a trait in a sufficiently biological sense, or rather a localised, culture- or society-
dependent or learned property.  Properties that are local and/or social in origin can also be
adaptive, so properties of these traits can be consistent with evolutionary ad-hoc hypotheses
(see II.7.1.1). However, they will differ insofar as they will not depend on an ancient point of
origin, and gene-expression won’t sufficiently and specifically explain them.
That a given property differs between cultures can constitute indirect evidence for its
not being genetically but socially inherited/learned. Henrich et al. (2010) have reviewed such
evidence,  suggesting  that  many psychological  properties,  ranging from higher-order  ones,
such as styles of reasoning and a sense of fairness, down to those which seem more hard-
wired in comparison, such as properties of perception or the heritability of the IQ, do in fact
differ  significantly  among  current  populations.  These  differences  are  not  accounted  for
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evolutionarily,  since suitable predictors for them are in fact non-evolutionary in nature: “a
population’s  degree  of  market  integration  and  its  participation  in  a  world  religion  both
independently predict higher offers [in ultimatum game trials, tracking a sense of fairness],
and account for much of the variation between populations” (Henrich et al 2010: 65). There, it
is also pointed out that in some cases cultural differences in cognitive processing correspond
to differential brain activation during the performance of the same cognitive tasks (ibid.: 72,
see also Hedden et al. 2008). Given the range of possible solutions to many theoretical or
practical tasks and the amount of different strategies for arriving at any of these, it is hardly
surprising that the employment of problem-solving strategies can depend on which of these
are favored in a given cultural environment, and that the use of different strategies can in turn
result  in  the  employment  of  different  cognitive  mechanisms  and  different  corresponding
neural bases. Yet, if cognitive processing were determined evolutionarily, it would be more
plausible to assume that corresponding brain activities doesn’t differ across culture, insofar as
these have evolved from the same ancestor.93 If a function has been selected evolutionarily,
then same function should imply same genetic basis, and same genetic basis should imply
same brain activation. And cultural difference shouldn’t be a better predictor for the brain
activity  underlying  cognitive  performance  than  sameness  of  the  evolutionarily  selected
function. 
While  it  hasn’t  been  shown  that  these  examples  apply  analogously  to  cognitive
processing across the board,  and we should expect there to be both sets of evolutionarily
inherited as well as socially inherited cognitive functions, these considerations should at least
illustrate how sociocultural explanations compete with evolutionary explanations of cognitive
functions. We should also expect them to overlap, namely when social  structures  have an
influence on which traits are adaptive and which aren’t. For example, since we have reason to
believe that the IQ’s heritability, and the degree to which higher IQs favor survival more than
lower IQs, are itself subject to cultural influence (see Henrich et al. 2010: 77), identifying the
cultural factors would in this case constitute the primary explanation for genetic make-up, and
the genetic  make-up constitutes the primary explanation for the expression of this cognitive
trait only within this social framework.
In those cases in which the presence of certain features can turn out to be primarily
explained  without  recurring  to  evolution,  it  may  still  be  necessary  to  try  and  acquire
93 In this and the following sentence, “sameness” of brain activation does of course not imply exact sameness,
but sufficient functional similarity.  That is, if we were to find out that a general set of (potential) activation
patterns  were  to  underlie  a  cognitive  function,  we  would  expect  sameness  to  mean  being  part  of  this  set.
Differential brain activation, as cited, would mean not being part of it.
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evolutionary  evidence  –  simply  because  there  will  be  no  other  way to  find  out  whether
assuming an evolutionary origin is plausible without reviewing available evidence. So, the
fact  that  it  is  strikingly  plausible  that  acquiring  evolutionary  evidence  is  superfluous  for
explaining why someone is a voter should not let us forget that we are likely to come across
cases in which the question whether an evolutionary origin story actually has a bearing on
explaining  the  presence  of  a  psychological  feature  cannot  be  settled  in  the  absence  of
reviewing  evolutionary  evidence.  Sometimes,  non-evolutionary  theories  (such  as  those
pertaining  to  social  learning)  will  only  outdo  competing  evolutionary  theories  after
evolutionary  evidence  has  been  reviewed  and  turned  out  not  to  support  establishing  the
respective  function  as  an  evolutionary  effect.  This  is  perhaps  going  to  be  the  case  in
evolutionary explanations of gender attributes, where currently we cannot be sure where our
evolutionary heritage ends and social conventions start (cf. Levy 2004). Thus, we may be
presented with the paradoxical case that evolutionary evidence is instrumental for establishing
its own expendability.
II.7.2. Dynamic Systems Theory
Dynamic systems theory typically opposes the notion of a centralised representational
processor, i.e. the view that, in order to master the challenges the environment poses and to
guide their behaviour accordingly, organisms use rich internal models of this environment (cf.
Brooks 1991, Thelen & Smith 1994, Beer 2000).94 As of late, a popular strategy to explain
away internal models is to invoke forms of embodiment and embeddedness (compare footnote
8). That is, if functional reactions to external challenges can be explained as direct reactions to
stimuli mediated by the senses there doesn’t need to be any additional internal encoding, and
comparatively simple algorithms would suffice.
Two things should be noted: firstly, these internal models stand in no obvious relation
to the kind of representations intentional psychology invokes, and it is an open question to
which degree neural representations (see II.3) can be explained away by said approaches. As I
have argued, partaking in symbolic practice is necessary for being assigned “rich” notions of
intentional  states,  and adherence to some of the laws specified  by intentional  psychology
(which amounts to saying that taking Dennett’s “intentional stance” is pragmatically justified,
94 The examples for neuronal representations which I presented in chapter II.3  are candidates for such internal
models.
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see section I.7.5) is necessary for being assigned “sparse” notions. But it is an open question
how informational richness of internal models contributes to either notion. All said notions of
rich and sparse representation require is that some internal informational state(s) fulfill the
function associated with the ascriptions. The question how informationally sparse or rich an
internal model will be depends on two things, (1) on how sparse an implementation of such
capacities can theoretically be and (2) how these capacities are actually implemented in an
agent’s  cognitive  substrate.  And  these  two  points  have  no  direct  bearing  on  matters  of
representation as construed above. For example, we can envision functioning thermostats to
either be based on sparse or on rich internal mechanisms but outwardly “behaving” in the
same way, so as to both justify taking the intentional stance in virtually the same way as well.
Which segues  into  my second point:  There is  a  limit  to  the explanatory power of
accounts which seek to do away with internal models. Such a theory faces similar problems as
behaviourism,  insofar  as  both  seek  to  explain  cognition  primarily  in  terms  of  organism-
environment  interaction.  This  makes  it  vulnerable  to  some of  the  criticism that  has  been
directed at behaviourism, especially the question how it can solve problems which seem to
require “representation-hungry” solutions by requiring substantial internal information storage
(cf. Clark 1997: 168, also see I.7.3).
However,  looking beyond its  criticism of internal  models,  dynamic systems theory
aims to lay the groundwork for naturalistically analysing cognitive representations (Thelen &
Smith 1994, Bechtel 1998). Michael Zehetleitner (forthcoming) has pointed why we should
favour  this  approach  over  evolutionary  ones,  namely  because  the  latter  suffer  from  the
Problem of Historicity, whereas the former does not.95 To illustrate this point, Zehetleitner
invokes Davidson’s thought experiment of the “Swamp  Man”, a creature that is physically
identical with a human being but has no evolutionary history (for the details see Davidson
2001b: 19). If we were to follow Millikan’s and Neander’s teleosemantic account – i.e. if
representational content is that which relies on evolutionarily selected structures (see section
I.8.4) –, such a creature could not be ascribed any mental content at all. Similarly, even if its
behaviour would justify taking the intentional stance (i.e. assigning mental states based on
laws  of  intentional  psychology),  we  would  be  unable  to  identify  any  physical  structures
underlying these mental states, since these structures would have to be individuated by their
95 An editorial note: I assume that Zehetleitner’s forthcoming paper is going to serve as an ideal reference for this
subsection. However, since at the time I am writing this it is still unpublished, I am basing the position presented
here on some of his recent talks (see footnote 63). Hence, his eventual position might deviate from my present
portrayal. To make up for this, I am also referencing several analogous (if less unified) positions here.
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mental functions and determining their functions hinges on evolutionary selection. For these
reasons Zehetleitner proposes an approach that is crucially ahistoric.
Cummins makes an analogous point, but rather than by citing Davidson’s “swamp
man” example, he invokes the “teleporter” from Star Trek,
“a kind of duplicating machine that duplicates organisms not by cloning, or by any other  
biochemical process that uses the information coded in the organism’s DNA, but just as a copy
machine duplicates a printed page without understanding it.  The machine I have in mind  
produces a perfect physical duplicate of an organism without ‘understanding it’. (…) [T]he  
assumption behind the Star Trek transporter is that the duplicate is the same person who  
entered  the  transporter.  There  seems  little  doubt  that,  for  the  purposes  of  a  psychology  
experiment, a molecule-by-molecule duplicate of a person would do as well as the original. To
deny this seems to be to deny physicalism” (Cummins 1991: 80 f.).96
To  be  sure,  since  the  odds  that  we  are  to  encounter  such  an  ahistoric  being  are
neglectable, any connected problem couldn’t turn into a virulent methodological problem for
identifying  mental  representations  in  biological  organisms.  Thus,  I  propose  reframing  the
problem of historicity in terms of our more pressing methodological problems: Namely, while
we can assume that all organisms whom we assign mental states to also have an evolutionary
history, it can be difficult to invoke this history in order to identify or characterise a specific
function. I have sketched some of these problems in section II.7.1, and while they sometimes
involve conceptual confusion about how secondary evolutionary explanations cannot play the
role of primary ones, and indirect evidence cannot serve as decisive one, more frequently they
boil  down to  a  lack  of  decisive  evidence.  That  is,  while  we are  likely  to  gather  general
evidence  about  evolutionary  interconnections  between  organisms,  evidence  about  the
evolution of specific cognitive functions is much harder to come by, which (as pointed out
previously)  is  why  evolutionary  psychology  remains  a  field  of  much  controversial
speculation.  Thus, if  we could find a way to characterise  such functions independently of
evolutionary/historic  properties  of  organisms,  and  rather  infer  these  characteristics  from
current  properties,  we  would  gain  a  significant  methodological  advantage  (also  compare
Waskan 2006: 3.6).
96 It should be noted that Cummin’s framework in which this quote should be placed is crucially different from
mine: Here, he seeks to find a notion of representation which satisfies computational requirements, and this is
where his criticism of historicity hails from: “According to computationalist accounts, history is an accidental
property of a cognitive mechanism. According to computationalism, cognitive systems are individuated by their
computational properties, and these are independent of history” (ibid.: 82). While there are notable connections
between the computational notion and the one I’m after, mine is at least different insofar as the satisfaction of
computationalist requirements does not straight away enter my account as a premise.
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This is what the dynamic systems approach aims to yield.  Roughly,  it  individuates
representations by equating them with internal structures in living systems which inhabit a
specific  place  in  a  causal  model  from dynamic  systems  theory  (Zehetleitner’s  respective
approach relies on Friston 2010, Ashby 1954, Bischof & Zehetleitner 2015). The idea is that
representations  are  things  which  elicit  a  directed  biological  activity  that  supports  an
organism’s  structural  integrity  and  ensures  its  endurance  as  a  functioning  system  by
minimising  entropy  (which  is  one  of  the  basic  characteristics  of  a  living  organism,  as
historically proposed by Schrödinger 1992: 67-75). In a nutshell: What an internal structure is
intentionally aimed at is learned by finding out how this structure supports the organism’s
homoeostasis. To invoke an example by Dretske (1986): Magnetotactic bacteria populating
the  northern  hemisphere’s  oceans  have  an  internal  magnet  that  guides  them  toward  the
geomagnetic north. This causes them to reach deeper, oxygen-free waters, which is crucial for
their  survival.  Since  the  decisive  factor  for  the  bacteria’s  homeostasis  is  the  anoxic
environment,  being  propelled  toward  it  can  be  singled  out  as  the  proper  function  of  the
organism’s respective mechanism and its external aim. Thus, the mechanism can be said to
have representational properties (although, as Dretske points out, certainly not full-fledged
beliefs) aimed at anoxic waters. (For brevity’s sake I will gloss over the differences between
Zehetleitner’s and Dretske’s account.)
We  can  imagine  that  in  many  cases,  evolutionarily  individuated  functions  and
representations  will  in  fact  coincide with  those  individuated  using  the  dynamic  systems
approach as just sketched. In cases analogous to the magnetotactic bacteria, the mechanism
which is conducive to maintaining homoeostasis is also the mechanism which was selected
evolutionarily  to  execute  this  function.  However,  not  only  can  finding  out  about  a
mechanism’s function and its evolutionary history be separated methodologically, we can also
envision cases in which the dynamic systems approach will single out functions which are
more  specific  than  evolutionary  approaches:  Joining  with  the  NSDAP  was  conducive  to
homoeostasis in Nazi Germany, while only very broadly having been evolutionarily selected
for (if, say, carrying genes responsible for developing ruthless compliance was a cause for
joining). Yet, many related examples will exceed even the dynamic systems approach: If we
wish  to  explain  the  representational  qualities  of  the  associated  ideological  beliefs,  both
evolutionary  and  dynamic  systems  explanations  would  reach  their  limits.  That  is,
representational systems feeding on “rich content” (see I.4.5) will incorporate elements which
need neither  be innate  nor conducive to homoeostasis,  but only depend on systematically
heeding  norms  of  symbolic  systems.  Zehetleitner  &  Schönbrodt  exemplarily  mention
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“mathematical symbolic systems” since these are purportedly “completely unrelated to the
external  world”  (Zehetleitner  &  Schönbrodt  2013:  216).  Despite  our  not  needing  to
acknowledge this strong claim, we can invoke their example on the grounds that adhering to
mathematical rules is primarily explained in heeding rules of symbolic systems instead of
being grounded in gene expression or homoeostasis. That is, mathematical knowledge can be
conducive  to  homoeostasis,  perhaps  even to  survival,  but  neither  approach  can  primarily
explain  why  a  given  individual  has  mastered  general  mathematical  principles.  Similarly,
subscribing  to  certain  ideological  beliefs  can  be  construed  as  conducive  to  achieving
evolutionary aims and goals concerned with bodily and functional integrity; but only in such a
roundabout way that it is dubitable whether said two approaches still provide anything that
can justifiably be called an explanation. A social learning approach would prove more fruitful
in such cases, since it is able to explain how we come to adhere to norms related to symbolic
systems and why we do so, and it would expand our explanatory scope regarding intentional
mental states considerably.
An  approach  which  seeks  to  individuate  cognitive  representations  in  terms  of
homoeostasis faces another shortcoming: namely, while it can account for misrepresenting, it
cannot  distinguish  between  deliberately  or  purposefully  meaning  something  and  meaning
something  by  accident.  For  instance,  an  evolutionary  mechanism  which  is  accidentally
advantageous will be ascribed the same content as one which has been selected for this very
advantage: main and side effects are thusly lumped together (see II.7.1.2, esp. footnote 92).
So, we are offered a trade-off for solving evolutionary theory’s problem of historicity:  We
lose some of its specificity. For example, the heart contributes to an organism’s homoeostasis
by supplying oxygenated blood to different bodily regions, but by doing so, it also contributes
to a temperature exchange: if the torso is warmer than the legs, then the heart’s pumping
blood contributes to a more rapid temperature exchange between torso and legs than if  it
weren’t pumping blood. Depending on external circumstances, this can serve homoeostasis
(by, say, keeping the legs warm). However, it seems exceedingly plausible to regard pumping
blood  as  the  heart’s  main  function  (or  “basic  factor”,  cf.  Cummins  1991:  76  f.)  and
temperature exchange as a side effect.  But in order to distinguish between main and side
effect, pointing to matters of homoeostasis isn’t enough, since these will only track what is
beneficial, no matter if it is purposefully or accidentally so. The heart, along with the other
organs, also adds weight to the body and might help me not to get blown off a cliff; all the
same, supplying weight surely isn’t the main function of the body’s organs (in fact, there
could  be  as  many  situations  in  which  weighing  someone  down  isn’t  functional  at  all).
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Amputating his own arm turned out to contribute decisively to Aron Ralston’s homoeostasis
when it was caught under a dislodged boulder; yet, his arm’s purpose wasn’t to be amputated.
We can invoke the conceptual  framework and methods of evolutionary theory in order to
make  this  distinction  which  can’t  be  made  in  terms  of  homoeostasis.  Homoeostasis  also
cannot even mark processes contributing to organismic change, and perhaps most strikingly,
to  matters  of  reproduction  as  functional:  organs  contributing  to  reproduction  cannot  be
assigned a homoeostatic function, and puberty and menopause would remain mysterious.
Since this distinction between purposefully and accidentally representing is integral to
ascriptions of semantic content across the board, there is an analogy for this problem at the
level of intentional psychological explanation: I can mispronounce Porto for Bordeaux while
booking a flight, yet still end up enjoying my vacation in the wrong spot; but that doesn’t
change  that  I  did  in  fact  mean  Porto  and  not  Bordeaux.  Even  if  a  mechanism’s
misperformance ends up having advantageous  consequences  for  its  host  (and even if  our
meaning something by accident can be beneficial, cf.  Zehetleitner & Schönbrodt 2013), we
should be able to separate meant content from beneficial  content. So, I suggest that while
matters of homoeostasis can certainly provide heuristics for assigning content, it can only do
so because matters of proper function and matters of homoeostasis often coincide; yet, the
latter cannot settle matters of proper representation all by themselves, and we will ultimately
still have to defer to the respective mechanism’s proper purpose.
What we should mark here are processes which systematically contribute to a species’
homoeostasis, not to those of an individual under special or extraordinary circumstances; but
with the need for marking the required systematicity comes the introduction of evolutionary
history, and thus the problem of historicity. Given these two options, I’d rather downplay the
problem of historicity than abandon the notion of adaptiveness altogether. Both in Davidson’s
“swamp man” example as well as in the case of the teleporter from Star Trek we can say that
the reason for the duplicate’s  having representations is that the original had them. In that
sense, it is wrong to say that such a duplicate doesn’t have a history: It’s just that its history
took an unlikely turn by duplicating an organism with adaptive representational mechanisms.
That is, we can accept duplicates; but the distinction between these duplicates accidentally
meaning something and their actually meaning something can only be made by mentioning
that  they are  duplicates  of  specific  kinds  of  organisms  (and therefore,  Cummins’  criteria
hailing  from computationalism should  be  amended,  see footnote  96).  Accepting  this  also
means that an exact physical duplicate need not inherit the original’s representational states;
but we knew that already (see I.8).
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II.7.3 Social Learning
Finding  out  about  an  organism’s  evolutionary  history  plays  an  important  role  in
explaining why it has developed its cognitive mechanisms, why they work the way they do,
and which parts of its neural architecture should count as fulfilling the organismic functions in
question. Still, we cannot exclusively rely on evolutionary accounts to explain these, because
the cognitive functions of organisms are not exclusively or specifically determined by gene
expression: they can also be learned. Most animals have the capacity to learn in one way or
another – to change their behaviour, their dispositions to behaviour, and/or their cognitive
processing depending on their experiences and habitat. Certainly, learning plays an important
part in the acquisition of cognitive capacities especially in higher animals, including humans.
Okano et al. define learning quite minimalistically as “a process of acquiring memory”
and memory as “a behavioural change caused by an experience” (Okano et al. 2000: 12403).
But while experience is a necessary part, it is not the only cause of behavioural changes which
count as learning.97 Rather,  it  is  the  interaction of  organismic  or genetic  dispositions  and
experiences which results in learning. When mentioning a genetic disposition and external
circumstances does not suffice to explain behaviour, learned abilities can fill this explanatory
gap. For example, in many animals, reacting with aversive and fearful behaviour to snakes
can be explained by pointing out their innate disposition to fear snakes and the perception of a
snake.98 Formally,  this  behavioural  explanation works just  like the syllogism employed in
action explanations (see section I.6):
(1) O has a disposition to fear snakes
(2) O perceives a snake
(C) O shows fearful behaviour.
If we assume the disposition to fear snakes to be innate, then (1) will be an evolutionary fact
about O, and the cognitive mechanism associated with it will be analysed just as laid out in
the previous sections. To briefly recapitulate: There, I have stressed the importance of adding
evolutionary accounts to analyses of cognition, since evolutionary explanations are tied to the
identification of cognitive mechanisms. Mechanisms are identified by their functional role for
97 This definition is too broad for another reason: it encompasses exercise. The difference is that learning refers
to the acquisition of an ability, whereas exercise means improving on it.
98 However,  there can also be features  which depend both on innate properties  as well  as on learning:  For
example, Mineka and Cook (1989) argue that monkeys have an innate disposition to acquire a fear of snakes.
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the organism. Assuming a teleofunctional account, functional roles are tied to evolutionary
history, and more specifically, an organism’s genetic make-up. This is crucial for specifying
the function that is to be fulfilled – namely, to produce the proper output.
However, if a disposition that fulfills the role of premise (1) in a given behavioural
explanation  is  not  exclusively  determined  by  genetic  expression,  then  we  need  to  move
beyond such accounts. For example, if the syllogism were the following
(1) P speaks English
(2) P perceives a sign that says “no parking here”
(C) P does not park her car where the sign points to
then, clearly, evolutionary accounts would not provide us with a satisfying explanation. They
simply are not fine-grained enough: While there could be an evolutionary explanation for
speaking a language,  there cannot  be one for  specifically speaking English (rather  than a
different language). And (C) clearly does not follow if we substitute (1) with an evolutionarily
explainable fact such as “P speaks a language” (compare Cummins 1991: 49 f.).
We can find many cognitive mechanisms in humans to not  depend exclusively on
genetic expression (or not to be “hard-wired”), insofar as they are either developed only if the
environment  provides  certain  stimuli,  or  insofar  as  they  undergo  fundamental
environmentally-induced change within the individual’s lifetime. To be sure, this fact does
not  negate  or  contradict  evolutionary  accounts.  Rather,  we  need  explanations  which
complement  applicable  evolutionary  ones  to  compensate  for  their  not  being  fine-grained
enough. In these required fine-grained explanations the environment does not merely take the
place  of  a  specific  context  (i.e.  formally taking the  place  of  premises  such as  (2)  in  our
syllogism), but in the shaping of the underlying cognitive disposition, i.e. premise (1). This is
consistent  with  finding  that  what  has  been  evolutionarily  selected  for  in  our  cognitive
architecture  are  not  merely  “hard-wired”  components,  but  rather  that  evolution  favours
phenotypic plasticity altogether (see II.7.1.3 and I.8.5).
To add three remarks: Firstly, the fact that neural plasticity underlies a lot of neural
processes is a given. What presently matters is that it is a way of shaping neural architecture
which is not exclusively determined genetically, but also by interaction with the environment.
Secondly, learned abilities are not to be confused with those which are a product of individual
(ontogenetic) phenotypic development. Some abilities are not present at birth – such as the
ability to procreate –, but they are not learned either. Learned abilities are those which require
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environmental cues. For example, we can find that without learning to ride a bike, this ability
will not magically appear by a certain age. Neither will the ability to speak English. Thirdly,
this is not to say that learned abilities such as riding a bike or speaking English do not depend
on  certain  abilities  which  are  the  product  of  genetic  expression.  They  simply  do  not
exclusively depend on these. That is, we can envision that someone has the genetic disposition
to learn the English language, but that either due to environmental limitations or due their
own decision, they don’t actually learn English.
Dretske makes this connection between social learning and the import of semantically
characterised states for explaining human behaviour explicit:
“The reason learning is so central to intelligent behavior, to the behavior of people, is that  
learning is the process in which internal indicators are harnessed to output and thus become 
relevant—as representations, as reasons—to the explanation of the behavior of which they are 
part.  It is in the learning process that information-carrying elements get a job to do because of
the  information  they  carry  and  hence  acquire,  by  means  of  their  content,  a  role  in  the  
explanation of behavior” (Dretske 1988: 104).
While  there  is  thusly  sufficient  theoretical  reason  for  invoking  learning  as
underpinning some intentional capacities, there can also be empirical effects relating mental
representations and learning. For example, studies have found that learned representational
conventions, such as grammatical gender, influence cognitive representations: “Our findings
indicate that grammatical gender can lead speakers of a language to think about inanimate
objects in terms of properties that they associate with males and females. The properties that
“pop out” when people think of inanimate objects are the result of a developmental process in
which language plays a meaningful role, starting at the age of 7 years” (Sera et al. 2002, also
see Athanasopoulos et al. 2015).
Apart from those cognitive skills which make explicit reference to symbols, such as
linguistic  skills  (see  section  I.4.4),  much  cognitively  invoked  semantic  content  refers  to
objects about whose existence and characteristics we need to be educated. Not all invoked
objects depend on learning: some basic objects of cognitive representations which were of
direct  evolutionary  importance  are  indeed  likely  to  be  “hard-wired”  (here,  the  objects
associated with some of my earlier examples for neural representations in section II.3 might
qualify).  Yet,  it  is  characteristic  for human cognition to acquire  mental  objects  which are
evolutionarily “new” – which have not been around long enough to be anything but learned.
Whether we think about going to the mall because we have determined the fridge to be empty,
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or only vote for parties which support gender equality, or decide to wait for the extended cut
of the “Lord of the Rings” before buying the DVD – none of the objects of our cognitive
processing in  these  cases,  and in  many more  akin  to  these,  could  have  exclusively  been
determined by hard-wired mental representations. When we find Robert Williams expressing
that  he’s  “been  fascinated  since  days  in  graduate  school  with  underdetermination/
indeterminacy arguments in the theory of representation” we can see the same investigative
aim:
“[looking] at alternative traditions – salient among them being the causal-teleological accounts
of Dretske and Millikan, or (in the case of language rather than mental content) the ideas  
surrounding the causal theory of reference, (...) the really compelling stuff that I could extract 
seemed to lack some of the virtues I prized in interpretationist accounts. Interpretationism, if it
worked, would give a story about all content, not just special cases (reference to medium sized
dry  good and  their  observable  properties).  My hunch was  that  I  wouldn’t  find  in  these  
alternative  traditions  a  satisfactory story about  unsexy but  genuine questions  about  what  
grounds the relation between the word ‘of’ and its semantic value, or about the grounds of  
content of highly theoretical beliefs remote from perception or action.”99
In a  nutshell:  Cases  of  rich  content  are  characteristic  and widespread enough for  human
cognition to warrant widening our accounts beyond teleofunctional accounts which determine
mechanisms based on genetic expression only (compare section I.4.5).
II.7.4. A Unified Account of Cognitive Representation
Given the teleological principles reviewed in the three previous subsections, we now
arrive at a unified form of cognitive representation (see Figure 7): Whether a cognitive state is
representational/intentional is determined by its falling under certain teleological principles.
These principles can either be stated in terms of functional aims of organismic mechanisms
which have been evolutionarily selected, or in terms of norms which are acquired through
social  learning.  The  former  are  not  necessarily  associated  with  mental  content  (yet,
conforming with them can still provide grounds for pragmatically assigning mental content in
attenuated  form,  see  I.7.5),  although  having  “rich”  mental  content  can  build  on  those
99 This  and Williams’  preceding  quote  were  taken  from an  interview conducted  by Lisa  Bortolotti  for  the
“Imperfect  Cognitions”  blog.  See  http://imperfectcognitions.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/the-nature-of-
representation-interview.html (retrieved on April 16th 2015).
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capacities conforming with them. Acquired norms can be those of logic, rationality,  or the
normative aspects of laws of intentional psychology.  For example,  if I promise to be at a
certain place, the fact that I should show up there is a matter of a conventional social norm.
My being there is rational insofar as it contributes to upholding this norm (much like Kant’s
categorical  imperative requires the maxims underlying our actions to be generalisable,  cf.
Kant 2011: 33 & 57 ff.). But this kind of rationality is not the kind which is a requirement for
having intentional states: that is, anyone can have good reasons (i.e. potential psychological
causes) to break this promise, namely when she has more urgent matters to attend to. In other
words: Any reasons for breaking this promise are assigned in terms of mental states which
(ceteris paribus) cause someone to break it. However, assigning any intentional psychological
causes depends on a second kind of rationality: on being consistent and generally believing
truths (see I.7.4). These norms are obviously distinct from norms such as that promises should
be kept: Abiding by the former is required for us to be assigned any intentional states at all.
So, apart from the kind of evolutionary aims mentioned before, rich intentional states (i.e.
those  for  whose  having  evolutionary/organismic  explanations  cannot  give  sufficient
conditions) can be traced to two kinds of norms: norms of semantic interpretation, which are
basic  and  indispensable,  and  conventional  social  norms,  which  can  explain  behaviour
contingent on social learning.
Figure 7:  Representations  are  relational  structures  holding between organismic  and environmental
properties which are connected by teleological principles. Evolution, homoeostasis and social learning
need not exhaust these principles, but they are the most dominant in current cognitive science.
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II.8. The Neuroscience of Intentionality
II.8.1. From Sparse to Rich Mental Content
As  Dretske  (1986)  and  others  in  his  wake  have  pointed  out,  one  problem  when
specifying how biological organisms represent objects is to pinpoint the exact content and to
allow for the possibility of misrepresentation (see II.4). So far I have argued that the solution
to both problems is to require that the object of a cognitive mechanism be the teleological aim
it has been fashioned to achieve. Millikan states this aim in terms of evolutionary selection
(see I.8.4 and II.7.1), dynamic systems theory does so in terms of homoeostasis (see II.7.2),
and sometimes we need to invoke norms acquired through social  learning (see II.7.3).  In
Dretske’s example the magnetotactic bacteria’s characteristic mechanism, while proximally
being aimed at guiding the bacteria into the direction of the earth’s magnetic north pole, in
fact executes the function of reaching deeper, anoxic waters. Being guided into the direction
of the north pole is the means by which the mechanism executes that function. No fruitful
function would be fulfilled for these bacteria by merely being directed to the north pole if this
would not result in reaching anoxic waters.
Specifying  a  mechanism’s  proper  function  is  a  matter  of  knowing  enough  of  its
environmental  and developmental  context,  as well  as pinpointing the role  it  plays  for the
organism. Both considerations of homoeostasis as well as of evolution can play their part in
this regard; but they do not always have to. Cognitive mechanisms can carry out functions
which are in no apparent way related to homoeostasis and for whose acquisition evolutionary
development is not sufficient. For example, we assume that those of us who have learned
addition  use  a  physically  realized  cognitive  mechanism  which  has  its  roots  in  genetic
expression in order to perform it; yet, evolutionary heritage alone does not suffice to put us
into a position of being able to perform addition, and while some of the means by which we
learn addition can be associated with homoeostasis in a broad sense (such as peer pressure or
associative  conditioning),  characterising  performing  addition  solely  in  terms  of  a
homoeostatic function means getting the concept of addition fundamentally wrong. Rather, in
cases such as these, agents shape evolutionarily acquired cognitive mechanisms in a way that
goes beyond what is evolutionarily explainable in order to perform the respective function.
What  holds for cases of sparse representation actually chimes with a view of rich
representation that is broadly Davidsonian in nature, namely that intentional explanation is,
“in  a  fundamental  way,  not  reducible  to  physical,  neurological,  or  even  behaviouristic
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concepts” (Davidson 2001a: 154). This is because “[e]vents conceived solely in terms of their
physical or physiological properties cannot be judged as (...) concerned with a subject matter”
(Davidson  2004:  180),  or,  in  other  words,  as  having  what  I  have  called  rich  intentional
content, and, if we do not add information about the purpose of physiological structures, not
even as having sparse content.  When we are dealing with rich content,  Davidson’s quote
identifies  the  central  problem  of  naturalising  those  mental  states  which  are  used  as
explanatory  kinds  in  intentional  psychology.  For  naturalists  it  is  a  reason for  wanting  to
explain intentionality away, and for intentional realists it is a reason to dismiss attempts at
naturalising  the  mind.  I  have  been  arguing  for  the  indispensable  explanatory  power  of
intentional psychology, while also claiming that it is not merely a descriptive theory, since the
normative aspect of its laws – logical, conceptual or rational norms – constitute a force which
is characteristically causally shaping our minds (compare I.6.4).
In cases of sparse representations, teleological descriptions have to be invoked in order
to determine representational content and to allow for misrepresentation, and for this reason,
non-individualistic analyses are a basic requirement for arriving at intentional descriptions at
all. In the case of rich representation, these teleological descriptions will not only be supplied
by  evolution  or  organismic  features  (although  these  do  form  a  basis  for  describing  the
cognisers  whose  minds  are  endowed  with  rich  intentionality),  but  by  further  normative
principles.  In  this  section  I  will  focus  on  how  the  neuroscientific  investigation  of  such
normatively shaped intentional states can proceed.
II.8.2. Getting a Grip on Normatively Shaped Cognition
Human minds are typically able to acquire skills which I have been associating with
rich forms of representations, namely the ability to be moved by semantic properties. Among
other  cognitive  skills,  some  characteristic  for  the  human  mind  are  learning  languages,
acquiring  and  contributing  to  explanatory  theories,  and  being  able  to  grasp  the  kinds  of
theories which underlie all kinds of representation, be they linguistic, aesthetic, scientific, or
psychological. (And for all we know, many of these cognitive abilities can be attributed to
non-humans as well, at least in proto- or attenuated form; compare I.7.5.) For this reason, the
task of explaining the mind cannot be achieved without acknowledging that it is shaped by the
normative forces delineating such skills.
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However, the fact that there are norms which have a causal influence on our minds is
itself  a descriptive fact,  and not a normative one. Therefore,  we can integrate  norms into
descriptive explanatory models. The fact that mental content is broad rather than narrow also
means that individual analyses of cognitive capacities, such as investigations of the brain, do
not themselves have to carry the burden of reducing norms (see section I.8). That is: If content
were individualistic – if having intentional states would not at all depend on environmental
factors –, then analyses of individual cognisers would also have to be able to settle matters of
content.  More specifically,  if  having a  brain  is  the foundation  for  being  a  cogniser,  then
analyses of individual brains would have to carry this burden. I have argued that this is not the
case.  Rather,  investigating  neural  properties  explains why and how individuals  fit  into an
environment which outfits their individual cognitive states with intentional attributes. Here,
we  can  speak  of  an  interpretation:  environmental  context  supplies  a  function  outfitting
individual  cognitive  states  with intentional  interpretations  (akin to Ned Block’s  “mapping
theory”, see Block 1991 and section I.8.5).
In  order  for  any  of  us  to  be  able  to  learn  the  skills  associated  with  intentional
properties,  the  characteristics  of  the  norms  guiding  these  skills  have  to  themselves  be
learnable. To be sure, this does not imply that we could internalise every potential application
of a rule (which would require infinite cognitive capacities). Rather, it means being able to
extrapolate  (potentially  infinite  applications  of)  a  rule  from  finite  observations  of  such
applications.  Cognitively,  it  means creating appropriately associated input-output-pairs, i.e.
identifying a finite set of characteristics of an input which warrant yielding a specific (kind of)
output. Since we can only ever extrapolate the characteristics of both in- and output from a
finite  amount  of observations,  we are never  safe from being led  to believe  that  we have
learned  a  given  rule  whereas  future  application  shows  that  we  have  in  fact  wrongly
extrapolated the norm governing its application (compare Kripke 1982: 8 ff.).
So, whatever the relevant norms themselves are, they cannot be facts intrinsic to the
cognitive make-up of someone who follows them (and they cannot  be determined by the
latter).  While  it  is  true that,  under idealised conditions,  the functions implemented  in our
neural mechanisms could also yield potentially infinite applications, we could not possibly
determine whether the norm which governs a cognitive function conflates with the external
norm which has caused the former’s acquisition. That is, even if we could find out which
formal rule is followed in either instance, we would not know whether it conflates with the
rule which is supposedly followed.100 Since the cognitive function has been acquired by way
100 Both Wittgenstein (PI §193 f.) and Davidson (1980: 255-259) invoke the tempting image of a machine which
could  be  broken  down,  much  like  an  idealised  neuroscientific  methodology could  make transparent  neural
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of extrapolating a rule from a finite amount of instances, we can only ever check whether
future applications contradict the previously extrapolated rule, but we cannot find out the one
rule governing all future applications. (The same is true for functions which are not acquired
through learning, but through evolution, and which are in this sense innate. This is because
even those functions which are innate are acquired by evolutionary means based on a finite
determination of characteristic “fit” between a species and its environment. For example, the
association between the magnetic north pole and anoxic waters has been acquired as the basis
for the magnetotactic bacteria’s mechanism because it proved stable over a finite amount of
time.  That the species’ characteristics  proved fitting for this  finite  amount  of time,  which
caused organisms to pass on these characteristics to its offspring, does of course not imply
that it is evolutionarily fit for all future instances of environmental conditions, so we cannot
say that the single defining norm governing the evolutionary fit has been implemented in the
respective species’ genes.)
Since intentional interpretations are not merely accidentally imposed on behaviour or
brain  states,  but  themselves  constitute  some  of  the  causal  determinants  of  characteristic
behaviour or brain states, it is crucial for explaining the structure of the mind. For example,
we only fear stock-market crashes because we have socially been taught to do so, and we are
only interpretable as fearing stock-market crashes for the very same reason. (I will go into
further detail regarding the shaping of cognitive architecture by way of norms in the following
section.)  In  this  sense,  intentional  ascriptions  capture  phenomena  pertaining  to  agential
behaviour more accurately than non-intentional descriptions.
From assuming this form of intentional realism and the fact that all actual cognitive
rule- and norm-related processing or behaviour can only ever be based on extrapolation from
finite application it follows that intentionally explaining such processing or behaviour is also a
matter of specifying finite states or processes. That is, for certain cognitive functions to count
as intentional it is sufficient for them to be traceable back to the external norm (which governs
the reference-relation) as its proper cause, not for the external norm to somehow be intrinsic
to the  cognitive  make-up itself.  Therefore,  the  conditions  under  which  brain  states  imply
intentional states are specifiable.
Any attempt at fully naturalising intentional properties of neural states still faces the
final verdict on what the norms guiding these themselves are. As I have argued, they are not
intrinsic facts about cognisers; instead, they are external phenomena which causally shape
cognition.  Anyone  keen on naturalising  intentionality  tout  court  should  like  to  treat  such
mechanisms for rule-following, thus unveiling the secrets about which rule is actually followed – and they both
reject this notion as misguided.
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norms as properties of the natural world, that is,  as properties restatable in non-normative
terms. While this aspect exceeds my present reach, I will briefly offer a potential scenario in
which one such naturalisation comes to pass. In it, norms turn out to be a highly complicated
web woven by communities  of  cognisers  and their  culture.  Here,  naturalisation  comes  to
terms  with  the  development  and  spreading  of  such  norms  through  communication,  and
succeeds in specifying how individual cognisers, who are both recipients and relays of such
norms, react to those environmental cues which make up the communication that constitutes
the building blocks of such norms.
While it is conceptually impossible to restate norms as non-norms, we can treat non-
normative properties as constitutive for norms, insofar as some non-normative properties are
sufficient  for  guiding  even  those  forms  of  behaviour  which  we  describe  as  normatively
guided. That is, the set of all environmental cues which can be described as shaping a mind so
as to internalise a norm is just that: a set of environmental cues; and environmental cues can
also be described non-normatively. I have pointed out that the functional norms governing our
cognition are arrived at through extrapolation from finite occurences; and while we think of
these  occurences,  as  well  as  of  some  of  our  cognition,  as  being  guided  by  such  norms
(whether these are universal laws of nature or functional aims), we may choose to view these
norms not as inherent facts of nature and cognition, but of our descriptions of these; and that,
under radically different descriptions, they eventually evaporate.
II.8.3. A Schema for the Neuroscientific Investigation of Intentional States
As has been noted  in section II.3, behaviour can be explained both by the means of
intentional  psychology and the means of neuroscience: that is,  both intentional  as well  as
neural states can be invoked as causes of behaviour. As has also been pointed out, the two
kinds of explanation are not interchangeable, since judgments of appropriateness or error are
only possible under the intentional explanation. No matter which norm exactly governs the
intentional state – whether it is a social norm, a norm of rationality, one judging evolutionary
adaptiveness,  or  otherwise  –,  it  is  clear  that  no such norm governs  an  individualistically
described neural explanation (see I.8.5).
It is sometimes held or implied that neural (or physical, or “natural”) explanations are
not governed by norms, or not dependent  on norms,  or not assuming or implying norms,
because they are causal explanations (see footnote 51). This rationale is misleading, since
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intentional explanation is also a kind of causal explanation: the attribution of a mental state
causally  explains  the behaviour  in  question  (see I.6.3).  However,  what  is  true is  that  the
intentional  explanation is characterised  not just by causal relations,  but also by normative
relations. So, what we should say is that the neural explanation is not governed by norms
because  it  is  merely causal,  whereas  the  intentional  explanation  is  more than  just  causal
(compare I.4.3).
To  briefly  recapitulate  (see  section  I.6.2  for  the  details):  the respective  causal
relationships are certain lawlike relations of the form FA → GA (“if F happens to A, then G
happens to A”). Any such law quantifies over objects which allow for these generalisations,
and these objects are typically called “kinds” (in the natural sciences usually called “natural
kinds”) – in this case, the set of objects designated by A, F and G. The law specifies a certain
property or starting conditions to which A is subjected (namely F), under which G occurs to
A. (For illustrative purposes, think of A being water, F standing for “being heated to 100°C”
and G standing for “boiling”.) Laws are not simply generalisations, but rather specifications
of  what  properties  of  which  objects  can  be  lawfully  generalised  (or,  using  Goodman’s
terminology, which are “projectible”; see his 1983: ch. 3). They are typically taken to explain
an event event by (1) treating it as an instantiation of a specific law, or “subsuming” the event
under a law and (2) by incorporating the laws themselves into scientific theories (which may
themselves  be sets  of higher-order laws; that  is,  the fact that  water  boils  at  100°C is  not
merely  explained  by  stating  that  “all  water  boils  when  heated  to  100°C”  but  also  by
incorporating  this  special  law  into  more  fundamental  laws,  e.g.  concerning  molecular
movement).
The relationship between behaviour and mental states is “criterial” (Dennett 2007: 74),
insofar  as  it  is  subject  to  certain  norms  characterised  by  inferential  relations  which  are
employed in agential explanations (cf. Levine 1987: 250). For example, exhibiting angriness-
behaviour may typically be caused by a frustrating event, but it is crucially also explained by
stating or supposing that it is appropriate to show this kind of behaviour in the case of such a
frustrating  event.  So,  it  does not  merely follow causally from a sparse description  of  the
frustrating context (i.e. of its description in non-intentional/non-psychological terms) and its
effects on agents, but also because there is an appropriateness-relation between such kinds of
contexts and the respective kind of behaviour (see I.6.4). Such a relation singles out certain
contexts as justifiedly or rationally eliciting angriness-behaviour, specifying the requirements
for  interpreting  certain  behaviour  as  intentional  (see  I.7.4).  The  respective  contexts  are
commonly marked by psychologically loaded terms pointing to appropriate reactions, such as
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“frustrating”  or  “annoying”.  To  give  another  example:  Sam’s  believing  that  Hugh  is
unmarried when being told that Hugh is a bachelor is explained by Sam’s knowing English
and knowing what a bachelor is. In both examples, the norms underlying or explaining the
behaviour in question can be descriptively construed as causes for psychological dispositions
or cognitive structures. And while the capacities employed in either example are at any given
time physically realised, i.e. neurally implemented, they are only implemented the way they
are because there is a functional relation between the frustrating context Max finds himself in
and his angry reaction, and because Sam has, at some point, learned English and learned what
being a bachelor means (see II.3).
Accordingly, any investigation of intentional states in neuroscience needs to account
for the criteria delineated by the practice of intentional attribution. We know that raising one’s
hand does not by itself imply having any (or any specific) intentional state (cf. Danto 1973: ix
f.), and therefore, neither can a brain state which can merely be described as, say, causing
someone to raise their hand (compare Block 1995b: 398). Rather, the intentional ascription
depends  on  the  context  of  raising  your  hand:  Its  external  cause  and its  relation  to  other
intentional states (compare Dennett 1987: 93). Just as any intentional implication of the neural
state which causes hand-raising depends on its external cause or its relation to other states
which fall under intentional interpretations.
So,  while  neural  descriptions  can  explain  behaviour  for  which  there  is  also  an
intentional description, they can only do so against the backdrop of said functional relations
(such as a practice in which people learn appropriate behaviour, or languages, or semantic
relations).  If  there  were  no  such  functional  relations,  there  would  also  be  no  cognitive
mechanisms for neuroscience to explain.  Thus, it is generally false that neural and mental
descriptions are merely different kinds of descriptions of the same thing: Neural descriptions
are individualistic, mental ones are not. Therefore, mental descriptions take facts into account
which strictly neural ones  cannot take into account by stating (or implying/requiring) that
what is described also falls under a norm. Since the two descriptions thusly refer to different
facts, they cannot have the same object. (Again, this is not to deny that there is intentional
behaviour which need not depend on an individual’s learning to conform to a norm; but even
insofar as it can be described as intentional, it is governed by norms, and thus construable as a
relation between a cognitive agent and whatever her cognitive makeup is or has been shaped
by. No such relation is implied by a neurobiological description.)
These inferentially characterised psychological properties (cf. Cummins 1983: chapter
2) can also be described as functions yielding correct outputs from given inputs (see II.5.2,
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also  compare  Gladziejewski  2015).  The  in-  and  outputs  are  interpretable  semantically,
because  only  then  can  they  qualify  as  meeting  the  applicable  norm,  as  being  correct  or
incorrect (cf. Searle 1983: 10). As mentioned, there can be different kinds of norms when
dealing with matters of intentionality: evolutionary (innate) ones, socially acquired ones, and
those concerned with basic matters of rationality. The following schema for mental functions
applies to all intentional mental  states, no matter  their  origin (socially imposed/learned or
innate):
Schema M: [INPUT-signifier)]  –FUNCTION→  [OUTPUT-signifier]
Every M can be stated by exclusively invoking physical (or chemical, or neural) terms.
All that is required for them as pertaining to mental states, or to see them as normatively
governed, is that inputs and outputs are also semantically interpretable. But this just relies on
the classic idea of what a signifier is: a material object which has a semantic interpretation in
a given symbolic system. It should be understood that schema M allows for a wider range of
signifiers  than the Saussurean notion  (see section I.4.2):  here they can be more  than just
symbolic signifiers (such as utterances, graphems and the like); rather, they can amount to any
in- or output which warrants an intentional  description (such as salient stimuli,  objects of
perception, and actions). By way of the signifiers’ semantic properties – i.e. the fact that the
input- and output-states are subject to semantic interpretation –, the functions underlying such
schemas  are  connected  to  intentional  mental  states.  In  other  words,  by  placing  a  causal
physical  process  in  an  accurate  normative  context  which  treats  the  initial  and  resulting
physical states as signifiers, these physical states are mapped onto intentional states and vice
versa. This way, physical systems can be interpreted as “intentional machines” or “semantic
engines”  performing  computations  over  semantic  content  (see  I.4.4).  However,  nowhere
inbetween in- and output (i.e. “internally”  or “intrinsically”)  do we require anything to be
interpretably semantically (although we can allow for it to be, as in the case of modules or
compilers,  which we could interpret  as  producing an intermediate  semantic  output  and/or
being  sensitive  to  semantic  input;  cf.  Levine  1987:  260).101 Any physical  process  which
101 Disregarding this fact  has been a dominant root of confusion in (theoretically or actually)  trying to map
mental onto neural states, only to be bewildered by losing intentional properties in the process. By accepting that
the states which are literally “inside our heads”, and which enable us to have contentful states, not need have
content themselves, we bridge the gap between semantic states and non-semantic states. Jacobson calls the latter
“Aristotelian representations (…) [which] do not have content or satisfaction conditions” (Jacobson 2013: 45),
suggesting that this is the kind of representations dominantly invoked in neuroscience.
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causally derives one signifier from another is potentially subject to physical (or, in our case,
neurobiological) investigation and in this sense “naturalised”.
Signifiers need not stand on both sides of the schema. We know that some mental
properties  are  effects  of non-mental  properties  and vice  versa (which,  combined with the
assumption of the causal closedness of the physical realm, has been a main motivator for
wondering whether mental properties are in fact epiphenomenal, cf. Kim 1993: 280 f.). For
example, lightrays emitted from an object X impinging on an agent’s retina can cause her
belief  that  there  is  an  X.  On  the  other  hand,  someone’s  desire  to  drink  can  cause  the
movement of a glass. So, we can expect to encounter processes which fit into either of the
following sub-schemas:
Sub-schema MS1: [INPUT-non-signifier]  –FUNCTION→  [OUTPUT-signifier]
Sub-schema MS2: [INPUT-signifier]  –FUNCTION→  [OUTPUT-non-signifier]
For illustrative purposes, consider a student being tasked with giving a presentation on
the mind-body-problem by her professor. If she succeeds, the student will eventually come up
with behaviour which qualifies as giving this presentation, and we can not only assume that
she eventually does so because she has learned to interpret her professor’s utterances as a
request to do so, but also that there is a causal process going on in her brain which leads from
an initial physical state caused by the request to the eventual behavioural output when giving
the presentation (see Figure 7 for this example and Figure 8 for the general schema). Given
the information about the professor’s request and some basic assumptions about the student’s
psychological  make-up,  there  is  an  intentional  explanation  for  her  eventually  giving  this
presentation,  and the  fact  that  she  does  so  provides  solid  evidence  for  her  having  some
specific  intentional  states (such as her prowess at  the language she converses in with her
professor, her knowledge about what giving a presentation requires, her motivation to do so,
and so on).
Given this schema, it is easy to see how norms can shape cognition, which in turn
produces behaviour that justifies intentional  ascriptions.  It is in learning processes that  “a
representation of the rules (…) [agents] follow constitutes one of the causal determinants of
their behavior” (Fodor 1975: 74, fn. 15; compare I.4.4 and II.3), insofar as a physical process
is  selected  (or “conditioned”)  which serves as an implementation of the function.  Simply
imagine you have several physical processes F1-3 which yield different outputs OS1-3 based on
an input IS1:
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Figure 8: Schema M (example).
Figure 9: Schema M (general form).
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[IS1]  ––F1→  [OS1]
[IS1]  ––F2→  [OS2]
[IS1]  ––F3→  [OS3]
Let’s assume that out of these processes it is only F1 which yields the output that corresponds
to what is specified as correct or justified by intentional law. So, it is only when an organism
computes F1 that it is interpretable as correctly or justifiably having an intentional property
pertaining  to  the  respective  law.  And  the  way  a  “representation  of  the  rules”  causally
influences behaviour is by selecting the suitable function F1. (It should be easy to see how this
general picture can apply to many different learning scenarios which range from learning in
childhood to ongoing learning processes in adulthood, from learning languages and all kinds
of social  conventions to learning to  operate  tools,  to the acquisiton of knowledge and so
forth.)
Yet, representations are not themselves causally efficacious in the function’s actual
computation (i.e. in the process which leads from IS1 to OS1), since these are only the material
parts  of  the  desired  symbols,  and  to  assume  otherwise  would  amount  to  committing  the
homunculus fallacy: to assume that the neural function is computed by a “homunculus pulling
a volume off the shelf” (Levine 1987.: 254, compare II.3). Certainly there is no internal “list”
or “rulebook” which is literally consulted by a brain-part: no neural process alone implies an
intentional description, since, as just pointed out, the intentional description takes more facts
into account than strictly neural ones. Crucially, the physicochemical description of a neural
process  is  already sufficient  for  explaining  those  properties  of  an  agent  whose  subset  is
potentially intentionally interpretable (i.e. it explains the totality of an organism’s activity, and
some of  this  activity  can  under  certain  internal  and external  conditions  be  interpreted  as
meaningful). A list or rulebook can be a causally efficacious factor insofar as it is part of the
learning  process,  weeding  out  possible  neurally  implemented  functions.  This  is  the
behavioural “trimming” implemented by the neural “pruning” we spoke of in I.8.5. Much the
same goes  for  sparse  forms  of  intentionality,  in  which  it  isn’t  representational  properties
which cause this trimming, but evolution – only that in such cases, neural functions are not
weeded out within an organism’s lifetime, and also not necessarily for social reasons.
To conclude this  subsection I am adding a cursory list  of what we can expect the
description  of  the  physical  process  whose  in-  and  outputs  are  potentially  intentionally
interpretable to be like. (This is only a very humble hint based on current methodology and
the research paradigms on which such descriptions depend, and it would have to be expanded
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on by further experimental paradigms investigating correlations between brain processes and
intentional states.) This list specifies and breaks down what I called an “intrinsic” description
of an agent’s properties  in section I.8.5. Note that the numbered steps on this  list  do not
necessarily indicate temporal sequences or ontological differences, but different steps in an
analysis. For example, any signal transduction in the brain (or, at the very least, part of its
sequence) will be identical to a change in the transducing neurons’ properties, but we can still
describe signal transduction and neural changes independently (and can analyse one in terms
of  the  other).  If  we  knew  all  the  laws  governing  neural  changes  depending  on  signal
transduction, we may be able to level this difference by reducing one to the other.
Note also that what I am labelling “signal state #2” is a pattern of nervous activation
caused by “signal state #1”, which in turn is an electrical and/or chemical effect of external
causes by way of perception. This signal is a sequence of dynamic electrical patterns of which
each subsequent state is an effect caused by the prior state and the properties of the physical
objects transducing the signal (chiefly among them cellular and neural transmitter properties),
and it causes neural changes (by strengthening used connections and weakening unused ones,
cf. Hebb 1949) and potentially further bodily changes (by, say, innervating muscles).
1.  Perception  [signal  state  #1]:  the  effects  of  external  causes  on  an  organism’s  
receptors
2. Electrical and chemical activity [the dynamic part of signal state #2]
3. Spatial and physical neural structures [the stationary aspects of signal state #2] 
4. Changes in conductive properties [such as by Hebbian learning] 
5. Behaviour [Motor responses caused by the transduction of signal state #2]
II.8.4. Translating Mental State and Neural State Descriptions
II.8.4.1. Requirements for a Translation
In the previous section I concluded that it is generally false that mental and neural state
descriptions refer to the same things, since neural ones are individualistic whereas mental
ones are not. Due to requiring that intentional states need to conform to a relevant norm, being
in an intentional state can allow for many different implementations of this state. So, human
beings with radically different brain structures could share the same desire, robots could share
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specific beliefs with humans, and so on. Accepting this so-called “multiple realisability” view
follows from adopting a kind of functionalism regarding mental states (see II.5, Fodor 1974,
Greene 2015, Nathan & Del Pinal 2015: 5.2). For example, we thusly accept that if it is true
that Max performed the addition task “2 + 3 = 5” yesterday at noon while his brain was in
state S, then it does not follow that if Max’s neural state at noon had not been S he would not
have performed this task. Many other states which are not identical with S are potentially
consistent with Max’s performing an addition task. And the neurobiological description of S
is itself not governed by the norm which specifies that what Max does counts as performing
addition.
However, even though it is not generally true that mental and neural state descriptions
are coreferential, they still can be so specifically. That is, it might be true of beings that have
brains,  or specifically of human beings,  that  only those who are in neural  state  S in  fact
perform addition tasks (or another intentionally characterised function). On the one hand, this
may turn out to be a fact about our neural make-up: It could turn out to be true that all neural
states which are not S and which humans are capable of having (or which they actually have)
do not allow humans to perform addition.  That is,  any other neural state which would be
interpretable as allowing someone to perform addition turns out to not be had by humans; or,
in other words, out of the set of neural states humans are capable of having it is only S that
enables them to perform addition. (Here we can distinguish between neural mechanisms in
one person as opposed to one shared by several, so that translation could be feasible for neural
states  of  one  individual,  but  not  for  several.)  On the  other,  it  may  be  a  truth  about  our
environment:  The  norm  which  allows  for  the  behaviour  caused  by  neural  state  S  to  be
interpreted as evidence for intentional mental state M might exclusively hold whenever S is
realised, so that all neural states which coincide with M are S. Such conditions constitute the
requirements for a translation between intentional mental and neural states. And whenever I
talk about translation being feasible under some conditions, I mean conditions under which
these requirements are met.
Whether they are met, and for how many intentional or neural states they are met, is
under ongoing investigation by cognitive neuroscience, and we should interpret studies which
relate mental and neural states as partaking in this endeavour. The kinds of facts we should
expect neuroscience to deliver, which would impact such a translation, pertain to what kinds
of neural states humans (can) have that underlie intentional capacities, as well as the brain’s
capacity for multiply implementing such states (for example,  by cortical  reorganization of
shifting functionality from one region/structure to another, cf. Shih & Cohen 2004). Consider
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once again the mindreading experiments discussed in section II.4, which seek to relate neural
states and meaningful states. While the results of such studies are “only” of a probabilistic
nature (but see footnote 78), these probabilistic results can still  translate to the intentional
description “it is more likely by such-and-such a degree that the subject has intentional state A
than intentional state B (or C, or D, etc.)”.
Settling the question whether intentional states can be inferred from neural states at all
is a matter of figuring out the respective algorithm(s). We know that such algorithms do exist
independently of our methodological access: For example, the correlation which mindreading
decoders exploit  in order to infer semantic  content  from neural states had already existed
before the decoders were invented, and they would even have existed if such decoders had
never been invented. As argued in section II.4, assuming that the agent herself has access to
the information which these decoders extract, it is a truism to suppose that an algorithm which
carries out the function in question is in fact implemented in the agent’s brain. So we can
assume that at least one algorithm which carries out the respective function is computable by
a  biological  neural  system  (cf.  Marr  &  Poggio  1977).  However,  as  far  as  questions  of
methodological attainability go – whether we can decode the algorithms in question –, the
jury’s still out. This is one of the senses in which approaches that already assume reducibility
of intentionality on neural states rely on “presumptive theses way out in front of the empirical
support they require” (Dennett 1991b: 51).
Whether  any  such  neural  mechanism  can  be  identified  as  producing  outputs
interpretable as evidence for intentional states is also tied to its being generalisable. In their
mindreading study,  Kay et al.  point out that  “[t]o be practical our identification algorithm
must  perform  well  even  when  brain  activity  is  measured  long  after  estimation  of  the
receptive-field models” (Kay et al. 2008: 354), and that their results “demonstrate that the
stimulus-related information that can be decoded from voxel activity remains largely stable
over time” (ibid.).102 While, given what has been said so far, we can at any time assume a
token-token-identity between neural activity and the cognitive mechanism(s) underlying any
intentional  state,  what  makes  intentional  states  inferrable  from neural  states  is  a  certain
temporal and structural stability of neural states correlatable to intentional states, or, in other
words, we should require a relation between some form of mental type and neural type in
102 “To assess performance over time we attempted identification for a set of 120 novel natural images that were
seen approximately two months after  the initial  experiment.  In  this  case 82% (99/120) of  the images  were
identified  correctly  (chance  performance  0.8%; subject  S1,  repeated  trial).  We also evaluated  identification
performance for a set of 12 novel natural images that were seen more than a year after the initial experiment. In
this case 100% (12/12) of the images were identified correctly (chance performance  8%; subject S1, repeated
trial)” (Kay et al. 2008: 354).
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order  to  establish  a  mapping  (cf.  Nathan  &  Del  Pinal  forthcoming);  with  the  most
straightforward kind of neural  type  being a  structurally  or physiognomically  defined one,
namely in terms of arrays of kinds of neurons (and the properties related to their activity).
Since any neuron instantiates a physical kind, it is described in terms of projectible properties,
and thus in the form of a type: What any neural token can do in virtue of its being a physical
kind,  any  corresponding  type  can  do.  The  connections  and  structural  relations  between
neurons (“networks”) are also defined this way, and they can serve to develop a “syntax” of
neuronal  types:  different  combinations  of  different  kinds  of  connections  can  constitute  a
combinatorial syntax insofar as we can build complex structures of neurons out of simpler
“building blocks” and infer the properties of such complex structures from the properties of
their building blocks (combined with appropriate connection rules; compare my discussion of
compositionality in section I.4.4).
Again,  whether  we  can  come  up  with  a  suited  compositional  picture  of  the
mechanisms underlying cognition is ultimately a question of disovering the nature of actual
neural ensembles in the brain and their functional and structural stability over time. It is also a
methodological  question  insofar  as  sufficient  knowledge  of  neural  organisation  and
development,  combined  with  a  suitable  technological  method,  might  allow  us  to  track
characteristic changes in neural organisation with sufficient precision over a relevant amount
of time, so that a later neural state which structurally differs from an earlier one can still imply
an intentional state just as reliably as the earlier one. Both issues of methodology and neural
characteristics are open to discovery.
Also, characteristic impairments related to lesions are sometimes stated in intentional
terms. For example, it has been claimed that damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC) leads  to  systematic  deficits  in  moral  motivation  (cf.  Roskies  2003).  Here,  the
VMPFC  damage  itself  is  a  neurological  description,  whereas  the  ascription  of  moral
motivation is based on evidence related to the respective intentional state, such as self-reports
(usually  obtained  through  questionnaires),  anecdotal  evidence  (such  as  biographical
reports)103, standardised behavioural evidence (such as the Iowa Gambling Task) and indirect
physiological evidence for lack of motivation (namely, measuring subjects’ skin conductance
response).  While  results  of  lesion  studies  usually  tell  us  which regions  are  necessary for
having  intentional  capacities,  but  not  which  ones  are  specific  to  them,  these  can  serve
translations in a heuristic or cumulative way and add to other more specific results.
103 The most popularly invoked example is Phineas Gage, a US railway worker who, following an accident in
1848, is taken have suffered from this kind of neural and behavioural impairment (cf. Damasio 1994: ch. 3; for
criticism of Damasio’s interpretation see Kihlstrom 2010 and Schleim 2010: chapter 3.2).
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What is not under investigation by neuroscience, however, is whether the norms which
specify that certain behaviour is justifiedly used as evidence supporting ascriptions of the
respective intentional state which the neural description is meant to translate to do in fact
obtain.  Such  questions  fall  to  the  sciences  adjacent  to  the  neuroscientific  experimental
methodology,  such  as  psychology,  philosophy,  linguistics,  anthropology,  and  so  on.
Experiments  in  cognitive  neuroscience  depend  on  there  being  an  operationalisable
psychological  construct  to  investigate,  and  this  operationalisation  cannot  itself  recur  to
neurobiological constructs. For instance, our assumption that participants in the mindreading
experiments perceive movies showcasing aeroplanes is based on what we take these movies to
represent and that participants are versed in this kind of interpretation (i.e. we treat them as
knowing that what they see are aeroplanes). While mathematical descriptions of the imagery
they are presented plays an important role for coming up with a translational algorithm, it is
readily acknowledged that its semantic aspects are also invoked in certain processing stages
and contribute to the algorithm (see footnote 76). If we aim to completely subtract semantic
aspects  in  our  operationalised  constructs  (and disregard  related  semantic  encoding  in  the
brain), then mindreading experiments could be “narrow”, insofar as they would only tell us
about the processing of perceived contrast, colour, and the like. In this case, it may appear as
if they could not be of any help to a translation from neural to semantic descriptions, but that
is not entirely true. The fact that participants’ perception is processed the way it is can be
characteristically  influenced  by what  participants  expect  or  think  they  perceive  (compare
Rauss et al. 2011). Semantic knowledge can thusly play a role even for a subject’s narrow
properties; not necessarily in every brain region involved in such processing (again, compare
footnote 76), and not in every act of perception, but certainly in some, and perhaps in those
most characteristic for perception related to intentional ascriptions. Thus, we should expect
even processing of asemantically operationalised constructs  to be specific  to the semantic
content of the perception (and associated mental states or behaviour) and to aid in building a
translation function.
Delineating  the conditions  under  which  a  change in  representational  norms occurs
which can impact the validity of a translation is much like asking “do aeroplane-symbols still
refer to aeroplanes”? This kind of question is indigenous to matters of translation. Translation
manuals change depending on whether certain words are still used to have the meaning they
had when the manual was created. Consequently,  the investigation of such matters will be
integral to operationalising experimental constructs which are supposed to capture semantic
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content (and once we have established translational bedrock, idiosyncratic understandings of
certain concepts may even explain idiosyncratic processing exhibited by some subjects).
II.8.4.2. The Methodology of Translation
A translation is a way of establishing semantic relations by non-semantic means, and
by not presupposing any semantic knowledge at all. Establishing a translation between mental
and  neural  state  descriptions  circumvents  semantic  reasoning  about  the  mind-brain
relationship.  The  most  popular  (if  not  all)  “philosophical”  views  about  the  mind-brain-
relationship  are  based  on  semantic  claims,  some  of  my own included.  For  example,  my
conclusion that mental and neural descriptions cannot refer to the same things is based on
semantic considerations (namely that mental  content  is broad), much as, say,  Bennett  and
Hacker’s argument that mental states are ascribed to persons and not to brains is (cf. Bennett
&  Hacker  2003:  chapter  3).  The  latter  can  be  trumped  by  adopting  Dennett’s  brand  of
pragmatism (cf. Dennett 2007: 87) which holds that ascribing mental states is justified if such
ascriptions prove useful, and why should we care too much about what people generally do
when applying such ascriptions anyway? These are all examples of arriving at truths about the
relation between mental and neural states by analysing the use of concepts. The downside to
invoking such arguments is that opponents may simply question the argumentator’s grasp of
meaning. But until we come up with a non-semantic way of establishing semantic relations,
such arguments will be the grounds on which we characterise the mind-brain-relationship.
It may seem a bit paradoxical that we cannot invoke translation as a non-semantic way
of establishing semantic relations without accepting some semantic claims in the first place. If
there was a way to start with a translation, then my arguments regarding broad content, much
as most of my characterisation of mental state ascriptions in the first chapter, would be moot.
However, it should become clear any moment now that my characterisation of mental states
as theoretical explanatory terms, as crucially observable and intersubjective, as functional and
their content as not essentially private, is what makes a translation which relies on correlating
observable circumstances possible in the first place. So, in accepting the requirements for a
theory of translation we do accept some semantic claims, but these are claims which imply
that under some conditions semantic relations can be established empirically.
My proposed method of establishing a translation manual between mental and neural
states proceeds along the lines laid out by Quine’s “radical translation” and Davidson’s spin
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on Quine’s ideas (also compare  Lewis 1983b: 108-121).  Essentially,  radical  translation  is
“[t]he recovery of a man’s current language from his currently observed responses (…) [by] a
linguist who, unaided by an interpreter, is out to penetrate and translate a language hitherto
unknown. All the objective data he has to go on are the forces that he sees impinging on the
native’s surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the native” (cf. Quine
1960: 28). Radical translation is an empirical form of establishing semantic relations without
being  able  to  invoke  any semantic  knowledge.104 Here,  interpreting  foreign  utterances  as
meaningful  depends  on  building  a  systematic,  interdependent  web  of  (what  Quine  calls
“analytic”)  hypotheses  about  the  dependency  of  a  speaker’s  utterances  on  external
circumstances (ibid.).105 As described  in I.7.4, the translational method consists in coupling
(foreign) utterances which are assumed to express mostly true beliefs with true descriptions of
external circumstances (expressed in a familiar tongue).
In  Davidson’s  case,  the  idea  that  theories  of  meaning  are  based  on  gathering
correlations is based on an intricate argument (in his 2001a: 17-36, see also 216 f. and 224 f.
for summaries of his main points). Now, if we accept Davidson’s acquisition of meaning by
way  of  triangulation  (see  I.7.4),  the  picture  itself  should  be  clear  enough:  A  learner
systematically correlates a teacher’s utterances with external circumstances in the world. So
her web of hypotheses about the meaning of utterances will have the status of an empirical
theory  which  is  evidentially  supported  by  observed  correlations.  Still,  the  way Davidson
originally established gathering correlations as an empirical method for building theories of
meaning is independent from his claims about triangulation (or rather, the latter emerged from
the  former).  Therefore,  I  will  briefly  sketch  Davidson’s  original  argument.  First  off,  any
theory of meaning should meet two criteria:  it  should give the meaning of every possibly
sentence  of  a  language  (due  to  semantic  holism,  see  I.7.4),  and  it  should  do  so  without
recurring  to  semantic  notions.  To  achieve  these  aims,  we  proceed  from  semantic
specifications of the form [1] to [2] (whereby we specify extra-linguistic conditions tracking
the meaning of the quoted sentence which is to be translated) and finally to [3] (whereby we
get rid of the intensional/semantic notion “means”):
[1] “Schnee ist weiß” in German means “Snow is white” in English
[2] “Schnee ist weiß” in German means that snow is white
104 While they are not known and cannot be assumed, these semantic relations are based on objective correlations
which are there, much as an ideal algorithm (i.e. the systematic relation which is the prerequisite for there being
an actual algorithm) exists before it is actually discovered (see II.4).
105 I should add that Quine’s ultimate aim here was to propound his thesis about the indeterminacy of translation
(see I.6.1). However, my focus is exclusively on his points about the methodology of a radical translation.
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[3] “Schnee ist weiß” is true in German if and only if snow is white
Since they specify truth conditions, biconditionals (i.e. sentences using the connector “if and
only if”) such as [3] are called “T-sentences” (cf. Tarski 1986: 51-198). Theories which yield
truth conditions for all possible sentences of a language are treated as specifying the meaning
of the sentence on their left hand side. Essentially,  Davidson defends this procedure in the
following way:
“How can a theory of absolute truth (...) be considered a theory of meaning? (…) The question
to ask is whether someone who knows a theory of truth for a language L would have enough 
information to interpret what a speaker of L says. I think the right way to investigate this  
question is to ask in turn whether the empirical and formal constraints on a theory of truth 
sufficiently limit the range of acceptable theories. Suppose, for example, that every theory that
satisfied the requirements gave the truth conditions of ‘Socrates flies’ as suggested above [i.e. 
in the form of a T-sentence]. Then clearly to know the theory (and to know that it is a theory 
that satisfies the constraints) is to know that the T-sentence uniquely gives the truth conditions 
of ‘Socrates flies’. And this is to know enough about its role in the language. 
I don’t for a moment imagine such uniqueness would emerge. But I do think that reasonable 
empirical constraints on the interpretation of T-sentences (the conditions under which we find 
them true), plus the formal constraints, will leave enough invariant as between theories to  
allow us to say that a theory of truth captures the essential role of each sentence. (…) I suggest
that  what  is  invariant  as  between  different  acceptable  theories  of  truth  is  meaning.  (...)  
Different theories of truth may assign different truth conditions to the same sentence (this is 
the semantic analogue of Quine’s indeterminacy of translation), while the theories are (nearly 
enough) in agreement on the roles of the sentences in the language” (Davidson 2001a: 224 f.).
One initial problem, which this defense means to address, is that “Snow is white” is
true if and only if 1 + 1 = 2, even though these two statements obviously do not mean the
same (ibid.: 25 f. & 138).
“[W]e might be misled by the remark that the (…) [T-sentences] could be read as giving  
meanings, for what this wrongly suggests is that testing a theory of truth calls for direct insight
into what each sentence means. But in fact, all that is needed is the ability to recognize when 
the required biconditionals are true. This means that in principle it is no harder to test the  
empirical adequacy of a theory of truth than it is for a competent speaker of English to decide 
whether sentences like ‘“Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white’ are true. So  
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semantics, or the theory of truth at least, seems on as firm a footing empirically as syntax”  
(ibid.: 61 f.).
This  combination  of  holism (ibid.:  138 f.)  and empirical  testability  of  such truth-theories
(ibid.: 135) ensures that if we know everything which is relevant for the truth conditions of
every possible sentence of a language, then that is all we could or need to know about their
meaning. For example,  how can a competent speaker of English ever learn that “Snow is
white” does not mean “1 + 1 = 2”, if all she can ever do to find out about linguistic meaning is
empirically gather correlations? Firstly, her hypothesis about what “snow is white” means is
also holistically informed by her hypotheses about what “snow fell on Christmas Day” and
“this dove is white” mean, and how the use of individual words influences the truth conditions
of sentences they appear in. Secondly, she can observe external circumstances which provide
plausible causes (or reasons) for speakers to utter either “snow is white” or “1 + 1 = 2”, and
these usually differ.
From  Quine’s  and  Davidson’s  theory  I  retain  the  form  of  specifying  meaning
empirically by way of gathering correlations (ibid.: 135). The parameters invoked in such
specifications might differ depending on the kind of mental or neural state, and the best way
of  describing  them;  but  for  starters,  I  propose  to  characterise  a  specific  mental  state  by
specifying the intentional agent A, the intentional mode I, the propositional content P, a time
index t  and the relevant context for the attribution C, and to characterise neural states by
specifying  a  nervous  system  N,  an  output  O  dependent  on  the  applicable  method  [for
example, in the case of fMRI, this would amount to a combination of anatomical descriptions
and a superimposed/dependent pattern of activation], a method M, and a time index t. At a
glance:
[An, In, Pn, Cn] coincides at tn with [Nn, On, Mn] 
A systematic  gathering  of  correlations  should  seek  to  eliminate  time,  person and context
variables as far as possible. The degree to which these correlations can be generalised as to
eliminate individual differences, or to factor out neural differences, will determine the extent
of the resulting translation manual. Ideally, we arrive at:
[In, Pn, Cn] if and only if [On, Mn]
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Also, by varying intentional modes (attitudes) while keeping propositional content constant,
and vice versa, we should attempt to separate these two factors and identify corresponding
factors on the neural side. Something similar can be attempted by modulating operationalised
construct  and  methodology  independently;  meta-theories  about  the  nature  of  different
methods of measurement, and the way results depend on each of them, will prove integral to
this endeavor (compare section 3 in Sullivan forthcoming).
Since distinct cognitive tasks can involve the same neural structures, while the same
cognitive task can be executed by distinct ones, substantially distinct mental properties can
turn out to correlate  with the same neuroscientific term and vice versa.  In such cases the
context  variable  will  have  to  be  retained  to  hold  on  to  terminological  differences  in  one
language when we are  unwilling  to  surrender  them to the  other’s  terminological  poverty
(despite creating additional queries, such as an adequate formalisation of context statements).
That is, it can be obvious to us that raising one’s hand in order to vote is strikingly different
raising it in order to swat a fly, even though some of the underlying physical processes might
turn out to be the same. If some intentional states turn out to be physically underdetermined
(cf. Barrett 2006 & 2012, see II.8.4.5) – that is, if a set of distinct intentional states maps onto
the same physical  state  –  then  we obviously need both  the  physical  information  and the
context variable to distinguish between them. And, vice versa, if there is a set of possible
physical implementations of an intentional state then we need additional information to infer
the neural state from the intentional one.
If  methodology  permits,  vocabulary  of  a  translation  manual  may  be  enriched  for
practicality and/or explanatory value: If it is not practical to look for a neural description for
each mental  description,  the  latter  may be broken down according to  its  syntax  (such as
intentional  modes,  types  of  content),  or  vice  versa  (anatomical  details,  concentration  of
neurotransmitters in certain areas, etc.). For example, it may turn out that we can track distinct
mental  states  to  distinct  neural  states,  but  not  their  individual  terms.  For  example,  the
difference between the belief that snow is white and the belief that grass is green may be
consistently trackable in neural terms, but maybe not the difference between having snow as
the content of a belief and having grass as the content of a belief (and similarly for “is”,
“white”  and “green”).  Neural  correlates  for  intentional  terms  or  intentional  correlates  for
neural “atoms” (such as types of neurons, transmitters etc.)  may need to be introduced in
order to limit ambiguity; but at the same time, introducing such terms depends on there being
consistent correlations. So, there may not be an explanatory need for introducing them in the
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first place; but if there is (due to the need for limiting ambiguity), then it may practically not
happen for lack of consistent correlations.
Also, we could find “neural tautologies” which appear in correlations but are obsolete
for translation. For example, one particular neural activation pattern N0 may occur at all times.
Additionally, assume that mental description M1 is true if and only if neural description N1 is
true. In this case, the fact that N0 and N1 are true whenever M1 is true does not mean that M1
means N0 and N1. Rather, N0 is a term which has no significance for M1. Here, the activation
pattern N0 and N1 needs to be split into two terms: One which means M1 and one which does
not. Something similar may apply vice versa, only that we must distinguish between beliefs
which are true at all times (such as the belief that 1 + 1 = 2) and beliefs which are reasonably
expressed under all circumstances (namely none).
Much as Haynes & Rees have stated (see II.4), what the reach of such translations
track  are  the  degree  to  which  a  distinction  made  in  one  theory  neatly  coincides  with  a
distinction in the other. And since this distinction can track truth conditions, it is all we can
and need to do to preserve meaning in a translation. However, the biconditionals we are using
to track such distinctions may plausibly turn out to only support local translations which are
considerably more restrictive than the term “translation” suggests. For example, the temporal
and intersubjective stability expected from common translation manuals might turn out not to
hold for the presently proposed mental-neural translations (also see II.8.4.4). They might not
apply across individuals, across species or even across one single individual’s lifetime:
„A [“species-specific biconditional law”] states that any organism or system, belonging to a 
certain species, is such that it has the given mental property at a time if and only if it is in a 
certain  specified physical  state  at  that  time.  (…) In  order  to  generate  laws  of  this  kind,  
biological species may turn out to be too wide; individual differences in the localization of  
psychological  functions in the brain are well  known. Moreover,  given the phenomena of  
learning and maturation, injuries to the brain, and the like, the neural structure that subserves a
psychological  state  or  function  may  change  for  an  individual  over  its  lifetime.  What  is  
important then is that these laws are relative to physical-biological structure-types, although 
for simplicity I will continue to put the matter in terms of species. The substantive theoretical 
assumption here is the belief that for each psychological state there are physical-biological  
structure types, at a certain level of description or specification, that generate laws of this  
form. (...) Unlike species-independent laws, these laws cannot buy us a uniform or global  
reduction  of  psychology,  a  reduction  of  every  psychological  state  to  a  uniform physical-
biological base across all actual and possible organisms; however, these laws will buy us a  
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series  of  species-specific  or  local  reductions.  If  we  had  a  law  of  this  form  for  each  
psychological  state-type  for  humans,  (…)  [it]  would  tell  us  how  human  psychology  is  
physically implemented, how the causal connections between our psychological events and  
processes  work at  the  physical-biological  level,  what  biological  subsystems  subserve our  
cognitive capacities and functions, and so forth“ (Kim 1993: 273 f.).
Yet,  at  least  as  far  as  temporal  stability  goes,  this  fact  sets  our  form of  translation  only
gradually apart from linguistic translation: for instance, if I were to visit China, I would not
bring a 200-years-old dictionary with me.
II.8.4.3. Lost in Translation
Contrary to what Kim says above, I reject the notion that such biconditionals support
reduction, even while accepting all of his other stated claims. But why can’t the resulting
mappings  be  used  as  “bridge  laws”  (cf.  Nagel  1961:  ch.  11,  Sklar  1967:  118-121)  in  a
reductionist  programme?  Now,  since  intentional  mental  states  are  explanatory  by way of
requiring  norms  about  the  proper  relations  between  cognitive  mechanisms  and  the
environment, subplanting them with descriptions which do not depend on the environment (or
only in a considerably more limited way), something must get lost in translation. But how can
this be, if translating by definition implies preserving meaning? It is because the correlations
we can gather between intentional and neuronal states, which form the basis for a translation
manual,  are  systematically  bound  to  the  environmental  conditions  under  which  they  are
gathered, namely by way of  teleological principles which serve as methods for determining
representational content (as described in II.7).  Some of these conditions are constitutive for
the meaning of the mental terms. If they change, the translation is moot. 
For  example,  while  establishing  correlations,  we might  find  some beliefs,  each  of
which at all times correlate with a neuroscientific description belonging to the belief’s holder;
and these might be beliefs as straightforward as “I am happy right now” or “I am sad right
now”. Intuitively, most people, or at least those who aren’t openly misanthropic, would hold
that people should rather be happy than sad. However, that it is in our power to change the
neuronal state correlating with the sadness-belief to the one correlating with the happiness-
belief does not imply that we should, even accepting the norm that people should rather be
happy than sad. Since there in fact are and have been many such cases, it is easy to see why:
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Changing  such  states  can  yield  dysfunctional  agents,  such as  in  the  case  of  drug  abuse.
Leaving aside any considerations of side-effects of drugs for the moment,  which can also
provide reasons against using them, the reason is this: The norm that people should be rather
happy than sad does not imply that people should be happy under all circumstances. This is
because there are psychological laws which state the conditions under which being happy is
justified/rational. Being happy over the death of a loved one is, ceteris paribus, not justified,
and neither  is  being  sad over  a  missed  friend’s  eventual  return.  Only under  very limited
constraints can it be deemed rational to find beauty ugly,  comfort abhorrent, or the like –
namely, when someone does in fact accept enough related rational norms (compare Davidson
1980: 222). Special cases can violate laws of rationality, but they cannot be violated across
the board. Rational norms need not be abided by for every singular ascription of an intentional
state,  but the fact that any single ascription can be made is based on there being laws of
psychological rationality whose holding the ascription requires (see I.7.4 and I.8.5). Again,
this  does  not  mean  that  people  cannot  be  inappropriately  happy;  it  just  delineates  the
requirements for us to ever perceive someone’s happiness as inappropriate.
In  the  case  of  a  purely  neurobiological  description,  there  is  no  such  implication.
Ideally – if we knew all the causes and consequences of neural activation – we could know
the conditions under which a neural mechanism induces behavioural happiness-states. But
whenever we want to find out about the appropriateness of a mental state, we will have to
gather information that goes beyond just this neural state. And that is just to say that we will
invoke the respective intentional law and relate it to the activity of the neural mechanism. In
this sense, it is methodologically impossible to fully subplant intentional state ascriptions with
neural state descriptions.
Yet, translations may appear to yield contrary results: If there are stable correlations
between intentional and neuronal states, then they are translatable. If they are translatable, the
meaning of the original and the translated term are identical. If their meanings are identical,
we can use them interchangeably. Which seems to contradict what I just said.
The solution is that what is required for translation are actually stable correlations over
(potentially) different environmental conditions. Once the environmental conditions change
so  as  to  violate  the  requirements  of  the  respective  law  of  psychological  rationality,  the
translation has to be revised. But this is just a reminder that broad content depends on the
environment while narrow content does not (see I.8), and that both can only be equated when
relevant environmental conditions are held constant. A translation manual gets outdated when
a sufficient amount of meaningful environmental properties changes, or, more specifically:
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when  the  environmental  conditions  change  so  much  as  to  completely  obscure  a  given
cognitive mechanism’s functionality.  This is not to say that semantic  descriptions become
moot  whenever  a  mechanism becomes  dysfunctional,  but  that,  if  enough dysfunctionality
accumulates, it can obscure its semantic object to the point where we cannot even describe the
mechanism as misrepresenting something. For example, when there are more toxic elongate
objects moving parallelly to their longitudinal axis in a toad’s environment than nourishing
ones, the neural mechanism underlying its predatory behaviour has outlived its functionality
(see II.6). It can still be described semantically as misrepresenting non-nourishing objects as
nourishing ones, but only as long as we can reconstruct the mechanism’s true purpose. As
long as  the  intentional  description  has  explanatory  value,  it  is  applicable.  This  is  why a
sufficient amount of environmental properties has to change: they have to change so much as
to  obscure  interpretability.  This  is  the  narrow equivalent  to  what  Davidson’s  criteria  for
interpretability in rich contexts are (see I.7.4): if irrationality pervades attempted explanations
in intentional psychology, at some point the respective agent cannot even be conceived of as
irrational any longer. Standards of rationality cease to matter when they cease to explain an
agent’s behaviour: the agent appears arational rather than irrational and stops being an agent.
II.8.4.4. Incongruencies between Mapped Kinds
Mindreading studies (see II.4 and II.8.4.1) have shown that a mental-neural translation
is  in  principle  feasible:  Correlations  between neural  activity  and perceptual  content  have
proven  stable  enough  to  support  inferences  from  fMRI-data  to  intentional  states  with  a
significant rate of success. While the translational algorithms used in these experiments are
relative to individual subjects (and therefore do not yield general “translation manuals”), the
method used to come up with these algorithms has proven to be intersubjectively applicable.
So,  while  input-output  connections  differ  across  individuals,  the  functions  for  each  are
determinable by having each individual undergo a series of trials.
Algorithmic  outputs  in  such  studies  are  characteristically  probabilistic  (compare
footnote  78).  In  the  case  of  decoding  moving  images,  visual  outputs  are  superimposed
according to probabilistic weights (cf. Nishimoto et al. 2011: figure 4). That is, even though
subjects view novel images which the decoder hasn’t been trained on, it is methodologically
assumed that there is only a finite  range of possibly viewed movies  which can cause the
neural  activity:  Based  on  the  measured  activity  the  “trained”  algorithm  determines  how
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probable  each  image  out  of  the  ones  it’s  been  trained  on is  and  superimposes  them
accordingly.  If  this  methodology  were  to  work  analogously  for  tracking  propositionally
individuated beliefs, desires and intentions, we would get results such as
if [agent A’s neural activation] then [p1 (A believes PB1) and p2 (A believes PB2) and...
pn (A believes PBn) and p3 (A desires PD1) and p4 (A desires PD2) and... pm (A desires PDm)
and p5 (A intends PI1) and p6 (A intends PI2) and... po (A intends PIo)],
where each p is a probabilistic weight, each PB is the propositional content of a belief, each
PD that of a desire and each PI that of an intention.
A perceived weakness in the analogy between viewed images and held propositional
attitudes might be that superimposed images form a visually graspable image (which shares
visual features with the image initially viewed by the subject), while propositional attitudes
cannot be similarly superimposed. However, superimpositions are just visual representations
of conjunctions: so, the possible output statement that, say, there is a 70% chance that at a
given time a given subject  believes  P1 and a  20% chance  that  she  believes  P2,  then this
statement plays much the same role as any visual superimposition in the cited study.
Once established, the probability with which such a translational algorithm yields a
false result marks a lack of taking into account a decisive variable regarding the mapping.
This variable may be a neural one (e.g. a neural activation pattern which is not fed into the
algorithm –  in  the  mindreading  studies,  only  some brain  areas  are  scanned,  and perhaps
“reading”  additional  areas  could  compensate  for  some  of  the  resulting  uncertainty;  see
footnote 76) or an external  one (i.e.  that  the intentional  property of a behavioural  output
depends on one or several factors which cannot be accounted for by “reading” the neural
activation alone).
These  and  similar  difficulties  in  establishing  correlations  between  neural  and
intentional states are of varying relevance to translational mappings. Some are methodological
in nature and should be distinguished from the claim that, even under ideal contextual and
methodological  conditions,  mental  kinds  do  not  map  congruently  onto  physiological  or
specifically  neural  ones  (see  Figure  9).  Now,  since  mental  categories  depend  at  least
implicitly on taking external factors into account (namely because they are individuated by
their content, and content itself is determined not by internal or intrinsic factors alone, see I.8)
whereas neural ones do not, neural and mental state descriptions never map neatly. Still, we
can give meaning to this claim when worrying that (1) several or all type-terms from one
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vocabulary do not correlate with or map onto type-terms from the other but only with an
arbitrary set of tokens, so that the translated terms would be wildly disjunctive  (cf.  Fodor
1974: 103 f.), or that (2) no matter whether they map onto types or tokes, they never correlate
systematically enough for there to be a mapping-algorithm outputting significant implications.
Figure 10: Although intentional states may not map congruently onto neural states, they may still be
inferrable. If we interpret balloons as sets of conjunctions, then IS1 is inferred from the conjunction of
NS1, NS2 and NS3, IS2 from NS4 and NS5, IS3 from NS5 and NS6, and vice versa. However, if we
interpret balloons as disjunctions of states, then three different states NS1, NS2 and NS3 are inferrable
from any instantiation of IS1. Such cases of ambiguity are unproblematic if each of the three neural
states  maps  back  to  IS1 and/or  if  they  are  resolvable  by  invoking  contextual  information:  say,
whenever the neural states are embedded or embeddable in a context which distinguishes between the
associated intentional states. Problematic cases are those where ambiguities cannot be resolved and no
use of a kind term from one theory distinguishes between several mutually exclusive kind terms from
another theory (NS5, which maps both to IS2 and IS3, might be such a term).
The second point can be dealt with comparatively briefly, so I will consider it first.
Again, the worry is that, if different instantiations of the same mental state do not sufficiently
coincide with the same neural state or vice versa, there can be no (significant) correlations.
This worry has two major roots, namely the idea that from accepting functionalism about
mental states it follows that they cannot be (or are unlikely to be) systematically tied to their
“multiple realisations” or implementations (cf. Kim 1993: 273-275, 309 ff., 341 f.). Yet, we
have to presume no such thing. A lack of systematic connections may turn out to be true
empirically, but there is no conceptual reason to conclude the impossibility of translation from
functionalism alone. As I have stated at the outset (see II.8.4.1), for translation to work it is
required that the different physical realisations of mental states – manifold as they may be –
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are de facto finite, systematic and can be specified. And even though functionalism says that
we could dream up an infinite amount of physical realisations for any single mental state, it is
not implied that the realisations that do exist are infinite.
The second root of this worry is that brains could be too diverse and malleable in
individuals, in or between species in order to tie neural properties systematically to mental
states (compare II.8.4.2). But, similar to our retort to its first root, recognizing phenomena
such  as  neural  plasticity,  differing  physiognomies  and  onto-  and  phylogenetic  histories,
convergent evolution and the like does not commit us to ruling out that mental states are still
systematically and trackably realised. For example, although the wings of birds and bats do
not share the same physiognomy and evolutionary history,  they both serve the function of
flying,  and we can track how either physical  implementation serves this function.  This is
because  this  and  similar  connections  between  function  and  physical  implementation  are
generalisable  enough, and so what we need to find out about mental states is whether there
actually are enough systematic realisations of them as well. In fact, we have good reason to
expect  that  there  are  such  trackable  systematicities  between  mental  states  and  their
realisations to be found, since, on the one hand, the evolutionary success of any organism
depends on the systematicity of the connections between its brain, behaviour and environment
and, on the other, mental states track determinants of behaviour in relation to environmental
context. And while it is reasonable to assume that brains are malleable, organisms would be in
poor  shape  indeed  if  their  brains  changed  arbitrarily in  a  way unrelated  to  their  mental
functioning. Rather, neural structures need to change somewhat systematically, namely so as
to be favourable in regard to behaviour and environment. Some mental states may turn out to
be  trackable  across  species,  some across  populations,  some  across  individuals,  and  some
merely across time within  one  individual (cf. ibid.: 274 f.). In each of these cases, we can
establish mental-neural translations with differing reach, and if no such case is to be found,
then translation does not come to pass – simple as that. (Another question, which I am not
pursuing here, is whether current or future neuroscientific methodology is up to the task and
whether scientific practice is actually aimed at establishing this kind of stable mapping; cf.
section 3 in Sullivan forthcoming).
So, what about the remaining worry, that translations could be inadequate due to their
potentially mapping types from one theory onto disjunctive terms from another? If through
correlative experiments we were to find out that the instantiation of a mental kind-term never
maps onto the “same” neural state (i.e. one which is reasonably similar by a neural criterion),
we would end up with a mapping of a mental type to different neural tokens at different times
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and no correlation at all. Saying that the mental state maps onto the disjunction of all these
singular neural tokens is obviously a terrible move, since the disjunctive term is completely
useless for any attempt at translation due to its not supporting counterfactual inferences to
mental states. However, construed this way, this worry conflates with the worry I just dealt
with: that  there simply turn out  to be no systematic  correlations  to be found. In order to
distinguish the two worries, we need to construe this one a bit differently, namely as holding
that a translation may be inadequate due to its mapping a mental state onto a disjunction of
heterogeneous neural types, not tokens. (And assuming that this disjunction is not a neural
type itself.) So, this is the worry I will be dealing with in the remainder of this section.
It is crucial to note that the mapping-algorithm’s output states are not meant to actually
replace kinds in the theory which provides the input, but only allow us to infer one from the
other, given some contextual conditions which preserve the explanatory differences between
our  two  theories  (i.e.  the  conditions  related  to  the  semantic  broadness  of  one  and  the
narrowness of the other).  Therefore,  the principal  point that  disjunctive kinds may not be
exploitable by bridge laws since they themselves do not constitute kinds in their indigenous
theory is moot (cf. Kim 1993: 317 f.). Simply put, the required mapping function is weaker
than a bridge law. Since it only needs to support inferences from one kind of state to another,
given that contextual explanatory factors are held constant, a mapped term’s being “wildly
disjunctive”  would by itself not be problematic for our endeavour (cf. Kim 1993: 316-319).
Rather, we require that translational algorithms map to types in a non-ambiguous way (see
Fig. 9). So, its mapping to disjunctions of types is only a problem when ambiguity ensues.
That is, translation can work if A maps to B or C and both B or C exclusively map to A. Here,
B and C could be multiple realisations of A, but for translation to work well either of them
needs to  only realise A (much like the wings of birds and bats both realise flying, but not
swimming).
We could allow for some translated terms to be ambiguous (as is also usually the case
between natural languages), but certainly not for all.  For example,  German contains some
ambiguous  words  like  “bank”,  which  translates  both  to  “bank” as  well  as  to  “bench”  in
English. Yet, it is still translatable, since we can invoke contextual information to clear up
ambiguities. A translation can only be complete if for every ambiguous term there are enough
terms related to it which are not ambiguous and which can be invoked for clarity. And even
when there aren’t, leaving a linguistic fragment untranslated need not be so catastrophic as to
undermine  a  translation’s  explanatory power on the whole.  But if  enough of the invoked
context were ambiguous too, we would be utterly lost. In our case, the overall threshold of
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when  translations  break  down,  signifying  the  loss  of  all  explanatory  power,  ultimately
amounts  to  the  value  of  statistical  significance  related  to  the  hits  and  misses  of  the
translational algorithms.
So, there is no need to insist that whatever neural property correlates with a mental
property is itself a non-disjunctive kind-term in neuroscience or vice versa. What is needed is
that there is a systematic correlation between any set of neural properties and a large enough
set  of  intentional  state  terms  yielding  a  computable  algorithm  which  tracks  differences
between  intentional  states  by  tracking  neural  differences  and  vice  versa.  Each  side  of
individual correlations might  very well  be wildly disjunctive; and here, “wildly” can only
mean “unwieldily”  (as in:  unlike an intentional  attitude ascription,  the corresponding data
derived from neural activation fed into the algorithm would take any human being a while to
read  out  loud)  but  not  “unsystematically”.  That  is,  they  can  be  disjunctions  in  terms  of
neural/physical kinds, but they cannot be disjunctions of neural states each of which would
correspond to a different mental  state  so that the entire  set  of implied mental  states were
irresolvably internally inconsistent. In such a case, translations would be too ambiguous to be
explanatory. While some ambiguities can be tolerated and resolved on the whole, they need to
be kept in check.
II.8.4.5. Kind-Revisions
In this final section I will exploit some of the lessons learned in the previous one and
apply them to a current debate in theory of science. The question driving the debate is this:
Could or should incongruencies between mapped kinds lead to revisions of kind-terms of
either of the two theories which supply these kinds, specifically in cognitive science? For one,
we do assume that  there are close relations  between what happens in the brain and what
happens mentally, so the idea that theory-formation in psychology could or should generally
have an effect on formation in neuroscience, and/or vice versa, presents itself. Consequently,
the view has been prominently advocated that, if mental and neural theories turn out to not
neatly map onto each other, nomological categories in one field should be revised in light of
the  explanatory  properties  of  the  other  categories.  And,  since  neural  kinds  are  generally
viewed as the ontologically more basic or “natural” ones, the dominant view is that it is the
mental categories which should be revised (or even eliminated) in favour of neural categories.
In the following,  I  am only going to  discuss  revisions,  not  elimination,  since eliminative
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theories generally assume that intentional theories have no actual explanatory power at all, or
don’t refer to anything “real”, which is a problematic assumption I do not share. (For the most
prominent view on elimination, see Churchland 1981 and 2005.) My disregarding eliminative
views notwithstanding, what to do when relating mental and neural categories turns up both
commonalities  and discrepancies  is  in  fact  a  pressing  issue,  since,  beyond  expecting  an
overall covariation between mental and neural goings-on, there is no theoretical reason for
expecting translations to turn out so smoothly as to amount to a simple one-on-one mapping.
First, let me point out when revisions are uncalled for: namely, whenever mental and
neural kinds constitute distinct explanatory factors within one theory. For example, there are
ongoing  attempts  to  trace  psychiatric  disorders  back  to  neural  causes.  However,  since
“[t]oday,  most  clinical  psychiatrists  try  to  understand  mental  illness  in  the  conceptual
framework of a so-called “bio-psycho-social” model that integrates the action of biological,
psychological, and social variables, and helps to design personalised therapeutic programs”
(Tretter et al. 2010: 31), both neural and mental kinds are marked as having a causal effect on
the  respective  theory’s  kinds  (i.e.  as  variables  contributing  to  the  explanation).  Here,
“revising” can only mean optimising the integration of neural variables into the theory, not
actually  revising the non-neural  kinds in terms of the neural ones.  (I  will  leave open the
question how such disorders themselves qualify as “mental kinds”; but, as I have pointed out
in section I.9.1., we do retract agential ascriptions in such cases, so mental disorders or their
symptoms  cannot  themselves  amount  to  paradigmatic  intentional  states.  For  a  broad
discussion of whether psychiatric disorders amount to “natural kinds”, see Kincaid & Sullivan
2014.)106 
Generally,  the  idea  is  that  so-called  “natural  kind  revisions”  proceed  by  aligning
causes between different theoretical categories, insofar as these categories
“ought to group together phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of 
causal explanation (see, e.g., Craver 2009) and respond similarly to the same kind of causal 
interventions (see, e.g., Woodward 2003). If psychiatric categories do not find such groupings,
there is reason to revise and/or eliminate existing classifications” (Kincaid & Sullivan 2014: 
2).
106 The mere fact that different kinds of “kinds” are contributing to an explanation does not imply that these kinds
are in any way  competing. Yet,  this can be insinuated by sticking with the term “natural  kind”, rather  than
explicating kinds in terms of specific explanatory roles. If one kind is “natural”, but another is, say, “interactive”
and therefore “unnatural”, then surely the “natural” one must enjoy primacy (see II.5.4)? But this is just to want
to make a case against explanatory power having primacy in theory-formation, and there can be no such case.
Sometimes (and perhaps in psychiatry, see Tretter’s quote below), theoretical pluralism may just turn out to be
the right way to go. Of course, we cannot know for sure until a supreme explanatory theory has been found to be
workable; all we know for now is that in some cases, distinct kinds serve their explanatory role by being distinct.
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However, given the standard notion that kinds and causal relations are defined in terms
of each other, the two quoted sentences don’t seem to fit together: kinds are terms whose
meaning  is  (exclusively  or  at  least  primarily)  defined  by the  laws  they  support,  and,  in
theories  which use the notion  of causality  for explanatory gain,  laws are causal  relations
between kinds (see I.6.2). So, it would be inconsistent to require that kind-terms be revised in
light of causal relations. For, firstly, either these causal relations are an accepted part of the
theory which uses the kinds, then the kinds’ meanings are already set by them and there is no
need for revision. Or, secondly, these causal relations are rejected (i.e. the corresponding laws
are found to not be generalisable), then they cease to be part of the theory and do not affect
the kinds to begin with, which also does not invoke the need for revision. Or, lastly, the causal
relations are part of another theory, but then they cannot line up if their kinds don’t. So, the
only way a theory’s kinds can be “revised” is by its adopting true causal laws (although it
would be more proper to say that in such cases it is the theory itself which is revised in light
of its lining up with available evidence, not its kinds in terms of their lining up with causal
relations). Since kinds are primarily affected by what laws are accepted by the theory they
figure in,  it  is  the process of accepting  laws as  true which is  the only “organic”  way of
revising kinds, namely the way of operating within one theory. (The non-organic way being
the theory’s rejection and the abandonment of its kinds – and there is a tipping point when
organic revisions become abandonments, namely when sufficiently large parts of a theory are
changed at once.)
In a nutshell, we cannot revise kinds of one theory in light of the other, since if their
kinds don’t match up to begin with, then the causal relations won’t either. It is the whole
theory in which these kinds are defined, along with its whole set  of laws, which is to be
revised; and it cannot be revised merely in terms of what other theory’s causal relations its
own line up with. This is not to say that the properties of one theory can’t affect the properties
of another – only that holding that their kinds or causal relations can be neatly lined up is
misleading. The obvious exception being two theories which are purportedly about the same
things, and which we thusly assume to make use of the same kinds, but even then, “lining up”
kinds or causal relations boils down to finding out which of the two theories is true. Once we
find that one theory is superior to the other, salvageable kinds are “revised” in terms of what
we now know to be true about them, and non-salvageable kinds are left behind.
These  ruminations  can  seem  close  to  considerations  of  incommensurability  and
paradigm  change  in  science  (cf.  Kuhn  1962  &  2000,  Feyerabend  1962).  However,  this
proximity can be misleading, because the reality of theoretical revisions is less dramatic and
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more practical  than either.  The chief  practical  aspect  is,  of course,  explanatory power.  In
dealing with potential revisions, our basic assumptions at this point are that we are concerned
with two distinct theories which are both explanatorily valuable (i.e. that none of them is
plainly wrong) and that one of them is a candidate for revision in light of the other. In other
words: The theory up for revision has some explanatory value, but also some categories/kinds
which could be somehow improved in light of the other theory. But how can this be if, as just
discussed, their meanings, the laws they figure in and the theory which is comprised of these
laws  cannot  be  neatly  compartmentalised?  Well,  they  can  be,  if  the  relevant  explanatory
relations which are effective for their meaning are respected.
Let’s look at an example from two theories which we assume to be interrelated, such
as  biology and physics:  improving  our  knowledge in  physics  can  improve our  biological
knowledge. For example, geese are a biological kind due to the fact that there are projectible
generalisations  such as  “geese  fly  south  for  the  winter”.  We can  assume  that  there  is  a
neurobiological cause for each individual goose’s flying south for the winter, and thusly, that
a  physical  description  of  this  mechanism  could  improve  our  knowledge  about  geese.
However,  it  can’t  just  be  any physical  description  of  this  mechanism,  even  if  it  were  a
description  which  would  turn  out  to  be  extremely  enlightening  for  physics.  Rather,  the
physical  description  needs  to  be  biologically  explanatory.  For  instance,  if  the  physical
description implies that there are subtle differences in mechanisms which have a systematic
bearing on said biological law – such as geese having mechanism  A flying south slightly
earlier  than  those  having  mechanism  B –  then  we  could  have  reason  to  introduce  A-
mechanism-geese and B-mechanism-geese in biology. In such a case, the relevant biological
kind would be respected, since it is acknowledged that the corresponding law is imperative for
determining the kind. So, the category is “revised” in the sense that it is differentiated, that it
is cut at more precise joints in order to gain an increase in explanatory power. This is how a
biological  kind  can  be  revised  in  light  of  physics  (assuming  it  is  in  fact  the  physical
description which explains the difference in biologically relevant behaviour).107 Generally, the
idea is that:
107 However,  it  should also be clear  that  any single insight,  even if it  does pertain to explanatorily relevant
characteristics, need not by itself lead to revising the biological theory. Rather, different characteristics need to
be balanced, and that geese can produce offspring with one another plausibly outweighs their flying south for the
winter. However, if an additional relevant distinction can be introduced to one theory in light of insights from
another one, while all other explanatory characteristics stay the same, then no such balance has to be achieved,
and revisions can be uncontroversially justified. If other explanatory characteristics do not stay the same, balance
needs to be achieved, and revision can be more controversial. Whereas, if explanatory characteristics are not
respected at all, revision would be nonsensical.
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(1) If there is a law F → G 
(2) and a systematic relation between F and a kind K from another theory
(3) and K can be analysed as the disjunction “H or I”, with H and I being kinds (or 
exclusively composed of kinds) from the same theory as K
(4a) and “F in terms of H” allows for an explanatory differentiation of G
(4b)  or  both  “F in  terms  of  H” and “F in  terms  of  I”  allow for  an  explanatory  
differentiation of G
(5a) then (if 4a is true and 4b is not) we have reason to introduce H-type Fs
(5b) or (if 4b is true) to split up Fs into H-type Fs and I-type Fs.
In our example, (1) is the biological law that geese fly south for the winter, (2) specifies that
there is a systematic relation between geese and a neural mechanism (namely their typically
having it), (3) says that the neural mechanism is found to actually comprise of two distinct
neural expressions which, whose specific expression A or B can further specify the biological
effect (such as A causes flying south a day earlier than B and B causes flying south a day later
than A) (4b), so that we could revise the biological kind “geese” by introducing A-mechanism
geese which fly south a day earlier  than B-mechanism-geese (5b). Of course, disjunctions
(here: F = H or I) could potentially comprise of as many terms as would make an explanatory
contribution to the causal effect specified in (1).
If we stick with a pragmatic scientific realism, i.e. with accepting kinds as real insofar
as they serve valuable explanatory roles, then the only potential reason for revising kinds is
that restating or adjusting one theory in relation to another increases explanatory power. If this
ultimate criterion for revising kinds is glossed over confusion can ensue, such as in the form
of attempting to cash out explanatory but “unnatural” kinds in one theory against “natural”
ones in another (see footnote 106). For example,  two views about emotions have recently
been clashing in psychology and cognitive neuroscience: In the one corner is constructionism,
“the view that emotions of a certain kind are constructed out of more general brain structures
whose function is not specific to emotions of that kind, or even to emotions at all” (Humeny
et al. 2012: 153). In the other we find locationism, which holds that the “category emotion and
individual  categories  such as  anger,  disgust,  fear,  happiness,  sadness (and perhaps a few
others) are respected by the body and brain” (Lindquist et al. 2012: 122). While it is not self-
explanatory  what  it  means  that  emotions  are  “constructed  out  of  more  general  brain
structures”  or  that  emotion  categories  are  “respected  by  the  body  and  brain”,  a  weak
interpretation  of these claims  amounts  to  opposing hypotheses  about  what  kind of neural
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structures underlie emotional processing and corresponding behaviour. Such an interpretation
is comparably weak because the truth of any of these hypotheses does not entail the need for
modifying or abandoning emotion categories. Rather, the results which would make either
claim true would serve to specify which neural structures or properties are responsible for the
instantiation  of states falling under these categories.  For example,  to  say that  someone is
angry can be true regardless of whether the processing and behavioural control related to this
person’s angriness is widely distributed, whether it involves several neural mechanisms which
are not specific to emotions, and so on. To deny this would mean to conflate emotional and
neural categories, in which case there would be no need for intertheoretical revision to begin
with (but perhaps for intratheoretical revision).
But as a strand of the discussion shows, we are in fact dealing with stronger claims
which insinuate that emotion categories clash with more “natural” kinds:
“In emotion research, measures of emotional behavior are often used to infer the existence of 
underlying  emotion  mechanisms.  (…)  Scowling  and  crying  are  taken  to  be  observable  
evidence that  the  causal  mechanisms for  anger and  sadness have been triggered.  (…) If  
emotions are distinct kinds that correspond to real distinctions in nature (i.e., distinctions in 
the brain and body), then examining the observable outputs for each emotion should give  
evidence of these distinctions. (...) Questions about the structure of emotion responses (such as
the structure of self-report or the structure of facial  behaviors)  are really questions about  
whether  anger, sadness, fear,  and so on are the natural kinds that constitute the building  
blocks of emotional life, and are therefore the most appropriate categories to support scientific
induction” (Barrett 2006: 34 f.).
As we have just seen, what is a “real” and “natural” distinction is directly equated with what
is a distinct property of the brain and body. It is an unresolved ambiguity that leads to this
equation:  The  natural-kinds-view  of  emotions  is  characterised  as  holding  that  (certain)
emotions are “natural kinds, or phenomena that exist independent of our perception of them.
Each emotion is thought to produce coordinated changes in sensory, perceptual, motor, and
physiological functions that, when measured, provide evidence of that emotion’s existence”
(ibid.: 28). The ambiguity lies in the fact that the first claim may well be true even if the
second isn’t. Phenomena which exist independently of our perception of them need not be
characterised  in  terms  of  intrinsic  properties  of  an  agent,  especially  if  they  are  of  an
intentional  nature,  which  usually  invokes  a  relation  between  an  agent  and  their
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environment.108 I will come back to this ambiguity later. Also note that what isn’t at stake is
whether emotional categories fulfill their explanatory roles, but whether they group together
“projectable [sic!] property clusters”109 (ibid.: 33):
“One way to establish the presence of an abstract construct like anger, fear, or sadness is to 
demonstrate  that  each  has  measurable  effects  that  are  highly  correlated.  From a  purely  
psychometric standpoint, psychologists assume that if measures are highly correlated, then  
they must derive from a common cause (in this case, the emotion). If measures are weakly 
correlated, then psychologists typically conclude that the measures have separable causes and 
do not give evidence of the construct in question. As a result, the extent of correlation between
measurable responses provides a psychometric test of whether or not a construct exists. In this 
case, such correlations provide a way of testing whether or not kinds of emotion exist as  
definable categories” (ibid.).
Barrett then goes on to report that correlations between measurable effects associated
with emotion categories have been empirically tested since the late 1960s, yet  these have
consistently  turned out  so weak that  “even the strongest  correspondences  within emotion
categories are weaker than those observed for broad affective dimensions” (ibid.). This means
that if we were to pick an emotion category and measure correlations between instantiations
of its characteristic effects, such as “facial movements, vocal signals, changes in peripheral
physiology, voluntary action, and subjective experience” (ibid.), then we would get a lower
correlational measure than if we were to correlate “facial behaviors, reports of experience, and
peripheral nervous system activity (…) [with] affective properties of valence and intensity”
(ibid.). In the study cited by Barrett, “[a]ffective evaluation is defined as the degree to which
pictures are judged as (un)pleasant and arousing” (Lang et al. 1993). So, to put it bluntly,
there  seem  to  be  nicely  measurable  bodily  signature  responses  to  finding  a  picture
“(un)pleasant  and  arousing”,  whereas  the  signature  response  to  being  angry  pales  in
comparison.
Does the lack or comparative weakness of emotional signature responses undermine
the  explanatory  credibility  of  emotion  categories?  Well,  for  one,  if  there  are  no  nicely
observable signature responses, then emotions themselves may not be (sufficiently or reliably)
108 I take the notion that emotions are independent of our perception as replaceable with the notion that emotion-
ascriptions potentially express objective facts. That is, it should be nonsensical to say that whether someone is in
an emotional state can neither be either true nor false.  So, the following debate can be read as being about
whether  what  makes  such  ascriptions  true  are  intrinsic  states  of  an  agent,  rather  than  about  whether  such
ascriptions are vacuous. 
109 The use of this concept evokes Boyd’s “Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory” (cf. Barrett 2006: 29, Boyd
1999), which relies on Goodman’s notion of “projectible predicates” (Goodman 1983).
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observable,  and so they run the risk of failing to constitute explanatory objects in reliable
empirical theories. Thus, proponents of the view that mental states such as emotions make for
kinds in empirical theories might be in serious trouble (compare the enthusiastic defense of
the scientific reputability of mental states in Fodor 1989: ch. 1). That mental states must in
principle be tied to observable behaviour is a classic view in analytic philosophy and rarely
disputed by anyone who believes that theories about mental states have genuine explanatory
value  (see  I.7).  As  Sellars  noted,  “the  fact  that  overt  behavior  is evidence  for  (…)
[instantiations of psychological states] is built into the very logic of these concepts, just as the
fact that observable behavior of gases is evidence for molecular [states] (…) is built into the
very logic of molecule talk” (Sellars 1997: 107, §59). I will call this notion that explanatory
psychological theories need to be (or are always) systematically tied to potentially observable
behaviour the observability constraint.
The  categories  used  by  said  empirical  psychological  theories,  such  as  anger,  are
vindicated if laws like “ceteris paribus, A is more likely to share something valuable to her
with B when not being angry at B than when she is” have explanatory value. In other words,
that anger is an explanatory kind in any one such theory means that “anger” is a technical
term defined by the laws in which it is invoked. Thus, the meaning of anger is extensionally
defined using the totality of laws invoking anger (compare Lewis 1972: 204, 207 f.).110 In our
example, it would work in the following way: Given only said law, “anger” is defined as any
directed property, which, whenever A has it and it is directed at B, makes A less likely to
share something valuable to her with B. If we only had this one law at our disposal, then a
host  of  other  psychological  properties  (such  as  jealousy,  hatred,  and  so  on)  or  perhaps
physiological  conditions  would  fulfill  this  definition.  So,  another  constraint  has  to  be
introduced which specifically singles out anger as the property invoked by said law, namely
that there is a host of laws which, when taken together, single out anger instead of jealousy,
hatred, or a physiological condition. (So, for the definition of the kind “anger”, we would
110 Which does not mean that there is a fixed totality of such laws, only that, at any given point in time, there is a
number of such laws extensionally defining the concept (many of which plausibly endure over time). Neither
does it mean that, in order to properly apply the concept, we need to have learned all the laws characterising it;
but we certainly need to have learned a sufficient amount. That is, in order for someone to apply a specific
concept, they need to have learned enough laws invoking it to be able to make a distinction between the applied
concept and other concepts (this wouldn’t involve too many laws if all the concepts we would ever apply were,
say, anger and joy, but with each additional concept, we need to learn additional distinguishing laws). The view
that we learn such concepts by witnessing stereotypical instantiations or expressions of them – for example: we
learn what anger is by witnessing enough angry people doing things out of angriness,  and extrapolating the
common property between all these events – would mean that we extrapolate mental laws from their instances by
hypothesizing  that  the  paradigmatic  instantiations  we’ve  witnessed  are  paradigmatic  because they  are
instantiations of the laws governing the mental concepts.
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arrive at a conjunction of the roles it plays in anger-laws.)111 I will call this the  specificity
constraint.
I do not claim that these constraints are exhaustive for what makes a good theoretical
kind. For instance, they do not say anything about whether the theory’s laws are explanatorily
valuable, which we would need to assume (and which I in fact have assumed earlier) in order
for determining whether the role theoretical kinds play is one serving explanation. Rather, I
have  singled  out  these  two  constraints  because,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  the  observability
constraint which seems to be under direct attack by the aforementioned studies, and, on the
other, the specificity constraint is the one which tells us how to define emotional kinds and
what role signature responses might play for defining them. So, we should consider in turn
whether the two constraints are touched by the cited results, namely that measurable bodily
responses generally correlate more strongly with affective valence and intensity than with
emotion categories. (In the following, I will set any methodological criticism aside and treat
these results as facts.)
So,  what  about  the  observability  constraint?  At  the  very  least,  the  studies  do  not
conclusively show that it is violated. What research tells us is that bodily responses may not
yield  sufficient  criteria  for  emotion  ascriptions,  but  it  says  nothing  about  the  lack  of
contextual  information.  As  mentioned,  intentionally  characterised  psychological  states
typically take relations between an agent and their environment into account, rather than just
the agent’s intrinsic properties (compare I.8.3 – I.8.5). For example, if I shove someone, they
may not show any behavioural sign of anger; yet, my attributing anger to them can be justified
on  the  grounds  that  I  shoved  them and  that  shoving  generally  angers  people.  Similarly,
external circumstances are typically marked as providing justifiable evidence for emotional
states: we often call events “joyful”, “frustrating”, “sad”, “annoying”, etc., which means that
being  in  any  one  such  context  can  be  justification  enough  for  attributing  the  associated
emotion (at least with a certain likelihood). So, that bodily expressions or responses fail to
generally  make  for  definite  criteria  does  not  imply  that  we  generally  lack  criteria  for
attributing emotions. Rather, bodily responses make for criterial evidence (cf. Dennett 2007:
74)  which is both supplementable as well as defeasible by contextual information. So, it is
readily acceptable that an intense somatic state correlates more strongly with, say, a kind of
facial behaviour than anger or sadness generally do.
111 It  may be historically true that purported natural kinds are first lumped together in virtue of their surface
features, rather than in terms of their theoretical explanatory value (so that, perhaps, anger is thought of as the
category  which  lumps  together  states  producing  certain  facial  expressions),  and  that  only through  ongoing
scientific investigation the groupings are revised in terms of underlying causal features (cf. Craver 2009, Reid
2002), which would enable us to come up with said extensional definition of the meaning of a theoretical kind.
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Do the cited results touch the specificity constraint? Only if it can be shown that the
states which compete with emotions can take their role in such laws as “ceteris paribus, A is
more likely to share something valuable to her with B when not being angry at B than when
she  is”.  While  it  cannot  be  ruled  out  that  there  are  such  somatic  states,  the  research
establishing correlations between facial behaviors, reports of experience, peripheral nervous
system activity and affective properties of valence and intensity clearly does not even begin to
suggest this. (And neither does it show that laws such as the one just cited are in any way
moot.) Trivially, the disjunction between all somatic states underlying emotion would qualify
as subplanting emotions, but surely it would be hypocritical to claim that this set is purely
governed by theories about somatic states, since it clearly owes its existence to its picking out
states governed by emotion-ascriptions (cf. Fodor 1974, see also II.8.4.5).
Let’s take a closer look at how neural kinds play into the claims marking the dispute
between locationism and constructionism. For one, what exactly are these “neatly delineated”
neural  kinds  associated  with locationist  claims?  Obviously,  we are  not  just  talking  about
individual  neurons  and  their  properties,  but  about  functionally  individuated  networks  of
neurons, brain areas or neural mechanisms:
“All natural kind models share the assumption that different emotion categories have their  
roots in distinct  mechanisms in the brain and body.  The mechanisms underlying  discrete  
emotion  categories  have  been  discussed  as  residing  within  particular  gross  anatomical  
locations (...) or networks (...) in the brain. These models constitute a locationist account of 
emotion  because  they  hypothesise  that  all  mental  states  belonging  to  the  same  emotion  
category (e.g., fear) are produced by activity that is consistently and specifically associated  
with an architecturally defined brain locale (...) or anatomically defined networks of locales 
that are inherited and shared with other mammalian species” (Lindquist et al. 2012: 122 f.).
Networks and brain areas can be defined by their architecture (i.e. by spatial or structural
properties) or physiognomically (i.e. by their location and structure relative to the organism’s
body), but also functionally (in terms of an array of neurons connected in virtue of a certain
task they’re dedicated to performing). On the other hand, mechanisms are primarily defined
functionally (cf. Sullivan forthcoming): it is only once an array of neurons has been found to
constitute a mechanism that this array can secondarily be described in terms of its architecture
or physiognomy. Mixing these descriptions can cause confusion since functional descriptions
aren’t innocently “natural” (i.e. not primarily physical), and even architecture or physignomy
needn’t be once it depends on mechanistic individuation.
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Yet,  as  we have  seen  in  the  passage  just  cited,  even mechanistically  individuated
neural kinds are commonly labelled as “natural kinds” and uncritically opposed to categories
such  as  emotions,  which  are  primarily  functional  categories.  This  opposition  is  artificial
insofar as the functions which are the basis for individuating emotions are also the basis for
identifying neural mechanisms, and it is misleading insofar as neural structures are not only
treated as implementations of such functions (cf. Nathan & Del Pinal forthcoming: 5.3), but as
the relevant kinds in theories explaining phenomena connected to emotional processing and
behaviour.  Now,  either  they  are  such  relevant  kinds  because  they  are  conceived  of  as
mechanisms,  i.e.  as  connected  to  the functions  underlying  emotions;  then these kinds  are
explanatorily  connected rather  than  opposed.  Or they are defined in  non-functional  terms
(such as physical kinds, or spatial [non-functional] architecture or physiognomy),  in which
case their explanatory role is at best indirectly connected to emotional categories. “It would be
very surprising indeed if the brain were organised into spatially discrete units that conform to
our  abstract  categorisations  of  behavior”  (Valenstein  1973:  142 f.),  but  thankfully,  being
organised into spatially discrete  units  has no direct  explanatory bearing on our “abstract”
categorisations of behaviour to begin with.
Consequently,  the claim that there are “distinct mechanisms in the brain and body”
underlying emotions is misleading as well. Mechanisms are distinct if they are explanatorily
distinct, and there is no direct relation between spatial distribution and explanatory role. If
they are mechanisms pertaining to emotional categories, then their being distinct mechanisms
means  that  they  are  distinct  regarding  explanations  pertaining  to  phenomena  related  to
emotions.  Typically,  evidence for whether an emotion  category is  instantiated  is  different
from evidence about whether a neural category is instantiated. So, just as in the example of
physical  mechanisms potentially explaining why some geese fly south earlier  than others,
neural properties make a difference to emotion-categories if they are explanatorily relevant.
For example, if (purely hypothetically) a widely distributed neural state were to result in more
severe aggressive anger-related behaviour than a densely located one, then this fact would
influence angriness-categories. But finding out whether locationism or constructionism is true
regarding one emotional state need by itself have no consequence for the respective emotional
category  (even  though  this  insight  may  constitute  a  considerable  leap  forward  for  the
neuroscience of emotion). So, a mental-neural mapping which respects explanatory categories
can allow for a mental state to be implemented in all manner of disjunctive ways, as long as
the properties of the associated neural state do not make a difference to the explanatory value
of the mental state (see II.8.4.4). To be sure, it may constitute one indirectly: Perhaps some
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distributions end up causing methodological problems, namely if not all relevant brain areas
are or can be “read” by a given method, or if distributed data is harder to read than centrally
localised data, or if relevant activation patterns are just so distributed as to exceed limits of,
say, fMRI resolution (see II.4).
Conversely, one and the same brain area or pattern of activation can be involved in
processing pertaining to diverse mental states. For instance, “[p]sychopaths, in whom striking
emotional  anomalies  are  strongly  correlated  with  specific  brain  anomalies,  appear  to
challenge  constructionism”  (Humeny et  al.  2012.: 153)  –  i.e.  one  psychiatric  category  is
associated with localised brain damage –, yet “[a]ggression appears to be how psychopaths
respond to a wide variety of situations about which they have a wide variety of feelings. If
this is true, aggression in them is likely to be associated with a wide range of emotions, not
just anger. This conclusion supports constructionism” (ibid.: 154). Similarly, Lindquist et al.
note:
“Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and  
specifically localised to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent  
with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions 
commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional
nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion 
categories” (Lindquist et al. 2012: 121).
Once  again,  we  find  that  our  earlier  distinction  between  spatial  and  mechanistic
characterisation applies: Since emotional categories are directly related only to mechanistic
explanation, and mechanisms are not (merely) characterised in terms of spatial structure or
anatomy,  the mere fact  that  a brain region which is spatially,  structurally or anatomically
characterised  as being a distinct  brain region  (i.e.  as distinguishable from other spatially,
structurally or anatomically characterised regions) underlies several emotions has no direct
bearing on emotional categories. (We should not exclude that it has an indirect bearing, but
the cited research gives us no conclusive reason to assume that it does, since it only argues for
neural  categories  having  a  direct  bearing  on  emotional  categories.)  To  say  that  several
different mechanisms are executed in the same region is no inherent contradiction, and neither
is it to say that the execution of one mechanism is spatially or anatomically distributed.
As we have seen, intertheoretical revisions, construed as revisions of theoretical kinds
of one explanatorily valuable theory in light of another, can work under the constraint that the
explanatory  power  of  the  revised  theory  is  respected.  This  is  because  the  meaning  of  a
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theoretical kind is defined in terms of how it  contributes to the explanatory power of the
theory it  is evoked by. Thus, if we treat two theories as distinct – as employing different
explanatory strategies, as stipulating different causal groupings, as having different scopes –
then there is no reason to assume that the kinds or causes evoked by different theories neatly
“line up” or non-disjunctively map onto each other. (In fact, their divergence in meaning may
make it difficult  for us to judge whether they do.) Making them want to line up forcibly,
namely only in explanatory terms of the revising theory, but not of the theory under revision,
has no constructive effect at best, or at worst disrupts the revised theory.
As  our  review  of  experimental  results  regarding  emotional  signature  responses
showed, behaviourally observable or measurable somatic states can underdetermine emotion
categories (cf. Barrett 2012: 421). In other words, the differences we routinely make between
such categories do not necessarily imply a difference in somatic or affective state, or in neural
states producing the respective somatic or affective states. As Barrett puts it, “perhaps one of
the  most  important  questions  that  remains  is  why  perception-based  judgments  routinely
produce evidence in support of emotion categories, even as instrument-based measurements
do not” (Barrett 2006: 49). Following Barrett, I suggest that we should assume that contextual
information beyond the somatic or behavioural state of a person contributes to the mental
ascription (compare Barrett 2012 for her view on the “social reality” of emotions). This view
that intentionally characterised psychological states do not merely reflect intrinsic facts about
an agent, but also extrinsic ones such as her relation to the environment, meshes exceedingly
well with the form of anti-individualism adopted earlier (see I.8 and Waskan 2006: 89 f.).
Experimental results are only inconsistent with the natural kind view of emotions (cf. Barrett
2006: 49) as long as these natural kinds are construed as referring to an agent’s intrinsic
states. However, if we assume that common emotion categories are anti-individualistic, the
experimental results do not constitute grounds for doubting the explanatory value of these
categories. We would in fact lose explanatory power if we were to revise emotion categories
only in terms of measurable bodily states, since the bodily responses underlying the emotional
one need not single out the respective emotional state.
As discussed  in II.8.4.4, that a mental term translates to a disjunctive neural one, or
vice versa, by itself constitutes no obstacle for a translation; it is only when such disjunctive
terms cannot  be correlated  significantly to  an explanatory term in the other  theory – and
cannot  be distinguished from contradicting  terms  – that  problems  arise.  Even though the
studies  under  review  suggest  some  mental-neural  cross-cutting,  and  we  should  therefore
expect  translated  terms  to  be  disjunctive,  this  does  not  establish  that  translational  efforts
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would be impeded by way of catastrophic ambiguity. As Valenstein pointed out, it would be
very surprising indeed if  intentional categories would coincide neatly with neural categories
(cf. Valenstein 1973: 142 f.). Since intentional and neural kinds are characterised differently,
their identity criteria differ substantially to begin with (some may not even have spatial or
temporal identity criteria, cf. Nachev & Hacker 2014), and so I suggest we should waive such
demands.  Neat  mappings  might  happen,  but  it  makes  no catastrophic  difference  to  either
translated theory if they don’t.
II.9. Summary
Representations are prevalent in cognitive neuroscience (II.1). Yet, neurobiology alone
does not supply representational concepts (II.2), and its explanatory value does not depend on
matters  of  semantics  (II.3).  While  we  can  find  neural  representations  to  be  related  to
covariance and cause, neither notion supplies sufficient justification for calling neural kinds or
structures representational (II.3 & II.4). Instead, we need to think of cognitive mechanisms as
neural structures whose joints are carved along their functional roles instead of along their
synapses. This functionality supplies teleological descriptions, thus specifying the aim which
is needed for characterising the mechanism’s directedness (II.5 & II.6).
When describing the in- and output of such mechanisms semantically, the content of
“neural representations”, which means the neural substrate of a mechanism, can be identified
in  several  ways  (II.7).  Firstly,  it  can  be  identified  by  determining  whether  one  such
mechanism has  been evolutionarily  selected  to  fulfill  its  function  (II.7.1),  which  is  to  be
sensitive to certain environmental cues – cues elicited by the mechanism’s intentional object –
and to  produce  a  certain  functional  output  (e.g.  behaviour  which  can  be  criterial  for  the
ascription of semantic content). An evolutionary analysis of a cognitive mechanism consists
of two steps: In describing the mechanism’s functionality in terms of adaptiveness within a
certain environment, and in describing the cause for the mechanism’s existence. Secondly,
using  a  dynamic  systems  approach,  other  organismic  purposes  can  be  singled  out  as
specifying the mechanism’s content, chiefly those contributing to homoeostasis (II.7.2). This
way of ascribing content does not suffer from evolutionary theory’s problem of historicity,
which means content can be ascribed to agents independently of facts about their ancestors,
and so they can be tested independently of evolutionary methodology. However, there is a
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trade-off  for  solving  this  problem:  Some evolutionarily  functional  mechanisms  cannot  be
grasped as such when viewed purely through the lens of homoeostasis.
However, evolution does not provide the only possible causes of the formation of such
mechanisms,  and  neither  is  homoeostasis  their  only  possible  purpose.  That  is,  while  we
generally require the structure of such mechanisms to be established by external requirements,
these requirements need not be of an evolutionary nature or pertain to homoeostasis. Aside
from practical requirements depending on a specific environment, which have shaped some
mechanisms by way of organismic evolution, there can also be social or cultural requirements
(II.7.3).  These  requirements  are  properly  described  as  norms,  conforming  to  which  an
organism can learn. Norms are environmental matters of fact: A norm is an external cause
which – by way of social mediation – influences the ontogenetic aspects of an organism’s
neural development. Unlike evolutionary requirements, norms are conventionally established
and enforced under agential description. In other words: While evolutionary requirements are
contingent  on  environments,  social  or  cultural  norms  are  contingent  on  (individual  or
collective) decisions.
Generally,  representations  are  relational  structures  holding  between  intrinsic  or
organismic  and environmental  properties  connected by way of said teleological  principles
(II.7.4). Theories using rich content to characterise their explanatory kinds depend on there
being norms in light of which to interpret some states as having such content (II.8.1). These
norms  are  not  (and  are  not  inferrable  from)  facts  about  things  which  are  narrowly
characterised, such as neural states. Rather, they are external environmental matters of fact
which shape neural development. As such, neural explanations cannot pertain to intentional
states without ackowledging such norms as causal factors. Since the behaviour that counts as
abiding by norms must be learnable and observable,  the conditions under which brain states
imply  intentional  states  are  specifiable  (II.8.2).  When  relating  intentional  and  neural
descriptions, we can construe these norms as being imposed on certain physical properties,
specifying whether and how these are interpretable intentionally.  We effectively treat such
physical properties as signifiers. Yet, the (physical, chemical, neural) processes which cause
the instantiation of such properties need not be interpretable intentionally themselves (II.8.3). 
If  normative  criteria  make  for  a  constant  or  specifiable  variable,  we  can  use
correlations between neural and intentional states as a method for mapping one to another
(II.8.4.1).  By  gathering  such  correlations  holistically  we  can  build  a  translation  manual
between neural and intentional states (II.8.4.2). This translation is non-reductive, insofar as it
depends on taking teleological principles into account, without such principles being reduced
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to the neural state description (II.8.4.3). These principles can themselves amount to sparse
explanation,  such as in biology,  or to rich explanation,  such as in intentional psychology.
Non-reductivity is primarily due to the need for maintaining these non-physical principles, but
in the case of intentional explanation it secondarily follow from the latter’s interpretational
nature, since interpretation needs to methodologically maximize an agent’s rationality. In any
case, neuroscientific investigation alone cannot settle the matter whether a specific state or
action  is  directed  at  a  specific  object,  even  though  neural  processes  are  constrained  and
shaped by such norms of directedness.
When mental and neural states do not map neatly onto one another it has been claimed
that mental theories can be subject to a revision of their kinds by “lining them up” with causes
from behavioural and/or neural theories (II.8.4.5). However, since a theory’s kinds and causes
cannot be defined independently, kinds can only be modified if it increases their explanatory
value relative to the theory which defines their meaning. Also, the notion that it is merely
intrinsic  properties  which  single  out  “natural  kinds”  underlying  emotions  mistakenly
disregards  that  they  are  characteristically  individuated  anti-individualistically.  Further,
intentional kinds cross-cutting neural kinds does not directly make any explanatory difference
to either intentional or neural theories and therefore does not imply the need for their revision.
That  is,  the  mere  fact  that  the  neural  translation  of  an  intentional  state  description  is
disjunctive does not speak against our describing the intentional state the way we do (and vice
versa),  and, insofar as disjunctive terms do not  imply translational  ambiguity,  it  does not
impede translation (II.8.4.4).
270
Conclusion
Understanding intentionality goes a long way toward understanding the mind. Mental
states are characterised representationally, and they are related to the world and to one another
normatively. In this book I have explored and endorsed the view that the way mental states
come  to  be  intentional,  and  what  it  means  that  they  are,  can  be  best  understood  by
investigating the explanatory value intentional states have. Assigning meaningful states to us
explains our behaviour in ways which the assignation of non-semantic states cannot. This is
because both our biologically as well as our socially determined behaviour is regulated by the
objects of our mental representations.
Granted, mental states need not all be intentional, and even those that are can still have
non-intentional  properties.  Especially  the  widely  shared  view  that  mental  states  have  a
subjective experiential quality to them need not invoke matters of intentionality. Yet, the way
these  experiences  are  characterised  and  referred  to  –  namely  as  being  experiences  of
something – is steeped in intentional vocabulary. For this reason, they need to be connectable
to  the  way we intersubjectively  assign  meaning:  While  having experiential  states  can  be
private, their being intentional cannot.
Such an assignation consists in systematically connecting observable properties with
potentially non-observable “meanings”. Here, the observable properties act as signifiers, and
while  these  are  grouped  together  by  the  meaning  they  are  endowed  with,  they  can  be
described non-semantically.  For example,  while each token of the letter  A has a meaning,
namely “A”, its material aspects, such as the range of angles between the three characteristic
lines, its overall orientation and spatial relation to other signifiers, etc., are describable non-
semantically. This is how non-semantic stimuli can elicit semantic mental representations and
how individuals can learn all the different tokenings of writing letters, eating non-toxic food,
voting, giving promises, and so forth.
While having a mental state can also explain having further mental states – such as
feeling treated unjustly can explain being resentful –, they are ultimately invoked to explain
actions. Therefore, they are only fully ascribable to agents (or, when used in attenuated form,
to sufficiently agent-like entities). The paradigmatic explanatory model used by intentional
psychology consists in relating actions to the reasons which elicit them, typically by assigning
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beliefs  rationally  related  to  the  intended action  and desires  whose  content  is  the  action’s
projected  consequence.  Other  psychological  attitudes  might  work a  bit  differently,  but  all
potentially play an analogous role in action explanations.
I have argued for a broad content view of mental ascriptions. Broad descriptions are
those which take environmental facts into account. According to this view, the ascription of a
mental state is best understood as a hypothesis about (A) the obtaining of a certain cognitive
structure of the agent (namely, that the ascribed rational relations are causally active in the
agent’s  mind)  and (B) the  obtaining  of  certain  causal  and rational  relations  between this
cognitive structure and external circumstances.  For example,  having learned to read is the
cause for the obtaining of a certain neural structure implementing a cognitive mechanism,
which,  if  it  consistently  yields  a  proper  output  based  on  a  matching  input,  can  be
behaviourally  identified  as  executing  the  function  reading.  And,  insofar  it  has  led  to  the
development of a consistently functioning mechanism, worms being nourishing for toads is
the cause for the toad’s cognitively representing worm-features. So, any such ascription at
least implicitly specifies (B) as the cause for (A). In this sense, mental state ascriptions are not
reducible to internal (“narrow”) state descriptions of the respective agent.  Rather,  agential
descriptions depend on both narrow and broad facts.
In intentional explanation, rational relations among mental states, as well as between
mental states and their objects, are methodologically employed to assign mental content. In
other words, agents are those who exhibit at least a minimum of consistency, both internally
as well as externally.  Internal consistency is measured by the logical consistency between
mental states as well as the practical consistency between mental states and actions. External
consistency is measured by the diversity of behaviourial responses elicited across different
instantions of relevantly identical environments under relevantly identical mental states: the
higher the diversity, the lower external consistency. For example, if my desire to eat oranges
rather than other fruit stays constant, and other factors remain equal, my choice of food should
not differ wildly across several instances of being presented assortments of fruit including
oranges.
It is sometimes assumed that human beings are too irrational to consistently stick to
such psychological laws; but even their straying from them is typically explained by evoking
conflicting  mental  states.  We  may  occasionally  seem  irrational  because  not  all  our
motivations  are  transparent  (perhaps  not  even  to  us),  but  hidden  motivations  are  still
motivations  after  all.  Crucially,  the  assumption  that  agents  are  largely  rational  is  not  an
empirical  hypothesis  about agents, but a condition for viewing them as agents in the first
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place.  If  fundamental  conditions  of rationality turn out not to apply to someone,  then we
cannot describe them as an agent, as performing actions, or as having mental states. Thus,
while  intentional  psychology is  concerned with an individual’s  cognitive structure,  it  also
transcends it by invoking rational explanation and justification: What is rational cannot be
deduced from individual psychological constitution, but a certain psychological constitution is
necessary to act rationally.
I have also argued for intentional realism: That the practice of ascribing mental states
is generally justified because psychological laws pick out explanatory relations between kinds
of cognitive states, kinds of behaviour, and kinds of objective circumstances. Each instance of
a mental state ascription is justified if it adheres to criteria specifying under which objective
set of available evidence the ascribed mental state obtains or under which it is its (rational,
functional or statistical) cause or effect. One such ascription is true if the cognitive structures
or  causal  relations  required,  assumed  or  implied  by  the  mental  state  ascriptions  actually
obtain.
Said psychological laws are reliably applicable because human beings are typically
cognitively able to systematically associate bearers of meaning with environmental properties,
conditions or events. Meanings capture such properties, conditions or events which we can
have a psychological  attitude towards (i.e.  an intentional  mental  state).  At the same time,
meanings are the operative aspects of interpretation, namely the objects whose ascription to
someone makes their actions interpretable, i.e. largely reasonable.
The  ascription of mental content depends on knowing the applicable psychological
laws, so they depend on theoretical  knowledge.  Having mental  content can, but need not,
depend on such theoretical knowledge. I have marked this distinction by calling the kind of
content which depends on such knowledge “rich” and the content which does not “sparse”.
Typically,  sparse  representation  can  be  explained  in  biological  terms,  while  rich
representation  relies  on  social  learning.  For  instance,  learning  social  norms  is  not  a
precondition for being able to be hungry. While potential objects of the agent’s hunger can be
specified as the intentional object of hunger, the agent’s attitude and the resulting directedness
of her behaviour need not be explained by social norms (it  can be when hunger is socially
conditioned) but can be explicated in terms of organismic/biological directedness. However,
an agent can also hunger for cheddar cheese, intend to play chess every Sunday, or know that
she should have sold her stocks before the last stock market crash. These mental states are
rich, insofar as they depend on the agent having been instructed about certain theoretical and
symbolically mediated classifications in order for these to become potential  objects of her
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mental states.  In other words, the fact that some psychological  laws apply to the agent is
necessarily owed to causal properties of representations themselves (although not sufficiently,
since  the  agent’s  sparse  –  narrowly  characterised  –  cognitive  makeup  contributes  to  her
internalizing such effects).
While I have only mentioned them in passing, there are two viable arguments to be
made to refute intentional antirealism, i.e. the view that mental states are explanatorily inert,
illusory and/or unscientific. A minimal argument says that mental states explain a wide range
of everyday human actions (such as why someone shows up where she promised to be), and
that at least at this time, there is no explanation in any other science which comes close to this
explanatory power in regard to such phenomena. A less boastful argument holds that even if
there were, say, neurological accounts which would predict and explain why someone did in
fact show up where she promised to (and which could help us construe giving this promise in
neural  terms  as  well),  the  explanation  would  still  have  to  recur  to  things  beyond  neural
matters: namely the content of the promise and the conventional rules underlying the practice
of promise-giving. In this sense, we would not abandon the notion of intentionality, but rather
put intentional psychology on more solid footing.
When we use representations in neurobiology to explain behaviour, we typically do so
sparsely,  by  relating  bodily  facts  about  an  agent  (from sensory  input  via  nervous/neural
processing, which includes electrical and chemical transduction as well as storage of neural
“information”,  i.e.  changes  in  neural  structures  to  accommodate  and  influence  future
transduction based on past transduction, to innervation of muscles) to the biological function
and/or heritage of the respective neural mechanism. The function specifies the directedness of
the “representation”, i.e. of those internal structures which we can single out as a mechanism.
Beyond  such  sparse  representations,  we  can  invoke  neurobiological  methods  to
explain psychological properties invoked by intentional psychology. To relate neurobiology
and  intentional  psychology,  intentional  states  are  also  construed  as  functional,  i.e.  as
characterised by input-output-pairs which are related by neural processing. What matters for
intentional psychology is that either input or output or both are interpretable: that they are
signifiers. Neurobiology can then supply a nomological (“lawlike”) description for how the
output’s material aspect is derivable from the input’s material aspect via neural processing.
A “law” in the natural sciences is a kind of statement which justifies generalisation
about its content based on inductively collected evidence. For example, a law governing the
release of a neurotransmitter under certain conditions justifies us to expect this release under
all instantiations of these (or similar enough) conditions. The explanatory concepts used in
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nomological  explanation  are  kinds  (i.e.  projectible/generalisable  properties)  and  causes
(relating such generalisable properties). Mechanistic explanation, which we are prone to find
in cognitive neuroscience,  uses lawlike explanation but adds explanatory concepts beyond
kinds, causes and laws, such as temporal and spatial relations. Laws typically explain by way
of  integration  into  higher-order  laws.  For  example,  causal  laws  about  the  release  of
neurotransmitters should be integratable into higher-order physicochemical laws.
While  neurobiological  states  are  described  narrowly  and  non-representationally,
correlations  between intentional  and neurobiological  states  can  contribute  to  a  translation
between the terms denoting such states. What delineates the scope of any such translation is
the extent to which distinctions made in narrow (neurobiological) descriptions can support the
respective inferences to broad (intentional) concepts. One example for an endeavour to come
up  with  algorithms  for  inferring  broad  from narrow states  is  the  development  of  “brain
decoders”: Recent studies have shown that computers can be “trained” to output semantic
content when fed activational information about certain brain regions.
Apart from such experimental studies we also have theoretical reason to believe that
the respective inferences should be viable. For example, it is apparent that, say, the English
language can be learned and spoken, and that, to some degree, speakers need to rely on stable
neural  processing  in  order  to  learn  it  and to  be  able  to  keep  on  speaking  it.  While  our
behavioural observations can of course not determine whether the respective processing is
stable  in narrow terms  (i.e.  in  terms of sustained neural  structures),  it  does  determine  its
stability in  broad terms:  Namely in terms  of significantly outputting  the correct  signifiers
depending on matching input. Given that each behavioural input- and output-signifier is non-
representationally  describable  and  that  their  matching  is  caused  neurally,  neurobiological
processing  and  narrow  descriptions  of  such  signifiers  must conflate:  Neural  processing
operates on material input and yields material output, and either or both are signifier-tokens
for associated representational content.  While the association between material  tokens and
meaning still depends on broad facts, namely a fitting environment, it is reasonable to assume
that many biologically or socially relevant conditions under which narrow signifiers (such as
the perception of elongate objects moving parallelly to their longitudinal axis and the string of
letters making up the word “rabbit”) consistently map onto stable meanings (such as worms
and rabbits). So, it is exceedingly plausible that facts about neural structures carrying out the
respective  processing  can  track  such  meanings,  that  the  latters’ in-  and/or  outputs  are
consistent  with  external  matters  of  fact  specifying  the  meaning  of  signifiers,  and  that
neurobiological knowledge can be exploited to build said translation function. To assume the
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alternative, namely that neural in- and outputs merely singularly coincide with semantically
interpretable states but not systematically or consistently so, would leave our command of
matters  of  semantics  as  well  as  some of  the  functional  stability  of  our  behaviour  utterly
mysterious. Therefore, we should expect ongoing research into the physicochemical basis of
neural processing, as well as into neural correlates of semantic properties, to contribute to a
translation between intentionally and neurobiologically characterised states.
This  translation  potentially  serves  interests  going  beyond  our  common  everyday
means of intentionally describing and explaining agents. For one, tracking intentional states
non-behaviourally is the standard aim driving the development of brain-decoders: to supply
agents who have lost the ability to express themselves behaviourally with new kinds of means
to interact with the world, and, more controversially, to extract evidence for the ascription of
intentional  states  from  uncooperative  agents  who  are  deemed  (potentially)  criminal  or
harmful.  Secondly,  neurobiological  insights  may indeed yield  finer  intentional  categories,
insofar as systematic associations between intentional causes and intentional consequences
might be trackable more concisely than with our classic behavioural methodology. And, since
tracking such relations is one domain of intentional psychology, these insights can lead to
theoretical refinements and/or revisions.
Of  course,  neurobiological  insights  can’t  directly guide  the  normative associations
between such in- and outputs; but even there these insights can have an impact, insofar as, if
we accept  that a normative “ought” needs to imply a psychological  “can”, we should not
expect more from agents than they are physically able to deliver. Ever since its inception,
psychology has been uncovering limits  of agency,  leading to our retracting  ascriptions of
responsibility in specific cases. For example, if we find that certain contexts are prone to yield
biased behaviour, this behaviour is not ascribable as agential tout court. We should expect
neurobiological insights to add to such retractions (and perhaps even expansions) of agential
responsibility.
Yet, there is no question that the largest revenue of an increasingly concise ascription
of intentional states lies in more properly situating agents in the world, in taking stock of the
relations between them and their surroundings, their environmental niche, their community,
their culture. The ways in which we scientifically do so can be manifold – they need neither
rely on any specific symbolic form, nor on any special scientific methodology. They simply
need to capture these relations in order to explain why we do what we do.
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